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Abstract  
 
 
This thesis examines the problematic of tragedy with the aim of identifying its 
significance in contemporary philosophy. Whilst there is a renewed interest in tragedy in 
contemporary philosophy, it has focused mostly on the ‘tragic idea’ or on the tragedies 
themselves, which not only relegates the contemporary discourse on tragedy to the history of 
ideas, but, more significantly, occludes the possibility of new forms of tragedy. In contrast, 
this thesis employs the paradigm of the ‘enlarged way of thinking’ (erweiterten Denkungsart) 
from Kant’s Critique of Judgment to consider tragedy as a major contribution to the goal of 
expanding the scope of philosophy. 
In Part I, this thesis argues that Kant’s call for an enlarged way of thinking represents 
a response to the failure of philosophy to reconcile nature and freedom, transforming the task 
of philosophy from outlining the conditions for objective knowledge to the task of mutual 
communicability. In Part II it examines the role of tragedy in the work of G. W. F. Hegel, 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger and Cornelius Castoriadis. It is argued that, apart from 
Nietzsche’s bifurcation of philosophy and tragedy, the philosophical discourse on tragedy 
does not so much depart from Kant as build from his example of responding to the failure of 
philosophy. 
This approach gives us reason to consider the growing interest in tragedy in 
contemporary philosophy not simply as a new instalment in the history of ideas but as the 
expression of a present crisis. The recent turn to tragedy will be surveyed in the final chapter 
to conclude that Kant’s enlarged way of thinking provides an exemplary procedure for both 
exploring this crisis and navigating a way through it, redirecting the goal of philosophy away 
from an exclusive focus on knowledge towards mutual communicability. 
 
 
  
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world,  
the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, 
the world is open and free, 
everything is still in the future and will always be in the future. 
 
 
– Mikhail Bakhtin 
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Introduction 
 
 
Throughout philosophical history, philosophers have employed the notion of ‘tragedy’ 
in order to question the limits of their practice. At times tragedy is called upon to raise themes 
that philosophy tends to overlook, such as suffering, loss, and death. At other times tragedy is 
used more radically; to identify the tendency of philosophy to transgress the limits of the 
knowable. Some philosophers employ tragedy as a non-cognitive ‘idea’ (if such a thing is 
possible) with which to disrupt the conceptual boundaries between individual autonomy and 
the shared dimensions of ethical life. Others evoke tragedy in order to explore the creativity of 
artistic genius and the capacity of human thought to bring new form into being. 
In recent years, tragedy has again become a prominent theme in philosophy. From the 
philosophy of literature,1 to political theory,2 ethics,3 epistemology,4 feminist philosophy,5 
and the history of philosophy,6 the contemporary use of tragedy as a philosophical theme is 
not unique to any one part of philosophy but spans across its diverse terrain. Broadly 
speaking, the recent interest in tragedy turns on a shared suspicion that philosophy has failed 
to provide the resources with which to navigate life as a whole. More specifically, it turns on 
the suspicion that tragedy can assist us to reorient the way that philosophy deals with 
problems of life, though there is little agreement on how this reorientation might occur.                                                              
1 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German 
Romanticism, Albany: SUNY, 1988; Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002; Terry Eagleton, Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. 
2 Peter Euben (ed.), Greek Tragedy and Political Theory, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986; 
Christopher Rocco, Tragedy and Enlightenment: Athenian Political Thought and the Dilemmas of Modernity. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997; Richard Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests 
and Orders, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Jonathan Badger, Sophocles and the Politics of 
Tragedy: Cities and Transcendence, New York: Routledge, 2012. 
3 Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000; Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Julian Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy: From Plato to Žižek, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
4 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999; Simon Critchley, Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and 
Contemporary French Thought, London: Verso, 2009. 
5 Luce Irigaray, ‘The Eternal Irony of the Community,’ in Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. G. Gill, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985; Niocle Loraux, Tragic Ways of Killing a Woman, New Haven: Harvard 
University Press, 1991; Bonnie Honig, Antigone, Interrupted, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
6 Dennis Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 
2001; David Farrell Krell, The Tragic Absolute: German Idealism and the Languishing of God, Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2005; Robert Williams, Tragedy, Recognition and the Death of God: Studies in Hegel 
and Nietzsche, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Martin Thibodeau, Hegel and Greek Tragedy, trans. H. 
Wilhelm, UK: Lexington Books, 2013. 
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Yet what philosophers mean when they refer to ‘tragedy’ is not immediately obvious. 
For some, tragedy refers to the institution of ancient Greek drama that arose to prominence in 
Athens during the fifth century BCE. There is something compelling about this definition, for 
the ancient Greeks where the first to use the word ‘tragedy’ (tragōidia) in order to describe a 
genre of theatre that was known for its depiction of serious themes. The tragedies first took 
shape as a part of the ‘City Dionysia’, an annual festival of the wine-god Dionysus. During 
this festival, the city’s best poets would each stage a tetralogy of tragedies to be performed 
before the Athenian citizens. Scholars speculate that ‘tragedy’ probably meant something like 
‘goat-song’, indicating the close ties between the ancient theatre and rituals of animal 
sacrifice.7 From what we can tell, the tragedies presented serious events that involve 
suffering, and a key part of a tragedy’s success at the City Dionysia lay in its ability to evoke 
an emotional response in the spectators. More specifically, the suffering presented by the 
tragedies results from the collision between the normative demands of a society, represented 
by the ancient myths of Athens, and human ambitions, represented by the tragic heroes. Yet 
providing any definitive account of tragedy is a problematic task. Only thirty-three of 
potentially thousands of tragedies performed at the City Dionysia remain today, meaning that 
much of what constituted tragic art is unknown to us. 
Other philosophers define tragedy as a distinctly philosophical idea that is distilled 
from the dramatic genre. As an idea, tragedy is said to have taken its most crystalline 
definition in the post-Kantian philosophers – and in Friedrich Schelling’s work in particular – 
as a means of expressing the failure of the philosophy of the ‘Idea’ understood as timeless 
form. The ‘idea of tragedy’ becomes the supreme oxymoron, or perhaps more accurately, as a 
‘catachresis beyond oxymoron’, pushing conceptual thought to its limit.8 As the first 
articulation of tragedy in Ancient Greece preceded philosophy, the idea of tragedy announces 
the end of philosophy understood as the pursuit of exhaustive knowledge and the beginning of 
a mode of thinking more closely modelled in the poetic thought of the tragedians than on the 
philosophical tradition. The philosophy of the early nineteenth century thus provides a lasting 
definition of tragedy in the philosophical sphere that, as one thinker put it, ‘rises like an 
island’ over ancient tragedy.9 
Given the multiple levels of meaning caught up in the notion of ‘tragedy’, we face 
several interpretive difficulties in our present analysis. Contemporary philosophers who turn                                                              
7 Edith Hall, Greek Tragedy: Suffering Under the Sun, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 1.  
8 Krell, The Tragic Absolute, p. 13. 
9 See Peter Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, trans. P. Fleming, California: Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 1. 
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to tragedy tend to take one of the two approaches outlined above: some return to the original 
tragedies, while others consider the way that tragedy has been understood as a philosophical 
concept. While this thesis is indebted to the way that contemporary philosophers have 
understood tragedy, it argues that both of these approaches to tragedy distract us from the 
matter of contemporary tragedy. While philosophers are again recognising the significance of 
tragedy for expanding the boundaries of philosophical analysis, they operate under the shared 
assumption that tragedy is a thing of the past; that tragedy is, for all intents and purposes, 
dead. In what follows I argue that by beginning with the assumed death of tragedy, the 
contemporary interest in tragedy distracts us from a greater issue: that philosophy, the task we 
are now undertaking, is liable to its own kind of tragedy. The way I will explore tragedy in 
this thesis is not to limit its meaning to the original context of Athenian tragedy or to any one 
philosophical approach, but to see it as a living problematic that captured the imagination of 
philosophers past and continues to open new theoretical possibilities today. 
The intention of this thesis is thus to problematise the interpretation of tragedy within 
contemporary philosophical discourse with the aim of revealing the living nature of the tragic 
form. This approach draws from what Michel Meyer called ‘problematology’ – that is, ‘the 
questioning of questioning’ – a process which involves both the articulation and interrogation 
of the discourse that underpins philosophical inquiry.10 By applying this approach to the 
interpretation of tragedy within philosophy, this thesis will trace diachronically an ongoing 
dialogue that has involved different thinkers operating in diverse historical circumstances. It 
will question both the semantic fields and the social spaces in which the problematic of 
tragedy was produced, while at the same time suggesting a new critical approach that pertains 
to our current cultural debates. This critical approach frames the philosophical problematic of 
tragedy as a way of challenging established patterns of thought that have become impervious 
to the living nature of social and linguistic form, thereby opening such patterns of thought to 
new possibilities. 
Approaching tragedy as an ongoing problematic involves the recognition that, as 
Mikhail Bakhtin said of language, tragedy is ‘populated – overpopulated – with the intentions 
of others’.11 As Bakhtin notes, the attempt to expropriate a ‘living form’, such as a word, 
genre or problematic, is a ‘complicated process’, for there are no enduring treatments or fixed 
                                                             
10 Michel Meyer, Of Problematology: Philosophy, Science, and Language, trans. D. Jamison, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 15. 
11 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992, p. 294. 
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reference points to draw upon.12 The task requires a reflective stance toward such a living 
form through elucidating the multiplicity of voices that have contributed to its use. Crucial to 
this method is Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue, which examines living forms in terms of an 
ongoing conversation that is at once limited to the historical locality and particular experience 
of those who contribute to it, and, as a shared and enduring form, is independent of any 
contributor: 
 
There is neither a first nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends 
into the boundless past and boundless future). Even past meanings, that is those born in the 
dialogue of past centuries, can never be stable (finalized, ended once and for all) – they will 
always change (be renewed) in the process of subsequent, future development of the dialogue. 
At any moment in the development of the dialogue there are immense, boundless masses of 
forgotten contextual meanings, but at certain moments of the dialogue’s subsequent 
development along the way they are recalled and invigorated in renewed form (in a new 
context).13 
 
Bakhtin’s dialogical method calls into question any attempt to finalise an idea of ‘the tragic’ 
or a definitive account of ‘ancient Greek tragedy’. Following his approach, this thesis will 
bring to the fore some of the significant voices that ‘populate’ the problematic of tragedy; in 
particular, G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Cornelius Castoriadis. 
The purpose is ultimately to identify the significance of the renewed interest in tragedy in 
contemporary philosophy and to invigorate this form in a new context. 
Two other figures underpin this dialogue and will be central to our analysis, one 
ancient and one modern. The first is Aristotle, whose famous definition in Poetics identified 
tragedy as the most ‘philosophic’ of the arts.14 The philosophical nature of tragedy, for 
Aristotle, lies in the distinction he draws between its content and form. The content of 
tragedy, he states, is action: ‘A tragedy, then, is the imitation (mimesis) of an action (praxeos) 
that is serious (spoudaias) and also, as having magnitude, complete in itself (teleias)’.15 More 
specifically, Aristotle identifies that the content of tragedy (the action) is drawn from the 
myths and stories that populate the inherited imaginative landscape of the Athenians; that is, 
the same content we find in epic. What sets tragedy apart from epic, Aristotle states, is the 
dramatic form that brings actors on stage to accompany the lone chorus. While the skill 
(techne) of the tragic poets is to imitate an action, their creative use of form transfigures the                                                              
12 ibid. 
13 Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. V. McGee. Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1986, p. 170. 
14 In Book IX of Poetics, Aristotle distinguishes poetry from history by stating that history attends to the singular, 
while poetry to the universal. Or in other words, history tells, poetry shows. Thus ‘poetry is something more 
philosophic and of graver import than history’. Aristotle, Poetics, 1451b5-6. 
15 Aristotle, Poetics, 1449b24ff. 
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orientation of the spectators to the content presented. In this respect, the difference between 
tragedy and other genres is not so much a matter of content (such as unhappy events) as it is a 
matter of form (how those events are presented). 
Identifying the importance of Aristotle’s voice in the ongoing dialogue on tragedy as a 
philosophical problematic is essential for our analysis, for his distinction between the content 
and form of tragedy establishes the framework for the renewed interest in tragedy in modern 
philosophy. Aristotle’s understanding of tragedy provides for modern philosophers what we 
might call a ‘descriptive phenomenology’ of tragedy. This phenomenological account refrains 
from making ontological claims about the content of tragedy, and instead identifies the form 
that is expressed in the parts of Greek drama. Thus he provides an alternative to Plato’s 
understanding of genre, wherein the techne of the poets is ontologically inferior to that of the 
philosophers.16 The modern problematic of tragedy, I will suggest, transcribes Aristotle’s 
formal interpretation onto the philosophical sphere through presenting traditional content in a 
new form, thereby transforming their relation to that tradition. Presented aesthetically, 
traditional philosophy is seen to be guilty of an intellectual kind of tragedy that is analogous 
to the tragic heroes, for its desire to approach the contingent sphere of practical reason 
according to predefined rules is seen to place it before inevitable failure. In this view, to 
recognise the tragedy of philosophy is to open space for non-cognitive – or aesthetic – 
dimensions of philosophical thinking. 
Identifying the importance of Aristotle’s formal understanding of genre draws the 
attention of this study to an unexpected contributor to the problematic of tragedy: Immanuel 
Kant. While the extensive attention Kant gave to the fixity of form in his theoretical work 
renders him an unlikely voice to populate the problematic of tragedy – indeed, he is the 
enemy of tragedy for Nietzsche and Heidegger – this thesis will argue that the philosophical 
dialogue regarding the problematic of tragedy is best understood as an ongoing conversation 
with the goal of expanding the scope of philosophy in the paradigm of the ‘enlarged way of 
thinking’ (erweiterten Denkungsart) Kant develops in Critique of Judgment (CJ). Given that 
Kant’s theoretical philosophy is often understood as a bulwark against tragedy, this argument 
will take some work. Part I of this thesis is dedicated to presenting this case. To anticipate the 
                                                             
16 In Book X of The Republic (602c-d), Plato discusses the techne of the poet in terms of imitation (mimesis). 
The poet is deemed not to imitate things as they are, but appearances, meaning that his work is thrice removed 
from the truth: ‘[He] knows little or nothing about the subjects he imitates and that the art of imitation is 
something that has no serious value; and that this applies above all to all tragic poetry, epic or dramatic’. Plato, 
The Republic, trans. C. Reeve, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004. 
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importance of Kant’s enlarged way of thinking for the argument of this thesis, a few 
introductory remarks on Kant are necessary. 
 
0.1 Tragedy and Kant’s enlarged way of thinking 
 
To understand Kant’s relation to the problematic of tragedy, it is vital to note that in 
the decades preceding Kant’s CJ, tragedy came to be seen as the exemplary form of poetry. 
The growing significance of tragedy during this time does not only indicate a sense that 
philosophy had failed to encompass the whole of life, but also a return to Aristotle’s 
reflections on art in his practical writings. For poets, playwrights and philosophers alike, 
tragedy was not seen as a mere artistic genre, but as the expression of a mode of thought that 
operates in the failure of philosophy to navigate questions regarding life as a whole. The 
Schulphilosophie of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff limited itself to a narrow 
set of problems that could be answered only with clear and distinct ideas; ideas that are, by 
necessity, divorced from practical life in order to maintain their universal status. Such ideas, 
on their own, are unable to navigate the new understanding of life in the biological sciences 
and the question of ethics in the collapse of a common sense of morality; that is, it is unable to 
navigate situations for which there is no end in view. Those concerned with the failure of 
philosophy to navigate such situations found resources in tragedy to reimagine the contingent 
singularity of the living sphere not as a threat to the philosophical project but as the basis of 
philosophical energy. The natural sphere, in this view, is transformed from being 
unfortunately contingent, and thus deficient to a greater ontological order, but as necessarily 
contingent, and thus not fully actual. Nature is thereby understood as an open-ended project in 
which humanity takes a creative role. Understanding exactly how tragedy is important to the 
task of reimagining the sensuous sphere as an open project will be a core part of this study. 
Generally speaking, the importance of tragedy in this task lies in the mode of thought of the 
poet who navigates the crisis of life, thus reconciling the ideas of reason with the sensory 
world, suffering, and contingency. The superiority of the poet over the philosopher in contexts 
of creative instability, however, raises a central problem to this thesis. This problem, simply 
stated, is that the claim that poetry is able to go beyond philosophy is self-defeating. If 
philosophy is the practice of thinking that is concerned with the truth, and a position arises 
that is critical of the activity that is concerned with the truth, we do not encounter the end of 
philosophy. Rather, we encounter the need for an enlarged kind of philosophy. 
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The relevance of tragedy to Kant’s project is more structural than direct, and the full 
extent of this relevance will not become apparent until Part II when we consider the 
importance of Kant’s enlarged way of thinking to tragedy as an ongoing philosophical 
problematic. While Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) and Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR) 
were concerned with determining objects and the will according to pre-given form, in CJ Kant 
gives extensive attention to the fluidity of form that was becoming increasingly apparent 
during his lifetime, particularly in the arts and sciences, leading him to outline an enlarged 
way of thinking that does not aspire toward objective knowledge but to making sense in 
common. The former aspiration requires a pre-defined end in view, while the latter is seen as 
an end in itself; it is an open-ended project of making ends. While it is a subject of much 
debate whether Kant actually allows for the possibility of new form, it is not Kant’s work as a 
whole but his response to the limitations of philosophy that interests us in this thesis. I will 
argue that it makes an exemplary, albeit implicit, contribution to the philosophical 
problematic of tragedy.17 
What is significant about Kant’s enlarged way of thinking for this study is that it 
outlines a non-cognitive procedure by which the thinker gains a reflective stance toward their 
immediate experience and opens their view to their neighbour and their neighbour’s best 
possibilities. In Kant’s words, enlarged thinking is a process by which the thinker ‘sets 
himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment, within which so many 
others are as if bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint’ 
(5:295). The key to universal judgment, for Kant, is not ‘the healthy understanding’, that is, 
the faculty of concepts that conditions the possibility of knowledge. Rather, it is ‘taste’, for 
‘the aesthetic power of judgment rather than the intellectual can bear the name of a communal 
sense’ (ibid.). Aesthetic judgments are the exemplary practice of enlarged thought, for they                                                              
17 This tension is exemplified in Hannah Arendt’s work on Kant. In a speech given in 1960, Arendt argues that in 
Kant’s moral and political philosophy everything is already given, and, thus, that it is ‘inhuman’ (see Hannah 
Arendt, ‘On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts About Lessing’, in Men in Dark Times, New York: Harvest 
Books, 1968, pp. 3-32, p. 26). However, ten years after this speech Arendt turns to Kant’s CJ in a series of 
lectures given at the New School for Social Research in order to outline a political theory that is sensitive to 
human creativity. In these lectures, she argues that CJ is Kant’s key political text, for it provides a way of 
thinking about the political as the realm in which new form is created (See Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s 
Political Philosophy, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). This development suggests that Arendt came to 
see that Kant, if not providing a philosophy of human creativity, outlines a framework for a new kind of 
philosophy oriented toward the political as an indeterminate sphere of action. The tension between Kant as 
theoretical philosopher and philosopher of creativity will continue throughout the thesis. For thinkers such as 
Nietzsche and Heidegger, while Kant provides vitally important developments to the project of philosophy, he 
remains unable to accommodate human creativity in his moral and political thought. In contrast to this approach, 
this thesis argues that Kant’s response to the tragedy of philosophy in CJ entails that nature and freedom can 
only be reconciled by human praxis, and that this proposal does, at least partially, open philosophy’s attention to 
the ungiven.  
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are premised on the recognition of the subjective nature of their outcome and yet claim 
agreement from a community of judgers. Thus they do not subsume a particular under a pre-
defined universal, leading to an end other than itself; that is, to knowledge. Instead, aesthetic 
judgments aspire toward universality, meaning that they contain a rational a priori. This a 
priori is applied to judgment itself, meaning that the intuitive content of the judgment remains 
undetermined while the judgment itself – its claim to universality – is its own end. 
The importance of enlarged thinking is that Kant’s presentation of the content of 
traditional philosophy in the new form of critical philosophy provides a philosophical 
analogue to Aristotle’s understanding of tragedy in terms of form and content. Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of tragedy is helpful here, for it suggests that the Apollinian impulse to search 
for the foundation of logic leads thought to stumble across its limits, leading to a situation in 
which ‘logic coils up … and finally bites its own tail’ (BT 98). For Nietzsche, the pulsating 
trajectory of the Apollinian impulse expresses an intellectual kind of tragedy, for it is 
precisely the attempt to exhaust the world in knowledge that unveils the impossibility of this 
task. For Kant, enlarged thought is essentially the transformed way of thinking that emerges 
from discovering the limits of thought, for it is developed through the experience of the 
failure of understanding to yield knowledge in matters of living form. Kant’s 
acknowledgement of this failure, I will suggest, occurs in two cases: the failure of our concept 
of nature to legislate the dynamism of organic life and the failure of moral concepts to guide 
action in the contingency of ethical life. The drive of reason to produce systematic knowledge 
entails that the experience of these failures is not a new fact that can be calmly subsumed into 
the pre-established system, but an intellectual crisis that pushes thought beyond the limits of 
the understanding to a new sphere of sense-making. Yet to operate beyond the limits of the 
understanding, thought must operate on its own. This does not entail that it has no framework 
to navigate this new sphere. Rather, through a holistic use of cognition thought is able to 
operate according to the example given to it by the understanding, searching for empirical 
laws in aesthetic diversity; searching for universality from a subjective standpoint. 
What is significant about reasoning by the example of the understanding – or 
reasoning by analogy – is that it begins from within life and proceeds via a sensuous kind of 
thought that uses the material of nature to create ‘another nature’ in order to navigate the 
crisis of knowledge with ideas of its own creation (CJ 5:314). It is Kant’s identification of this 
embodied, creative mode of thinking that interests us in this study. Poetry is the exemplar of 
enlarged thinking, Kant states, for it ‘strengthens the mind by letting it feel its capacity to 
consider and judge of nature, as appearance, freely, self-actively, and independently of 
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determination by nature’ (5:326). The poet dwells within life and begins from a feeling of 
unity with the natural world, using nature as the material for the expression of ideas. Yet the 
poet is not determined by nature, for she operates free from the rational determinations of the 
mind by reasoning analogically. Poetry is a break with heteronomous thinking, meaning that 
poetic thought is able to go beyond the formal limits of reason to create new aesthetic form 
with the material of sensuous life. In short, through poetry we give form to ourselves. 
As poetry became a central matter of philosophical concern during the mid-eighteenth 
century, many philosophers and art critics saw tragedy as the height of poetic achievement.18 
Kant himself recognises tragedy as one of the few instances where the sublime can be 
presented in the poetic arts (CJ 5:325). When I turn to this period of thought in Chapter 1, I 
will suggest that the renewed awareness of tragedy’s philosophical importance does not leave 
philosophy unaltered, for the kind of knowledge poetic thought produces does not take the 
form of timeless truth or clear and distinct ideas. Rather, the knowledge gained from tragedy 
is not a matter of content but of the form of thinking, or in Kant’s words, the ‘way of 
thinking’ (Denkungsart). In other words, tragedy is transformative, altering our orientation to 
thinking at the same time it alters the object being thought: one’s own thinking. Writing from 
a time of historical transition different to that experienced by Kant, Karl Jaspers draws from 
Kant’s understanding of transformation to argue that our interest in tragedy cannot be ‘a 
matter for the unconcerned spectator, interested only in cognition’.19 Rather, it involves the 
gaining of knowledge ‘wherein I grow in selfhood by the very manner in which I think I am 
achieving understanding, by the way in which I see and feel’.20 The content of Jaspers’ ‘tragic 
knowledge’ is not the failure of theoretical philosophy in matters of biology and ethics, as it 
was during Kant’s time, but the failure of modern philosophy to navigate the new conditions 
of post-WWII Germany. The form of tragic knowledge, however, is the same, for it frames an 
experience in such a way that transforms the established relation to inherited content. The 
‘whole content of tragedy is lost,’ argues Jaspers, if we think ourselves safe or look upon 
tragedy as something alien to ourselves, that is, something historical, abstract and dead.21 The 
‘content’ of tragedy that is ‘lost’, for Jaspers, is not an idea of tragedy but a way of thinking. 
                                                             
18 Chapter 1 is concerned with identifying why tragedy arose to a place of philosophical importance in the 
eighteenth century. It argues that tragedy expresses a reaction against the determination of all knowledge 
according to techne in order to return to the way of thinking Aristotle outlines in terms of phronesis in his 
practical and poetic texts. 
19 Karl Jaspers, Tragedy is Not Enough, trans. H. Reiche, H. Moore & K. Deutsch, London: The Beacon Press, 
1952, p. 72. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid., p. 88. 
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To maintain this way of thinking, Jaspers argues that philosophy in every epoch must grasp 
tragedy ‘anew and bring this truth to life for itself’.22 
 
0.2 Tragedy in contemporary philosophy 
 
While this thesis is indebted to the renewed interest in tragedy in contemporary 
philosophy, it argues that the main approaches to tragedy in this emerging field ultimately 
distract us from a deeper problem: that philosophy, the task we are now undertaking, is liable 
to intellectual tragedy. The term ‘intellectual tragedy’ is drawn from Stanley Cavell. In The 
Claim of Reason, Cavell identifies an intellectual kind of tragedy that ‘is not a matter of 
saying something false’, but the ‘inability to acknowledge, I mean accept, the human 
conditions of knowing’.23 Cavell employs the language of tragedy to confront a particular 
blindness that he sees in modern philosophy. Modern philosophy, in his portrayal, desperately 
attempts to overcome scepticism by converting all problems into ‘problems of knowledge’. 
For Cavell, by doing so philosophy misunderstands the relation of knowledge to 
acknowledgment, thus investigating problems that have a non-epistemic basis (i.e. an aesthetic 
basis) in epistemic terms. Such thinking, Cavell informs us, is destined to fail, for it seeks to 
solidify that which is, by its essence, fluid and underdetermined.  
Throughout this thesis I will call the kind of philosophy that aims to convert all 
problems into problems of knowledge ‘technical philosophy’ or ‘technical thinking’. My 
understanding of the ‘technical’ nature of such thinking draws from Aristotle. For Aristotle, 
techne constitutes a form of practical knowledge, which is sharply distinguished from 
theoretical knowledge (episteme). While episteme deals with ‘things that cannot be other than 
they are’, that is, with timeless objects such as mathematics and geometry, practical 
knowledge deals with ‘things that admit of being other than they are’.24 Once Aristotle has 
separated theoretical from practical knowledge, he makes a finer distinction between two 
modes of practical knowing. Techne, he informs us, is interested. It is subservient to a pre-
given end, for it navigates the contingent order according to a set of rules appropriate to 
achieving a particular end. While techne is an appropriate form of thinking/doing when the 
object being acted upon is rule-governed and pliable to such a pre-established end, Aristotle 
informs us that another form of activity is required for singular cases that are not amenable to                                                              
22 ibid., p. 28. 
23 Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 19, 454. 
24 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1142a25ff. 
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pre-given rules. He terms this form of creativity phronesis, which is often translated as 
‘prudence’ or ‘practical judgment’. Phronesis does not create with a given end in view. 
Rather, it is an end in itself; the exercise of good judgment is its own end.25 Thus it is attuned 
to situations that are singular in nature, situations that have no available precedent. This 
entails that it is the kind of judgment appropriate for living things, such as the polis. 
‘Technical’ considerations are thus opposed to ‘political’ considerations, just as artistic 
technique (as being able to play the piano) is opposed to expression and interpretation (being 
able to improvise or interpret).26 Aristotle’s separation of techne from phronesis lies behind 
my idea of ‘technical thinking’ to the extent that technical thinking fails to make this 
distinction. Technical thinking, in my understanding, is the kind of thinking that fails to 
distinguish between techne and phronesis; it approaches ‘political’ considerations as 
‘technical’ considerations by employing pre-established rules.  
For Cavell, the kind of thinking that approaches all problems as problems of 
knowledge – that is, technical thinking – is liable to an intellectual kind tragedy, for the very 
attempt to do so ineluctably places it before catastrophe. To mix my own terms with Cavell’s, 
technical thinking is subject to intellectual tragedy to the extent that it fails to accept the 
human conditions of knowing; it attempts to solidify indeterminate situations through the 
application of pre-established criteria. Yet evoking the language of tragedy is not to resign 
technical thinking to a closed fate. As Hölderlin’s famously stated in Patmos, ‘where danger 
looms / Salvation grows there too’: it is through being confronted with its own failure that 
technical thinking is able to acknowledge a world that incessantly escapes its grasp.27 As we 
see in Cavell’s equivocation between acknowledgement and acceptance, the task presented to 
us by intellectual tragedy is not simply to acknowledge the human conditions of knowing, 
though acknowledgement is basic to situations for which no rule can be found. The task is to 
accept these conditions, to allow the acknowledgement of finitude to transform the task of 
thinking. 
The contemporary interest in tragedy distracts us from the problem of intellectual 
tragedy by focusing on one of two lines of inquiry. The first line of inquiry limits its 
understanding of tragedy to the Greek tragedies themselves, suggesting that they contain 
lessons from which contemporary philosophy must learn. The second is primarily concerned 
with the philosophy of tragedy in post-Kantian philosophy with the aim of locating a ‘tragic                                                              
25 ibid. 
26 Castoriadis makes a similar distinction in CL (235).  
27 Friedrich Hölderlin, Selected Poems, trans. D. Constantine, Bloodaxe Books: Newcastle upon Tyne, 1996, p. 
54, translation modified. 
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Idea’ or ‘tragic absolute’. While each line of inquiry provokes insight into the limitations of 
contemporary philosophy’s practice, both, I suggest in the following two sections, fail to 
grasp the deeper problem of intellectual tragedy. Without acknowledging the tragedy of 
philosophy – the proximity of tragedy to every philosophical endeavour – the contemporary 
turn to tragedy risks falling into a dehistorisised form of essentialism, fixing the problematic 
of tragedy into a graspable form and thereby keeping what Jaspers calls ‘tragic knowledge’ at 
arm’s length. 
 
a. The Nietzschean View 
We can identify these two lines of inquiry by tracing key moments of their 
development to two texts published in the 1960s and 70s: Peter Szondi’s An Essay on the 
Tragic (1961) and Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s Myth and Tragedy in 
Ancient Greece (1972). Vernant and Videl-Naquet reject the philosophical tradition in favour 
of the mode of thinking expressed in the tragedies, arguing that ‘[t]ragedy succeeded epic and 
lyric and faded away as philosophy experienced its moment of triumph’.28 ‘Each play’, they 
argue, ‘constitutes a message, enclosed within a text and inscribed within the structures of a 
discourse that must be analysed at every level from the appropriate philological, stylistic, and 
literary points of view’.29 The message of tragedy has little to do with philosophy, for Vernant 
and Vidal-Naquet, for tragedy ‘can only be fully understood when account is taken of its 
particular context’.30 
For those who draw from Vernant and Videl-Naquet, philosophy is seen as a way of 
thinking that aims to remove the ambiguity of meaning. In this view, philosophy must move 
aside for a mode of thinking that has learned from the tragedies if we are to grasp the 
dimensions of experience outside philosophy’s narrow view.31 I will call this the ‘Nietzschean 
view’, for it echoes Nietzsche’s story of tragedy’s death in antiquity outlined in The Birth of 
Tragedy. From this view, even those philosophers who take hold of tragedy, such as Schelling 
and Hegel, retain the drive to ease the ambiguity of life by constructing a system of 
understanding that deems the tragic order as a falsehood. The problem with philosophy’s 
limited vision is not simply the abstract nature of the understanding, but also reason’s drive to                                                              
28 Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, New York: Zone Books, 
1990, p. 29. 
29 ibid., pp. 29-30. 
30 ibid., p. 30. 
31 Proponents of this view are generally within the fields of political philosophy, feminist philosophy or the 
philosophy of international relations. See, for example, Martha Nussbaum, Peter Euben, Richard Lebow and 
Bonnie Honig. 
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systematic knowledge. Reason’s drive to systematicity, in this view, occludes the ambiguity 
of social life, meaning that philosophy, seen as the institutionalisation of the will to 
knowledge, is part of the problem. 
Martha Nussbaum makes this case in The Fragility of Goodness. She begins by 
arguing that Plato, through Socrates, makes a ‘systematic assault’ on tragic knowledge.32 
Aristotle does little to correct this error, she informs us, but merely develops ‘a complicated 
attempt to preserve some elements of the tragic picture while doing justice to Socrates’ 
position’.33 For Nussbaum, the tragedians uncover something that was obscured by an 
exhaustive religious comprehension of the world: the fact that the ‘ability to function as a 
citizen, the activities involved in various types of love and friendship, and even those 
activities associated with the major ethical virtues (courage, justice and so on) require external 
conditions that the agent’s goodness cannot by itself secure’.34 The tragic poets provide us 
with an alternative that precedes the abstract anthropology of Kantian philosophy and Hegel’s 
attempt to ‘eliminate’ the conflict between the various spheres of society,35 revealing that 
‘powerful emotions, prominently including pity and fear, were sources of insight about human 
life’.36 While this is indeed true, the problem with Nussbaum’s argument, and with others 
who take the Nietzschean view, is that her interpretation of ‘philosophy’, and ‘Kantian’ 
philosophy in particular, tends to give a caricature of the western tradition. The problem of 
caricaturing the tradition is not simply that it reifies philosophy as an analytic mode of 
thinking impermeable to the fragility and disorder of tragedy, but that it is unable to explain 
the role of reasoned thought in the task of thinking in a disordered world.  
In this thesis it will be argued that the Nietzschean view is weakened by its refusal to 
take seriously the philosophical voices that populate the problematic of tragedy – voices that 
could strengthen its approach. In my analysis of Kant’s CJ, I will argue that Kant identifies 
two essential points that Nussbaum seeks to advance in The Fragility of Goodness: the 
importance of feeling in moral deliberation and the recognition of contingency in ethical life. 
In CJ, Kant suggests that without an aesthetic feeling of unity with the natural world, reason 
must conclude that it is irrational to act morally. Thus it finds itself divided from its moral 
ideals. Yet works of art, Kant argues, can hurl a bridge over a divided consciousness in order 
to draw us into an integrated experience of life that goes beyond reason’s moral ideals. The                                                              
32 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. xiii. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid., p. xiv. 
35 ibid., p. 68. 
36 ibid., p. xv. 
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significance of Kant’s response to the tragedy of philosophy is that it gives the option of new 
form, and it is this element of Kant’s thought that this thesis aims to extend. By neglecting 
Kant’s identification of the creativity of imagination to create new form, Nussbaum returns 
our attention to the possibilities of human agency expressed in the tragedies without opening 
the present constellation of thought to new possibilities. The example that Kant sets in 
responding to the failure of philosophy is not simply to identify alternatives from outside our 
present framework of thought, but to present contemporary forms of tragedy in such a way 
that cleaves open the given to the possibility of new form. 
 
b. The Idealist view 
The second line of thinking in the contemporary interest in tragedy does not aim to 
abandon the philosophical tradition, as does the Nietzschean view, but to argue that 
philosophy is dramatically transformed after Kant though the destruction of metaphysics. In 
this view, tragedy marks a transition from a speculative understanding of metaphysics that 
buffered the subject from the finite conditions of experience to a mode of philosophy that is 
sensitive to the fallibility and fluidity of the human condition. This view builds from Peter 
Szondi’s An Essay on the Tragic (whether in agreement or not) by returning to philosophy’s 
engagement with tragic art in the early nineteenth century.37 For Szondi, the philosophy of the 
tragic was ‘[b]egun by Schelling’ and ‘runs through the Idealist and post-Idealist periods’, 
meaning that it is ‘proper to German philosophy’.38 In this view, Schelling’s Letters on 
Dogmatism and Criticism (1795–6) begins the philosophy of the tragic by arguing that 
tragedy (in the shape of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex) reconciles freedom and nature by presenting 
the equilibrium between the ‘superior strength’ (Übermacht) of the objective world and the 
self-affirmation of the ‘I’ in its absolute freedom (Selbstmacht).39 Building from Szondi, 
Terry Eagleton argues that in the wake of the limits Kant placed on thought, the philosophy of 
tragedy reminds us that we are ‘amphibious animals’ who inhabit the natural and intelligible 
                                                             
37 Philosophers who take this approach do not necessarily agree with Szondi’s understanding of the tragic, but 
adopt the narrative he tells of tragedy’s development: that tragedy is properly understood in the paradigm of 
Schelling’s tragic absolute with the aim or reconciling the Kantian dualism. 
38 ibid., pp. 1-3. 
39 Friedrich Schelling, Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, in The Unconditional in Human 
Knowledge: Four Early Essays (1794-1796), trans. F. Marti, Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 1980, pp. 
156-218, p. 192. Schelling develops this argument in Philosophy of Art (1802-3), arguing that tragedy is the 
highest manifestation of art whereby the ‘hero of tragedy … the one who represents … the unconditioned and 
absolute itself in his person, … the symbol of the infinite, of that which transcends all suffering’. Friedrich 
Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. D. Stott, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, p. 249. 
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realms, never quite at home in either.40 For Dennis Schmidt, the philosophy of tragedy 
confronts the impoverished scope of contemporary philosophy that is unable to respond to the 
manifold questions that humans have asked throughout history. The ‘turn to the work of art by 
philosophers since Kant [in the work of] Hegel, Hölderlin, Nietzsche and Heidegger’ and the 
‘move to reaffirm the integrity of the work of art for the project of self-understanding is 
clearly evident in contemporary works such as one finds by Derrida, Gadamer, Deleuze, 
Foucault, and others’.41 For Schmidt, tragedy speaks to us today through the voice of these 
thinkers. 
The approach taken by Eagleton and Schmidt diagnoses the narrow vision of 
mainstream contemporary philosophy through turning to a legacy beginning at the dawn of 
the nineteenth century. I will call this understanding the ‘Idealist view’ of the philosophy of 
tragedy, for it takes the German Idealist treatment of ‘the tragic’ – the attempt to overcome 
the theoretical-practical dualism left by Kant’s philosophy – as the deepest philosophical 
articulation of tragedy. For Eagleton, ‘it is tragedy, rather than Kant, which supplies the 
solution’.42 In Eagleton’s framework, the idea of tragedy acts as a kind of historical 
protagonist, ‘bridg[ing] the gap between pure and practical reason which the critical 
philosophy itself could never span’.43 Simon Critchley grants more agency to the philosophers 
than to the idea by noting the ‘massive privileging of the tragic … in the nineteenth century’, 
yet again limits tragedy to a means for Kant’s successors to diagnose and sublate the 
‘amphibious character’ of Kantian modernity.44 For Schmidt, ‘Schelling opens the door for 
what will prove to be an escalation of the importance of the question posed by tragedy’, for it 
is Schelling who identifies the experience whereby the spectator feels the unity of nature and 
freedom in a medium that philosophy cannot provide.45 Martin Thibodeau concurs, 
suggesting that the philosophical ‘preoccupation with Greek tragedy … manifests itself for 
                                                             
40 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, p. 287. See also p. 41, where Eagleton seems to accept Szondi’s treatment of 
tragedy in terms of Hegel’s dialectic that is both tragic and the means of overcoming tragedy. 
41 Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks, p. 2-3. Schmidt (p. 77) states that ‘Szondi is quite right when he 
writes that “after Aristotle there is a poetics of tragedy, only after Schelling is there a philosophy of the tragic.”’ 
The reappearance of the topic of tragedy, he states, now posed as a matter of the tragic, ‘is contemporaneous 
with the arrival of the end of metaphysics as a possibility’. 
42 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, p. 119. 
43 ibid. 
44 Critchley, Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity, p. 219. 
45 Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks, p. 276. Schmidt argues that Schelling’s Philosophy of Art 
establishes the framework for philosophy’s renewed interest in tragedy, particularly Schelling’s view of tragedy 
as the presentation of ‘necessity genuinely caught in a struggle with freedom, yet such that a balance obtains 
between the two … both, necessity and freedom, emerge from this struggle simultaneously as victorious and 
vanquished, and accordingly equal in every respect’. See Friedrich Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. D. 
Stott, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, p. 249. 
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the first time in the writings of the young Schelling’.46 Miguel Beistegui and Simon Sparks 
put forward the following hypothesis regarding philosophy’s concern with tragedy, which 
identifies Schelling as the first philosopher of tragedy: 
 
if such a passage to tragedy was able to take place, then it was only because tragedy was itself 
envisaged as passage, as a bridge thrown over the abyss opened by the critical philosophy; it is 
because, in other words, tragedy was envisaged as a ‘solution’ to the problem inherited from 
Kant, and in the wake of a path opened by him.47 
 
This hypothesis leads Beistegui and Sparks to argue that the Idealist notion of tragedy unveils 
an immanent metaphysics that could hurl a bridge over the split nature of the critical 
enterprise by presenting the theoretical appearance of freedom in the empirical realm of 
experience. David Farrell Krell builds from Beistegui and Sparks in The Tragic Absolute, 
stating that the ‘generation that came after Kant and read Kant’s third Critique’ found it 
‘impossible … to pursue aesthetics and metaphysics along separate routes’.48 Thus, according 
to Krell, they were forced to break with Kant’s CJ, a text in which Kant had ‘no genuine 
interest or competence in the realm of aesthetics as such’.49 
While the present study is indebted to these thinkers, it will argue that the Idealist 
view contains three significant problems. The first is that Schelling was not the first 
philosopher in the so-called ‘preoccupation with Greek tragedy’. As I will identify in Chapter 
1, the fascination with recreating the tragedies on stage exploded in France during the 
seventeenth century, causing philosophers and art critics such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Jean-Baptiste Dubos to explore the merits and dangers of tragic theatre for national modesty 
and others such as David Hume and James Moor to grapple with the paradox posed to our 
understanding of moral sentiment by the ‘tragic effect’. The influence of these thinkers in 
Germany and the extensive popularity of German translations of Shakespeare’s tragedies led 
to a host of philosophical work on tragedy in German philosophy in the mid- to late-
eighteenth century, the most significant being the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder. In the 
1770s Herder developed a theory of taste from his reflections on tragedy, building a system 
that aimed to unite reason and feeling in sensuous cognition in a manner that influences 
Schelling’s treatment of Kant. For the original readers of Schelling’s interpretation of tragedy 
in Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, the appeal to Herder and the desire to read Kant 
through the lens of the Sturm und Drang movement would have been clear. It is only possible                                                              
46 Thibodeau, Hegel and Greek Tragedy, p. 2. 
47 Miguel de Beistegui and Simon Sparks (eds.), Philosophy and Tragedy, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 2. 
48 Krell, The Tragic Absolute, p. 2. 
49 ibid.  
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to conclude that the philosophy of tragedy was ‘begun by Schelling’ if Schelling’s treatment 
of tragic art is taken to be decisive in such a way that renders previous treatments mere 
poetics and the contemporary philosophy of tragedy as mere commentary.50 
 The second problem with the Idealist narrative is that it relies on a conception of 
Kant’s critical philosophy that was not accepted by Kant’s immediate successors (see Chapter 
4) and is no longer accepted in Kant scholarship (see Chapters 2 and 3). Proponents of this 
narrative undermine Kant’s own attempt to construct a bridge between the theoretical and the 
practical through his critique of the faculty of pleasure and displeasure and the expansion of 
his concept of nature. Thus they are unable to see that for Kant’s successors the tragic is not 
simply an artistic genre but a way of understanding Kant’s notion of teleology and nature’s 
self-organisation. This reading reflects an ongoing bias within Kantian scholarship to read CJ 
in terms of Part I (Critique of Aesthetic Judgment), undermining the importance of Part II 
(Critique of Teleological Judgment); a bias that has only been questioned during the last two 
decades.51 
The third problem with this narrative is that it aims to identify a particular ‘tragic idea’ 
(Szondi) or a ‘tragic absolute’ (Lacoue-Labarthe, Krell) that is free from the constraints of 
history and culture.52 For Szondi, the tragic idea is a ‘dialectical phenomenon’ that is not 
concerned with historically specific subject matter but with ‘freedom itself, which, now at                                                              
50 This is precisely Szondi’s argument (See Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, p. 2). By building on Szondi’s work, 
thinkers such as Eagleton, Critchley and Schmidt ultimately undermine the significance of their own work, for 
the upshot of Szondi’s framework is that any present work done on tragedy can only be a matter of the history of 
ideas and not of philosophy. The aim of this thesis is to argue that their work, when understood through the right 
historical method, extends tragedy into the present, outlining the shape of a present intellectual tragedy. 
51 The argument put forward by Beistegui and Sparks, Schmidt, Critchley and Eagleton that undermines Kant’s 
efforts to reconcile the tensions of his critical project in the CJ draws from the reception of CJ in French thought, 
particularly through Jean-Françis Lyotard’s Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime and Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy’s The Literary Absolute. For Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, for example, CJ elucidates the abyss between 
the two realms of critical philosophy only to leave philosophy in a state of ‘crisis’, leaving a ‘gaping hole’ that 
Idealism takes as its starting point (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, The Literary Absolute, p. 30). While Lacoue-
Lebarthe and Nancy are correct in noting that those who followed Kant’s lead felt compelled to bring his critical 
move to a more satisfying completion, they neglect the fact that Kant went a long way toward providing a 
solution himself. This oversight is not unique to Lacoue-Lebarthe and Nancy, but reflects a broader 
misunderstanding of CJ that will be criticised in Chapters 2 and 3. Until recent developments in Kant scholarship, 
scholars have devoted relatively little attention to the systematic place of CJ in Kant’s critical corpus and have 
instead compartmentalised the themes of the work for the sake of a few currently interesting arguments about 
beauty and sublimity. This interpretation takes the mechanical conception of nature Kant advances in CPR as his 
definitive view on the matter, relegating his theory of aesthetic judgment to a chapter in the history of aesthetics 
and his theory of teleology as an unusual moment in the history and philosophy of natural science. 
52 This problem is not strictly true of all thinkers that have been identified with the Idealist view. Schmidt, for 
example, pays significant attention to tragedy as an ongoing philosophical discourse for articulating the finitude 
of the human condition. While he shares Szondi’s narrative regarding the development of the philosophy of 
tragedy in Schelling, Schmidt takes seriously the development of the philosophy of tragedy through Nietzsche 
and into Heidegger’s work. Nevertheless, his interpretation of the philosophy of tragedy concerns tragedy as a 
German conversation that is present to us only in the legacy left to us by these thinkers; tragedy itself remains a 
thing of the past. 
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odds with itself, becomes its own adversary’.53 For Lacoue-Labarthe and Krell, ‘[t]ragedy is 
the absolute organon … because tragedy is itself presentation of the tragedy of the 
absolute’.54 In this conception, tragedy presents the failure of the Kantian dualism, fusing 
freedom and necessity into a single experience and thereby ironing out pure and practical 
reason into an aesthetic task. Szondi sets the framework for this view by defining the task as 
one of ‘mak[ing] the various definitions of the tragic comprehensible by revealing a more or 
less concealed structural element that is common to all’.55 The task is not to consider their 
theories of tragedy ‘in view of their specific philosophies’, states Szondi, but ‘in the hope of 
securing a general concept of the tragic’.56  
The problem with Szondi’s method, as Julian Young notes in The Philosophy of 
Tragedy, is that the conditions that ‘made tragedy an important phenomenon in the nineteenth 
century cannot be elevated into an account of what makes tragedy an important phenomenon 
tout court’, since in other times the genre of tragedy is called upon to confront different 
content.57 Young is sensitive to the dialogical character of tragedy, suggesting that if we take 
the meaning that nineteenth century philosophers found in tragedy as the key to understanding 
the philosophical importance of tragedy as a whole, we limit the power of tragic art to a 
particular moment in philosophical history that is, for all intents and purposes, finished.58 
 
 
 
                                                             
53 Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, p. 10. 
54 Lacoue-Labarthe, cited in Krell, The Tragic Absolute, p. 425. In a footnote (p. 2), Krell states that ‘[b]y 
referring to the literary absolute, I wish to salute the ground-breaking work by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Jean-Luc Nancy, L’Absolu littéraire’. 
55 Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, p. 2. 
56 ibid., p. 2-3. 
57 Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy, p. 266. 
58 Szondi argues that it is Schelling, Hegel and Hölderlin who properly identify the ‘tragic Idea’, implying that 
those who follow in this tradition merely invoke the tragic to signal their commitment to Idealist themes. For 
Szondi, the original tragedies themselves fade away under the Idea of the tragic that ‘rises like an island’ over 
Aristotle’s reflection on matters of plot and characterisation, leading his survey of tragedy as a philosophical idea 
to end with Max Scheller’s ‘On the Phenomenon of the Tragic’ (1915). He fails to note the significant 
contributions made by Benjamin, Jaspers, and Heidegger, assumedly because they reject the Idealist conception 
of the tragic and thus misunderstand the tragic essence, meaning that his Essay paints a static picture of 
philosophy that dismisses any philosophical attempt to think the tragic anew. Furthermore, Szondi limits the 
philosophy of tragedy to German philosophy: ‘Until this day,’ Szondi writes, ‘the concept of the tragic has 
remained a German one’. While it certainly true that tragedy is a significant problematic in German philosophy, 
Szondi dismisses the philosophical importance of the ‘ancient debate’ and overlooks the broader reflections on 
tragic art during the eighteenth century. Szondi’s Essay has been eclipsed by the significant return not only to the 
Idea of the tragic but also to philosophical reflections on the tragedies themselves. Szondi, An Essay on the 
tragic, pp. 1-2. 
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0.3 The question of method in the history of philosophy 
 
The Nietzschean and Idealist views are essentially concerned with identifying the 
proper content of tragedy. For the Nietzschean view, tragedy is concerned with the collision 
between ancient myth and new forms of law, for such was the experience of the ancient 
Athenians. This view is concerned with reconstructing the environment of ancient Greece in 
such a way that unveils the lessons contained within the tragedies that can inform 
contemporary thought. For the Idealist view, tragedy is concerned with the collision between 
agency and the objective world, for this problematic is the foundation of the modern 
experience of tragedy. It is concerned with defining the modern experience of tragedy, and 
how this experience transformed the landscape of modern philosophy in such a way that 
opens us, as contemporary philosophers, to themes of finitude, death and fallibility. Implicit to 
both of these views is the impossibility of contemporary tragedy; for Vernant and Vidal-
Naquet, tragedy is a thing of the past, for ‘tragic man’ is a product of the polarity between 
ethos and daimon that is unique to ancient Athens;59 for Guy Debord, tragedy is impossible in 
the contemporary society of the spectacle which ‘arrogates to itself everything that in human 
activity exists’, meaning that scenes of demise, death and mistaken intentions are all sublated 
into our penchant for voyeurism;60 for George Steiner, tragedy today is ‘dead’, because the 
mythical construction of the contemporary world occludes the depiction of blind necessity 
that is basic to tragic drama.61 While it may well be true that tragedy is more difficult for us to 
see today than ever, the arguments of the Idealist and Nietzschean views preclude us from 
considering whether contemporary forms of tragedy are possible. It is the aim of this thesis to 
open our vision to the possibility of contemporary tragedy by employing a method that is 
focused not on the content but the form of tragedy; not what is thought but the way in which it 
is thought. 
                                                             
59 Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, p. 37. 
60 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith, New York: Zone Books, 1999, p. 26. 
61 George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy, London: Faber and Faber, 1961, p. 5. Christoph Menke’s work stands 
as an exception to the contemporary acceptance of the death of tragedy, yet his Idealist historical method fails to 
identify how tragedy might be employed in contemporary philosophy. Menke argues that tragedy remains 
‘present’ in modernity despite Hegel’s attempt to render it a thing of the past, for our experience of ethical 
irresolvability remains. While reflection, for Hegel, is aimed at dissolving pre-given determinations, thereby 
making tragic conflicts essentially impossible, Menke argues that the factual constraint of reflection, that is, the 
impossibility of resolving the ethical and the aesthetic, makes tragedy both necessary and possible in modernity. 
Yet tragedy remains an epochal experience rather than a creative genre in Menke’s interpretation, undermining 
the view of tragedy as a way of thinking that frames the given in such a way that opens the possibility of the 
ungiven. The formal approach to tragedy in this thesis aims to extend Menke’s important work into a practical 
mode of transforming our perception of the present. Christoph Menke, ‘The Presence of Tragedy’, in Critical 
Horizons, vol. 5, no. 1, 2010, pp. 201-225. 
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To do so, it is important to clarify the method of this thesis in relation to the Idealist 
and Nietzschean views. The problems raised by the Idealist and Nietzschean views are 
underpinned by a deeper question of philosophical method in the history of ideas.62 
Proponents of the Nietzschean view, on the one hand, use the language of ‘Greek tragedy’63 
or ‘tragic man’64 as if an authentic understanding of the ancient Greek tragedy can be found, 
undermining the fact that tragedy was a creative and unfolding form of presentation that 
developed over a one hundred year period and that there are only thirty two remaining 
tragedies out of an estimated one thousand written during the fifth century BCE.65 While 
proponents of the Idealist view do not search for an authentic Greek notion of tragedy, they 
often express a different problem concerning historical method. In the work of those who 
express the Idealist view, philosophy’s interest in tragedy is often described through the use of 
language appropriate to a machine, suggesting that tragedy is ‘programmed by the horizon 
opened by the critical philosophy’.66 At other times their work employs de-subjectified 
language appropriate to an organic process outside of human control, stating that tragedy 
‘emerged in Greece at the end of the sixth century’67 and that it ‘appears’ again in the ‘wake 
of Kant’.68 The language of ‘program’ suggests that the idea of tragedy was set in motion by a 
force external to the philosophers who bare the idea, while the language of ‘appearance’ 
connotes an organic process whereby a particular arises as an expression of a greater whole. 
In both analogies, the whole is both the necessary and sufficient condition of the particular, 
implying that the particular (in this case, the philosophy of tragedy) is fated by a historical 
force outside of the agents (i.e. philosophers such as Schelling) who bring them into being. 
This thesis will approach the history of ideas by an alternative method to both views, 
drawing from Quentin Skinner’s ‘Cambridge School’ methodology that begins by 
historicising philosophical problems. The mechanical and organic analogies used by the                                                              
62 It is the hope of this thesis not simply to clarify the philosophical importance of tragedy, but to use this 
particular case in order to clarify the philosophical value of the history of ideas more generally. 
63 ‘Greek tragedy shows good people being ruined because of things that just happen to them, things that they do 
not control’. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 25. 
64 ‘Tragic man is constituted within the space encompassed by this pair, ēthos and daimōn’. Vernant & Vidal-
Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, p. 37. 
65 Scholars have estimated that Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides alone composed between two and three 
hundred tragedies. The reasons why the specific tragedies that remain today have survived the tumult of history 
are unknown, meaning that to speculate on what ‘authentic’ Greek tragedy is will remain always incomplete. It is 
the method of this thesis to view this fact not as a limit to our inquiry, but as a reminder of the limits of grasp of 
history. See Hall, Greek Tragedy: Suffering Under the Sun, p. 1. 
66 Beistegui & Sparks, Tragedy and Philosophy, p. 7. 
67 Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, p. 29. 
68 Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks, p. 276. Szondi’s language suggests that tragedy is fated by a 
trajectory that is autonomous from any process or thinking, arguing that it ‘ris[ing] like an island’ above poetics 
and ‘[knowing] no national or epochal boarders’. Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, p. 1. 
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Idealist view present history as a tragic drama in which, to use Skinner’s words, ‘ideas get up 
and do battle on their own behalf’.69 Skinner argues that the tendency of historians of 
philosophy to search for an ‘ideal type’ leads to a kind of ‘non-history’ in which philosophers 
are mere occasions for their ideas. Such reflection aims to point out earlier ‘anticipations’ of 
later doctrines, crediting each writer in terms of their ability to predict the subject matter to 
which the historian attends.70 According to Skinner, ‘philosophers have perhaps been rather 
slow’ to question the model of history implicit to this method, failing to note the serious 
implications it has ‘for the analysis of meaning and understanding, as well as for the 
discussion of the relations between belief and action, and in general over the whole question 
of the sociology of knowledge’.71 In this view, if we reject the particularity and creativity of 
past philosophers, then our inquiry risks falling into a dehistoricised, essentialist conception 
of philosophy. John Dewey describes this dehistoricised approach as the method of the 
‘contemporary philosopher’ of history, the philosopher who comes to his work 
 
protected and perhaps muffled by an immense intervening apparatus. He carries in his head a 
vast body of distinctions previously made, of problems already formulated, of solutions 
formulated ready to hand. … The two variables, himself as a thinker and the cultural material 
thought about, are insofar technalized, if I may venture the word, for him in advance. The 
mind is removed from contact with the vital traditions and movement of the time and place, 
and the material thought about is not the existent scene but ideas and doctrines previously 
distilled from a great variety of other such scenes.72 
 
Dewey’s use of the word ‘technalised’ has close parallels with my understanding of ‘technical 
thinking’. He suggests that the ‘technalised’ imagination manifests a form of intellectual 
tragedy insofar as it removes ideas from the locale of the philosopher and creates a dualism 
between life and idea. This is evident in Szondi’s method that aims to look past the specific 
philosophies of each thinker of tragedy with the aim of securing ‘a general concept of the 
tragic’. Szondi’s method fails to benefit from Kant’s maxim of the enlarged way of thinking, 
for it is unable to reconcile ideas with material life; with the subjective locale of the thinker. 
For Dewey, we can avoid the intellectual tragedy of the technalised imagination if we take 
care to identify the ideas which were ‘alive and active in forming the mind of the 
philosopher’, meaning that we must ‘reconstruct the environment sufficiently to know what 
                                                             
69 Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,’ in History and Theory, vol. 8, no. 1, 
1969, pp. 3-35, p. 11. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid, p. 50. 
72 John Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, USA: Sothern Illinois University Press, 2012, p. 
33. 
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problems its needs imposed upon the thinker, and what direction it gave to the imaginings it 
invoked’.73  
 However, Dewey and Skinner’s historicised method tends toward the danger of 
assuming that the correct approach to history can overcome what Cavell describes in terms of 
intellectual tragedy, understood as the inability to accept the human conditions of knowing. 
For example, in the attempt to correct the limitations of the Idealist view, Skinner aims to 
stabilise historical meaning by limiting the philosophical content of philosophy to its 
historical locale. While this is an important corrective, Skinner fails to recognise that, as we 
noted in Bakhtin’s dialogical method, that even ‘past meanings … can never be stable 
(finalized, ended once and for all) – they will always change (be renewed) in the process of 
subsequent, future development of the dialogue’. The significance of Bakhtin’s method for 
this thesis is that, while accepting the importance of attending to the material conditions in 
which ideas are creatively produced, it establishes that the task of engaging with dialogical 
ideas is not to overcome intellectual tragedy, but to recognise the danger involved in any 
intellectual endeavour and to identify a procedure for thinking that is aware of the risk of 
mistaking our own subjective private conditions as external reality. This is to say that if 
philosophy is to take account of tragedy it must come with a proper historical approach to 
philosophy more generally. Or to put it in other words, a proper historical method and taking 
account of tragedy are linked; they each teach us a similar lesson. If we proceed via Szondi’s 
method, for example, then we occlude both our own agency as thinkers and the agency of the 
philosophers posing the ideas that concern us. We are, to use Dewey’s words, ‘protected’ and 
‘muffled’ from the content of our analysis by technalising the two variables involved: 
ourselves as thinkers and the cultural material involved. A historical method that takes 
account of intellectual tragedy, on the other hand, proceeds in a similar fashion to the tragic 
poet who is aware of the dangers of bracketing the ideas from the agent. Like tragedy, it 
presents history as the product of conscious agents who are simultaneously free and bound by 
the ideas that shape their action. Thus it refuses to eliminate the risk involved in its practice, 
for it is aware that it, too, is subject to the same conditions. 
Kant’s enlarged way of thinking provides a way by which to advance a counter-
narrative to the Nietzschean and Idealist views. As I will identify in my discussion of Kant’s 
CJ, enlarged thinking does not attempt to ‘explain’ the appearance of a phenomenon, for 
explanation is the modus operandi of the understanding. For the understanding, ideas have 
                                                             
73 ibid. 
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necessary and sufficient conditions, and hence can be discussed independently of an agent. 
Enlarged thought, on the other hand, aims to ‘elucidate’, to allow the phenomenon to appear 
in such a way that schematises our conception of it, for it refuses to separate the idea from the 
appearance.74 Kant’s notion of elucidation allows for the language of creation in discussing 
the history of ideas. Creation connotes a break with the past, the rupture of something new 
into the sensory manifold. In the paradigm of creation, the whole from which a particular 
appears is necessary but not sufficient for its origination. There is a kinship with what came 
before, but something else is required in order for the new to appear. This ‘something else’ is 
the creativity of a living being. 
Because enlarged thought aspires to operate without the conceptual ‘buffering’ of 
Dewey’s contemporary philosopher, we are vulnerable to alteration as we undertake our 
inquiry. This does not mean that we operate without concepts or that we come with no 
prejudices of our own. Rather, it means that we aspire to remove the buffering that would 
hold those subjective private conditions as reality, meaning that we ready ourselves to 
stumble across our own forms of intellectual tragedy. A historical method that takes account 
of tragedy recognises the risk involved in its practice. It does not aspire to objective 
knowledge but to common human understanding, recognising that fallibility is basic to 
philosophical practice. 
By elucidating the problematic of tragedy – that is, the ongoing dialogue in philosophy 
concerned with problematising patterns of thought that that have become impervious to living 
form – through this method, it will be argued that the turn to tragedy in contemporary 
philosophy is not a new instalment in the history of ideas, but an expression of a deeper crisis 
in the landscape of philosophical inquiry. In other words, it is a new, creative attempt to 
cleave open the given in the hope of elucidating the possibility of new form in a way that is no 
less significant than the ancients or moderns who employ the problematic of tragedy. For 
Raymond Williams, the philosophical importance of tragedy lies in its transformative 
character, for through presenting our own experience in tragic form, ‘new connections are 
                                                             
74 Kant clarifies the difference between explanation and elucidation in terms of two different concepts of nature: 
one of mechanism and the other of organism: ‘Now since we can have no concept of this except the 
undetermined concept of a ground that makes the judging of nature in accordance with empirical laws possible, 
but cannot determine this more precisely by any predicate, it follows that the unification of the two principles 
cannot rest on a ground for the explanation of the possibility of a product in accordance with given laws for the 
determining power of judgment, but only on a ground for the elucidation of this for the reflecting power of 
judgment’ (CJ 5:412, emphases mine). For Kant, because aesthetic experience of matters such as living beings 
and history does not yield knowledge of the necessary and sufficient reasons of what appears, such matters 
cannot be explained by must be elucidated according to enlarged, reflective thought. 
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made, and the familiar world shifts, as the new relations are seen’.75 If we think that the 
philosophy of tragedy is ‘a single and permanent kind of fact’, Williams argues, ‘we can end 
only with the metaphysical conclusions that are built into any such assumption’.76 If we reject 
this assumption, however, the problem is necessarily transformed: ‘Tragedy is then not a 
permanent kind of fact, but a series of experiences and conventions and institutions’.77 Thus 
we ‘are not looking for a new universal meaning of tragedy’, but for the ‘structure of tragedy’ 
in our own times.78 Williams argues that to discern the intellectual tragedies in a given epoch 
is not a kind of fatalism whereby destiny is said to be inevitable. Rather, recognising what has 
‘fatefully’ come into being through a community’s own action is to enlarge one’s view in 
order to understand what one is doing. As soon as one understands what one is doing, 
Williams observes, ‘other directions seem open’.79 Our task is thus one of identifying in the 
contemporary turn to tragedy the possibility of new philosophical directions. 
 
0.4 Chapter outline 
 
The present study is divided into two parts. Part I, ‘Kant’s Critique of Judgment’, 
questions the Idealist view of the philosophy of tragedy by reassessing Kant’s relation to the 
philosophy of tragedy. Chapter 1 examines the conversation occurring during the eighteenth 
century regarding the authority of the natural sciences and the role of aesthetics in navigating 
between natural science and philosophy. This experience expresses a collision of epochs 
wherein the traditional order of value is confronted with new demands. Within this collision 
we find that philosophers such as Hume, Moor, and Herder raise the problematic of tragedy 
well before Kant in order to navigate the dilemma concerning the relationship of taste and 
morality. 
Chapter 2 considers Kant’s CJ in light of this conversation, arguing that his critique of 
taste can be understood as a response to the tragedy of philosophy understood as the 
inevitable failure of what I call ‘technalised thinking’; that is, the failure of the kind of 
thinking that remains ‘protected … by an immense intervening apparatus’, to use Dewey’s 
words. Acknowledging this failure enables Kant to identify a procedure for philosophy 
capable of reconciling the contradiction between the orders of biologically mediated sense                                                              
75 Raymond Williams, Modern Tragedy, London: Chatto and Windus, 1966, p. 45. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid., p. 46. 
78 ibid., p. 62. 
79 ibid. 
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impressions and theoretical (a priori) ideas by identifying the ground of judgment in mutual 
communicability. This procedure is seen in his introduction of a reflective kind of judgment 
that possesses its own a priori that does not guarantee the content of its activity but regulates 
the way it proceeds. 
 Chapter 3 suggests that Kant’s introduction of the notions of genius, the sublime and 
sensus communis in the final drafts of CJ serves to ground the procedure of reflective 
judgment in the ethical practice of a community. While theoretical reason cannot reconcile a 
collision between two contradictory parts of experience, Kant suggests that the writer of a 
poem is unrestrained from theoretical limits and can represent experience in such a way that 
allows us to feel the unity of the biological and the rational. The work of beautiful art 
becomes the exemplary product of the imagination, orientating a community toward the 
realisation of their moral calling by uniting them according to a common mode of judgment. 
Yet we conclude by noting that while Kant reconfigures the critical project as a historical 
project, outlining a way in which the moral project of the first two Critiques can be realised in 
sensuous life, he effectively places the transcendental legislation of the will subordinate to the 
community’s aesthetic culture. 
Part II, ‘Tragedy after Kant’, builds from the argument of Part I by identifying an 
ongoing dialogue in philosophy regarding tragedy as a means to navigate the tension between 
nature and freedom through the lens of Kant’s CJ. We turn to four philosophers from key 
moments during this conversation, namely Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Castoriadis. This 
study does not claim to be comprehensive – indeed, many key voices who populate the 
problematic of tragedy are largely overlooked, such as Friedrich Schelling, Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe, Søren Kierkegaard, Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault, to name just a few. 
Rather, it intends to re-examine philosophy’s relation to Greek tragedy construed as a 
dialogue that is ongoing throughout philosophical history. Thus, this study includes thinkers 
who are canonical to the Idealist view (Hegel and Nietzsche), who are significant to the 
Nietzschean view (Nietzsche and Heidegger), and, additionally, one thinker who fits neither 
view and assists us to call them both into question (Castoriadis). However, my approach will 
attempt to broaden this analysis, where possible, by including other significant voices to show 
how the philosophies of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger were received outside of their own 
times. This will lead us to consider the voices of Friedrich Hölderlin, Arthur Schopenhauer, 
Walter Benjamin, Franz Rosenzweig, and Karl Jaspers, among others. 
We begin Part II in Chapter 4 with Hegel, whose philosophical treatment of tragedy 
has gained significant attention in contemporary scholarship. While Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
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Benjamin and Adorno reconceive of tragedy as a means to usurp Hegel’s attempt to sublate 
tragedy into a philosophy of history, recent scholarship contends that it is precisely by 
returning to his attention to the tragic nature of human experience that Hegel’s thought can be 
reclaimed as a non-metaphysical project of self-understanding. This chapter argues that 
Hegel’s philosophy of art gives more attention to Kant’s CJ than is often credited. For Hegel, 
by cleaving open a symbolic sphere of becoming that is separated ‘by an abyss’ from the 
impassable theoretical sphere of limit and fixity, Kant enlarged philosophy’s perception of 
alteration and becoming while limiting the theoretical sphere of ends and morality to a static 
ontology of the eternal infinite. In Hegel’s account, tragedy dethrones the fixity of the 
concepts of the understanding and places us before a process of becoming within the one 
sphere of being, reconciling us to a concept of nature that reverses the hierarchy of being over 
becoming, alerting us to an enlarged concept of life. We find, however, that Hegel’s reading 
of tragedy is problematic for other thinkers who experience the ‘underside’ of Spirit. Through 
exploring one such thinker, namely Walter Benjamin, we find that reading history in terms of 
tragedy entails a notion of philosophy that undermines the singularity of the work of art. In 
short, Hegel notes the vitality of Kant’s enlarged thought only to reduce it to a shape that is 
defined philosophically, thus occluding the tragedy of philosophy. 
In this light we turn to Nietzsche in Chapter 5, giving particular attention to his most 
extensive engagement with tragedy: The Birth of Tragedy (BT). Nietzsche argued that Hegel’s 
attempt to ground the superiority of philosophy over tragedy merely continues the traditional 
attempt to bring the dynamism of becoming into the fold of metaphysics by absorbing time 
and history into the ‘Divine Tragedy’ of the Idea. In Nietzsche’s view, philosophy does not 
heal the experience of tragedy but occludes it, compelling experience ‘to cling close to the 
trunk of dialectic’ while consciousness ‘withdraws into the cocoon of logical schematism’ 
(BT 91). Philosophy is a veneer of a self-deception while art draws us into the deeper truth 
where violence, strife and conflict are imagined as inextricable from Being. The question I 
pose to the Nietzsche of BT is whether his purely aesthetic understanding of reality achieves 
the end he desires: to reconcile us to the world and thereby open us to an aesthetic 
redemption. By turning to Nietzsche’s understanding of Kant’s CJ, which, I suggest, is largely 
refracted in BT through a thinly-veiled appropriation of Schopenhauer, we find that Nietzsche 
merely inverts the so-called ‘Kantian dualism’ and thus occludes the opening toward new 
form that Kant cleaves in philosophical history. To outline the consequences of Nietzsche’s 
argument we turn to another historical moment in which tragedy arises as a central theme to 
philosophical reflection in Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption. Rosenzweig assists us to 
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see that by attempting to equate reality and aesthetics Nietzsche destroys philosophy’s ability 
to perceive the ethical dimension of experience, and thus can only achieve aesthetic 
redemption at an unacceptable cost. 
In Chapter 6 we find that Heidegger begins his critique of Nietzsche in similar terms 
to both Benjamin and Rosenzweig, declaring that Nietzsche stands as the last metaphysician 
who fails to overcome the problematic dualism he inherits from Kant. In a letter to Karl 
Jaspers written after WWII, Heidegger claims that the lectures he gave after his resignation 
from the Rectorate of Freiburg University – lectures in which he considers Nietzsche, 
Hölderlin and Greek tragedy – constitute a ‘confrontation’ with National Socialism. To assess 
whether this self-defence is valid, this chapter examines two of these lecture series, 
Introduction to Metaphysics and Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’, in which Heidegger critiques 
the technical thinking he saw in National Socialism through reference to tragedy. Through 
exploring Jaspers’ response to Heidegger’s interpretation of tragedy in Tragedy is Not 
Enough, it is argued that Heidegger’s reading of the tragedies ultimately serves to unveil the 
philosophical origin of the political sphere. But by collapsing the distinction between the 
philosophic and the political, Heidegger conceives of history not as the result of human action 
but as the recognition of an existing meaning. This understanding of the work of tragedy, I 
argue, entails that Heidegger’s critique of technical thinking is unable to constitute a 
meaningful confrontation with the prevailing political order. Heidegger’s reading of tragedy, 
we conclude, unveils the polis as a site of interpersonal engagement only to undermine its 
significance. 
Chapter 7 considers Castoriadis’ interpretation of tragedy as a critique of the Idealist 
and Nietzschean views. The significance of Castoriadis’ interpretation, I argue, is that he turns 
precisely to Kant’s CJ to critique these views, suggesting that Kant’s reflective procedure not 
only recognises the tragedy of philosophy but also provides a profound solution. He draws 
from Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger in order to elucidate the implications of Kant’s CJ for 
contemporary philosophy, turning this conversation into a path to overcome determinacy in 
various guises – such as Marxism, structuralism, and Heideggerian phenomenology – in order 
to elucidate the organic freedom of human cognition. Castoriadis’ interpretation of tragedy 
enables us to see that Kant’s CJ begins to enlarge our vision in a way that is analogous to the 
tragedies, reframing human dependency as the condition of the possibility of creativity and 
casting freedom as a collective project. 
The final chapter of this thesis, Chapter 8, concludes this study by identifying three 
dimensions of an enlarged way of thinking that are developed in philosophy’s contemporary 
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turn to tragedy: the expansion of the imagination, the recognition of ethical complexity, and 
the search for a new understanding of universality. These themes express the ongoing 
significance of Kant’s enlarged way of thinking for navigating the failure of philosophy to 
respond to human problems that lie outside the limits of our understanding, and point us 
toward the contemporary significance of the problematic of tragedy. 
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PART I 
 
KANT’S CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT
 30 
CHAPTER 1 
The Eighteenth Century Background to the Tragedy of Philosophy 
 
 
Human reason has [a] peculiar fate … [It] falls into this embarrassment through 
no fault of its own (CPR Aviii).1 
 
 
The aim of Part I of this thesis is to outline an alternative to the Idealist and the 
Nietzschean views by reconsidering the role of Kant’s CJ in philosophy’s ongoing dialogue 
regarding the significance of tragedy. Before I turn to Kant, it is necessary to examine the 
background to philosophy’s renewed interest in tragedy, a task that requires us to begin well 
before Kant’s critical work. In this chapter I argue that tragedy returned to philosophy’s 
attention in the midst of the social, scientific, and political change occurring during the 
eighteenth century in the work of thinkers who argued that traditional philosophy was unable 
to navigate the new demands of their time. In the work of these thinkers we find a search for a 
new procedure by which to reconcile the empirical sciences and traditional philosophy in the 
midst of a rapidly changing world, and, I will suggest, tragedy was central to this task. 
Before I begin, it is necessary to situate this renewed interest in tragedy in the context 
of a broader reconsideration of Aristotle’s practical and rhetorical texts such as Nicomachean 
Ethics, Rhetoric, and, most importantly, the text in which Aristotle considers Greek tragedy as 
the most philosophic of the arts: Poetics. Philosophers concerned with the dramatic social 
change of the eighteenth century found Aristotle’s distinction between the two modes of 
practical knowledge we identified in the Introduction, techne and phronesis, as an alternative 
to rationalism’s exclusive focus on technical thinking. Identifying the way that these 
philosophers appropriated Aristotle is not a matter of judging whether their interpretation of 
his work was correct or misleading. Rather, it is a matter of identifying the significance which 
parts of Aristotle’s writings they chose to prioritise. One of the questions I will consider is 
why Aristotle’s practical and rhetorical texts become a particular matter of importance during 
the eighteenth century.                                                               
1 I have modified Guyer and Wood’s translation of Verlegenheit from ‘perplexity’ to ‘embarrassment’ in order to 
highlight the continuity of Kant’s observation with his recognition of another embarrassment of reason in CJ 
(5:169). See Chapter 2. 
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To examine what philosophers searching for an alternative to rationalism during the 
eighteenth century found useful in Aristotle’s practical philosophy, it is vital to look closer at 
Aristotle’s distinction between the two kinds of practical knowledge, techne and phronesis. 
Here it is important to note that Aristotle’s typology of practical knowledge deviates sharply 
from Plato. For Plato, techne exhausts the whole of practical knowledge, and involves the 
application of knowledge according to predefined rules. What techne brings into being is an 
imitation or reworking of a pre-defined, natural model. The natural model is the highest form 
of reality, and the task of techne is to make the real actual.  
Aristotle employs the basic form of Plato’s techne, but makes two important 
adjustments. The first is to problematise the strict distinction between the actual and the real. 
While in some instances techne imitates nature, in other instances techne ‘completes what 
nature cannot bring to a full finish’.2 This seems to imply that techne does not imitate a 
natural model, but is somehow involved in the completion of nature itself. Aristotle makes a 
second adjustment to Plato’s conception of techne by separating it from a second kind of 
practical knowledge: phronesis. In Book IV of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle separates 
technical creativity from practical action in terms of poiesis (art or production) and phronesis 
(practical judgment). Both poiesis and phronesis constitute actions that deal with ‘things that 
admit of being other than they are’, that is, with things that are contingent and singular in 
character. To this extent they are the same, for they both deal with practical matters. This 
difference lies in the way that each proceeds according to a distinctive understanding of end. 
Poiesis is technical, because it produces according to rules. It has ‘an end other than itself’, 
such as the application of rules to produce a work of art or a product of determinant 
knowledge. Phronesis, on the other hand, is not technical but a mode of praxis, meaning that 
it ‘is itself an end’, namely ‘good action’. It is ‘concerned with the ultimate particular fact, 
since the thing to be done is of this nature [i.e. particular]’.3 As we explored in the 
Introduction, ‘technical’ considerations are opposed to ‘political’ considerations as artistic 
technique (knowing how to play the piano) is opposed to expression and interpretation (the 
creative extension of a piece into the present). 
In this chapter I argue that the significance of Aristotle’s separation of poiesis and 
phronesis for philosophers searching for an alternative to the technical understanding of 
practical reason is that it identifies an alternative to the exclusive focus on techne by 
recognising some instances where the technical application of knowledge is appropriate (i.e.                                                              
2 Aristotle, Physics, 199a15-21. 
3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1142a25f. 
 32 
where there is an end in view) and others for which no rules can be found. What was 
attractive in Aristotle’s notion of phronesis is that it identifies mode of thinking that does not 
operate according to pre-established rules and yet is not subject to chaos. In other words, it 
provides a model for a reasoned way of thinking in singular cases for which no rules are 
available. When practical knowledge is understood solely within the paradigm of techne, as 
we find in Plato’s account, it is limited to that which is rule-governed and adheres to pre-
established form. This is appropriate for settings in which the end can be held in view – in 
cases that are universal – but ceases to be effective when the end is unknown – in cases that 
are singular. Separating technical knowledge from the creativity of phronesis, on the other 
hand, provides an alternative mode of practical thinking that is attuned to singular 
appearances. 
The renewed significance of Aristotle’s practical philosophy during the eighteenth 
century reflects a broader shift occurring in aesthetics between a technical, rule-governed 
understanding of art and an understanding of artistic creativity that emphasised the 
transgressive ability of genius to produce new form: to create works of art that are ends in 
themselves. In his interpretation of tragedy in Poetics, Aristotle was seen to be identifying 
creativity expressed in the work of art (techne) with the creativity of phronesis; the techne of 
the tragedians does not so much follow rules as give rule, bringing a new artistic genre into 
being. By focusing on the reception of Aristotle’s work in eighteenth century thought, this 
chapter argues that tragedy did not return to philosophical discourse in post-Kantian 
philosophy during the early nineteenth century, as the Idealist view suggests. Rather, it argues 
that tragedy returns during the mid-eighteenth century in the work of poets, biologists, and 
philosophers as a way of navigating the growing divide between traditional philosophy and 
the experience of nature as a domain of radical singularity, open to transformation at the 
hands of human creativity. 
 
1.1 Rationalism and the problem of life 
 
In order to understand the failure of traditional philosophy to navigate problems 
specific to the mid-eighteenth century, I begin by identifying the challenge posed to 
rationalism by the rapidly increasing influence of the empirical sciences. To elucidate this 
challenge, a brief excursus to Medieval philosophy is necessary, for the tension in modern 
thought between the theoretical understanding of nature and empirical science is ultimately a 
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collision of a traditional constellation of thinking and novel demands, or, in the terms of 
tragedy, of the old gods and the new. 
In Medieval philosophy, reflections on the empirical dimension of experience, such as 
science and art, draw from neo-Platonic resources, particularly from the transcendental 
principle of beauty. An important text of neo-Platonism, Plato’s Timaeus, articulates a rational 
cosmology in terms of mathematics. By upholding mathematics as the foundational principle 
of order, neo-Platonism gives an image of the world as, to use Umberto Eco’s words, 
something ‘endowed with artistic order and resplendent with beauty’.4 The creative act of the 
demiurge is not creation ex nihilo but a kind of production through which the demiurge 
imitates the eternal world of form in order to shape the material world. Thus our sensory 
knowledge and our experience of beauty are complete only when they recognise the higher 
form in which they participate. Thomas Aquinas, for example, defines beauty as ‘a 
participation in the first cause, which makes all things beautiful. So that the beauty of 
creatures is simply a likeness of the divine beauty in which things participate’.5 For Aquinas, 
beautiful things do not establish new form but are produced according to pre-defined laws that 
allow it to participate in a beauty that is identified with Being itself. Such beauty is produced 
by nature according to necessary and sufficient principles, meaning that beauty in works 
produced by human skill is merely the representation of pre-established form. The beautiful is 
a First Principle, an original harmony from which all things derive. Thus Aquinas can state 
that ‘[e]verything that exists comes from beauty and goodness (from God) as an effective 
principle. And things have their being in beauty and goodness as if in a principle that 
preserves and maintains’.6  
Aquinas’ understanding of beauty as an effective principle builds not only from neo-
Platonic sources, but also from the speculative systems of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and 
Physics. Carol Poster describes Aquinas’ understanding of Aristotle as the ‘scientific-
technical’ reading of his work; a reading that was common in medieval thought.7 This reading 
is reflected in the fact that Aristotle’s rhetorical and practical texts did not feature in Medieval 
handbooks of the arts curriculum, and neither were Rhetoric nor Poetics printed in the original 
five-volume Aldine Aristotle (1495-1498).8 The absence of Greek tragedy in the Latin west 
meant that Aristotle’s Poetics had little purchase on the Medieval imagination, while the                                                              
4 Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, trans. H. Bredin, London: Radius, 1988, p. 23. 
5 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Divine Names, in Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, p. 27. 
6 ibid. 
7 Carol Poster, ‘Whose Aristotle? Which Aristotelianism?: A Historical Prolegomenon to Thomas Farrell’s 
Norms of Rhetorical Culture’, in Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 41, No. 4, 2008, pp. 373-397, p. 385. 
8 See ibid., p. 379. 
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poetics of Islamic philosopher Averroës, which outline a writing pedagogy that addressed 
poetry and prose together, were more easily assimilated into Medieval cultural life.9 
The role of Aquinas’ scientific-technical reading of Aristotle in establishing the 
priority of technical thinking in modern philosophy is that it collapses the distinction between 
poiesis and praxis, establishing thinking in the paradigm of poiesis as philosophical 
orthodoxy. The mode of practical knowledge appropriate in a world that comes into being 
according to an efficient principle, that is, a pre-established rule, is one that operates 
according to such rules. The inability to distinguish poiesis and praxis is evident in Medieval 
Latin. As Bernard Lonergan notes, ‘both poiesis and praxis might be rendered as actio’ in 
Medieval Latin.10 Aquinas does distinguish two kinds of action, one that is proper to 
production and one to action, but this distinction was between ‘the actio of moral conduct, 
which is a perfection of the agent, and the actio, more properly factio, which transforms 
external matter’.11 Aquinas’ translation of praxis as factio ascribes ‘actions done’ to the same 
framework as ‘things made’, that is, it ascribes to praxis the same movement though which a 
thing is produced. In his technical definition, there is no political realm in which ends are 
created, but only a realm applying pre-established ends in the shape of moral principles. 
Aquinas states that ‘action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action 
proceeds from some cause or principle to what is from that principle’.12 Action is not 
conceived of as the result of a process of deliberation but as techne, which means that it 
originates from a cause or principle which provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
its being. Understanding action in terms of techne expresses what Dewey called the 
technalised imagination in which ideas can be separated from the agent without deliberative 
contingency of praxis. For the technalised imagination, action is pure, stemming from a single 
intention located in the agent. It is not an end itself, but works toward realising a pre-given 
end. Thus the temporality of action is thus a problem, for the coexistence of cause, action, and 
effect in the moment of deliberation in Aristotle’s praxis must be replaced with a model 
where action takes place after the cause (i.e. as a result of some rule), but before the presence 
of the effect.13 
                                                             
9 For a discussion of Averroës’ influence on the reception of Poetics and tragedy in general in the thirteenth 
century, see Henry Kelly, Ideas and Forms of Tragedy from Aristotle to the Middle Ages, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993, especially Chapter 1. 
10 Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1997, p. 129. 
11 ibid. 
12 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Chicago: 
William Benton, 1942, 41:1, p. 383. 
13 See Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000, p. 48. 
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More than four centuries after Aquinas, Descartes presents a scientific-technical 
reading of Aristotle in The Principles of Philosophy (1644). Echoing Aquinas’ argument in 
the Summa Theologica that ‘[i]n the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection’,14 
Descartes argues that the natural order is grounded in original perfection: 
 
I do not doubt that the world was created in the beginning with all the perfection which it now 
possesses; so that the Sun, the Earth, the Moon, and the Stars existed in it, and so that the 
Earth did not only contain the seeds of plants but was covered by actual plants; and that Adam 
and Eve were not born as children but created as adults. The Christian faith teaches us this, 
and natural reason convinces us that this is true; because, taking into account the omnipotence 
of God, we must believe that everything He created was perfect in every way.15 
 
Descartes’ natural theology seems to reproduce Aquinas’ notion of original perfection. He 
gives a purely mechanistic explanation for the entire universe, including living beings, from 
material elements, and gives no reference to any form or to any teleology. However, he 
continues: 
 
nevertheless, just as for an understanding of the nature of plants or men it is better by far to 
consider how they can gradually grow from seeds than how they were created [entire] by God 
in the very beginning of the world; so, if we can devise some principles which are very simple 
and easy to know and by which we can demonstrate that the stars and the Earth, and indeed 
everything which we perceive in this visible world, could have sprung forth as if from certain 
seeds (even though we know that things did not happen that way); we shall in that way explain 
their nature much better than if we were merely to describe them as they are now.16 
 
It appears that Descartes provides two different explanations of the same facts: one that is 
purely mechanical and one that is organic, and maintains them both. The former turns on the 
belief of how the world was created, while the latter involves the description of how it is. The 
tension between these two views is between a mechanical and an organic understanding of 
nature, or between Descartes’ inherited Thomism and a modern scientific explanation.17 
These two views correspond to the degrees of knowledge Descartes identifies, the highest of 
which is based on clear and distinct concepts, and the second degree encompassing all that is 
learned from the senses.18 
                                                             
14 Aquinas states that ‘[i]n the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act preceds potentiality; 
for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, 94:3, p. 
730. 
15 René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, trans. V. Miller & R. Miller, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1982, p. 105 (Part III, § 45). 
16 ibid., pp. 105-106. 
17 This is not to say that Thomism and modern science are antithetical, but that Descartes’ rationalist theology is 
at odds with modern science. 
18 See, for example, the opening paragraphs of Descartes’ Third Meditation. René Descartes, Discourse on 
Method and The Mediations, trans. F. Sutcliffe, London: Penguin Books, 1968, p. 113f. 
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Yet there is no tension between ‘organism’ and ‘mechanism’ for Descartes, for he 
understands both in terms of the First Principle. To consider nature as the causal result of a 
First Principle assumes a model of creation much like Aristotle’s techne, which operates 
according to pre-given rules. Knowledge gained by the senses is lower than the clarity and 
distinctness of conceptual knowledge, for appearances do not disclose original perfection but 
constitute an imperfect expression of the First Principle. Thus the task of natural philosophy, 
as Descartes notes, is to find ‘several principles which are quite intelligible and quite simple’ 
that might explain how an original seed or First Principle causes the appearances gathered by 
the senses. It is precisely these principles that Isaac Newton attempts to lay down in 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1687); principles that outline the 
mathematics of causality in order to explain the development of natural phenomena without 
reference to teleology. 
For Leibniz, however, Descartes’ causal conception of nature and ends restricts God’s 
gracious care for the creation by casting God as a divine watchmaker, a problem that is 
manifest in Descartes’ mind-body problem. By rendering mind as res cogitans and body as 
res extensa, Descartes requires a mechanical explanation of how the two substances can 
interact. For mind to interact with matter, it must somehow enter the realm of causation, 
becoming causally determined. Thus God’s gracious care for God’s creation must submit to 
the order determined by mechanical philosophy, meaning that the kingdom of grace is 
subordinated to the kingdom of law for the sake of scientific knowledge. Leibniz’ solution is 
to posit the pre-established harmony of mind and body, separating spirit and flesh so that the 
two modes of explanation – nature and grace – can dwell harmoniously together. As he states 
in §79 of Monadology (1714), 
 
Souls act according to the laws of final causes, through appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies 
act according to the laws of efficient causes or of motions. And these two kingdoms, that of 
efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with each other.19 
 
For Leibniz, the mind or soul operates according to particular ends that are explainable in 
terms of final causation, while the actions of the body, instances of matter in motion 
according to the claims of mechanical philosophy, are explained in terms of efficient 
causation. ‘[T]hough this is impossible’, he states, souls act as if there were no bodies and 
bodies as if there were no souls, and yet ‘both act as if each influenced each other’.20                                                              
19 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadology, in Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays, trans & ed. D. 
Garber & R. Ariew, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991, p. 79. 
20 ibid., p. 80 (§81). 
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In order to seal the primacy of God’s grace over the threat posed by the empirical 
sciences, Leibniz separates the soul and body into two realms that are necessarily inseparable, 
which allows natural philosophy to use both efficient and final causation as harmonious, 
albeit contradictory, forms of explanation. Thus the construction of a metaphysical system 
such as that put forward in the Monadology is the first task of science if its empirical 
observation of the mechanical order is to harmonise with final causation. The great foundation 
for such a system, Leibniz states, is mathematics, which gives us the principle of identity: 
‘that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time’.21 This single principle, 
according to Leibniz, ‘is sufficient to demonstrate every part of arithmetic and geometry, that 
is, all mathematical principles’.22 Yet in order to proceed from mathematics to natural 
philosophy, ‘another principle is required’: ‘the principle of sufficient reason, namely, that 
nothing happens without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise’.23 The principle 
of sufficient reason reproduces Aquinas’ rejection of the distinction between poiesis and 
praxis, for it entails a world in which every action and event can be explained according to a 
given rule. It guarantees the rational structure of nature, allowing the transition of 
mathematical principles from the theoretical order to our inquiry into nature. In Christian 
Wolff’s terms, the principle of sufficient reason entails that our sensory input cannot yield 
knowledge of natural order, ‘but when understanding is added, the same ideas become 
distinct’, for now the causes are known.24 He explains this hierarchy of knowledge as follows: 
 
Because of that which one knows only by experience, one knows only that it is but does not 
see how it is connected with other truths, in knowledge from experience there is no reason. 
Hence experience is opposed to reason… . We have, then, two ways by which we can reach 
the knowledge of truth: experience and reason. The former is based on the senses, and the 
latter on the understanding.25 
 
In order to accommodate the empirical sciences in philosophy’s conception of knowledge, 
Wolff outlines a system of metaphysics in which there are two modes of knowledge, one 
consisting of passively received sense impressions, the other of understanding. Both constitute 
ways by which we can reach knowledge of the truth, yet because reason is opposed to 
experience, they remain separate, one higher than the other. 
                                                              
21 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Correspondence, ed. R. Ariew, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000, p. 7. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid. 
24 Christian Wolff, German Metaphysics, §277, in Lewis Beck (ed.), Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, New York: 
The Free Press, 1966, p. 218-221. 
25 ibid., §370. 
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1.2 Epigenesis: life and final causation 
 
While the rationalist method of Leibniz and Wolff sealed the clarity of the rational 
conception of nature over the confusion of the empirical conception, both perspectives came 
into a dramatic tension in the developing field of biological science in the mid-eighteenth 
century. This tension is particularly evident in the debate occurring in the development of 
biology between defendants of the traditional, preformationist concept of nature in which 
nature operates according to the principles of mechanical philosophy, and advocates of a new, 
epigenetic concept that is only explainable by empirical judgments of final causation. The 
significance of the epigenetic view, I will suggest, is that it posed a fundamental challenge to 
the primacy of metaphysics over empirical observation, effacing the impassable boundary 
between the Leibnizian spheres of nature and grace.26 
On one side of the debate, the preformationists held that the form of a living thing 
exists prior to its development and has existed since the beginning of the creation. It 
postulates an original organisation that, as Peter McLaughlin describes, ‘explained why only 
those of the physically possible particle combinations that actually exist were chosen by the 
Creator in the beginning’.27 God’s original creative act establishes a Frist Principle, 
determining all possible form, thus presuming a mechanical view of the world that unfolds 
according to an efficient principle. On the other side of the debate, advocates of epigenesis 
argued that the form of a living thing comes into existence in its birth. The parts do not 
determine the whole but rather the whole gives the proper form for the generation of the parts. 
In an epigenetic universe, new form is created wherever there is life, meaning that the world 
is infused with creation and spontaneity as each living thing expresses its own form. This idea 
                                                             
26 This debate, I will show in the following chapters, had a significant impact on Kant’s argument in CJ. In §81, 
for example, Kant observes that we can consider ‘each organic being generated from its own kind as either the 
educt or the product of the latter. The system of generatings as mere educts is called that of individual 
preformation or the theory of evolution; the system of generatings as products is called the system of epigenesis’. 
27 Peter McLaughlin, ‘Newtonian Biology and Kant’s Mechanistic Concept of Causality,’ in Paul Guyer, Kant’s 
Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, pp. 209-217, 
p. 210. 
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poses a radical challenge to the pre-established form of the preformationist view, for in such a 
framework contingency and novelty are basic to life.28  
In Histoire Naturalle (1749), French botanist Conte de Buffon made a decisive 
argument in favour of the epigenetic view, arguing that epigenesis required a new procedure 
for thinking about the concepts we use to categorise nature that allows for contingency, a 
procedure he called ‘natural history’.29 Buffon argues that while the natural world appears to 
us as ‘Cosmos’, an ordered whole where all that might possibly exist does exist, schematic 
order is a subjective result of the workings of the human mind rather than a reflection of 
objectively existing reality. This argument problematises the primacy of metaphysics in 
natural philosophy, for it suggests that if we begin from concepts then our empirical analysis 
merely conforms to the concepts we use. For example, if we presume that nature organises 
itself according to the concepts of genus and species, then the existence of genus and species 
is precisely what we find in our empirical analysis. For Buffon, the schematising activity of 
cognition problematises the method of botanists such as Carl Linnaeus, for their attempts to 
provide an encyclopaedic taxonomy of plant life fails to question the mental schema that 
makes such an attempt possible.30 To overcome the narrow focus assumed by the 
preformationists, Buffon calls for a ‘quality of spirit’ that ‘makes us capable of grasping 
distant relationships, bringing them together, and making out of them a body of reasoned 
                                                             
28 The theory of epigenesis opens the door for the notion of a living principle – what Blumenbach called the 
Bildungstrieb (formative impulse) – which infuses the natural order and gives life to matter (See CJ 5:424). In 
Blumenbach’s terms, ‘the word Bildungstrieb just like the words attraction, gravity, etc., serves no other purpose 
than to designate a force whose constant effect is known from experience, but whose cause just like the cause of 
the above mentioned so universally recognized natural forces is for us a qualitas occulta’. Blumenbach’s 
anthropology had a significant impact on Kant, and the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment’ can be read as a 
sustained reflection on the difficulties encountered in Blumenbach’s understanding of nature. Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach, Uber den Bildungstrieb, in McLaughlin, ‘Newtonian Biology and Kant’s Mechanistic Concept of 
Causality’, p. 209. 
29 Kant first grappled with Buffon’s work in the lectures he gave on physical geography in 1775. What was of 
particular interest to Kant was Buffon’s redefinition of the term ‘natural history’ that refigured the study of 
history according to a scientific method. Kant adopts Buffon’s new definition of natural history, arguing that it 
would ‘transform the currently so diffuse system of academic natural description into a physical system for the 
understanding [i.e. a science]’. Kant, ‘Von den verschiedenen Racen der Mensch,’ in John Zammito, The 
Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 200. Kant reconsiders 
Buffon’s ideas again in CJ, though without referring to him explicitly. See § 80. 
30 In a marginal note to the First Introduction to CJ, Kant criticises Linnaeus for presuming that his taxonomy 
(the western taxonomy of genus and species) corresponds to real similarities and difference in the inner nature of 
things: ‘Could Linnaeus have hoped to outline a system of nature if he had had to worry that if he found a stone 
that he called granite, this might differ in its internal constitution from every other stone which nevertheless 
looked just like it, and all he could hope to find were always individual things, as it were isolated for the 
understanding and never a class of them that could be brought under concepts of genus and species[?]’. What 
Kant finds in Buffon is the self-regulating power of judgment; to draw disparate parts of experience into 
concepts that it holds to be regulative, not constitutive, of experience (CJ 20:216n). 
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ideas’.31 The new procedure he outlines does not begin from the categories we already 
possess in order to explain nature. Rather, it begins from phenomena; that is, it begins without 
a concept and aims to bring the chaotic appearances together in order to create ideas for the 
interests of human cognition. Such a procedure would be both empirical and rational, for it 
begins with phenomena and then searches for a concept. 
Buffon realised the radical challenge this view posed to rationalist philosophy. If 
research into organic processes revealed natural agency, then natural history would have to 
commit itself to the principle that nature is susceptible to change. Yet if we consider nature in 
terms of change, then the tension between Descartes’ two explanations becomes an 
irresolvable antinomy. We can set out the antinomy by using Descartes’ tree example. If a tree 
in its final state is different from its initial state as a seed, then there will be some features of a 
tree that are different from the seed. The question is what relationship those features of the 
tree bear to the seed: are these novel features of the tree already present implicitly, but not 
apparently, in the seed? If so, then they are not actually new but are derived from an original 
order. However, if the novel features are not to be found in the seed, then they must be 
contingent, and thus unexplained. In this formulation it seems that the tree is either 
inexplicable in relation to the seed, or it is not really a development from the seed at all. 
To suggest that organic life is subject to change is to radically alter the goal of 
describing nature. Change produces variation, which, if true, means that the task of natural 
history is not simply taxonomy but genealogy.32 Categories such as genus and species would 
be the ideas that humans have found useful in order to bring order to the chaotic mass of 
natural phenomena, meaning that ‘natural history’ would not be merely a study of objects but 
a self-reflective inquiry into our own faculty of categorisation. From the view of natural 
history, categories such as genus and species would be self-created ideas, allowing us to see 
more than there actually is in the information delivered by our senses. For Buffon, to say that 
our categories are contingent does not entail that nature is chaos, for the fact that we have 
categories at all suggests that nature is highly amenable to systematisation. Rather, Buffon 
argues that in order to recognise the contingency of our understanding of nature without 
collapsing into chaos, we cannot think of nature in terms of Aristotle’s notion of efficient 
causation. Instead, we must think of nature as an organic whole that organises itself according 
to Aristotle’s notion of final causation. In this paradigm, the form of nature (such as genus                                                              
31 Comte de Buffon, ‘The “Initial Discourse” to Buffon’s “Histoire Naturalle”: The First Complete English 
Translation’, in Journal of the History of Biology, 9(1), 1976, pp. 133-181, p. 172. 
32 Jennifer Mensch, Kant’s Organicism, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013, p. 4. 
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and species) does not dwell in nature, as does the soul of Leibnizian monads. In Leibniz’s 
conception of the monad, soul and body dwell harmoniously together in impassable spheres. 
Rather, the form of nature is expressed by what appears as nature unfolds according to its own 
inner purpose. Thus sensation and reason would be required to discern this purpose. This 
view is much closer to Aristotle’s form/matter distinction than Leibnizian metaphysics, for it 
entails that when matter is in motion, the cause of its coming-to-be (its form) is expressed in 
the movement of its parts.33 
As scientists such as Buffon became increasingly aware of the creative dimensions of 
cognition, the realm of art – and Aristotle’s theory of art in particular – gained a new 
significance in the task of exploring the nature of experience. If thought is free from natural 
constraints and gives order to experience according to categories of its own devising, such as 
genus and species, then we might say that it has an ‘artistic’ dimension, crafting an image of 
nature that extends beyond the data given by the senses. It does not operate according to rules 
in the framework of techne – indeed it cannot, for the end of nature is emergent rather than 
pre-given. Rather, it creatively deliberates in a situation in which no rules are sufficient to 
navigate the dynamism of life in the paradigm of praxis. 
The importance of Buffon’s argument in Histoire Naturalle is that calls for a new 
procedure by which to navigate the contingency of sensory experience. Because natural 
history begins from nature’s self-expression, a new spirit of inquiry is required that does not 
seek to imitate a stable foundation but begins from the products of nature in order to discern 
their inner purpose. When science is no longer understood as the imitation of nature but as a 
creative project that must actively come to nature in order to be taught by it, a new conception 
of the agency of both the scientist and nature is required. The following two sections examine 
the attempts to build such a new conception of agency by rationalist and empiricist 
philosophers. While rationalists such as Baumgarten elucidate the importance of a sensuous 
kind of cognition, I will suggest that it is empiricists such as Hume and Moor who understand 
this new kind of cognition in terms of reason. It is this move, I will argue, that brought the 
problematic of tragedy to their attention. In the final section I explore a third alternative that 
draws from both rationalism and empiricism in the work of Herder. Herder, I will show, 
outlines the use of reason in sensuous life in a way that is drawn from Greek tragedy. 
 
                                                             
33 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1034b12. 
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1.3 The rationalist response: aesthetics 
 
The growing acceptance of the theory of epigenesis during the mid-eighteenth century 
threatened to undermine the authority of theoretical philosophy’s clear and distinct reasoning, 
for it entails a concept of nature that resists the conceptual determination of rationalism. In the 
mechanical conception of nature, emergent features can be explained according to a First 
Principle. However, no amount of speculation can result in a clear and distinct idea of a living 
being, for its form can only be judged through empirical observation. In the theory of 
epigenesis, the emergent features of living beings are singular and contingent, and hence 
cannot be explained by a rationalist concept of nature. In this context it seemed to many 
philosophers that the hegemony of philosophy over the sciences was coming to an end, and 
that a new way of thinking about the natural world was required. 
Alexander Gottleib Baumgarten, a student of Wolff, attempted to re-establish the 
primacy of philosophy by calling for a systematic study of the means by which we acquire 
and express sensory knowledge. In this study, Baumgarten sought to find an objective validity 
for sensuous thought and a claim to truth that was equal to cognition.34 While he retained 
Descartes and Wolff’s distinction between the higher and lower faculties, he explored the 
faculty of sensuous knowledge to provide a rational foundation for empirical science. In 
paradigmatic terms, Baumgarten termed this science ‘aesthetics’, defining its parameters in 
the opening paragraph of the Aesthetica (1750) as follows: 
 
Aesthetics (the theory of the liberal arts, the lesser theory of knowledge, the art of thinking 
beautifully, the art of reason by analogy) is the science of sensuous cognition.35 
 
Just as logic is concerned with the operations of reason and the understanding, Baumgarten 
suggests that the new discipline of aesthetics ought to be concerned with what we apprehend 
through the senses.36 Through giving attention to individual appearances, he argues that 
Wolff’s distinct idea comes at a significant cost. By subsuming an individual appearance 
under a concept or by enumerating its attributes, anything that exceeds our capacity of 
understanding is occluded. In Baumgarten’s terms, 
 
                                                             
34 Jane Kneller, ‘Imaginative Freedom and the German Enlightenment’, in Paul Guyer, Kant’s Critique of the 
Power of Judgment: Critical Essays, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, pp. 181-198, p. 182. 
35 Alexander Baumgarten, Aesthetica, I. C. Kleyb, 1950, §1. 
36 Gregory Moore, in Johann Gottfried Herder, Selected writings on aesthetics, trans. G. Moore, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 4. 
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the specific formal perfection contained in cognition and logical truth had to be bought dearly 
by a great and significant loss of material perfection. For what else is abstraction than a loss?37 
 
While logic arrives at clear and distinct concepts though abstraction and simplification, 
Baumgarten suggests that by privileging logical form over sensuous appearance, Wolff’s 
theoretical knowledge could provide only a partial and impoverished perspective of the world. 
Epistemology cannot ‘reach the knowledge of the truth’, for Baumgarten, which is the very 
task it was meant to complete.38 Opposed to Wolff’s constrained picture of reason, aesthetics 
is an exercise in our capacity to grasp reality in its particularity and complexity, drawing what 
exceeds our logical systematisation into view. 
According to Baumgarten, art provides an alternative kind of synthesis to the marriage 
of concepts and appearances in the mind, for it does not work with abstractions (i.e. it does 
not proceed from concept to appearance) but with the totality of an organism. An artwork is 
produced by the collaboration of the sensuous, imaginative and intellectual faculties, meaning 
that it is both an interaction with the world we experience and the synthesis of this material 
with intellectual ideas. The synthesis afforded in art cannot be understood in the Platonic 
terms of mimesis, for it is utterly new and unprecedented in every case. Yet as an operation of 
understanding it is a mode of knowledge – of truth – for through sensuous cognition we come 
to learn about the world in its complexity. In this framework truth does not pre-exist 
cognition, but is a cognitive activity of the subject. If art is truly such a synthesis, then, as 
Aristotle claims in Poetics, the study of art will shed light on the complexities of human 
nature and experience to the fullest degree. Moreover, art history will be the locus for a new 
philosophical study in anthropology (just as natural history becomes a kind of genealogy for 
Buffon), for sensuous cognition is temporal, expressing a particular experience that is not 
limited to timeless being. If artworks have rules, they are not objective necessities or natural 
regularities but the products of human freedom. Thus artworks give an immanent revelation 
of the unbounded freedom of human agency. 
While Baumgarten attempts to seal the philosophical legitimacy of sensuous 
experience, he remains unable to ground an independent science of human sensibility. His 
notion of truth remains monopolised by the higher cognitive faculty, thus failing to break with 
the rationalist mind/body split of Wolffian philosophy. As Angelica Nuzzo notes, Baumgarten                                                              
37 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §538, in Brigin Kaiser, ‘On Aesthetics, Aisthetics and Sensation: reading 
Baumgarten with Leibniz and Deleuze’, Esthetica, www.estheticatijdschrift.nl, viewed on 30/10/2012. 
38 As Andrew Bowie notes, after Baumgarten aesthetics becomes ‘the location in which what has been repressed 
by a limited conception of reason can be articulated’. Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to 
Nietzsche, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990, p. 4. 
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leaves no path for empirical observation to connect to the ‘history, anthropology, and moral 
philosophy in a way that can positively defy the charge of materialism and the attacks of 
skepticism’.39 By remaining committed to rationalist metaphysics, his philosophy entails an 
account of aesthetic judgment that is exempt from the constraints of cognition. The problem 
that remains after Baumgarten’s aesthetics is how sense and reason might be linked.  
 
1.4 The empiricist response: taste 
 
In ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ (1757), David Hume outlines an alternative solution to 
the problem of sense and reason to that put forward by Baumgarten. To do so, he confronts a 
certain ‘species of philosophy’ that Baumgarten remains committed to; one that separates 
experience from reason, thereby destroying the possibility of aesthetic agreement. This 
species, of course, is rationalism. In such a species of philosophy, Hume explains, 
 
[a]ll sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, and is 
always real, wherever a man is conscious of it. But all determinations of the understanding are 
not right; because they have a reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of 
fact; and are not always conformable to that standard.40 
 
Hume criticises the rationalist juxtaposition of the contingency of sentiment with the 
determinacy of the understanding. To provide an alternative, he reconsiders the concept of 
taste. 
Taste, for Hume, is a sensuous measure that operates in accord with reason. It is not 
reason itself, which, in his account, is the calculative exercise of human thought that draws 
ideas into logical relation, but a mode of thinking appropriate to sensation. In this view, the 
rational boundaries of morality are no longer cast as opposite to the subjectivism of sentiment, 
for both are understood to operate according to empirical (a posteriori) rules. Sentiment, for 
Hume, turns on a productive kind of cognition that is rule bound – rules that are not ‘a priori’, 
‘eternal’ or ‘immutable’, but that share a foundation with the ‘natural sciences’.41 This 
foundation, he states, is ‘experience’. Poetry, for example, is confined by ‘rules of art’, rules 
that are discovered by the author ‘either by genius or observation’.42 The development of taste 
turns on the experience of artworks, whereby one’s mind is furnished with the rules                                                              
39 Angelica Nuzzo, ‘Kant and Herder on Baumgarten’s Aesthetica’, in Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 
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appropriate to a given genre. Thus ‘beauty and deformity’ are not cognitive, that is, they ‘are 
not qualities of objects’, but ‘belong entirely to … sentiment’.43 
Hume first outlined this argument in Treatise On Human Nature (1739-40), where he 
stated that ‘feeling constitutes our praise or admiration’.44 This is to say that feeling or 
sentiment is the beauty of the artwork, meaning that sentiment is the source of value, not the 
artwork itself. In Hume’s terms, the experience of pleasure is singular in every case, 
depending not on thought but on the subjective experience of the perceiver. Thus taste signals 
an autonomous domain that outstrips reason in its ability to set value into motion: 
 
[Reason] conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood; [taste] gives the sentiment of beauty 
and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects, as they really stand in nature … the 
other has a productive faculty [giving rise to] a new creation.45 
 
While reason is concerned with knowledge, meaning that it is limited to nature, taste is 
concerned with aesthetics and virtue, meaning that it is productive. The products of taste are 
new creations, going beyond the material given by nature.  
However, by separating aesthetics from reason and equating taste and virtue, Hume is 
unable to explain the pleasure found in artworks that are not agreeable to the observer. This 
problem becomes evident in his essay ‘Of Tragedy’. In this essay, Hume attempts to explain 
the pleasure that ‘a well-written tragedy’ affords by producing ‘sorrow, terror and anxiety’ 
and other naturally disagreeable emotions.46 To answer this he must outline how our 
disagreeable sentiment at the transgression of order can be converted into agreeable ones if 
sentiment is disconnected from thought. He builds on the thought of French playwright Jean-
Baptiste Dubos, who attempted to defend tragedy as an important part of moral development. 
For Dubos, ‘tragedy excites and cherishes the good passions, but raises abhorrence at the 
vicious and wicked passions’.47 Yet Dubos’ defence of tragedy does not ultimately assist 
Hume’s case, for it raises the question of how tragedy can excite the good passions if it 
presents scenes that ought to occasion a negative response, such as the demise of the good. 
Hume argues that any emotion that ‘attends a passion, is easily converted into it, though in 
their natures they be originally different from, and even contrary to, each other’.48 Because                                                              
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the passions are not caused by the experience of order or disorder but are ‘new creations’, or 
feelings, tragedy manifests the ability of art to ‘convert’ one passion (such as displeasure) into 
another (pleasure). 
By separating the passions or sentiments from ideas – from thought – it is unclear how 
or why such a conversion from a disagreeable to an agreeable sentiment occurs. If sentiment 
and thought are radically separated, one a spontaneous creation and the other a constrained, 
calculative procedure, the process of taking pleasure in the suffering of another on stage is no 
different from taking pleasure in another’s actual suffering. This would mean that it reveals a 
deficiency in moral taste. As Hume states in ‘On the Standard of Taste’, writers who present 
the collapse of order ‘have not pleased by their transgressions of rule or order, but in spite of 
these transgressions: they have possessed other beauties, which were conformable to just 
criticism’.49 Thus for Hume the standard for judging a tragedy relies on its ability to condemn 
vice without presenting action that is ‘too bloody and atrocious’.50  
In The End of Tragedy According to Aristotle (1763), James Moor argues that both 
Dubos and Hume are unable to explain the ‘chief difficulty vis how Tragedy purifies any 
passion by means of exciting that very passion’, for neither understand the significance of 
Aristotle’s notion of katharsis.51 He attributes this misunderstanding to their failure to ‘attend 
to the propriety of the [Greek] language’, arguing that they render Aristotle’s pathê and 
pathêmata as ‘Sufferings, or Calamities’ – that is, to unfortunate external events – rather than 
to emotions occurring within the character.52 Moor argues that the purpose of tragedy for 
Aristotle was to persuade people to remove (katharein) calamities (pathêmata) from the world 
‘by exciting the Pity and Terrour of the audience at the representation of them’.53 The end of 
tragedy is thus moral and political reform by means of educating taste according to reason. 
The pleasure found in tragedy does not come from enjoying another’s suffering, for Moor, but 
in the moral clarification undergone when we come to understand the nature and causes of 
suffering. In other words, the pleasure Aristotle locates in tragedy is intrinsically linked to 
reason, igniting our passion so as to affect a moral transformation in the spectator. If the 
French playwrights could capture this reading of Aristotle, Moor argues, ‘the places of public 
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resort and amusement might become some of the most agreeable and useful schools of 
education’.54 
 Moor’s reading of Aristotle transforms the scientific-technical reading into what 
Poster calls a ‘rhetorical-humanistic’ view.55 Like Dubos and the French playwrights who 
attempted to restage tragedies in the modern age, Moor was frustrated with the scholastic 
focus on Aristotle’s speculative texts and placed greater emphasis on the Politics, Poetics, 
Rhetoric, and ethical treaties. Yet writing against the playwrights who attempted to use 
Poetics as a textbook, Moor reinterprets Aristotle as a practical philosopher; that is, a 
philosopher concerned with ‘the productive arts and those matters about which knowledge is 
probable rather than certain’.56 
The rhetorical-humanistic reading of Aristotle draws our attention to the impossibility 
of designing a science about the particularities of living beings. For events and expressions 
that are singular, proponents of this reading of Aristotle argue that the exclusive focus on 
technical knowledge implicit to traditional philosophy must make room for phronesis. The 
search for universal truths – the goal of science – involves reasoning guided by principles, 
while phronesis, practical judgment, is a mode of reasoning guided by experience. For 
Aristotle, only phronesis is properly called judgment, for it is not predetermined by available 
principles or guided by an end other than itself. As we saw earlier in Aristotle’s definition of 
techne in Physics, art is not concerned with actualising nature through the application of a 
natural standard, as it is for Plato, but with participating in the formation of nature as a shared 
project.57 
Ultimately, Moor’s reading of Aristotle focuses on Aristotle’s efforts to separate 
poiesis and praxis, where poiesis directs itself to the world according to the rules of art 
(techne) and praxis directs itself to the life of the polis (phronesis). While techne operates 
according to rules, phronesis involves the creativity of thought to act apart from rules in the 
framework of reflection and deliberation. For the philosophers who turn to Aristotle’s 
practical and rhetorical works for resources to overcome the scholastic reading, a particular 
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mode of action – what they came to describe in terms of genius – cannot be explained 
according to the rules of techne, for it brings new rules into being. 
 
1.5 Embodied mind: genius 
 
Hume’s separation of taste from reason removes the universality of morality and 
places it at the mercy of social and cultural developments. His subjectivist understanding of 
aesthetic experience – that the experience of beauty, for example, is not determined by the 
artwork’s representation of nature but is produced in the perceiver as a ‘new creation’ – 
reconfigures taste from being a determination from a First Principle to a subjective, 
productive experience. The problem raised by Hume’s work is how to explain the subjectivist 
experience of art while maintaining aesthetic experience in relation to reason. Aesthetics is 
contingent, for it involves the production of form that is free from the ideas of reason. Reason 
is necessary, for it is bound by rules. The question facing aesthetics is whether taste and 
reason can harmonise, and in this section we find that the solution, for Herder, lies in the 
concept of genius. This will prove significant for our reading of Kant, for Herder’s 
understanding of genius allows Kant to identify a way of thinking adequate to the demands of 
sensuous life. 
Before turning to Herder, however, we begin with Englishman Edward Young who 
attempted to build a new theory of creativity that could expand the direction of aesthetics 
beyond the ‘disembodied soul’ assumed by rationalist philosophy. Young attacked the 
neoclassical attempt to reproduce classical art as an infantile relinquishment of responsibility, 
which, ‘like Crutches, are a needful aid to the lame, tho’ an impediment to the strong’.58 The 
self-reflective preface he wrote to his most influential work, Night Thoughts (1742), captures 
his novel understanding of poetry and the moral implications of experiences of sensuous 
experience: 
 
As the occasion of this Poem was real, not fictitious; so the method pursued in it was rather 
imposed by what spontaneously arose in the Author’s mind on that occasion, than meditated 
or designed. Which will appear very probable from the nature of it. For it differs from the 
common mode of poetry, which is, from long narrations to draw short morals. Here, on the 
contrary, the narrative is short, and the morality arising from it makes the bulk of the Poem. 
The reason of it is, that the facts mentioned did naturally pour these moral reflections on the 
thought of the Writer.59                                                              
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Young’s poem had a significant impact on philosophy’s understanding of artistic creation, 
most notably on Edmund Burke who found in it the impetus for his reflections on the 
beautiful and the sublime in Night Thoughts. Young does not portray a rule-governed 
morality, yet neither does he equate morality and taste. Rather, he presents a sensuous 
experience that gives rise to significant moral implications: an experience of nature that pours 
moral reflections into thought. 
Young’s Night Thoughts crafts the poet as a genius, as a second Creator, a promethean 
figure who imitates neither the ancients nor others but only his own experience of nature. 
Genius operates as a mode of shifting the disembodied soul of Baumgarten’s aesthetics 
toward the direction of what we might call, following Nuzzo, an ‘embodied mind’, 
developing an anthropology in which sensuous cognition and reason can be seen as part of the 
same science.60 As Young suggests in the preface to Night Thoughts, the experience of nature 
prompts a sensuous morality that occupies the bulk of the poem. As he draws out in his 
critical work Conjectures on Original Composition (1759), the genius creates intuitively and 
cannot explain his or her work through reference to antecedents. Thus the work of the genius 
is not mechanical but organic: 
 
An Original may said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously from the vital root of 
Genius; it grows, it is not made.61 
 
Genius is not organic because it unfolds according a First Principle, as it is for Descartes, but 
because it creates new form. Because it is the work of nature in the subject, the notion of 
genius destroys the Wolffian dualism of sense and intellect, for it is at once natural 
(theoretical) and creative (aesthetic). Nature is not constrained by mathematical principles, 
and yet neither is it chaotic. Rather, it is like a work of art in that it expresses indeterminate 
form; it is not produced according to rules but gives rules, it does not unfold from pre-
established form but creates form.  
Young’s Conjectures was published in two separate German translations in 1760, and 
had a significant impact on Schelling, Schiller, Herder, and the Sturm und Drang movement. 
Significantly, Young modelled his account of genius on Shakespeare, bringing Shakespeare’s 
work to the attention of German aesthetics. Herder’s essay ‘Shakespeare’ (1773) grapples 
with Young’s poetry and critical work, focusing on the difference between Shakespearean 
tragedy and Greek tragedy in order to highlight the historical significance of genius. Herder’s                                                              
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notion of genius provides a significant contribution to Young’s, for he introduces a culturally 
bound element to the genius of poetic creation. According to Herder, while poetic genius is 
universal, for it is true to the atemporality of nature, the manner in which it expresses itself 
must be understood in terms of the history and context in which it emerges. This gives a new 
meaning to the notion of artistic genre, for genre is not subject to timeless form, but is created 
by a transgressive work that brings a new form into being. Thus for Herder, Greek and 
Shakespearian tragedy are not the same genre, for they were created under vastly different 
conditions which means that they are guided by and establish different rules. In this view, the 
French playwrights who attempted to write modern tragedies with Poetics as their textbook 
misunderstood the temporal character of genre. 
The significance of Young’s account of artistic genius for Herder is that it provides a 
way of thinking that does not equate taste and reason, thus destroying the theoretical sphere, 
but reconciles them, identifying the theoretical in the aesthetic. The creativity expressed in the 
tragedies, in his view, provides a way of understanding this reconciliation, for the 
development of tragic poetry is a creative achievement of genius: 
 
Greek tragedy developed, as it were, out of a single scene, out of the impromptu dithyramb, 
the mimed dance, the chorus. This was enlarged, recast: Aeschylus put two actors on to the 
stage instead of one, invented the concept of the protagonist, and reduced the choral part. 
Sophocles added a third actor and introduced scene painting. From such origins, though 
belatedly, Greek tragedy rose to greatness, became a masterpiece of the human spirit, the 
summit of poetry, which Aristotle esteems so highly and we, in Sophocles and Euripides, 
cannot admire deeply enough.62 
 
Building from the organic account of tragedy’s religious origins Aristotle gives in Poetics, 
Herder argues that tragedy arose from the impromptu worship of Dionysus to become the 
greatest example of human spirit.63 Herder does not use the language of ‘emergence’ but 
states that Aeschylus ‘invented’ the concept of the protagonist, suggesting that tragedy is 
created through a series of ruptures, each expressing a new rule that governs artistic practice. 
The organic language of ‘genius’ does not refer to a mechanical process whereby that which 
‘emerges’ comes forth from a First Principle. Rather, it portrays the activity of the organism 
as a radical break with the given, a spontaneous act of creation that can only come from the 
incarnation of theoretical freedom in sensuous life. Because Greek and Shakespearean tragedy 
are two different expressions of artistic genius, Herder argues that we cannot judge according                                                              
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to a universal set of rules, nor can we establish a criterion from Greek tragedy or 
Shakespearean drama. Both establish the rule by which those of their immediate context were 
to use to judge other artworks. 
 Herder harmonises Hume’s notion of taste with contemporary discussions of genius, 
arguing that genius is the expression of nature – of reason – in the sensuous domain. Because 
genius is a creative expression that has meaning in the context of the community from which 
it breaks, it can be understood to give an orientation, a sense of taste, to a people: 
 
Taste is at last nothing but truth and goodness in a beautiful and sensuous form, 
understanding and virtue in an immaculate garb fit for humanity.64 
 
Taste, in other words, is the incarnation of the transcendentals, reconciling reason with 
sensuous life.65 The transcendentals are no longer eternal forms that are forever separated 
from sensuous life, but products of nature, of genius, that schematise cognition. If taste is the 
supreme organising principle, then art displaces (rationalist) philosophy as the activity that is 
most adequate for generating an understanding of life, for it is able to grasp life as a whole – 
including what goes beyond the understanding – by means of analogy.66 If every appearance 
in nature and history is singular, meaning that such appearances cannot be explained as 
deriving from a First Principle, then only poetry, myth, story, and analogical thinking can do 
justice to life.  
Herder’s work highlights the ability of analogical thinking to do that which Buffon 
called for, that is, to express the quality of spirit that looks at the phenomena of life and 
gathers it together without requiring it to conform to pre-established criteria. Analogical 
thinking provides a new procedure for thinking that is capable of attaining a greater                                                              
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systematic understanding of ourselves as physical and intellectual beings than technalised 
philosophy was able to provide, because it draws the whole of our experience together 
without the logical requirements of clarity and distinctness. Moreover, it allows us to conduct 
the task of understanding nature not from the abstraction of theoretical philosophy, but from 
within nature itself, for it refuses to subject phenomenological experience to theoretical 
explanation. If we conceptualise the coexistence of mind and world as machine and spirit, for 
example, then we render the subject incoherent from the very start. If we begin from our 
feeling of the unity of life, as does the author of a novel or the writer of a play, we are able to 
judge body and mind as parts of a living organism, where an organising power integrates the 
physical powers it possesses. This judgment is not made possible by speculative philosophy, 
however, but by experience. Without a feeling of the unity of sense and reason, Herder 
argues, 
 
reason is but an idle spectator, and if these are opposed to it, then discord ensues and taste will 
never reach maturity. The influence of reason is obscured, deceived, outweighed; it calls out in 
vain.67 
 
In the following chapter we find that, for Kant, the significance of Herder’s defence of 
analogical thinking is that it shows that rationalist philosophy expresses a kind of intellectual 
tragedy, for its technical method entails that, form the outset, rationalism is destined to fail in 
its attempt to harmonise reason with sensuous life. Moreover, it shows that taste, by contrast, 
provides a way of reconciling reason and sense, for it regulates the function of the sense 
organs and drives, allowing reason to enter the practical sphere as a guide for cognition. In 
Kant’s CJ, I will suggest, the task of navigating the failure of philosophy to integrate reason 
in sensory life is an aesthetic task, requiring the cultivation of taste.68 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I have made the claim that tragedy begins to feature in the writings of 
philosophers who argued that traditional philosophy failed to provide a procedure of thinking 
adequate to the contingency of aesthetic experience, prompting a return to Aristotle’s practical                                                              
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and ethical writings in order to elucidate a way of thinking whereby reason could be operative 
in aesthetic judgment. The renewed interest in tragedy turns on the transformation of the 
scientific-technical reading of Aristotle to a rhetorical-humanistic view that privileges Poetics 
and the ethical texts of Aristotle’s corpus. The rhetorical-humanistic view of Aristotle entails 
a conception of human agency and the production of art in response to the failure of 
rationalist philosophy to navigate the emerging problems of aesthetics, in the biological 
sciences, and in art theory. Tragedy features as a way of reconciling taste and morality within 
the limitations of theoretical reason to encompass culture as a whole, requiring the exercise of 
the creative, analogical use of reason. 
The priority given to aesthetics by philosophers such as Herder means that taste 
assumes the role of orientating us toward truth, goodness, and beauty: the ideas of reason. Yet 
if taste orients us toward the ideas of reason, it appears that the practical freedom of the 
theoretical sphere is subject to the contingency of culture. Thus the problem undergirding the 
threat that aesthetics poses to theoretical philosophy concerns the authority of what 
Baumgarten calls ‘sensuous cognition’ in relation to theoretical knowledge. For Wolff, 
experience is merely sense perception, meaning that it must be reconstructed by the mind 
before it can be intelligible or meaningful. For Baumgarten, however, and for those who build 
on his notion of aesthetics, experience becomes far more than ‘confused’ representations that 
require organisation, but the very means by which to find species, universals, and laws that 
are adequate to life. In the following chapters I identify Kant’s response to the failure of 
traditional philosophy to provide a way of thinking adequate to the aesthetic sphere. His 
answer, I will suggest, turns on the development of an ‘enlarged way of thinking’. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Reflective Judgment 
 
 
This embarrassment about a principle … is found chiefly in those judgings that 
are called aesthetic (CJ 5:169). 
 
 
 Having contextualised Kant’s CJ in terms of the wider conversation occurring during 
the eighteenth century that was concerned with the problem that emerging forms of empirical 
knowledge posed to rationalist philosophy, it is now important to examine Kant’s particular 
confrontation of this dilemma. From the outset of CJ, Kant acknowledges the failure of 
technalised thinking in empirical contexts, observing that when judgment is confronted with 
an experience for which no concept can be found, reason finds itself ‘embarrassed’, for it is 
unable to achieve its task of subsuming objects under rules (5:169). While Kant does not 
express this failure of technical thinking in terms of tragedy, this comparison was not 
uncommon for the eighteenth century interpretations of Aristotle given by Moor and Herder, 
and nor was it difficult for Kant’s successors such as Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel to find 
resources within CJ with which to explore the failure of technical philosophy in terms of 
Greek tragedy. In what follows I will argue that Kant’s CJ does, at least implicitly, conceive 
of philosophy in terms of tragedy, thought of as the inevitable failure of technalised thinking. 
What is significant about Kant’s method in CJ for philosophers concerned with 
tragedy is that Kant does not suggest that the embarrassment of judgment requires philosophy 
to overcome its failure by providing a more powerful account of technical judgment. And 
neither does it require philosophy to buffer itself from tragedy by limiting its reach to the 
conditions of the possibility of knowledge, as did reason’s first embarrassment in the opening 
lines of CPR.1 Rather, what philosophers concerned with the tragedy of philosophy found to                                                              
1 If we recall the opening lines of CPR cited in the epigraph of the previous chapter, the embarrassment of reason 
gave the initial need of a critique of pure reason: ‘Human reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its 
cognitions that it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems about 
the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity of human reason. 
Reason falls into this embarrassment (Verlegenheit) through no fault of its own’ (CPR Avii, translation 
modified). In CJ, reason finds a new embarrassment ‘chiefly in those judgings that are called aesthetic, which 
concern the beautiful and the sublime in nature and in art’ (5:169). 
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be significant about CJ is that, at its most radical moments, it provides the outlines for a new 
philosophical procedure that authentically engages with the contingency of nature without 
giving up on reason’s demand for a systematic project. 
In this chapter I put forward an interpretation of CJ that suggests that Kant does not 
simply acknowledge the tragedy of the kind of philosophy that seeks to legislate the 
appearance of nature according to technical knowledge, but that he proposes a method of 
philosophy that aims to accommodate the contingent elements of life that were necessarily 
excluded by philosophy’s technical approach. What is significant about Kant’s proposal is 
that it does not conclude by denying that the conditions of nature that bind the unity of reason 
cannot be known; it advances the positive thesis that such conditions can be felt in reflective 
judgments and thus thought by reason. The tragedy of technical philosophy sets the mind in 
motion on a procedure that, if we acknowledge it, leads philosophy to think the unity of 
nature and reason through the analogous, poetic use of judgment.2 Kant’s introduction of 
reasoning by analogy marks a concession to Herder’s thought that, I claim, significantly alters 
the parameters of the critical project. 
This chapter begins by identifying the place of CJ in Kant’s critical project, 
highlighting Kant’s understanding of the transformation philosophy must undergo in the 
context of the failure of his first two Critiques to provide a way of thinking the unity of nature 
and freedom. It then examines Kant’s account of reflective judgment, giving close attention to 
the transcendental deduction of taste he conducts on judgments of beauty; a deduction that 
identifies the basis of reflective judgment in the form of purposiveness. In the final sections, 
this chapter considers the antinomy that arises for reflective judgment between nature as 
mechanism and nature as purposive. Kant acknowledge that the vitality that the antinomy 
bestows on our thinking ‘forces’ us, despite our critical intentions, to posit the unity of reason 
in a supersensible substrate that judgment cannot know but reflection can feel and reason can 
think. Thus the critical system can only be completed once the failure of technical judgment 
has set the mind in motion to develop an analogous, poetic use of judgment.  
 
 
 
                                                             
2 I use the word ‘procedure’ not as a technical, rule-governed operation of thought, but as a synonym for a ‘way 
of thinking’. The strength of Kant’s approach in CJ, I argue in this chapter, is that it outlines a new procedure – a 
new way of thinking – that is neither technical nor merely chaotic, but that gives rule to itself, meaning that it is 
sensitive to the creation of form. 
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2.1 The tragedy of philosophy: the origin of the third Critique 
 
 The importance of CJ can only be understood in the context of Kant’s recognition of 
the limitation of his earlier critical works. Contrary to the Idealist narrative of the philosophy 
of tragedy, it is not Kant’s critical work that establishes the impassable dualism that the 
philosophy of tragedy must breach, but the third Critique that forms the cornerstone to the 
project of reconciling the theoretical and practical orders of philosophy.3 
In his first two Critiques, Kant set a rigid distinction between the theoretical and the 
practical domains by building a mechanistic concept of nature and a metaphysical concept of 
freedom (CPR), which he then clarifies in terms of practical philosophy (CPrR). The 
mechanistic concept of nature outlines the necessary conditions by which nature is 
represented in cognition. As a concept of the understanding, it is not concerned with nature as 
thing-in-itself, but as an ordered appearance whereby everything that occurs is the result of a 
necessary, effective cause. The metaphysical concept of freedom, on the other hand, outlines 
the necessary conditions for practical, moral judgment that is not subject to cause and effect 
but is freely determined by reason. In the third antinomy of CPR, Kant argues that ‘nature and 
transcendental freedom are as different as lawfulness and lawlessness,’ meaning that the 
antinomy is only solved by removing practical reason from the causal domain, from the very 
domain where it should be operative (A446/B474-A447/B475).  
The division articulated in his first two Critiques came under significant attack during 
the late 1780s, for it renders theoretical knowledge unable to interact with practical reason. 
Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s criticisms of Kant’s critical philosophy are particularly important 
to Kant’s future development, for they establish the objections to the critical enterprise that 
led Kant to begin a third Critique and became the foundation for an Idealist program of 
philosophy at Jena.4 Moreover, Reinhold’s criticisms do so by explicating the intellectual 
tragedy of Kant’s thinking as it can be seen in the first and second Critiques. With the 
intention of building a more comprehensive and systematic ground to the critical system,                                                              
3 The Idealist view put forward by Beistegui and Sparks, for example, identified the task of the philosophy of the 
tragic as the construction of a ‘passage’ or ‘transition’ (Übergang) from the order of nature to the order of 
freedom, from pure theoretical reason to pure practical reason (Beistegui & Sparks, Philosophy and Tragedy, p. 
3). In what follows, we see that Kant’s ‘Critique of Taste’ begins by identifying the need for such a passage as 
the basis of his new project. 
4 As Karl Ameriks argues, while Reinhold initially fashioned himself as an expositor and disseminator of Kant’s 
work, he quickly became its critic and reviser after receiving a professorship of philosophy at Jena. In his 
Introduction to Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, Ameriks argues that Reinhold’s Letters is 
‘arguably the most influential work ever written concerning Kant’, for it gained Reinhold his professorship 
established Jena as the ‘center of the next generation of German thought and the first professional home of the 
German Idealists: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel’. Karl Reinhold, Letters on the Kantian Philosophy, ed. K. 
Ameriks, trans. J. Habbeler, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. ix. 
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Reinhold argued that Kant’s philosophy failed to live up to its two central ideals of criticism 
and science.5 Criticism demands that thinking should be autonomous and self-authorising, 
while the ideal of science, as Kant outlined in CPR, requires that our ‘cognitions cannot at all 
constitute a rhapsody but must constitute a system, which alone can support and advance its 
essential ends’ (A831/B860). The legislation of human reason (philosophy) must encompass 
both the spheres of practical judgment and theoretical necessity in a ‘single philosophical 
system’, drawing together nature and freedom, ‘everything that is’ and ‘that which should be’ 
(A840/B868). For Reinhold, Kant’s first two Critiques failed on both fronts because his 
account of freedom remains unable to ground itself in sensible nature, while his division 
between the theoretical and practical domains resists the systematic ideal that science 
demands. His critique illuminates Kant’s limitation of knowledge to judgment’s legislation of 
nature according to the ideas of reason as a tragedy of philosophical thinking, suggesting that 
it remains unable to reconcile two necessary concepts of philosophy in an account of human 
experience. 
Traditionally, these criticisms have shaped the reception of Kant’s work, which 
focuses on the failures of the first two Critiques. Yet the third Critique can be understood to 
provide an answer. Only a few weeks after the publication of CPrR, Kant suddenly 
announced to Reinhold in a letter that a third critique was being written in order to remedy the 
shortcomings of his earlier work. He states that the process of looking back over his critical 
project led him ‘to discover elucidations [he] had not expected’.6 Kant elaborates on these 
discoveries: 
 
I am now at work on the critique of taste, and I have discovered a kind of a priori principle 
different from those hitherto observed. For there are three faculties of the mind: the faculty of 
cognition, the faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire.7 
 
Kant’s language portrays his new endeavour as both a creative search and a scientific 
discovery of a principle that would draw his fractured system into a whole, suggesting that he 
not only became aware of the need to identify a creative, poetic modality of reason in order to 
unify the critical system, but that he discovered the operation of this searching, creative 
modality in the movement of his own thinking. In this creative search he notes that CPR 
located a priori principles of the first faculty, cognition, while CPrR located principles for the 
third faculty, desire. Kant states that the process of reflecting on the apparently unmediated                                                              
5 Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p. 240. 
6 ‘Letter to K. L. Reinhold, December 28 and 31, 1787’, in Arnulf Zweig (ed. & trans.), Kant: Philosophical 
Correspondence, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967, p. 127. 
7 ibid. 
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relation between the two principles ‘allowed [him] to discover something systematic’ that 
could draw the scope of knowledge together under the banners of theoretical philosophy, 
teleology, and practical philosophy.8 The second, teleology, is ‘the least rich in a priori 
grounds of determination’, but was to unify the critical project in a systematic whole under 
the title of the ‘Critique of Taste’.9 
The transformative nature of Kant’s new critique is shown in the Second Introduction 
he wrote for the final, 1790 edition of CJ: 
 
Now although there is an incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, 
as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, so that from 
the former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason) no transition is possible 
… yet the latter should have an influence on the former, namely the concept of freedom 
should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible world; and nature must 
consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at 
least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that are to be realized in it in accordance 
with the laws of freedom. – Thus there must still be a ground of the unity of the supersensible 
that grounds nature with that which the concept of freedom contains practically, the concept of 
which … makes possible the transition from the manner of thinking in accordance with the 
principles of the one to that in accordance with the principles of the other. (5:175-176) 
 
While an ‘incalculable gulf’ lies between the sensible domain and the domain of the concept 
of freedom, meaning that ‘no transition is possible’, Kant recognises that ‘the latter should 
have an influence on the former’ so that the concept of freedom can impose its own law on 
the sensible world. Kant recognised this tension in CPR, yet he deemed it necessary to keep 
each domain separate so as to seal the purity of reason against movements in philosophy such 
as that put forward by Herder that privilege aesthetic taste over theoretical reason.10 In CJ, 
however, Kant seems to have discovered an asymptotic relationship between the ‘is’ and 
‘ought’, meaning that if morality is to become operative in the sensible realm another way of 
thinking about the problem must be found. The aim of Kant’s critique of taste is thus to 
identify a passage that would allow one to move across the gulf that his own critical                                                              
8 ibid. 
9 ibid., p. 128. The ‘Critique of Taste’ took on several forms over the following years and expanded to become 
CJ, published in 1790. Recent scholarship on CJ goes to great lengths to identify the development of Kant’s 
argument by attempting to date the various section of the final text, ranging from the initial ‘Critique of Taste’, 
which was written in the later summer of 1787 to the publication of the final form in Easter 1790. This chapter 
builds from Zammito’s suggestion that giving attention to the ‘genetic development’ of CJ opens us to a greater 
understanding of ‘the major impact of the work on its epoch’. According to Zammito, Kant’s revisions ‘left 
vestigial traces in the final product which aroused the speculative interest of his Idealist successors, who would 
follow out the trail of these neglected possibilities’. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, p. 2. 
10 See, for example, A811/B839ff. In this section Kant is highly aware of the problematic way that his 
framework separates the ideal world from the sensuous world. He identifies his project as the attempt to 
reconcile these two orders which he explains in terms of Leibniz’ notion of the kingdom of grace and the 
kingdom of nature. While for Leibniz these kingdoms dwell together without tension according to God’s pre-
established harmony, for Kant their unity must be established by the activity of reason. 
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philosophy had deemed necessary. Kant aims to achieve this passage by reconciling nature 
and morality through reference to the supersensible (das Übersinnliche). 
The supersensible provides a more expansive basis to the critical project than Kant had 
previously allowed for, drawing the lawgiving activity of reason and the purposiveness of 
nature into a systematic harmony. Yet a problem arises given the limits of critical philosophy, 
for ‘the idea [of the supersensible] itself can never be raised up and expanded into a 
cognition’ (5:175). Given the Copernican Revolution in the domain of knowledge – the idea 
that we cannot have a God’s-eye view of the world but are limited to our own perspective – 
the occurrence of the supersensible must be a schematism, a finite production of the 
imagination.11 While in terms of epistemology the supersensible remains outside the bounds 
of cognition, Kant argues that we enjoy its presence not in a kind of knowing but in aesthetic 
feeling, and in particular, in the feeling of pleasure we experience in judgments of the 
beautiful.  
Kant’s search for the a priori of taste does not, as Jügen Habermas contends, unify 
epistemology, moral culture and aesthetic culture as three separate domains, each containing 
its own a priori.12 For Habermas, Kant’s project in CJ is to strengthen the critical enterprise 
against the critique made by Reinhold in order to seal the authority of critical philosophy over 
the Sturm und Drang movement, and over Herder’s historical understanding of taste in 
particular. In this view, Kant’s project aims to place philosophy ‘as the highest court of appeal 
vis-à-vis the sciences and culture as a whole’.13 This interpretation characterises Kant’s 
argument in CJ as the epitome of intellectual tragedy, for it suggests that instead of 
acknowledging the failure of the technical project, Kant attempts to give further buffering to 
the critical enterprise from the threat posed by the contingency of nature. In Habermas’ terms, 
Kant’s efforts in CJ is not to provide a new procedure for philosophy that prioritises human 
action, but ‘superimposes … the ahistoricity of the conceptual system … on culture, which 
                                                             
11 In CPR (A138/B177) Kant identifies a schema as a ‘third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the 
category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to 
the latter’. Schemata form a bridge between the sensible and ideal orders, providing a direct presentation of a 
concept. 
12 In his essay ‘Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter’, Habermas states that Kant ‘sets up practical reason, 
judgment, and theoretical cognition in isolation from each other, giving each a foundation unto itself, with the 
result that philosophy is cast in the role of the highest arbiter for all matters, including culture as a whole’. See 
Jügern Habermas, ‘Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter’, in Baynes, Bohman & McCarthy (eds.), After 
Philosophy: End or Transformation, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987, pp. 296-315, p. 297. 
13 ibid., p. 298. 
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nets philosophy the … role of judge, parcelling out separate areas of jurisdiction to science, 
morality, and art’.14 
Habermas’ interpretation of Kant is unwilling to concede that Kant’s effort to unify 
the concepts of nature and freedom by identifying a ‘shared ground’ transforms the direction 
of the critical enterprise, for it holds that Kant merely superimposes a fixed foundation onto 
both spheres. In what follows it will be argued that by linking aesthetic concepts to the 
theoretical order, Kant, as John Zammito claims, ‘completely transfigured the significance of 
these conventional connections’.15 I will suggest that in CJ, Kant responds to Reinhold’s two 
criticisms in the following ways: he responds to the charge of failing the demands of criticism 
by arguing that freedom is manifest not simply in practical reason but in nature’s self-
organisation, meaning that nature is not a threat to autonomy but that we are able to judge 
nature to be complicit in the enlightenment project. He responds to the charge that his critical 
project fails the demand of science for a system by developing a framework that would 
reconcile freedom and nature through his critique of the faculty of feeling pleasure and 
displeasure. Kant proposes a procedure for philosophy that, through acknowledging the 
tragedy of philosophy, engages with the contingency of nature without giving up on the 
scientific demand for a system. This solution, I will argue, introduces a speculative, 
constructive dimension to his philosophy in which we feel the unity of reason in the 
supersensible substrate. 
 
2.2 The power of judgment 
 
 Kant’s solution to the problem of accommodating the supersensible in his critical 
project is to expand his conception of judgment so that it can operate outside the limits of the 
understanding. To do this, he must first free the imagination from the constraints he imposed 
on it in CPR. In CPR, one of Kant’s basic moves is to identify two faculties of knowledge: the 
faculty of presentation and the faculty of concepts, the imagination (Einbildungskraft) and the 
understanding (Verstand). Both are at work in the relation of a knowing subject to an object; 
                                                             
14 ibid. 
15 Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, p. 277. 
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the imagination places the object before the mind, and the understanding applies conceptual 
schemata to the presentation.16  
CPR ultimately provides a technical conception of the imagination. The imagination is 
characterised by its production of images that are determined by a priori ideas of the 
understanding, meaning that the imagination is not subject to fancy but provides the 
foundation for objective knowledge. Technical judgment requires that nature adhere to the 
rational concepts of the understanding, allowing the clear and distinct ideas of rationalist 
philosophy to become instrumental in sensuous life. The understanding’s concept of nature 
adheres to the strictures of mathematics, requiring that every appearance have a rational, and 
hence knowable, cause. The primary implication of Kant’s CPR is that it is only when the 
chaos of sense impressions are brought under such a concept can our thinking about nature 
claim the objective status of knowledge. 
Yet in CJ, Kant notes the importance of situations in which the substantive or 
technical operation of judgment fails to find a rule under which to subsume an object, such as 
the failure of established scientific principles to explain new discoveries or the failure of 
metaphysics to determine the dynamic nature of living beings. The importance of such 
situations lies in the fact that when the substantive efforts of judgment fail to determine an 
object under a rule, judgment does not give up in failure but finds itself confronted with a new 
task: the task of reflection. The distinction Kant introduces between two kind of judgment 
identifies that the tragedy of philosophy is not the end of the philosophical enterprise, but 
simply the recognition of the failure of rule-governed thinking in contexts that contain 
contingency. It is through acknowledging and accepting this tragedy that the procedure of 
philosophical thinking can be transformed. 
The consequence of Kant’s introduction of reflection is shown in his new emphasis on 
the capacity of judgment to refrain from determining an object – to refrain from operating in a 
cognitive context – and to explore creatively the sensory manifold in search for unity. While                                                              
16 Kant identifies two powers of the imagination: reproduction and production. Reproductive imagination is ‘the 
faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present’ (B151). The obvious example of this is the 
recollection of a visual image that we recall to the mind’s eye. This kind of imagination is necessary not only for 
knowledge but for the continuity and coherence of experience generally, for ‘experience as such necessarily 
presupposes the reproducibility of appearances’ (A101). The productive imagination, on the other hand, is the 
very happening of the transcendental synthesis, spontaneously giving itself the image (Bild) that it receives. The 
representations of the imagination do not emerge according to a cause outside of the imagination, but are 
creatively brought into being according to the rules of the understanding. Kant goes as far in CPR to describe the 
imagination as ‘a blind but indispensable power of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge 
whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious’ (CPR A78/B103). The imagination does not 
purposefully intuit this or that object or image, but forms the field of ‘manifestness’ in which every experience is 
brought together for the imagination via presentation (Darstellung; literally ‘placing before’). 
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reflection does not involve the subsumption of an object under a concept, neither is it to 
accept the sheer contingency of nature. Rather, to reflect, Kant states, is ‘to compare and 
combine a given representation either with other representations or with one’s cognitive 
faculties, with respect to a concept thereby made possible’ (5:179). Because a concept cannot 
be found for a given manifold, the reflective use of the imagination is free to compare and 
combine a representation with other representations. It operates analogously to the 
understanding in that it compares representations in a way that is procedurally rational whilst 
not rational in its content (5:180). In other words, reasoning by analogy allows the rational 
confirmation of a relation, but not the confirmation of its determinate content.17 The rational 
principle of judgment is thus transcendental, for it conditions the possibility of our attempts to 
find order amongst natural diversity. And yet because it cannot be applied to objects, it is 
subjective. It is applied to judgment itself, meaning that it pertains to a way of judging that is 
attuned to singular, contingent appearances. Thus the universal claim made by reflective 
judgments cannot pertain to knowledge but to communal agreement; it is the claim that others 
should make the same, rational connections if they were judging the same appearances. 
 The cogency of Kant’s introduction of judgment’s reflective capacity is shown in his 
acknowledgment of the failure of technical judgment. More specifically, it is shown in the 
fact that, by acknowledging this failure, Kant does not then seek to limit the reach of 
judgment per se, but the reach of technical judgment. The failure of technical judgment, Kant 
notes, sets the imagination on a process that reaches beyond its substantive practice with the 
example given by reason’s search for unity as its guide. While imagination was bound to the 
activity of the understanding in the first two Critiques, processing the material of sensation 
into the products of experience, Kant argues that it is capable of operating free of the 
understanding by reflecting upon the sensory manifold without determining an object.18 The 
freedom of the imagination does not mean that it is subject to fancy, but that it follows the 
example given to it by reason in the search for unity in aesthetic diversity. 
Kant clarifies the two activities of judgment as ‘determinant’ and ‘reflective’ 
judgment. ‘If the universal (the rule, principle, or law) is given,’ he states, ‘then the judgment 
which subsumes the particular under it is determining’ (5:179). Determinant judgment is 
similar to Aristotle’s conception of techne, which considers ‘the kind of thing whose 
                                                             
17 An analogy, for Kant, is ‘the identity of the relation between grounds and consequences (causes and effects), 
insofar as the identity obtains in spite of the specific difference between the things or those of their properties 
that contain in themselves the ground for similar consequences’ (5:464n). 
18 Jane Kneller, Kant and the Power of Imagination, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 3. 
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principles cannot be otherwise’.19 The universal exists prior to the individual case and simply 
needs to be applied. The problem, however, is that no amount of applying the universal will 
demonstrate that the multiplicity to which it applies has any kind of unity. Determinant 
judgment cannot, for example, derive any meaning from Darwin’s observations of the genetic 
mutations in animals, for it cannot form a total system such as evolution. The process of 
subsuming objects under categories cannot reach a higher principle that would demonstrate 
their unity, for it is limited to the concepts it already possesses. The question Kant considers is 
how we can understand the parts of nature for which we have no laws at all. 
The answer lies in reflective judgment, which will not yield the kind of knowledge 
toward which determinative judgment aspires, but is able to operate within the contingency of 
sensuous life. It is modelled on Aristotle’s conception of phronesis (practical judgment), the 
faculty of the mind that, for Aristotle, is refined in our participation in tragic theatre. 
Phronesis, Aristotle explains, contemplates ‘variable things’. While techne involves the 
application of pre-established rules, phronesis operates where no rules can be found, meaning 
that it is attuned to environments that are singular.20 What is important for Kant about 
Aristotle’s identification of two modes of practical knowledge, both of which require a way of 
thinking that contains reason, is that it identifies the failure of determinative judgment to 
subsume the sensory manifold under a rational concept as a confusion about the kind of 
judgment that is appropriate to sensuous life. Such a failure does not entail that the task is 
futile, but that we require a new procedure that is more adequate to its subject matter.21 
 
 
                                                             
19 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1139a1-17. 
20 An example Kant employs in CJ to highlight the limits of technical judgment and the importance of reflective 
judgment is Abraham Trembley’s famous discovery of the freshwater polyp in 1741 (5:419). The significance of 
Tembley’s discovery, for Kant, lies in the fact that the polyp’s reproductive activity could not be explained in 
terms of the established concept of animal genesis, namely preformationism, but pushes the scientific 
imagination to search creatively for a new idea: epigenesis. When Trembley discovered the polyp, a moss-like 
organism that lives in freshwater streams, he concluded that due to the polyp’s ability to contract when 
stimulated and to ‘walk’ by successively attaching its ends to a surface that it was an animal. Yet when cut in 
half, the polyp did not die but formed two new and complete organisms. The challenge that this experiment 
posed to preformationism is that the self-formation of the two halves of the polyp cannot be explained by 
rational principles. It does not express a ‘motive power’ that would adhere to the concepts of the understanding, 
but a ‘formative power’ that lies beyond our concepts, for it is a power that ‘communicates to the matter, which 
does not have it (it organizes the latter)’ (5:374). The formative power of the polyp entails that judgment cannot 
explain the appearance in purely causal terms, but is forced to judge it as having a ‘self-propagating … power, 
which cannot be explained through the capacity for movement alone (that is, mechanism)’ (ibid.). The task of 
judgment, then, is not to determine the polyp’s inner cause but to discern the final cause by drawing the sensory 
manifold into a unity. 
21 ibid. 
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2.3 Beauty and purposiveness 
 
In Part One of CJ, ‘The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’, Kant provides an extensive 
elaboration of reflective judgment by focusing on judgments of taste, and, in particular, 
judgments of beauty. Such judgments display the ability of reflective judgment to compare 
and combine a representation with one’s faculties, meaning that judgments of beauty are well 
suited for the transcendental deduction of taste – the reflective examination of the inner 
workings of our own faculties. 
The transcendental idea underpinning judgments of beauty is displayed in the rational 
structure of such judgments. In the process of conducting a transcendental deduction on 
judgments of beauty, however, Kant discovers that such judgments do not entail the 
transcendental application of a concept to an object, but an application of a concept to itself. 
The use of a concept in such a way cannot yield knowledge in the paradigm of techne, but 
gives regulation to the procedure of judgment in contexts for which no rule can be found. In 
judging an object to be beautiful, Kant explains, we do not determine an object to be 
beautiful. Rather, we go beyond the evidence given by a subjective feeling of pleasure to 
impute the same judgment to the rest of humankind as the potential audience of that object.22 
In Kant’s terms, the aesthetic universality that is ascribed to a judgment is ‘of a special kind, 
since the predicate of beauty is not connected with the concept of the object considered in its 
entire logical sphere, and yet it extends it over the whole sphere of those who judge (über die 
ganze Sphäre der Urteilenden)’ (5:215). In other words, the basis for our claim to universality 
is not epistemic (connected with the concept of an object) but is based on the feeling (Gefühl) 
of pleasure produced in the process of judging the beautiful. Yet this feeling of pleasure is not 
linked to the subjective faculty of desire as Kant outlined in CPrR (5:9n), where pleasure was 
linked to the ‘causality of the representation with respect to the existence of its object’. 
Rather, Kant defines the feeling of pleasure experienced in judgments of beauty as 
Lebensgefühl, the ‘feeling of life’, which is not caused by the faculty of desire obtaining its                                                              
22 It is important to note that by appealing to the beautiful as a means to locate an a priori, Kant moves beyond 
his understanding of aesthetics in CPR. According to Guyer, ‘in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant had completely dismissed the possibility of an a priori theory of taste (A21), a position which he only 
barely moderated in the second edition of the work’. At the section entitled the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, Kant 
adds a footnote in the second edition (B36) about Baumgarten’s use of the word ‘aesthetics’ to refer to a ‘critique 
of taste’. He suggests that the attempt to bring judgments of beauty into philosophy is futile because such 
judgments are based on empirical rules that cannot have the binding force of a priori rules. Kant asserts that 
Baumgarten obscures the original meaning of aesthetics as the ‘science of all principles of sensuousness’ 
(B35/A21). See Paul Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 4-5, and Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to 
Nietzsche, p. 17. 
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object (i.e. by cognition), but is produced by a certain vitality that comes from feeling part of 
life itself (5:204).23 
When an object is given and no concept can be found for it, as in judgments of beauty, 
the imagination (which composes the manifold of intuition) and the understanding (which 
provides the example of searching of laws) come into an expansive, free play that produces 
Lebensgefühl (5:217). Because Lebensgefühl is not caused by the subjective interest of desire 
but the vitality produced by feeling a part of life, we judge that the ‘subjective relation’ of 
imagination and understanding in apprehending the beautiful object ‘must be valid for 
everyone and consequently mutually communicable’ (5:218). Thus the ground we have to 
attribute the predicate ‘ought to agree with my judgment’ is, as Béatrice Longuenesse 
explains, ‘the capacity I attribute to all of those who judge, to experience the very same 
feeling I presently experience. And my only ground for attributing to them this capacity is the 
feeling itself, as I experience it’.24 Such a judgment, Kant deduces, must be based on an a 
priori assumption of similarity between our own responses and those of others:25  
 
it is the universal communicability of the state of mind in the given representation which, as a 
subjective condition of the judgment of taste, must serve as its ground and have the pleasure in 
the object as a consequence. (5:217) 
 
Kant’s view seems to be that if the pleasure we take in the object were the ground of our 
aesthetic judgment, then to claim that such a judgment is universal would be self-
contradictory.26 It would mistake the subjective, reflective character of aesthetic judgments 
for the technical, determinative use of judgment. Such judgments are not judgments of beauty 
but of ‘agreeableness’ (5:212).  
If we take the universal communicability of the state of mind of judging the object as 
the source of the pleasure, we discover that the pleasure is not occasioned by the object but is 
a result of the judger’s own activity, meaning that it is ‘disinterested’ (5:204). Because the 
pleasure experienced in judgments of beauty is disinterested, that is, the object is merely an 
occasion for the pleasure we experience, Kant concludes that the pleasure we experience must 
come from our mental activity in determining the object. The ground of the judgment ‘this                                                              
23 Unlike Hume’s subjective account of aesthetic feeling, Kant argues that Lebensgefühl, the feeling of life, has 
an ethical dimension, for it heightens our awareness of our empirical freedom and harmonises our purpose as 
moral beings with our bodily emotions. If we understand ‘life’ as the property of an intentional will, then the 
‘feeling of life’ pertains to an affirmation of our nature as practically purposeful in the material world of 
sensation. 
24 ibid., p. 283. 
25 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984, p. 1. 
26 See Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant on the Human Standpoint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 
275-276. 
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rose is beautiful’, for example, is the intuited object’s disposition to produce the enlivening 
play of imagination and understanding in apprehending this form (5:218).  
Because the free play of imagination and understanding is not simply pleasurable, but 
enhances both faculties (understanding gives the rational example so that imagination can 
operate analogously) and enlivens the mind (in the feeling of life), the occasion of such free 
play – the object judged to be beautiful – is deemed to satisfy a subjective purpose. In other 
words, we are able to judge that the object is an expression of nature for the purpose of 
enlivening our cognition. Thus Kant concludes the transcendental deduction by arguing that 
‘the judgment of taste has nothing but the form of the purposiveness (Zweckmässigkeit) of an 
object (or of the way of representing it) as its ground’ (5:221). It is not our knowledge of an 
object’s purpose but the form of purposiveness that grounds judgments of beauty, for we do 
not determine nature to be purposeful but are able to judge nature ‘as if’ it expressed a 
purpose, that is, the purpose of enlivening our cognition. Purposiveness turns out to be the a 
priori principle of judgment that governs, justifies and makes possible reflective judgment, 
from our aspirations to empirical knowledge to our aesthetic judgments. 
The significance of judgments of beauty, then, lies in their expression of the form of 
purposiveness that releases judgment from its technical, determinant practice and empowers it 
to judge in a way that is analogous to reason in that it searches for unity in aesthetic diversity. 
While technical judgment fails to determine all of nature according to a rational concept of 
nature, the resources for a kind of judgment attuned to the contingency of nature do not 
require thought to transgress the limits of the possibility of experience by claiming objective 
knowledge of underdetermined objects, such as living beings or objects that occasion 
judgments of beauty. Rather, judgments of beauty turn on the form of purposiveness that 
allows us to compare the relations between the parts of an organism without determining its 
content. 
Kant uses the idea of the ‘form of purposiveness’ to unite teleological judgments and 
judgments of beauty under the same a priori, and to show that both modalities of reflective 
judgment unite the practical and theoretical domains in the supersensible substrate. In the 
second Introduction to CJ, Kant argues that nature must ‘be able to be conceived in such a 
way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that 
are to be realised in it in accordance with the laws of freedom’ (5:176). This way of thinking 
would make ‘possible the transition from the manner of thinking in accordance with the 
principles of the one to that in accordance with the principles of the other’ (5:175-176), thus 
uniting the critical system in a speculative feeling. Purposiveness is the key to this transition, 
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for it binds the supersensible substrate of nature with the supersensible freedom of the moral 
subject, providing a solution that allows us to recognise the order (lawfulness) of nature and 
yet confirm our own freedom.27 
Despite the fact that we have no concept of the purpose of the object we are judging, 
Kant suggests that we find it as purposeful because of the feeling we experience. Kant 
describes this notion of purposiveness as ‘purposiveness without a purpose’ (Zweckmässigkeit 
ohne Zweck), for the idea of purpose it gives rise to is not a concept of purpose, but the idea 
that the form of the object expresses an inner purpose that goes beyond a merely mechanistic 
view to an end or telos that does not exist in nature but is necessary for cognition. Thus Kant 
transforms the concept of teleology by limiting its extension, for the concept of purposiveness 
without a purpose is teleology ‘not in the sense of serving a previously identified good’, as 
Rachel Zuckert explains, but of ‘aiming towards an indeterminate future end, and this new 
form of teleology characterizes only and specifically human, judging subjects’.28 
Purposiveness without a purpose does not characterise the purpose in nature or the rational 
intelligence of God, but simply functions as a principle of human knowledge; of knowledge 
that is finite and sensibly dependent.29 
 
2.4 The antinomy of teleological judgment 
 
 Essentially, Kant’s reflective judgment not only provides a passage between the 
theoretical and natural domains but fundamentally challenges the project of critical 
philosophy. While CPR acknowledges the intellectual tragedy of technical thinking that fails 
to recognise its limits, it refrains from proposing a method that can navigate the tragedy of 
philosophy. Reflective judgment provides a way of accommodating the tragedy of technical 
judgment, for it does not simply limit what judgment can do but outlines a way that judgment 
can operate without the technical practice of subsuming objects under rules in order to search 
                                                             
27 While proposing a solution in terms of the supersensible, Kant does not see himself as departing from 
transcendental philosophy’s denial of any cognitive access to noumena. Rather, he argues that the notion of the 
supersenible is transcendentally necessary for consciousness in general. In order to reconcile the lawlessness of 
nature with the lawfulness of the will, Kant identifies our capacity to feel their unity in judgments of beauty and 
ends. The solution can be neither theoretical nor practical but only a manner of thinking; to use John Zammito’s 
words, it is ‘subjective, but nevertheless indispensable’. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, p. 
266. 
28 Rachel Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the ‘Critique of Judgment’, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 10. 
29 ibid. 
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for universal communicability where no knowledge can be found. The result of this kind of 
judgment, however, is the transformation of the aspirations of the critical enterprise. 
The radical implications of reflective judgment are shown in the antinomy of 
teleological judgment that arises between the form of purposiveness, or teleology, and the 
determinant concept of nature as a mechanism. Like a work of art, Kant’s presentation of the 
antinomy of reflective judgment puts the experience of the tragedy of philosophy – the 
inability of technical thinking to unify the realms of freedom and nature – into a work. By 
acknowledging the failure of technical thinking to reconcile the critical project, Kant suggests 
that a new procedure of thinking can be found. While commentators such as John McFarland 
attempt to undermine the speculative implications of this antinomy, suggesting that the 
antinomy is not a real antinomy at all, in what follows it will be argued that the antinomy 
reflects a contradiction far more demanding than the antinomies of the first two Critiques.30 
The antinomy of teleological judgment, I will argue, does not simply lead Kant to search for a 
positive ground, tipping his critical project in the direction of a speculative system, but also 
reveals the subjective interest of determinative, technical judgment. 
Let us begin by clarifying the two maxims of the antinomy. The idea of purposiveness 
stands opposed to the concept of nature Kant built in his earlier work. In his pre-critical 
‘Essay on the constitution and the mechanical origin of the whole universe according to 
Newtonian principles’ (1755), for example, he explores mechanical necessity and beauty in 
the same framework: ‘Matter, which is the original material of all things, is thus bound by 
certain laws, and if it is left freely to these laws, it must necessarily bring forth beautiful 
combinations’.31 In this determination of nature there can be neither self-organisation nor 
contingency, and beauty is the expression of mathematical order. In CPR, Kant recognises 
that this technical formulation forced nature to adhere to the strictures of a subjective concept, 
and no longer explores nature ‘in itself’ but as the ‘sum of appearances in so far as they stand, 
in virtue of an inner principle of causality, in thoroughgoing interconnection’ (B446). He 
separates nature as thing-in-itself and our concept of nature, stressing the formal organisation 
of cognition that signifies the connections between appearances in terms of an inner principle 
of causality.32  
The developing character of Kant’s understanding of nature continues in CJ as the 
antinomy of teleological judgment pushes thought beyond the concept of nature that is limited                                                              
30 John McFarland, Kant’s Concept of Teleology, Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970. 
31 Immanuel Kant, Kant: Natural Science, ed. E. Watkins, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 1:228. 
32 Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, p. 298. 
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to the understanding in order to experience nature in itself. The antinomy lies between the two 
ways that nature appears to us, as mechanism and as purposive, both of which have a rational 
basis. The first, the thesis, is that ‘all generation of material things and their forms must be 
judged as possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws’ (5:387). The second is that 
‘some products of material nature cannot be judged as possible according to merely 
mechanical laws’ (ibid.).33 
In his efforts to identify the continuity of Kant’s argument in CJ with the concept of 
nature developed in CPR, McFarland undermines the speculative implications of the 
antinomy of teleological judgment by arguing that there is no antinomy at all. He notes that 
this antinomy takes a different form to the antinomies of CPR, where Kant states that an 
antinomy is a contradiction between two concepts in a context that reason ‘demands an 
absolute totality’.34 Taking this definition, McFarland argues that there cannot be an antinomy 
of teleological judgment, for judgment is teleological only if it works without concepts.35 
Thus there is no real problem raised by the so-called antinomy if the principles are taken to be 
regulative rather than constitutive. And Kant recognises this point himself. After first stating 
the antinomy in the form of determinative judgment, he observes that the antinomy does not 
lie in nature, but in the way we judge nature: 
 
All appearance of an antinomy between the maxims of that kind of explanation which is 
genuinely physical (mechanical) and that which is teleological (technical [i.e. artistic]) 
therefore rests on confusing a fundamental principle of the reflecting with that of the 
determining power of judgment, and on confusing the autonomy of the former … with the 
heteronomy of the latter, which has to conform to the laws given by the understanding. (5:389) 
 
McFarland’s reading fits well with Kant’s suggestion that the antinomy of judgment results 
from an error of ‘confusing’ a regulative principle for a constitutive one. McFarland argues 
that Kant’s ultimate intention in recognising the contradiction between the concepts of 
mechanism and teleology is to show that ‘the mechanical system is regulative as a 
                                                             
33 In §70 of CJ, Kant gives two different formulations of the antinomy, giving rise to much debate regarding 
which is the real antinomy. The first relates to reflective judgment, where we have cause to both (1) judge 
material things in accordance with mechanical laws and to (2) judge some things by a different law of causality. 
The second entails the two maxims in the terms of determinative judgment: (1) All generation of material things 
is possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws and (2) some generation of such things is not possible in 
accordance with merely mechanical laws. 
34 Such a contradiction arises, argues Kant, ‘when for a given conditioned reason demands an absolute totality on 
the side of the conditions (under which the understanding subjects all appearances to synthetic unity), thereby 
making the category into a transcendental idea, in order to give absolute completeness to the empirical synthesis 
through its progress toward the unconditioned’ (CPR, A409/B436). 
35 John McFarland, Kant’s Concept of Teleology, p. 120. 
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methodological principle, and that when occasion arises we may use teleological concepts 
without contradiction’.36  
McFarland interprets Kant’s project in CJ as a task of overcoming the tragedy of 
philosophy by limiting judgments of purpose to their regulative form while maintaining the 
determinative concept of nature as mechanism. Nature remains subject to laws that cannot be 
known, and thinking takes the form of an intellectual tragedy only when it judges purpose 
determinatively. Yet McFarland fails to note that while Kant’s formulation of the antinomy 
does not meet the critical conditions of CPR that requires us to think of one in terms of 
noumena and the other in terms of phenomena, for it is formulated speculatively, urging us to 
think the unity of reason with reference to the supersensible substrate. Thus he dissolves the 
antinomy without confronting the deeper problem that purposiveness poses to Kant’s critical 
system. To suggest that Kant merely demotes the contradictory principles from constitutive 
principles of determinative judgment to regulative principles of reflective judgment is, as 
Henry Allison aptly states, ‘ultimately untenable’.37 For Allison, the former, determinative 
formulation of the antinomy is the one that demands our attention, for while it is not an 
antinomy in the form of CPR, it provides a ‘threat of an even greater contradiction’.38 This 
‘even greater contradiction’ lies in our speculative thinking, for mechanism puts forward a 
conception of nature in which all appearances are causally necessary, while teleology requires 
that we think of appearances as contingent. The consequence of this contradiction lies in the 
fact that we are required, as Werner Pluhar states, to judge ‘as both necessary and contingent 
“one and the same product” (5:413), indeed, even the same causal connections within that 
product (5:373, and cf. 372-73). Hence we are contradicting ourselves (5:396) unless we can 
reconcile the two principles (5:414)’.39 
Allison and Pluhar’s interpretation shows that Kant’s solution does not lie in 
dissolving the antinomy in the reflective formulation of both laws, which would simply ignore 
the problem and settle for judgment to operate in a contradictory manner, but in a speculative 
kind of thinking that unites the two in some third principle. Reading the antinomy in this 
manner reveals, as Gary Banham states, that the ‘need for this third principle is what the 
Dialectic as a whole is written both to demonstrate and to provide’.40 Kant himself states that                                                              
36 ibid. 
37 Henry Allison, ‘Kant’s Antinomy of Teleological Judgment’, in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 30, 
1991, pp. 25-42, p. 25. 
38 ibid. 
39 Werner Pluhar, ‘Translator’s Preface,’ in Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Pluhar, Indianapolis, Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987, p. xc. 
40 Gary Banham, Kant and the Ends of Aesthetics, Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 153. 
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the antinomy leads us to search for a ‘ground outside ourselves’ (5:246) that reconciles the 
two. This ground cannot be theoretically objective, for that would require an infinite 
cognition, an intellectus archetypus, but neither can it be only practically necessary, like the 
negative, grounding noumena in CPR. Kant makes it clear that he is reluctant to identify a 
positive ground to the system, he does this all the same, stating that despite our recognition of 
the limits of cognition such a ground is ‘forced’ upon us in the antinomy of teleological 
judgment, an antinomy by which ‘one is compelled, against one’s will, to look beyond the 
sensible and to seek the unifying point of all our faculties a priori in the supersensible: 
because no other way remains to make reason self-consistent’ (5:341). 
That Kant goes beyond the critical philosophy of CPR is seen in his argument that the 
antinomy is solved in a supersensible substrate that can only be experienced in aesthetic 
feeling and, because of the capacity of judgment to reflect on this feeling, thought by 
reason.41 In the feeling of pleasure we feel in the experience of beauty the contradictory 
maxims of the antinomy are unified in what Kant calls ‘a mutual and unknown way’: 
 
On account of the outer possibility of a nature that corresponds to it, as related to something in 
the subject itself and outside of it, which is neither nature nor freedom, but which is connected 
with the ground of the latter, namely the supersensible, in which the theoretical faculty is 
combined with the practical, in a mutual and unknown way, to form a unity. (5:353) 
 
The antinomy of the theoretical and the practical pushes us beyond the tragedy of technical 
philosophy. In its inability to resolve the antinomy ‘for us’ or ‘in a known way’ as Kant did in 
CPR, technical judgment is forced to recognise that the resolution cannot be known but that it 
can be felt in judgments of reflection. And if the resolution can be felt then it can be thought, 
not in a technical kind of thinking that produces knowledge, but in a poetic kind of thinking 
that is capable of reflecting on its inner experience and operating outside of the limits of the 
understanding. The hope of reconciling the antinomy in poetic thinking is, for Kant, the very 
hope of CJ, for it provides a way in which we can think of nature and freedom in sensuous 
life. Thus it is by acknowledging the failure of technical thinking to reconcile the critical 
project that Kant is able to propose a method of philosophy that accommodates the 
contingency of nature by identifying a solution in the heightened experience of pleasure we 
feel in the exercise of reflective judgment whereby reflection is pointed toward the ultimate 
meaning of nature that determinate judgment can never attain. 
                                                             
41 As Zammito states, Kant’s solution entails that what ‘understanding could not prove, reason could think, 
reflection could feel’. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, p. 271. 
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The significance of Kant’s solution to the antinomy of teleological judgment is that it 
enlarges our concept of nature, which ultimately enlarges our concept of what an object is. In 
order to reconcile the antinomy in the supersensible substrate, Kant argues that we must first 
acknowledge that nature is beyond our concept of it, not by virtue of being a thing-in-itself, 
but by virtue of being contingent, that is, resistant to totalising concepts. We might say that 
nature, for reflective judgment, expresses immanent-transcendence. Reflective judgment 
cannot resolve the antinomy unless it can recognise and move beyond the failure of concepts 
to exhaust reality, thus ‘expand[ing] … our concept of nature, namely as a mere mechanism, 
into the concept of nature as art’ (5:246). Expanding our concept of nature from mechanism to 
art entails a view of nature, as Henry Allison states, that is ‘far broader than reason’s concept 
of systematicity’ we find in the CPR, for it requires a view of nature that is larger than our 
knowledge of it.42 To use Dennis Schmidt’s apt words, the result is ‘a sense of nature so 
generous that it shatters the economy of the concept’.43 
Elsewhere, Kant identifies the immanent-transcendence of nature by describing the 
beauty in nature as ‘an analogue of art’ (5:375), an analogy that allows us to think of beauty 
as nature’s self-expression in the same way that we understand the beauty in art to be an 
expression of the artwork. Thus understood, beauty is ascribed to objects ‘only in relation to 
reflection on their outer intuition, thus only to the form of their surfaces’ (ibid.) and not 
according to a rational artist or efficient principle. While the outer surface of nature can be 
understood to be analogous to our experience, because it deals with appearances (i.e. in terms 
of the form of purposiveness and not purposiveness in itself),  
 
inner natural perfection, as is possessed by those things that are possible only as natural ends 
and hence as organized beings, is not thinkable and explicable in accordance with any analogy 
to any … natural capacity that is known to us; indeed, since we ourselves belong to nature in 
the widest sense, it is not thinkable and explicable even through an exact analogy with human 
art. (5:375) 
 
Kant makes the remarkable observation that analogy can help us to think of beauty as nature’s 
self-expression rather than determining nature’s inner natural perfection because human 
beings belong to nature. Kant concludes that if human beings belong to nature, then nature 
must be reimagined as ‘an analogue of life’ (5:375, emphasis mine), as an autonomous, self-
expressive power that resists conceptual totalisation and can only be judged reflectively. 
                                                             
42 Henry Allison, Essays on Kant, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 170. 
43 Dennis Schmidt, Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: Essays on the Periphery of the Word, Freedom, and History, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005, p. 17. 
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While the enlarged, organic conception of nature might be impossible for determinant 
judgment, it is possible for reflective judgment, for reflective judgment does not prescribe law 
‘to nature (which would be autonomy), but to itself (which is heautonomy) for reflection on 
nature’ (5:185-6). Heautonomy is a principle of reflective judgment that is not ‘cognized a 
priori’ but is ‘the law of the specification of nature’, and is thus a principle used by judgment 
in order to facilitate its investigations of nature; to find ‘the universal for the particular 
presented to it by perception’ (5:186). While the determinant judgment of CPR legislates 
nature according to its concept of system (autonomy), reflective judgment allows one to judge 
nature as a self-organising entity (heautonomy). 
 
2.5 Autonomy and heautonomoy 
 
 The transformative nature of Kant’s insistence on an enlarged, underdetermined 
concept of nature as the resolution of the antinomy is shown in the fact that it undermines the 
delineation between determinant and reflective judgment, thus undermining his delineation 
between the autonomy of the former and the heautonomy of the latter. When we consider 
whether the capacity for bringing contingent manifolds into unity without concepts in a 
conscious manner is presupposed by the capacity for determinative cognitive judgments, we 
recognise that reflective and determinant judgment are not, as Kant might suppose, two 
distinct operations of judgment.44 Kant assumes that the capacity of judgment to operate 
reflectively is learned by the example given to it by the autonomous use of judgment that 
gives law to nature (determinant judgment), which is constantly and spontaneously uniting 
manifolds under concepts. In this formulation, reflective judgment discovers its own freedom 
by operating in a domain that is distinct from the epistemic domain of determinant judgment, 
and rather than operating in the ‘interested’, instrumental procedure of determinant judgment, 
it is ‘disinterested’, for it is no longer concerned for the acquisition of knowledge but with 
enjoying the presence of the object. It is not autonomous, for it does not give rule to nature. 
Rather, it is heautonomous, for it gives rule to itself; not a law of reason but a law that it has 
found, a law of its own creation. 
                                                             
44 In The Fate of Art, Bernstein argues that Kant’s recognition of a mode of judgment without knowledge does 
not simply provide a secondary, subordinate exercise of judgment to its determinative operation, but identifies 
the ground of all judgments. This recognition, Bernstein argues, ‘almost certainly entail[s] modifications to the 
central arguments of the first Critique’. Jay Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to 
Derrida and Adorno, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992, p. 20. 
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Yet as Kant recognises, the application of a determinate concept is not causally 
determined by the object but is the result of judgment scanning a sensory manifold in order to 
arrange a match between the manifold and a concept. A judgment is determinant not in 
contexts where no searching is necessary, but in contexts where the discerning work is done 
under the governance of a legislating faculty other than judgment itself; namely, the 
understanding. Given that reflective judgment operates without this legislating faculty, we 
might conclude that it is, in fact, the operation of judgment itself that is freed of its technical 
role. This would imply that, as Bernstein argues, reflective judgment, ‘in the moment that it 
(historically) becomes autonomous, which is the moment of Kant’s unearthing of the logical 
grammar of the aesthetic, reveals the subjective interests of truth-only cognition’.45 The 
subjective interest of truth-only cognition – or we might say the subjective interest of 
technalised thinking – is so deeply entrenched into our established conceptual scheme and life 
practice that ‘heretofore they have appeared objective’.46 They are only discovered at the 
moment that judgment becomes autonomous – not autonomous in the sense of giving law to 
nature, but in the paradigm of heutonomy whereby judgment gives law to itself.  
Ultimately, this interpretation of CJ views the notion of aesthetic judgment as a 
historical discovery; a discovery found within the conversation occurring the eighteenth 
century regarding the relation between sense and reason. Such a discovery returns philosophy 
to a more basic understanding of thinking that is not determined by the subjective interests of 
technalised thinking that demands all truth to fit the paradigm of techne, but that is open to a 
more original comportment to nature. Thus Kant’s proposal for a new method of philosophy 
in CJ can be understood as an exploration of judgment when it is freed from its submerged 
role in its technical practice and freed to operate autonomously, that is, by giving itself rule. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In contrast to the Idealist narrative of the philosophy of tragedy, CJ establishes a 
system for reconciling the dualism presented in his first two Critiques between the theoretical 
and natural orders. Kant proposes to identify a passage between the two orders by 
acknowledging the failure of technical philosophy to determine the rational structure of living 
beings, and thus proposing an alternative method to philosophy that accommodates the 
contingency of nature whilst maintaining the rational search for systematic understanding.                                                              
45 ibid., p. 49. The italicisation of this sentence has been removed from Bernstein’s original text. 
46 ibid., p. 50. 
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This system, however, is not accomplished by the critical use of reason, but in the feeling of 
unity we experience in judgments of beauty. Kant’s project proposes a procedure for 
philosophy that acknowledges the tragedy of philosophy in a move that allows the failure of 
the understanding to grasp nature as a whole to transform our concept of what nature is. 
Nature is able to come into appearance at the moment we cease to regard our inner, subjective 
conditions as reality and submit to the contingent appearance of nature. 
This resolution has important implications for philosophical inquiry, for nature no 
longer provides an objective condition for the agreement of knowledge. Indeed, our reflective 
judgments of nature make no knowledge claims at all. For reflective judgment, agreement 
cannot be guaranteed but becomes the aspiration of a community united around a collective 
mode of judging, one that does not use reason to give law to nature but one that gives law to 
itself. Kant’s CJ transforms the task of philosophy from limiting the use of reason to the 
strictures of objective knowledge to a collective task of mutual communicability, of making 
sense in common. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Ethical Turn 
 
 
… with this I bring my entire critical enterprise to an end (CJ 5:170). 
 
 
In the previous chapter I put forward an interpretation of Kant’s CJ as the 
development of a procedure that could navigate the failure of philosophy to unite the 
theoretical and the practical spheres. While Kant’s letter to Reinhold in 1787 indicates that 
this procedure was intended to identify the systematic completion of the critical system, 
during the time between the penning of this letter and the completion of CJ in 1790 Kant’s 
project takes a significant turn. Specifically, his project expands from a matter of reconciling 
morality and nature to a matter of reconciling moral development and world history. As John 
Zammito notes, the latest ideas to appear in CJ, such as genius, sensus communis and the 
sublime, all spring from Kant’s developing understanding of history as a sphere that is ‘not 
spontaneously moral but could be changed by human praxis’.47 Zammito describes Kant’s 
new attempt to reconcile the critical project in history as Kant’s ‘ethical turn’, a turn that was 
‘stimulated no doubt by the French Revolution’.48 The revolutionary demand for a new 
political order in France seems to have led Kant to view the tragedy of philosophy not simply 
in terms of philosophy’s failure to reconcile reason and nature, but in terms of philosophy’s 
                                                             
47 Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, p. 333. 
48 ibid., p. 333, 268. Because morality always held the primary position in Kant’s critical philosophy, Zammito 
does not describe this shift as a ‘moral’ but as an ‘ethical’ turn. The ethical nature of his turn encompasses 
Kant’s increasing concern for the realisation of humanity’s moral calling in the natural order, showing a greater 
emphasis on morality as the ethical or shared life of a community rather than purely transcendental morality. In 
Zammito’s terms, Kant’s emphasis is on the ‘viability of man’s moral purpose in the world of sense’. ibid., p. 
323. 
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failure to reconcile reason and history; to assist humanity in realising its vocation for moral 
freedom.49 
Kant’s new understanding of the tragedy of philosophy in CJ – the failure of 
philosophy to reconcile reason and history – can be understood as a response to the failure of 
the moral project that Kant had already noted in CPR. Far from outlining a practically viable 
moral philosophy, Kant recognised that his attempt to reconcile the Leibnizian realms of 
grace and nature revealed that the idea of a ‘moral world’ is only ‘a mere, yet practical, idea, 
which really can and should have its influence on the sensible world, in order to make it agree 
as far as possible with this idea’ (A808/B836). Because the first maxim of pure reason is that 
one must ‘[d]o that through which you will become worthy to be happy’ (CPR A809/B837), 
the moral agent requires the ‘hope for happiness’ in order to realise the moral world, that is, 
the hope that happiness will be merited ‘in the same measure as he has made himself worthy 
of it’ (ibid.).50 Yet Kant notes a significant problem that the moral agent faces, for such hope 
‘cannot … be known through reason’, for it ‘may be hoped for only if it is at the same time 
grounded on a highest reason’ (A810/B838). The ‘highest reason’ is nothing other than God’s 
knowledge, meaning that it is necessarily unattainable. The only way that the ‘hope for 
happiness’ can be known through reason is if the kingdom of ends were to become an 
empirical reality, for the moral project ‘rests on the condition that everyone do what he 
should’ (ibid.).  
This dilemma places the moral vocation of humanity in a double bind. The 
actualisation of the moral good depends on the existence of the kingdom of ends, and yet the 
                                                             
49 Kant anticipated the inability of revolution to change the way of thinking of the public in his 1784 essay ‘An 
Answer to the Question “What is Enlightenment?”’, yet seeing the reality of the French Revolution seems to 
have challenged his thinking. In this essay he states that a ‘revolution may perhaps bring about the fall of an 
autocratic despotism and of an avaricious or overbearing oppression, but it can never bring about the true reform 
of a way of thinking [Denkungsart]. Rather, prejudices will serve, like the old, as the leading strings of the 
thoughtless masses’ (p. 61). Instead, Kant argues that the way of thinking of a people can only be changed if the 
head of a state allows ‘his subjects to make public use of their reason and to lay publicly before the world their 
thoughts about the better formulation of this legislation as well as a candid criticism of laws already given’ (p. 
63). In CJ, however, Kant writes from within the tumultuous years of the French Revolution, and suggests that 
something more basic is required if the public is to be oriented to the public use of reason. He argues that the key 
to universal judgment is not ‘the healthy understanding’, that is, the ability to think without the tutelage of others, 
but ‘taste’, for ‘the aesthetic power of judgment rather than the intellectual can bear the name of a communal 
sense’ (5:295). The task of enlightenment, in this framework, is an aesthetic task, requiring the creative 
unification of reason and nature in works that opens the public to the creative use of their intellectual faculties. 
Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question “What is Enlightenment?”’, in James Schmidt (ed.), What is 
Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996, pp. 58-64. 
50 This depends on the first question of pure reason that concerns practical interest: ‘Do that through which you 
will become worthy to be happy’ (CPR A809/B837). 
 79 
existence of the kingdom of ends depends on moral agents actualising the moral good.51 
While reason can give us cause to postulate the immortality of the soul and the existence of a 
supreme being capable of seeing to it that the same measure of happiness is doled out 
according to the worth of one’s conduct (see CPrR 5:122-124), it cannot transform the way 
we think of this world.52 Thus reason – the very power that ought to ground the moral project 
– either leads the moral agent to despair at the hopelessness of the situation or to acts of 
revolutionary zeal in the attempt to force a new set of values onto history. For Kant, neither 
despair nor revolution can overcome the tragedy of philosophy, for neither is able to provide a 
procedure through which morality and nature might be reconciled. 
In this chapter I build from Zammito’s recognition of an ‘ethical turn’ in the final 
versions of Kant’s critique of taste in order to argue that CJ can be read as an insightful 
response to this double bind. Kant’s response is to ground his new procedure in a historical 
project, one that requires neither a revolution nor a conservative backlash, but that is already 
in action. This response transforms the task of philosophy from one of outlining a moral 
philosophy that ought to be instituted in society to one of outlining a procedure through which 
society might develop toward a kingdom of ends. Thus we can conclude that Kant’s response 
to the tragedy of philosophy is to undermine the hegemony that philosophy had traditionally 
held over politics, displacing philosophy from its pedestal and locating it as an institution 
within historical life.53 
                                                             
51 This dilemma is the same as that faced by Rousseau’s famous Lawgiver, who must recognise (1) that he 
cannot give just laws to unjust people, for they will not follow them, and (2) that the people cannot become just 
without just laws. In On the Social Contract, Rousseau stated the question as follows: ‘The one who dares to 
endeavour to institute a people must feel himself capable of changing, so to speak, human nature’ (39). Rousseau 
recognises that in order to give new institutions to a people, one must change the very way of being of the people. 
Given this double bind, Rousseau states that ‘Gods would be required to give men laws’ (39). Yet he finds a 
solution in bestowing this divine task onto the lawgiver, suggesting that by laying down the laws, the legislator 
must not posit laws that are good in themselves, but laws that are amenable to the ethical mores of the people 
(41), for ‘there is a time of maturity that must be awaited before subjecting them to the laws’ (42). For Kant, the 
kingdom of ends in which moral action is met with happy ends only gives hope to the question of practical 
interest if it is more than an idea but a practical reality. Without the realisation of such a kingdom, reason is 
unable to empower the agent to act morally. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, trans. D. Cress, 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987. 
52 Jane Kneller suggests that adopting a belief in God or immortality does not really allow Kant to solve the 
problem. The moral law demands that we, as mortals, bring about the highest good, and our hope to achieve this 
end depends our belief on our ability to do so. And yet the notion of a God who will complete this task for us, 
and that we have infinite time to complete it, is ‘an admission of the hopelessness of the quest as mere mortals’, 
thus nullifying reason’s command. This is probably why Kant turned away from this argument in CJ and came 
up with a new approach. See Kneller, ‘Imaginative Freedom and the German Enlightenment’, p. 188-9. 
53 This formulation of the result of Kant’s CJ is drawn from Dennis Schmidt’s Ethical and Lyrical Subjects. 
Schmidt argues that, in a way not dissimilar to Kant’s ethical turn, Heidegger’s work announces the fact that ‘the 
hegemony of the philosophic over the political has lost its legitimacy’. Schmidt, Lyrical and Ethical Subjects, p. 
177. 
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To advance this interpretation of CJ, I will argue that central to Kant’s response to 
philosophy’s double bind is his acknowledgment that while philosophy proved unable to 
reconcile reason and the sensuous order, humanity is constantly at work at this task by 
creating a symbolic realm that expresses the shared destiny of material nature and practical 
freedom. Kant identifies a shared realm of works of human creation that anticipates a sensus 
communis, a community that is united by the reflective use of judgment. In the symbolic 
sphere, beautiful art dethrones a particular constellation and provides a new rule, orientating a 
people toward the procedure of reflective judgment examined in the previous chapter. Thus 
Kant fashions our moral vocation as a project whereby we must elevate our purpose in the 
midst of the double tension between material determinacy and the transcendence of freedom. 
This proposal, I will suggest, grants art history a radical importance that prioritises aesthetic 
creativity over the transcendental legislation of the will in the task of realising our moral 
vocation. This argument places Kant much closer to Herder, Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel’s 
understanding of history in terms of tragedy than is often recognised. 
 
3.1 Genius and the sublime: the spiritual character of art 
  
In order to consider Kant’s confrontation with the failure of philosophy in terms of his 
ethical turn, it is important to note the late appearance of the concept of genius in the final 
versions of the critique of taste. In 1768, Kant wrote a letter to his student, Herder, in which 
he warned him against the excesses of ‘genius’, contrasting the ‘youthful feeling’ of genius to 
the ‘sensitive tranquillity’ of philosophy.54 Yet by the later drafts of CJ, Kant employs the 
idea of genius as the origin of beautiful art. Genius is that which finds an ‘aesthetic idea’ for a 
work of art, giving a sensuous demonstration of a rational idea and providing an image of 
inexhaustible wealth for the empowerment of the audience of the work. The significance of 
the concept of genius is that it enlarges Kant’s procedure for thinking about nature so that art 
and morality are united in the same aesthetic project. The concept of genius provides a way to 
identify the creative ability of human agents to realise the ideas of reason in sensuous life, 
orientating a community of which those agents are a part to the collective use of his proposed 
procedure for confronting the tragedy of philosophy: enlarged, reflective judgment. 
While Kant had remained critical of the spontaneous creativity of genius in the work 
of Young, Baumgarten, Herder, Mendelssohn, Hume and others, in CJ he retracts this critique                                                              
54 Immanuel Kant, Correspondence, ed. A. Zweig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 94. 
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in order to explore the notion of genius as the exemplary use of the productive imagination. 
While Baumgarten identified genius as the harmonious use of the faculties, which results 
from significant training, Kant stresses that genius is ‘the talent (natural gift) that gives the 
rule to art, … an inborn productive faculty of the artist’ (5:307). Because genius is not an act 
of reason but is given, it ‘belongs to nature’, meaning that the artist is not limited to the 
categorical determination of the mind but operates in the domain of nature, of freedom (ibid.). 
Yet the freedom of the artist is not unfettered or chaotic, for the artist ‘ventures to make 
sensible rational ideas … beyond the limits of experience’ (5:314). The ‘making sensible’ of 
rational ideas cannot be achieved by reason but must be achieved by a poetic kind of thinking 
unique to genius. Kant acknowledges that it is the work of nature in the subject that makes the 
sensuous expression of rational ideas possible, thus opening a way for nature to express its 
freedom in the sensuous order through human praxis. 
In order to explain how nature could act in the artist in such a way that allows her to 
move beyond the limits of experience, Kant requires a new aesthetic category capable of 
displacing her from these limits though an encounter with something greater: the sublime. 
While the beautiful provides the possibility of the conception of nature as art, allowing us to 
reconcile the theoretical and practical in an enlarged concept of nature, it shows us nothing of 
the purposiveness that lies in ourselves. By introducing the sublime in the 1789 manuscripts 
of his critique of taste, Kant identifies an aesthetic judgment that can expand our concept of 
nature, not one that indicates a ‘purpose in nature itself’, but one that occasions ‘the possible 
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use of its intuitions to make palpable in ourselves a purposiveness that is entirely independent 
of nature’ (5:246).55 
The significance of the sublime for Kant’s ethical turn is that it occasions the possible 
use of intuitions – non-conceptualised representations in the imagination – to encounter that 
which is beyond nature, reason itself, thus alerting us to an inner purposiveness in ourselves 
that is independent of nature. The sublime, Kant states, is an encounter with the ‘absolutely 
great’ (5:248), either in the vastness of the ‘mathematical sublime’ or the power of the 
‘dynamical sublime’ (5:247). Rather than resulting in the ‘calm contemplation’ of judgments 
of beauty, the ‘mind finds itself moved’ (5:257). Such an encounter, whether in the limitless 
sky, a lofty mountain or the chaotic sea, makes us feel ‘the inadequacy of our capacity for the 
attainment of an idea’, for no idea can be found that is adequate to the formlessness of the 
absolutely great (5:257). What is absolutely great, Kant explains, is that which causes us to 
consider all things as small when they are drawn into comparison. Yet no mere thing, no 
object of nature, can have this characteristic. The absolutely great is not found outside of us 
but refers to what is inside: the ideas of reason.  
What is important about Kant’s new account of the imagination’s encounter with the 
ideas of reason is that it enlarges the capacity of the imagination to go beyond its sensible 
limits. In the determinative operation of judgment, imagination is limited to sensibility, for it 
combines intuitions of nature with the concepts that nature has born in the understanding. In 
judgments of the sublime, the harmony of judgment is momentarily disrupted, which, given 
cognition’s desire for unity, produces the feeling of displeasure. Unlike the beautiful, the 
sublime does not provide an arena for the imagination and sensibility to play freely in mutual                                                              
55 Kant made no mention of the sublime in the initial proposal for a ‘critique of taste’ in the letter to Reinhold in 
1787, and neither do we find it in the editions of CJ prior to Kant’s final drafts in 1789. For Paul Guyer, the late 
inclusion of the sublime entails that it is ‘something of an afterthought’ in Kant’s work, not adding anything 
significant to his argument, but, unawares, providing a ‘fundamental challenge to it’ (Guyer, Kant and the 
Claims of Taste, p. 399). Yet for Michel Souriau, Giorgio Tonelli and Zammito, while the concept of the sublime 
was not original to Kant’s critique of taste, it appears at an important moment in his ‘cognitive turn’, marking a 
vital development in his thinking (in the spring of 1789). Souriau argues that while the sublime does not appear 
until ‘the very latest exposition of Kant’s aesthetic thought,’ it was no afterthought but the most mature idea of 
CJ, one that alters the entire landscape of the text (Souriau, Le jugement refléchissant, in Zammito, The Genesis 
of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, p. 276). Zammito concurs with Souriau, arguing that it is precisely Kant’s notion 
of the sublime that leads him to his final ‘ethical turn’ of 1790 in which he attempts to seal the realisation of 
freedom in the realm of nature in his understanding of the symbolic, aesthetic sphere of human culture (Zammito, 
The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, p. 276). After receiving extensive criticism for marginalising the 
importance of the sublime, Guyer corrected his view in the Introduction to Kant and the Experience of Freedom: 
‘In my earlier work I was rash enough to suggest that Kant’s discussions of such topics as the sublime and 
genius, which appear to be tied only loosely to the architectonic structure of the Critique of Judgment, were mere 
concessions to the literary fashion of his day, thus not essential to his fundamental argument about the conditions 
under which it is epistemologically justifiable to claim the universal validity of one’s pleasurable response to a 
work of nature or art, the claim that is inherent in a judgment of taste’. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of 
Freedom, pp. 2-3. 
 83 
harmony. Rather, the feelings we experience in the sublime alert us to the fact that it is ‘not 
play but something serious in the activity of the imagination’ that is occurring (5:245). 
Through coming into contact with the ideas of reason, the sublime involves an intuition (i.e. 
an empirical perception) of the indeterminate. The sublime thus has a paradoxical effect, for it 
is in the inhibition of the power of judgment to determine an object that enlarges the 
imagination to form a schema of the infinite, and to use this empirically derived infinite in 
practical life.56 While the sublime manifests itself through the experience of nature, 
judgments of sublimity lie in the mind, which discovers its own essential superiority over 
nature.57  
Through coming into contact with reason, the imagination, the faculty that is limited to 
sensibility, is expanded by the law of reason so that is able to make present the negative idea 
of the unattainability of nature. Reason expands the imagination, pushing it toward its limits 
and opening it to the field of the infinite. Thus imagination discovers in its possession an 
infinite power that is greater than any realm of representation or dogmatic code of ethics. In 
Kant’s words, 
 
One can describe the sublime thus: it is an object (of nature) the representation of which 
determines the mind to think of the unattainability of nature as a presentation of ideas. (5:268) 
 
The representation of that which is unrepresentable determines the mind to think of something 
negative – the unattainability of nature – as a presentation of the infinite domain of ideas. In 
particular, in the judgment of the sublime, the moral law claims its validity and is released 
into the sensory world as a guiding principle, alerting us to ‘a finality quite independent of 
nature’ (5:246). Thus the sublime affords a kind of passage from the realm of the theoretical 
(nature) to the realm of the practical (morality), for the excess of nature alerts us to the 
practical task of judgment: our moral vocation. This realisation of our moral vocation is not 
achieved by giving laws to the mind, but by leaving the subject to his or her own devices as 
                                                             
56 Basic to judgments of the sublime ‘is a pleasure that arises only indirectly, being generated, namely, by the 
feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital powers and the immediately following and all the more powerful 
outpouring of them; hence as an emotion it seems to be not play but something serious in the activity of the 
imagination’ (5:245). 
57 Kant describes this as follows: ‘The astonishment bordering on terror, the horror and the awesome shudder, 
which grip the spectator in viewing mountain ranges towering to the heavens, deep ravines and the raging 
torrents in them, deeply shadowed wastelands inducing melancholy reflection, etc., is, in view of the safety in 
which he knows himself to be, not actual fear, but only an attempt to involve ourselves in it by means of the 
imagination, in order to feel the power of that very faculty, to combine the movement of the mind thereby 
aroused with its calmness, and so to be superior to nature within us, and thus also that outside us, insofar as it can 
have an influence on our feeling of well-being’ (5:269). 
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the beautiful form crumbles at freedom’s expense.58 In this sense, nature, which occasions the 
sublime, pushes us toward our moral calling ‘in order to enlarge [the imagination] in a way 
suitable for its own proper domain (the practical) and to allow it to look out upon the infinite, 
which for sensibility is an abyss [Abgrund]’ (5:265). The abyss, however, does not threaten to 
swallow the ideas of reason in its voiding presence, but occasions a creative, 
transubstantiating experience. The abyss transforms us, awaking the imagination to reason’s 
infinite grasp and the practical possibilities revealed within the disruption of causal necessity. 
The alarming indeterminacy of the abyss, however, means that the sublime itself is not a 
passage, but opens up the possibility of a passage being built by human creativity. 
 Kant’s understanding of genius is the ability to turn this experience of the sublime into 
a work that sets an example for how others might experience nature in the same way by 
presenting the unattainability of nature. We think of Caspar Friedrich’s Wanderer Above the 
Sea of Fog or J.M.W. Turner’s A Disaster at Sea; works of art that invite the spectator to join 
in the artist’s own experience of the sublime. Such works do not imitate nature, but use nature 
as a schema for presenting the supersensible: the negative feeling that alerts us to our moral 
vocation. Romantic poet John Keats describes the power released in the sublime as a 
‘Negative Capability’ of the mind, clarifying the Romantic connection between sublimity and 
autonomy.59 According to Keats, the negativity of the mind’s capability lies in its ability to 
dwell ‘in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and 
reason’.60 In a similar way to Kant, Keats identifies the capacity of the sublime to place us 
before the practical task of making laws for ourselves in the space that emerges within the 
collision of the traditional order and the creative emergence of the new, revealing that it is 
                                                             
58 Kant describes this as a sacrifice (Aufopferung) in the realm of the aesthetic, wherein reason catches a glimpse 
of its supersensible freedom and its power to judge with rational concepts such as totality and freedom that 
exceed representation’s scope: ‘It thereby acquires an enlargement and power which is greater than that which it 
sacrifices, but whose ground is hidden from it, whereas it feels the sacrifice or deprivation and at the same time 
the cause to which it is subjected’ (5:269). At this moment, practical reason enters the theoretical under the event 
of representation’s failure and reason’s triumph. At the very moment when imagination is ruptured and all 
appears to be lost, reason discovers itself to be infinite, at home with itself and above all things. Kant’s treatment 
of the sublime depicts the triumph of reason, reconfirming the self’s ultimate transcendence over nature, a power 
that is threatened by the awful and monstrous experience it faces. 
59 John Keats, Letters of John Keats, ed. S. Gardner, London: University of London Press, 1965, p. 68. 
60 ibid. 
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nature that originally moves us toward our moral calling.61 It is the work of the poet, the 
genius, to make this experience intelligible. 
Kant’s identification of a sensible appearance of rational ideas is remarkable given 
that it unifies two ideas that have been strictly kept apart in Kant’s theory of knowledge: 
sensation and reason, signalling his attempt to realise his project in collective, ethical life. The 
communicative power of the artist is expressed when their imaginative material takes on form 
that combines genius with taste: ‘Taste, like judgment in general, is the discipline (or training) 
of genius’ (5:319). Genius without taste is incommunicable, because it is a break with 
convention and has no determinate content. Donald Crawford describes Kant’s understanding 
of artistic creativity as a process through which ‘taste guides the creative imagination of the 
artist as to how far the imagination may extend itself and still be able to be communicated’.62 
Crawford is correct, but it is important to note that the combination of taste and genius marks 
a particular development from his early critique of taste. Kant identifies taste as ‘the judging 
of beautiful objects’ and genius as ‘the producing of such objects’ (5:311). While Kant’s 
transcendental deduction of taste provides a new procedure for judging with mutual 
communicability as its ground, his inclusion of the concepts of genius and the sublime in the 
final editions identifies the capacity of human praxis to produce works of art that orient a 
community toward good taste, to the collective use of the procedure Kant’s analysis of taste 
produced. The concept of genius, it can be said, is Kant’s strategy for housing his proposal to 
navigate the tragedy of philosophy in shared, ethical life. 
By combining genius and taste, Kant puts forward an expressivist account of 
aesthetics, suggesting that art is not limited to form but communicates (expresses) something 
that goes beyond appearance. In the first two Critiques Kant argued that we give rule to nature 
in knowledge (objects must conform to our knowledge) and to ourselves in ethical 
determination (the categorical imperative). In CJ, the aesthetic law emerges as a consequence 
of nature acting in the subject. In genius, that is, we find ‘the inborn predisposition of the 
mind (ingenium) through which nature’ manifests its freedom (5:307). In works of art, the 
                                                             
61 Keats’ words express the reconfiguration of the connection between aesthetics and morality occurring in 
modernity. In this sense, Enlightenment and Romanticism are not polar opposites but mutually inform each other, 
a theme we find in Kant’s tract ‘What is Enlightenment’ (1784). In this tract Kant states that ‘Enlightenment is 
man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. … “Have the courage to use your own understanding,” is 
therefore the motto of the enlightenment’. Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings, trans. H. Nisbet, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 54. 
62 Donald Crawford, ‘Kant’s Theory of Creative Imagination,’ in Paul Guyer (ed.), Kant’s Critique of the Power 
of Judgment: Critical Essays, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, pp. 143-170, p. 160. 
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ideas of reason become intelligible in sensuous form; the practical becomes incarnate in the 
domain of nature through the power of human creativity. 
Kant’s notion of genius draws from the enlarged concept of nature he discovered 
through the antinomy of teleological judgment. By arguing that the antinomy of teleological 
judgment is only solved when we understand nature as ‘an analogue of life’ (5:375), Kant 
suggests that nature is a formative, self-organising power that communicates itself through 
products. In the beautiful we find that nature expresses itself, and, by identifying the work of 
genius as the work of nature, Kant now identifies the self-expression of nature in the domain 
of culture, identifying the self-organising growth of nature in the heart of ethical life. Kant’s 
argument is not that nature is spontaneously moral, that it is on a trajectory toward ever-
growing moral progress. Rather, it is that nature can be changed by human praxis, meaning 
that Kant’s project becomes one of outlining a procedure for the enhancement of nature by 
human activity. Kant recognises that to confront the tragedy of philosophy, the failure of 
philosophy to unify moral culture and history, the task of philosophy is not to unify morality 
and nature but to provide a procedure for thinking about nature and morality that allows us to 
see human culture as a moral project; to engage in the ethical life of a community through art 
and other creative endeavours. 
Kant’s understanding of the cooperation of the self-organising dimension of nature 
and human creativity places CJ much closer to Herder and the Sturm und Drang movement 
than his former critical work. Building from Zammito’s suggestion that this shift toward 
historical thinking is best understood as a response to ‘the events taking place simultaneously 
in France’, it seems that Kant engaged with the rapidly changing world of the late-1780s by 
moving away from ‘his harshly Hobbesian orientation and closer, if not to Herder, then to that 
generation which inherited Herder’s agenda’.63 While the Idealist view of the philosophy of 
tragedy claims that it is Schelling who draws Kant’s project together in in his notion of 
tragedy in Philosophy of Art, Schelling himself identifies Kant’s notion of art in his System of 
Transcendental Idealism (1800) as the means by which the critical project is brought together 
into a whole. In Schelling’s words, the work of art is the ‘synthesis of nature and freedom,’ 
meaning that ‘in every task that art has discharged, an infinite contradiction is reconciled’.64 
Schelling saw that Kant’s engagement with teleology led to a new form of critical philosophy. 
Such a production cannot be explained by what precedes it, either historically or                                                              
63 Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, p. 330. 
64 Friedrich Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. P. Heath, Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1978, p. 225, 228. 
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psychologically, for the genius cannot explain from whence his or her inspiration came or 
give a coherent account of the creation.65 Beautiful art is only possible if it results from an 
activity for which no determinate rule can be given, meaning that the work of art necessarily 
expands our concept of what nature is.  
 
3.2 Beautiful art: the synthesis of nature and freedom 
 
Thus far I have argued that the significance of Kant’s account of genius is shown in 
the connection it draws between art and the human vocation for freedom; a freedom that is not 
simply presumed by but is manifest in the creation of works of art. This freedom is not 
expressed through a conception of artistic skill modelled on Aristotle’s techne, which gives 
form to unformed matter according to rules. Rather, it is expressed through the ability of 
genius to create rules. The freedom of art is a transgressive freedom, for it interrupts previous 
art history in order for that history to begin anew. In this section we consider Kant’s notion of 
beautiful art as a way to navigate the tragic, double bind of philosophy – that is, the inability 
of philosophy to reconcile the ideas of reason and history. 
In §44 Kant describes the kind of art that manifests transgressive creativity as schönen 
Kunst, literally translated by Guyer as ‘beautiful art’. Yet schönen Kunst is not merely art that 
is beautiful, for it idiomatically refers to the ‘fine arts’, that is, art that is some sense canonical 
or part of art history. Guyer preserves Kant’s play on the word ‘beautiful’ in order to show the 
continuity between the transgressive freedom manifest in the beautiful and the historical 
dimension of the fine arts. To clarify the distinction between what is merely beautiful and the 
transgressive freedom of beautiful art, Bernstein translates schönen Kunst as ‘great art’, for 
Kant is referring to artefacts of fine art that have epochal significance.66 Kant identifies the 
                                                             
65 Kant argues that the inability of the genius to give an account of their creation is precisely what separates an 
aesthetic idea from a schema; the creative process of an artist from that of a mathematician: ‘Thus we can readily 
learn all that Newton has set forth in his immortal work on the Principles of Natural Philosophy, however great 
a mind was required to discover it, but we cannot learn to write spirited poetry, however, express may be the 
precepts of the art and however excellent its models. The reason is that Newton could make all his steps, from 
the first elements of geometry to his own great and profound discoveries, intuitively plain and definite as regards 
consequence, not only to himself but to everyone else. But a Homer or a Wieland cannot show how his ideas, so 
rich in fancy and yet so full of thought, come together in his head, simply because he does not know and 
therefore cannot teach others’ (CJ 5:108-9). However, Kant seems to draw an unequal analogy here, confusing 
the discovery of the mathematician with the teaching or systematic exposition of truths. Mathematicians cannot 
tell us how they know to begin an unobvious proof any better than Homer could have told us how their ideas 
came together. As Crawford suggests, in the above passage Kant has not ‘successfully distinguished between 
discovery procedures in mathematics and in art’. See Donald Crawford, ‘Kant’s Theory of Creative Imagination,’ 
p. 156f. 
66 Bernstein, The Fate of Art, p. 90. 
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definitive feature of schönen Kunst in terms of its autonomy, holding that works of art must 
not be determined by a human end (buildings, columns etc.) but must be final and without an 
end: 
 
Beautiful art … is a kind of representation that is purposive in itself and, though without an 
end, nevertheless promotes the cultivation of the mental powers for sociable communication. 
(5:306) 
 
By insisting that beautiful art is without end, Kant argues that it does not only presuppose 
freedom but that it manifests freedom. Bernstein helpfully draws out the expressive dimension 
of beautiful art by describing it as the ‘production of freedom through freedom’.67 Because 
beautiful art is expressive of human freedom, Kant argues that it is spiritual; it is different to 
natural beauty because it is a product of human creativity. According to Kant, art that merely 
imitates nature (mimetic art) in an ‘accurate and well organized’ manner is ‘without spirit’, 
for it fails to set ‘the mental powers into motion’ (5:313). In beautiful art, on the other hand, 
‘spirit (Geist) is the animating [i.e. natural] principle’ (ibid.), meaning that the causality of the 
artwork lies in the unlimited domain of nature. 
Kant’s identification of the spiritual dimension of beautiful art serves to fuse the work 
of nature and human praxis into the same creative act. As the work of genius, spiritual art 
expands the minds of those who experience it, containing the ability to make universally 
communicable ‘the ineffable element in the state of mind’ (5:317). This implies that such art, 
as the work of genius, is able to use aesthetic ideas not merely to entertain but to symbolise 
rational ideas that form our moral destiny. As Lambert Zuidervaart explains, spirit is thus ‘the 
talent for finding aesthetic ideas to symbolize rational ideas as well as the artistic means to 
communicate the mental state accompanying both kinds of ideas’.68 The capacity of spirit to 
symbolise rational ideas entails, as Giorgio Tonelli observes, that spirit and genius can be 
used interchangeably, referring to the locus of nature in humanity that is ‘spontaneous, free, 
cannot be accounted for, it is the power enabling man to reach some otherwise unattainable 
analogue to God’s ideas’.69 Kant’s notion of spirit refigures the subject as a part of nature, 
meaning that genius is both nature and subject; it is the freedom of nature expressing itself 
though the subject and the subject expressing itself through freedom. 
                                                             
67 ibid., p. 91. 
68 Lambert Zuidervaart, ‘“Aesthetic Ideas” and the Role of Art in Kant’s Ethical Hermeneutics’, in in Paul Guyer, 
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, pp. 
199-208, p. 204. 
69 Giorgio Tonelli, ‘Kant’s Early Theory of Genius (1770-1779): Part II’, in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
vol. 4, no. 3, 1966, pp. 209-224, p. 209. 
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The importance of Kant’s notion of beautiful art for his attempt to confront the tragedy 
of philosophy lies firstly in his recognition that reason alone cannot reconcile the natural and 
moral orders, and secondly in his suggestion that we must create a moral world. Kant’s 
recognition of the failure of philosophy suggests that philosophy’s traditional project has 
reached its limit and that art must take over its role of searching for a ‘fundamental principle’ 
to guide the realisation of our moral ends. Thus he proposes that this task is the responsibility 
of the productive imagination, which we see expressed in the example given by genius: 
 
The imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is, namely, very powerful in creating, as it 
were, another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it. We entertain ourselves 
with it when experience seems to mundane to us; we transform the latter, no doubt always in 
accordance with analogous laws, but also … in accordance with which material can certainly 
be lent to us by nature, but the latter can be transformed by us into something entirely 
different, namely into that which steps beyond nature. (5:314) 
 
Kant’s enlarged conception of the imagination does not imitate nature, but contains a ‘mighty’ 
power to ‘create’ another nature out of the material given to it. Due to their ability to 
‘transform’ natural material into another nature entails that the ideas crafted by judgment 
restructure experience. The imagination is ‘world-making’, to use Nelson Goodman’s terms, 
meaning that our perspectives on the world have the nature of a creative work themselves, and 
the shared symbolic world is a product of our aesthetic endeavour.70 
What is significant about Kant’s understanding of beautiful art for his project of 
reconciling moral culture and history is that it entails that freedom does not manifest itself in a 
vacuum of ideal thought, but through sensuous expression in material life. Kant seems to be 
arguing that the French Revolutionaries, whilst they recognised the need for transgression in 
the project of freedom, misunderstood the importance of the established field of reference. 
Freedom cannot come from rejecting one’s culture and attempting to legislate the world 
according to transcultural, rational principles, for such an approach fails to overcome the 
tragic divide between reason and culture, between philosophy and practice. Rather, freedom is 
expressed by using the established symbolic field of reference in order to go beyond them, 
meaning that it is the very things that limit the subject that make the ‘going beyond’ of 
freedom possible. As Brigitte Sassen describes, the task of creative action is not to ‘conjure up 
novel ideas by following some rule or other; the ideas are novel precisely because they break                                                              
70 Goodman uses the phrase ‘world-making’ to describe Kant’s notion of imagination in CJ. Pillow develops this 
description in the attempt to interpret Kant’s imagination in CJ as the hermeneutical imagination. See Nelson 
Goodman, ‘Metaphor as Moonlighting’, in On Metaphor, ed. S. Sacks, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1978, p. 178, and Kirk Pillow, Sublime Understanding: Aesthetic Reflection in Kant and Hegel, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 2000, p. 263. 
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out of the realm of established rules’.71 By detaching the artwork from the limitations of the 
subject, the being of the work cannot be traced causally. If it is not the individual subject but 
freedom in nature that expresses itself in beautiful art, then we find both a sensuous 
expression of nature (an enlarged conception of nature that is expressive) and a consilience 
between the end of nature and the end of humanity. 
The consilience of the end of nature and the end of humanity is best seen in Kant’s 
concept of the aesthetic idea.72 In Kant’s clearest description of aesthetic ideas he describes 
them in terms of the expression that ignites the curiosity of the imagination by uniting the 
particular, emotional dimensions of spirit with the objective, corporate dimension of 
language:  
 
In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, associated with a given 
concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial representations in the free use of 
the imagination that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for it, 
which therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is un-nameable, the feeling of 
which animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter of language. 
(5:316) 
 
Aesthetic ideas are analogous to the ideas of reason in that they gather disparate phenomena 
under the unity of an idea that is aesthetic, or sensuously derived. They are expansive rather 
than determinative, meaning that they ‘go beyond the bounds of experience’ (5:314). Thus 
they are inexhaustible in our contemplation of them, for they do not exhaust what they 
represent but combine a ‘manifold of partial representations’. Aesthetic ideas ‘strive toward 
something lying beyond the bounds of experience [thus seeking] to approximate a 
presentation of concepts of reason’ (5:314).73 In other words, they are the building blocks of 
‘another nature’, for they give incarnate form to the transcendent idea. 
Kant identifies the greatest example of an aesthetic idea in the work of poetry. In ‘the 
art of poetry’, he states, ‘the faculty of aesthetic ideas can reveal itself in its full measure’ 
(5:314): 
 
                                                             
71 Brigitte Sassen, ‘Artistic Genius and the Question of Creativity’, in Paul Guyer, Kant’s Critique of the Power 
of Judgment: Critical Essays, USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, pp. 171-179, p. 171. 
72 It is important to note that Kant’s notion of ‘aesthetic ideas’ shows a radical break from his understanding of 
ideas in CPR. As Andrew Bowie notes, in CPR, ‘aesthetic’ provided the ‘rules for sensuousness’, giving 
intuitions for the understanding in the form of schemata (CPR B36n). ‘Ideas’ are the basis of reason and are not 
available for intuition because they would have to become subordinate to the understanding. Bowie, Aesthetics 
and Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche, p. 29. 
73 Elsewhere Kant elucidates the nature of aesthetic ideas by drawing them into direct comparison with schemata: 
‘Intuitions are always required to establish the reality of our concepts. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions 
are called examples. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions are called schemata’ (5:351). 
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The poet ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the 
blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation etc., as well as to make that of which there are 
examples in experience, e.g., death, envy, and all sorts of vices, as well as love, fame, etc., 
sensible beyond the limits of experience, with a completeness that goes beyond anything of 
which there is an example in nature, by means of an imagination that emulates the precedent 
of reason in attaining to a maximum. (ibid.) 
 
Just as the productive imagination schematises the categories of the understanding so that the 
ideas of reason are applied in the sensible world, poetry ‘ventures to make sensible rational 
ideas of invisible beings’. Poets produce symbols: indirect, figurative presentations of 
concepts that are not determinate but that ‘strain toward something lying beyond the bounds 
of experience … because no concept can be fully adequate to them, as inner intuitions’ (ibid.). 
Their work is expressive, not formalist or mimetic, because it ‘judges’ nature by giving 
expression to ideas for which nature can provide no adequate form. Moreover, the symbols 
are beautiful and, as rational ideas, are expressive of our moral vocation. Thus Kant moves 
from his earlier insistence that moral action is dispassionate by identifying that, as Zuidervaart 
states, ‘by functioning as symbols of morality, aesthetic ideas can attractively indicate the 
morally good to be something desirable and not merely obligatory’.74 While the ideas of 
reason, such as those laid down by Newton in Principles of Natural Philosophy, can be 
communicated to everyone and ‘readily learnt’, the poet ‘cannot show how his ideas … come 
together in his head’, meaning that they cannot be learnt (5:108-9). Rather, poetic ideas are 
exemplary, empowering the reader to join in the poet’s creative endeavour. 
 The ability of the poet to consider and judge nature, to see nature as more than 
mechanism and to put it to creative work, is important for Kant’s attempt to find a thematic 
basis that could reconcile the theoretical and the practical. While the supersensible basis to the 
theoretical and practical orders ‘can never be elevated and expanded into a cognition’ (5:175), 
poetic language manifests the ability to use nature as a schema in order to govern the 
application of supersensibility: 
 
The art of poetry (which owes its origin almost entirely to genius, and will be guided least by 
precept or example) claims the highest rank of all. It expands the mind by setting the 
imagination free and presenting, within the limits of a given concept and among the 
unbounded manifold of forms possibly agreeing with it, the one that connects its presentation 
with a fullness of thought to which no linguistic expression is fully adequate, and thus elevates 
itself aesthetically to the level of ideas. It strengthens the mind by letting it feel its capacity 
[Vermögen] to consider and judge of [zu beurtheilen] nature, as appearance, freely, self-
actively, and independently of determination by nature, in accordance with points of view that 
nature does not present by itself in experience either for sense or for the understanding, and 
thus to use it for the sake of and as it were as the schema of the supersensible. (5:326)                                                              
74 Zuidervaart, ‘“Aesthetic Ideas” and the Role of Art in Kant’s Ethical Hermeneutics,’ p. 206. 
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Poetry expresses the imagination’s formative capacity to schematise what resists presentation, 
using nature to express what goes beyond nature. In CPR, Kant introduced the concept of the 
schema as a bridge between the heterogeneous poles of thought and sensation, making 
‘possible the application of the former to the latter’ (CPR A138/B177).75 The possibility of 
schematising the supersensible, then, contains the solution to Kant’s intention to reconcile the 
critical system under a common, supersensible ground. This solution is not a product of 
philosophy, but one that can be experienced in our encounter with beautiful art. 
 Thus we can see that Kant’s solution to the tragedy of philosophy, understood as the 
failure of philosophy to reconcile morality and nature, is to outline a way of thinking that 
recognises the symbolic sphere at the heart of collective life as a historical project that 
reconciles morality and nature. The task of the philosopher is not to unify the theoretical and 
the practical in conceptual thought, but to identify the symbolic realm in which such a unity 
appears and to identify the ground of reason that underpins our experience of it: mutual 
communicability. The failure of philosophy to reconcile nature and reason is mirrored by the 
failure of what Kant calls ‘mechanical art’, which is ‘a mere art of diligence and learning’ 
(5:310). Yet art that is purely genius also fails at this task, for genius ‘can only provide the 
material for products of art; its elaboration and form require a talent that has academically 
trained’ (ibid.). For Kant, those who claim to operate outside of the rules and produce works 
of art without form are as comical as the members of the public who claim to understand it. 
The task of the philosopher, then, is to elucidate the nature of the symbolic sphere in such a 
way that trains the public to recognise beautiful art that combines genius and training. We 
might say that such a task is therapeutic, aimed at cleansing our drive toward objective 
knowledge and pointing us toward the interpersonal realm of creative praxis. In the wake of 
the immense progress occurring in the aesthetic sphere during his lifetime, Kant outlines the 
task of philosophy as one of unearthing the project underpinning the creativity of the artist to 
reconcile the moral and natural parts of our being. His acknowledgment of the tragedy of 
philosophy understood as the inevitable failure of an exclusive focus on technical thinking                                                              
75 In Kant’s words, ‘the image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination, the schema of 
sensible concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a priori imagination’ 
(A141-142/B181). Schemata are best understood as procedural rules for the imagination for providing a concept 
with its image. They provide a kind of ‘know-how’ of applying concepts. For example, we might have the 
concept of an orange, but if we are unable to go into a fruit store and select an orange to purchase then we have 
no schema of the orange, meaning that we effectively have no knowledge about oranges at all. Kant’s notion of 
schemata links the theoretical with the practical, just as Aristotle’s notion of practical judgment requires wisdom 
and deliberation: ‘if a man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know which sorts of 
meat are light, he would not produce health, but the man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to 
produce health’. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1141b19-20. 
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undermines the hegemony that philosophy traditionally held over the aesthetic sphere, thus 
transforming the task of philosophy from one of legislating a society according to 
philosophically defined ends to one of outlining the procedure by which society can give law 
to itself. 
 
3.3 Sensus communis: an enlarged way of thinking 
 
In the previous sections I identified that by introducing the transgressive creativity of 
genius that generates aesthetic ideas, Kant not only outlines a new way of thinking about 
nature in terms of self-expression, but a new way of thinking about historical modes of 
figuring nature; the tradition of art history. In this section I argue that Kant’s identification of 
the creativity of imagination places the concept of history, the shared sphere of aesthetic 
ideas, at the centre of collective life. This will allow us to see that Kant’s intention in 
identifying this historical dimension to his project is to couch the procedure of enlarged 
judgment in the ethical life of a community. Kant identifies that the task of enlarged thinking, 
of confronting the failure of philosophy to reconcile moral culture and history, is not the 
individual task of one who practices philosophy. Rather, it is a collective project spurred on 
by acts of transgressive creativity. This move, I suggest, displaces philosophy from the 
position of providing moral guidance and identifies the moral project as a collective, creative 
endeavour. 
Kant’s understanding of beautiful art entails a domain of art history in which artworks 
give new rules and destroy old ones. The work of art, the highest of which is poetry, gives 
rule to art by using nature to schematise what is beyond nature, giving us an example of the 
kind of creativity it takes to realise our moral calling in sensuous life: 
 
The product of a genius … is an example … for emulation by another genius, who is thereby 
awakened to the feeling of his own originality, to exercise freedom from coercion in his art in 
such a way that the latter thereby itself acquires a new rule, by which the talent shows itself as 
exemplary. (5:318) 
 
Beautiful art gives a new rule, one that draws its audience into an experience of imaginative 
expansion. Because this new rule is given by an act of transgressive creativity, the sphere of 
art history manifests a ‘lawfulness without law’ (Gesetzmässigkeit ohne Gesetz) that is 
counterpart to nature’s purposiveness without purpose. It is lawful to the extent that gives an 
example to other artists and to the observing public, and yet it is lawless to the extent that it 
lies outside the transcendental constitution of the mind; there is no law that is necessary and 
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sufficient to explain the forms that emerge. In Bernstein’s terms, the artwork is, paradoxically, 
‘empirically transcendental’, because it serves as a ‘standard or rule for estimating’.76 
 Kant’s notion of the rule-giving nature of beautiful art provides a solution to the 
double bind that reason gets itself into, a solution that is seen in what he calls a sensus 
communis. The sensus communis anticipates a community that is bound by a common mode 
of judgment. It is not an objective reality, such as an existing community of judgers who share 
common taste. Rather it is an ‘indeterminate norm [that is] presupposed by us: our 
presumption in making judgments of taste proves that’ (5:239-40). Sensus communis operates 
as a regulative a priori for judgment, affording a critical distance from current modes of taste 
and allowing us to judge with the standard of mutual communicability as our ground. It is ‘the 
necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which is assumed in 
every logic and every principle of cognitions that is not skeptical’ (5:239), meaning that it is 
not simply an abstract concept of community to which we aspire, but the ground of every 
judgment of taste. Thus sensus communis has a quasi-moral character wherein one claims for 
oneself and demands of the other that the aesthetic claims that pass between them, like 
practical claims, are not determined by their own narrow interests but aspire to universality.77 
In short, sensus communis grounds Kant’s enlarged procedure of judgment in the ethical life 
of a community. 
In §40 Kant explains the normative dimension of sensus communis by distinguishing it 
from the notion of common sense posited by the British philosophers. For the British 
philosophers, common sense indicated an established sense that was held in common. We 
might say that this notion of common sense embodies the tragedy of philosophy, for it 
detaches taste from reason, thereby condemning the established common sense to remain ever 
separated from a rational standard. On the other hand, Kant informs us that sensus communis 
is  
 
the idea of a communal sense (gemeinschaftlicher Sinn), i.e., a faculty for judging that in its 
reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s way of representing in thought, in order 
as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion 
which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have 
a detrimental influence on the judgment. (5:293) 
 
A community bound by a communal sense uses reflective judgment to abstract from the 
particular vantage of immediate subjective representation to generate an intersubjective 
perspective, turning on the a priori expressed in judgments of taste: the assumption of the                                                              
76 Bernstein, The Fate of Art, p. 92. 
77 Paul Redding, Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche, London, Routledge, 2009, p. 94. 
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intersubjective similarity of the faculties of judgment. Thus the concept of sensus communis 
empowers one to recognise the subjective nature of one’s judgment, and yet to make a claim 
to universality. While vulgar common sense designates beliefs that are immediately held in a 
community that binds it together in a sense of commonality, the sensus communis is an a 
priori sense that relates us to all of humanity. As Béatrice Longuenesse argues, the mere 
possibility of agreement we feel in judgments of beauty becomes for us a ‘normative 
necessity, an obligation made to all human beings to take their part in the common effort to 
constitute humanity as a community of judging subjects, beyond the particular limitations of 
each historically and biographically determined sensing, feeling, emotional access to the 
world of sensory objects’.78 It is the fact that the notion of taste assumes community that 
sensus communis is necessary for aesthetic judgment. 
 The significance of Kant’s notion of sensus communis is that it ties the realisation of 
our moral project together with aesthetic creativity. Just as the imagination ‘orientates’ us 
spatially by representing the world in reference to our sensory experience, figuring left and 
right, up and down not in terms of an intuition but a feeling, Kant argues that the sensus 
communis orients us to our community in such a way that mutual communicability becomes 
the ground of judgment.79 If it is mutual communicability that grounds reflective judgment, 
and if reflective judgment reconciles morality and nature through aesthetic creativity, then it 
seems that the notion of the sensus communis opens the possibility of connecting morality and 
aesthetics. As Jane Kneller suggests, sensus communis entails that ‘political and moral 
progress may be intimately connected with our ability to make universally valid aesthetic 
judgments’.80 In other words, despite the fact that morality and aesthetics are separated by an 
abyss, morality is increasingly caught up in the aesthetic sense of the community. Lambert 
Zuidervaart describes this turn in terms of Kant’s development of ‘ethical hermeneutics’, a 
holistic understanding of the human being in which ‘knowing and acting can coincide in 
                                                             
78 Béatrice Longuenesse, ‘Kant’s Leading Thread in the Analytic of the Beautiful’, in Rebecca Kaula (ed.), 
Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 194-
219, p. 219. 
79 In his essay ‘What does it mean to orientate ourselves in thinking?’, Kant explores the manner by which we 
are orientated toward the world via feeling: ‘In the proper meaning of the word, to orient oneself means to use a 
given direction … in order to find the others – literally, to find the sunrise. Now if I see the sun in the sky and 
know that it is now midday, then I know how to find south, west, north and east. For this, however, I also need 
the feeling of a difference in my own subject. I call this a feeling because these two sides [right and left] 
outwardly display no designatable difference in intuition’. Immanuel Kant, ‘What does it mean to orientate 
ourselves in thinking?’, in Kant: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. A. Wood & G. Di 
Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 3-30, p. 4. 
80 Kneller, ‘Imaginative Freedom and the German Enlightenment’, p. 181. 
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respect to truth’.81 In other words, art takes on a distinctive role in providing a medium in 
which we can see ourselves reflected, and the sensus communis becomes a context in which 
‘an overriding concern for the process of interpretation through which rational morality can be 
enacted and not merely conceptualized’.82 In short, sensus communis outlines a procedure 
though which the heteronomous use of reason can be overcome, allowing morality to become 
instrumental in collective life through human praxis. 
The connection between the moral project and aesthetics is seen in the procedure 
identified in the previous chapter that ensures that the use of reason does not become 
heteronomous: heautonomy. Resisting the heteronomy of reason is not, for Kant, a matter of 
thinking according to the autonomy of reason, that is, the legislation of the understanding 
according to the principles of reason. Rather, the key to resisting heteronomy is the 
heautonomous use of reason, the operation of reflective judgment whereby the judgment gives 
a law ‘not to nature (as autonomy), but to itself (as heautonomy), to guide its reflection upon 
nature’ (5:185). The significance of the heautonomous use of reason is shown in Kant’s 
identification of a third maxim of the autonomous use of reason: an ‘enlarged way of 
thinking’ (5:239). The maxim of the enlarged way of thinking echoes the expansion of the 
imagination undergone in the experience of the sublime, for it presupposes our supersession 
of vulgar common sense for the sensus communis. Enlarged thinking refrains from legislating 
according to subjective principles and instead undertakes the procedure of ‘comparing our 
judgment with the possible rather than the actual judgment of others’ (5:294). In other words, 
enlarged thinking is a possibility of human thought opened by the acknowledgment of the 
tragedy of philosophy, the failure of philosophy to unify the ideas of reason with sensuous 
life, and yet retains a rational standard. Thus the enlarged way of thinking embodies a 
procedure that is adequate to the conditions of interpersonal life whereby no appeal can be 
made to a theoretical standard. 
By identifying the enlarged way of thinking as the product of a community united by 
the reflective use of judging, Kant ties the fate of the autonomous use of reason to the 
aesthetic, symbolic sphere of collective representation. Judgment, genius and the sensus 
communis all serve to harmonise aesthetic and moral culture, making the rule-giving activity 
of nature through the expansion of the sublime and the schematising work of art regulative 
over aesthetics. Yet in another sense, the aesthetic sphere becomes the means by which a 
community is set on the path to autonomy, meaning that the exercise of reason becomes                                                              
81 Zuidervaart, ‘“Aesthetic Ideas” and the Role of Art in Kant’s Ethical Hermeneutics,’ p. 199. 
82 ibid., p. 200. 
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subject to the creative praxis of a community.83 By refusing to ground judgment in either 
cognition or morality Kant’s harmonisation of aesthetic and moral culture through the 
historical dimension of sensus communis is not simply a harmonisation, but the recognition of 
the primacy of the aesthetic sphere in regulating our orientation to morality, even if moral 
culture ‘ought’ to govern the aesthetic. Thus the task of philosophy, in its efforts to realise the 
moral calling of humanity, is not to legislate the moral project, but to alert the community to 
the aesthetic sphere in which the moral project is already being realised in their midst.84 
Interpreting CJ as the outlining of an enlarged procedure for thinking highlights 
Kant’s understanding of history as the domain in which the dualism between nature and 
reason is reconciled through creative human praxis. Kant’s conception of history recognises 
two aspects of nature; that nature can be changed through human praxis, and that nature acts 
in ways that stimulate human praxis in the direction of moral transformation.85 Or to put it 
differently, nature is purposive to the extent that all its parts work toward its ultimate end: the 
realisation of moral freedom. As Zammito aptly states, throughout CJ ‘history [becomes] a 
realm between nature and freedom: the record of the interventions of freedom in the world of 
mechanical causality and the sting of their consequences’.86 The significance of Kant’s 
understanding of history as a realm between nature and freedom is that it does not advance the 
idea that history progresses according to some mechanical or natural law. Rather, it advances 
an idea of history as a human project with the aim of reconciling morality and nature. Thus 
Kant overcomes the tragic double bind of moral philosophy by recognising the radical                                                              
83 Kant’s sensus communis designates a community of enlarged thought that is able to recognise what is mere 
prejudice or superstition and not a basis for universal understanding. To borrow from Gadamer, the sensus 
communis signals the ‘abstraction of the part-whole relation of the object to its horizon’, that is, it allows us to 
become aware of the contingent character of our aesthetic ideas, thus opening them to the possibility of critique 
and transformation. Gadamer’s notion of the ‘horizon’ plays on Kant’s Copernican move, indicating the ‘range 
of vision that can be seen from a particular vantage point’. Rather we are orientated to our horizon through the 
sensus communis. The sensus communis allows us to discern between what is essentially communal in our 
community and what has only survived due to traditional authority, meaning that it is the critical, historical space 
that opens which allows us to assent or dissent from what is commonly held. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and 
Method, London: Continuum, 2004, p. 301. 
84 This interpretation of CJ resonates with Ernst Cassirer’s reading of Kant. Cassirer stresses the transformative 
character of CJ, arguing that because of his attempt to reconcile the aesthetic and moral dimensions of 
experience in CJ, Kant ‘touched the nerve of the entire spiritual and intellectual culture of his time more than 
any other of his works’ (Ernst Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, trans. J. Haden, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1981, p. 273). This is because it combines symbolic thinking with theoretical philosophy in such a way 
that reconciles the natural sciences with developments in modern logic. In this attempt, ‘the critique of reason 
becomes the critique of culture,’ for the critical method ‘seeks to understand and to show how every content of 
culture, in so far as it is more than a mere isolated content, in so far as it is grounded in a universal principle of 
form, presupposes an original act of the human spirit’. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 3, 
trans. R. Manheim, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, p. 80. 
85 In §83, Kant’s words sound remarkably similar to those of Herder. In this section he attributes to nature a 
person-like agency, arguing that nature places humankind before constant danger and calamity in order to push 
them toward recognising themselves as ultimate ends. 
86 Zammito, Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, p. 332. 
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creativity by which human action transfigures the world from the determinism of the natural 
order into an order of freedom. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that in the final versions of CJ Kant develops his project into 
the outlines of a procedure though which to navigate the failure of philosophy to take an 
instrumental role in reconciling morality and history. His understanding of genius, beautiful 
art, and sensus communis are instrumental in outlining how his enlarged procedure of 
philosophy can overcome the double bind of philosophy and realise humanity’s moral calling 
in history as a collective project. Kant knew well that as moral agents we are constantly faced 
with evidence that the natural world is not well adjusted for our moral realisation.87 He 
recognises that we are regularly faced with the sight of moral virtue going unrewarded, even 
thwarted by forces indifferent to moral concerns. In his efforts to outline a procedure for 
philosophy that would allow us to reconcile the moral project with history, CJ can be 
understood as a sustained reflection on how we are to find hope in a world that seems 
inhospitable to our moral vocation. While society remains less than the civil society of ends in 
which moral and aesthetic culture are one, while we find there to be no guarantee that moral 
action will result in happy ends, Kant ties our ability to feel ‘at home’ in the world to our 
production of aesthetic ideas that give us the feeling that the world is morally inhabitable. 
Beautiful art, art that allows us to experience ourselves as fully rational and natural beings, 
opens us to ‘the possibility that nature and freedom may harmonize, that reconciliation may 
be achieved’.88 That harmonisation, however, will be the results of our own creative labour. 
                                                             
87 In the final pages of CJ Kant makes a curious observation about a righteous man (such as Spinoza) who seeks 
to act in conformity to freedom and yet is unable to reach the subjective position in which he can judge nature as 
a fitting place for the realisation of his moral destiny. Such a man is fundamentally split and cannot find aesthetic 
unity in his experience: ‘[He] does not demand any advantage for himself from his conformity to this law, 
whether in this or in another world; rather, he would merely unselfishly establish the good to which that holy law 
directs all his powers. … from nature he can, to be sure, expect some contingent assistance here and there, but 
never a lawlike agreement in accordance with constant rules (like his internal maxims are and must be) with the 
ends to act in behalf of which he still feels himself bound and impelled. Deceit, violence, and envy will always 
surround him, even though he is himself honest, peaceable, and benevolent’ (5:452). This man sounds 
surprisingly like Schelling’s tragic hero, Schopenhauer in his moral anxiety or Benjamin’s silent sufferer. Unless 
we can grasp the ‘final end’ of the world in terms of morality, unless we can find a way to judge nature ‘as if’ it 
were adjusted to fit our moral ends, Kant suggests that we find ourselves in the position of the tragic hero, 
constantly surrounded by deceit, violence and envy rather than occurrences that are rendered intelligible to our 
moral vocation. 
88 Zuidervaart, ‘“Aesthetic Ideas” and the Role of Art in Kant’s Ethical Hermeneutics,’ p. 207. 
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The task left to those after Kant’s CJ is to search for a language, a form of art, that 
would be adequate to this calling. In §52, Kant notes a form of art that might be up to the task, 
stating that ‘the presentation of the sublime, so far as it belongs to beautiful art, can be united 
with beauty in a verse tragedy’ (5:325).89 He does not develop this observation, however, for 
in his view the task of reconciling morality and history is not the task of the philosopher but 
the genius. The task of philosophy, for Kant, is to outline a procedure that allows this 
reconciliation to appear. 
 
                                                             
89 In this section, entitled ‘On the combination of the beautiful arts in one and the same product’, Kant refers to 
tragedy as a kind of art that combines music, drama, song and dance, anticipating many of the themes of 
Wagner’s ‘total work of art’ (Gesamtkunstwerk). See Richard Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future, and other 
works, trans. W. Ellis, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Hegel: The Philosophy of Tragedy 
 
 
They are gripped and shattered by something intrinsic to their own actual being 
(LA 1217-8). 
 
 
 Part I of this thesis put forward an interpretation of CJ that identifies Kant’s 
perception of the tragedy of philosophy as the key to his discovery of a new task for 
philosophical thinking. This task builds from the creative potential of the imagination to 
operate according to an enlarged procedure that is grounded on the a priori of mutual 
communicability. The discovery of a rational principle in aesthetic judgment is based on 
acknowledging the unknowability of aesthetic matters, for such a principle is based on the 
recognition of the contingency of the aesthetic realm. The principle of aesthetic judgment 
enables us to judge matters of nature and ethical life ‘as if’ they were unfolding according to a 
purpose consonant with our moral destiny, thereby reconciling nature and moral ends in a 
subjective judgment. For Hegel, however, while Kant’s understanding of aesthetic judgment 
made a significant step in the development of critical philosophy, it entailed two implications 
he deemed to be highly problematic: that the end of nature and ethical life cannot be known 
but only felt, and that by grounding a society’s orientation to its moral calling in a context 
outside the agent’s rationality, that is, in history, Kant’s ‘ethical turn’ subjects the realisation 
of humanity’s moral vocation to a historical trajectory that is beyond the control of an 
autonomous will. 
This chapter argues that Hegel’s interpretation of tragedy can be understood as an 
attempt to bring Kant’s project to its fitting conclusion by extending Kant’s enlarged way of 
thinking. The significance of Hegel’s theory of tragedy, I will claim, is that it does not address 
tragedy as a mere artistic genre, but as a way of reconciling the Kantian dualism between 
nature and freedom. The task of bringing Kantian philosophy to this fitting conclusion, for 
Hegel, lies in overcoming the two implications of Kant’s argument; in overcoming the ‘as if’ 
of regulative judgment so as to provide a substantive way to think of history’s rational 
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trajectory. While Kant responded to the tragedy of philosophy in terms of a new procedure for 
philosophy that begins with self-regulation, Hegel argues that Greek tragedy itself – a 
temporally specific artistic genre – provides a solution. While the understanding fails to 
reconcile our moral ideals with the chaos of nature, Hegel argues that tragedy raises up nature 
and morality in a work that reconciles us to ‘the necessity of what happens’ in the historical 
domain by revealing that it unfolds according to ‘absolute rationality’ (LA 1215). To complete 
the Kantian project Hegel finds it necessary to enlarge thinking beyond that proposed by Kant, 
rejecting Kant’s insistence that poetry can enlarge the mind to judge nature as if it were fitted 
for our moral end in order to argue that poetry, and tragedy in particular, enlarges the mind to 
constitute the historical sphere as a progressive domain, allowing us to be ‘morally at peace’ 
with history (ibid.). To do this, Hegel develops Kant’s understanding of the intellectus 
archetypus to describe the self-positing nature of human cognition, radicalising Kant’s 
antinomy of teleological judgment in order to show the development of reason according to 
antinomies arising in a community’s ethical practice. Reading Hegel’s understanding of 
tragedy as part of his attempt to complete the critical project will prove significant to our 
overall thesis, for identifying Hegel’s use of Kant’s poetic response to the failure of 
philosophy further establishes the significance of Kant’s enlarged way of thinking for the 
philosophical problematic of tragedy. 
Before we begin our analysis of Hegel’s theory of tragedy, however, it is important to 
acknowledge the polar reception it has received. On one side, philosophers such as Friedrich 
Nietzsche, A. C. Bradley, Walter Benjamin, Theodore Adorno, Martha Nussbaum, and 
Sebastian Gardner argue that Hegel’s theory of tragedy removes the insights of Kant’s critical 
philosophy and returns to a pre-critical metaphysics.1 We shall call the view shared by these 
thinkers the ‘Kantian’s view’, for its proponents are more inspired by Kant and early 
Romanticism than by Hegel. In the Kantian’s view, Hegel’s theory of tragedy does not heal 
Kant’s divided philosophy but occludes the critical insights of Kant’s critique of substantial 
metaphysics. Hegel’s philosophy is thus anti-tragic, for it covers the contingency of Kant’s 
aesthetic sphere with a trajectory that cannot do other but progress toward greater rationality.  
In recent years, however, another view has gained significant attention. Philosophers 
such as William Dudley, Stephen Houlgate, Theodore George, Robert Stern, Robert Williams,                                                              
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, trans. W. Kaufmann, New York, Vintage 
Books, 1967; A. C. Bradley, ‘Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy,’ in Anne & Henry Paolucci, Hegel on Tragedy, New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962; Theodore Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. R. Hullot-Kentor, London: 
Continuum, 2004; Martha Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; Sebastian Gardner, ‘Tragedy, Morality and Metaphysics’, in 
Sebastian Gardner & Jose Luis Bermudez (eds.), Art and Morality, New York, Routledge, 2002. 
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and Martin Thibodeau have proposed that Hegel does not break faith with tragic experience 
but allows philosophy to be transformed by tragic art.2 We shall call this the ‘metaphysical 
realist view’, for it suggests that Hegel restores content to Kant’s attempt to limit metaphysics 
to thought, refiguring philosophy through Kant’s reflections on art. Proponents of the 
metaphysical realist view argue that Hegel does not depart from the critical paradigm. Rather, 
he corrects it, revealing Kant’s inability to break from traditional philosophy and thereby 
outlining a properly tragic philosophy; that is, one that is unencumbered by external 
constraints. 
By examining Hegel’s theory of tragedy in light of the two main interpretations, in this 
chapter I will make the following claims: that the metaphysical realist view allows us to see 
Hegel’s insightful critique of Kant’s refusal to reconcile nature and freedom philosophically, 
but that the Kantian’s view is able to show us, despite its weaknesses, that Hegel 
problematically undermines Kant’s separation of the philosophic from the aesthetic sphere. 
The first claim will assist us to see that Hegel does not undermine Kant’s separation of the 
philosophical from the aesthetic by returning to the metaphysical project of philosophy Kant 
rejected, as the Kantian’s view suggests. The second claim will show that Hegel does, 
however, undermine the import of Kant’s separation, and that he achieves this by subsuming 
Kant’s recognition of the tragedy of philosophy into an enlarged understanding of what 
philosophy is about. The upshot of the second claim, I suggest, is that Hegel does not outline 
a procedure for engaging with the contingency of the aesthetic sphere, but a system of 
philosophy that claims to be consonant with the final cause emerging in the aesthetic sphere. 
 
4.1 Hegel’s aesthetics 
 
In order to examine Hegel’s theory of tragedy, it is first necessary to outline his 
understanding of aesthetics. Hegel’s understanding of aesthetics can be viewed as an attempt 
to reconcile the aesthetic and moral spheres that Kant recognised to be in tension in CJ. From 
as early as his essay Faith and Knowledge (1802) (FK), Hegel recognised that CJ draws these 
spheres together subjectively in its idea of a historical sphere that is defined by the notion of                                                              
2 William Dudley, Hegel, Nietzsche and Philosophy: Thinking Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002; Stephen Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004; Theodore George, Tragedies of Spirit: Tracing finitude in Hegel’s Phenomenology, 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006; Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012; Robert Williams, Tragedy, Recognition and the Death of God: Studies in Hegel and 
Nietzsche, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Martin Thibodeau, Hegel and Greek Tragedy, trans. H. 
Wilhelm, UK, Lexington Books, 2013. 
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‘lawfulness without law’ (Gesetzmässigkeit ohne Gesetz). While rationalists such as Wolff 
and Baumgarten saw the aesthetic sphere in terms of personal sentiment, Kant’s notion of the 
productive ability of imagination to create aesthetic ideas generates a symbolic sphere of ideas 
that are lawful to the extent that they regulate judgment but lawless to the extent that they are 
not determined by the theoretical order. In Kant’s view, the lawfulness of the aesthetic sphere 
constitutes a kind of ‘inner purposiveness’ of the community, a fate to which all the members 
of the community are bound. This purposiveness, however, can only ever be known 
subjectively, meaning that it remains an ‘as if’ of reflective judgment; an analogy between our 
own purposefulness and what we find unfolding in the aesthetic sphere. 
In Hegel’s view, Kant’s recognition of the aesthetic, historical sphere that is 
autonomous from the theoretical domain made a crucial contribution to the progress of 
philosophy. The significance of this move, he explains, is that it ‘resuscitated the Idea in 
general and especially the Idea of life’ (EL 280), the idea of life as process, becoming, and 
alteration. In Hegel’s view, Kant restores dignity to the human ability to judge the 
purposiveness of the phenomenal world and opens our perception to development unfolding 
within collective life. The idea of life was not ‘discovered’ but ‘resuscitated’, he suggests, 
because it was originally in Aristotle. In Physics, Aristotle determines nature as internal 
finality, describing it as arche kineseos kai staseos, the ‘principle of change and rest 
immanent in all natural beings’.3 This determination of nature, for Hegel, ‘already contains 
this internal purposiveness; hence, it stands infinitely far above the concept of modern 
teleology which had only finite, or external, purposiveness in view’ (280). Aristotle’s 
determination of life was occluded by the ontological commitments of traditional philosophy, 
which holds Being as timeless, impassable power. The strength of Kant’s attention to the 
tragedy of philosophy, for Hegel, is that it reopens philosophy’s perception of life. 
Despite the strength of Kant’s insight, however, Hegel argues that Kant failed to grasp 
the ultimate truth that our judgments about nature’s purpose and the reality to which Kant 
always contrasted it are in fact one and the same.4 As he states in his discussion of Kant in 
Encyclopaedia Logic (EL): 
 
the objectivity of thinking in Kant’s sense is itself again only subject in its form, because, 
according to Kant, thoughts, although they are universal and necessary determinations, are still 
only our thoughts, and are cut off from what the thing is in-itself by an impassable gulf. On the                                                              
3 Aristotle, Physics, 192b21. The full citation is as follows: ‘nature is a principle or cause of being moved and of 
being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not accidently’. 
4 Paul Guyer, ‘Thought and Being: Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy’, in Frederick Beiser, The 
Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 171-210, p. 171. 
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contrary, the true objectivity of thinking consists in this: that thoughts are not merely our 
thoughts, but at the same time the In-itself as thought-product, the significance of what is 
there, as distinct from what is only thought by us, and hence still distinct from the matter 
itself, or from the matter in-itself. (83) 
 
Hegel treats Kant’s subjective reconciliation of reason and aesthetics – his insistence on an 
incalculable gulf between thought and objects – as an inability to break from the restrictive 
dogma of traditional metaphysics that occludes the full power of his discoveries. Thus Hegel 
sets out to show knowledge of an absolute realm of being in which the opposed poles of 
thought and object have an underlying identity that Kant argued we could feel but not know. 
To reconcile the Kantian dualism and extend critical philosophy, Hegel requires a way to 
show that Kant’s regulative ‘as if’ is in fact a constitutive principle, thereby uniting the 
theoretical and the aesthetic spheres in the domain of history. 
For Hegel, Kant’s notion of intuitive understanding provides the key to this task; that 
is, the key to reconciling the critical project. In his discussion of the antinomy of teleological 
judgment, Kant makes it clear that the distinguishing feature of natural purpose concerns the 
‘peculiarity’ of human judgment: ‘that in cognition … the particular is not determined by the 
universal, and the latter therefore cannot be derived from the former alone’ (CJ 5:406-407). In 
other words, Kant acknowledges that aesthetic judgment cannot derive a rational universal 
from a particular, but merely a regulative, aesthetic universal: an aesthetic idea. But if natural 
purpose is only a reflective principle, an analogy derived from comparing the products of 
nature to our own moral purpose, then 
 
it must be based on the idea of a possible understanding other than the human one … so that 
one could say that certain products of nature, as far as their possibility is concerned, must, 
given the particular constitution of our understanding, be considered by us as intentional and 
generated as ends. (5:406) 
 
Here Kant observes that we are only aware of the contingency of human understanding by 
placing it in contrast to ‘other possible ones’, and one other possible one in particular: the 
divine, intuitive intellect, or intellectus archetypus. In contrast to the discursive nature of 
human understanding that can only experience the reconciliation of the antinomy in the 
feeling of the supersensible, intuitive understanding ‘goes from the synthetically universal (of 
the intuition of a whole as such) to the particular, i.e., from the whole to the parts’ (5:407). As 
Paul Redding notes, the operation of intuitive intellect is similar to the way that we proceed 
from the whole to the parts in our determination of space.5 We do not think of time and space, 
                                                             
5 Redding, Continental Idealism, p. 100. 
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but time and space are the forms of intuition that condition the possibility of what can be 
sensibly experienced. Unlike the understanding, which must proceed from the parts to the 
whole, in the divine, intuitive intellect the representation of the whole contains ‘no 
contingency in the combination of the parts’ (ibid.). For intuitive intellect there is no 
distinction between the theoretical and practical spheres, for all the ideas thought by such an 
understanding would exist by virtue of having been thought. Or in other words, there would 
be no distinction between form and content, for the singular thing and the universal are united. 
In this framework, Kant’s account of intellectual intuition suggests that we become conscious 
of the limitations of our judgment of purpose if we are able to contrast it with a divine 
intellect.  
 For Hegel, understanding human thought through the framework of what Kant 
described as intellectual intuition is the key to reconciling the critical system.6 Rather than 
determining the world in itself to be unknowable, reason in the sense that Kant limited to 
intellectual intuition is that which posits it as beyond the limits of sensible reason.7 By 
attempting to reconfigure Kant’s regulative understanding of the intuitive intellect as, to some 
extent, the basis of human cognition, Hegel ultimately attempts to enlarge the critical project 
according to a regulative procedure outlined by Kant himself. It might be said that Hegel 
reads Kant’s CJ as a philosophical tragedy; that is, as the philosophical presentation of two 
one-sided maxims that arose within the intellectual life of eighteenth century Europe: the 
maxim of the world as unknowable to human cognition, and the maxim of the world as 
knowable for the divine intellect. Such maxims cannot be reconciled by a discursive 
conception of reason that posits each maxim in a different realm, but by a poetic kind of 
reason capable of going beyond the limits of the theoretical order. Thus Hegel is not saying 
that we must discard the limits Kant established for thought and replace it with divine intellect 
that produces the world intuitively, but that both positions must be reconciled in a larger                                                              
6 While I suggest that Hegel employs the framework of Kant’s regulative understanding of intellectual intuition 
in his understanding of human thought, it is important to note that, against Fichte, Hegel was reticent to use the 
Kantian terminology of ‘intellectual intuition’. In his Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte’s account of intellectual 
intuition begins with proposition that the ‘I posits itself’. In the act of intuiting oneself, the philosopher performs 
the act whereby the self arises for him. ‘To posit’ (setzen) means ‘to be aware of’, or ‘to be conscious of’, 
implying that the essence of I-hood lies in the assertion of one’s own self-identity. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The 
Science of Knowledge, P. Heath & J. Lachs (ed. & trans), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 94. 
For Hegel, Fichte’s appraisal of the Kantian notion of intellectual intuition bestows critical philosophy wither an 
overly cognitive foundation, undermining the inter-subjective dimension of consciousness. In FK (156ff.), Hegel 
criticizes Fichte’s account of the Ego as intellectual intuition for remaining without content.  
7 As Paul Guyer explains, Hegel’s understanding of human cognition in terms of Kant’s intuitive intellect does 
not make an ‘internal criticism’ of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, such as arguing that certain premises are 
unsound or that his conclusions are invalid, but an ‘external criticism’. The significance of Guyer’s explanation 
is that it draws our attention to the continuity between Kant and Hegel. See Guyer, ‘Thought and Being: Hegel’s 
Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy’, p. 171. 
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understanding of thought. It is through the enlargement of thought – the radicalisation of the 
intuitive component of Kant’s reflective judgment – that a solution can be found. 
While the significance of tragedy for Hegel’s reading of Kant will become clearer in 
the following section when we turn directly to Hegel’s theory of tragedy, what is important to 
note is that Hegel views Kant’s notion of the intuitive intellect as pushing beyond the limits of 
the transcendental structure of the mind. While Kant maintains that we cannot think of the 
world ‘in itself’, the way the world is independent of our way of seeing, it is by considering 
the world as it really is that makes human teleology a merely reflective principle. Yet in 
Hegel’s view, if the world as it really is – the world as it is in the mind of God – is 
unknowable, then this must be because, as Redding explains, ‘reason constitutes the mind of 
God in this way as unknowable, not because that mind is “in itself” unknowable’.8 Kant’s 
recognition of the antinomy leads him to identify the notion of intellectual intuition, the 
intellect for which form and content are one, not only providing a way the world might be 
considered as a whole, but also giving a vital account of what the positing of the world would 
be like for such an understanding. Hegel argues that by recognising this limit, human 
understanding can no longer constitute the world as unknowable. Rather, it recognises its 
constitutive role in positing the world through reason – even the realm that is unknowable.9 In 
Hegel’s view, the intellectual tragedy of Kantian thinking is overcome in this recognition.10 
 The importance of Kant’s intuitive understanding for Hegel’s aesthetics is that it 
provides a model of thinking that reconciles understanding and intuition, returning life to the                                                              
8 Redding, Continental Idealism, p. 101. 
9 According to Redding, by modelling human understanding on Kant’s intuitive understanding, Hegel can be 
understood as responding to Jacobi’s critique of the Enlightenment in terms of nihilismus. For Jacobi, the 
Enlightenment move from faith to a conceptually articulated world view is nihilistic to the extent that it removes 
the sense of immediacy from our commitment to moral principles, not only opening the justification of morality 
to an infinite regress, for there is no immediate certainty that might provide self-justification to moral principles, 
but also disempowering the moral agent from instinctual moral behaviour. In response to Enlightenment 
philosophy’s supposed nihilism, Kant’s intuitive intellect not only serves Hegel with an account of morality in 
terms of immediate moral commitments, but also with a way of reconciling aesthetic ideas and the ideas of 
reason in the attempt to reconcile the Kantian dualism once and for all. See ibid. 
10 Hegel also notes the significance of Kant’s intellectual intuition for completing the critical system in LA. 
Focusing on Kant’s aesthetic categories, Hegel argues that Kant’s concept of the beautiful ‘comes nearer to the 
concept organic and living,’ and yet he also notes that Kant treats the concept of organism ‘only from the point 
of view of reflection which judges them subjectively’ (LA 57). Because Kant’s aesthetic judgment does not come 
from the understanding, the faculty of concepts, Kant makes ‘this dissolution and reconciliation itself into a 
purely subjective one again, not one absolutely true and actual’ (58). Thus in Hegel’s view, Kant opens us to the 
hope of a unified system at the very moment he establishes an absolute hierarchy of reality over appearance, 
noumena over phenomena, being over becoming. Hegel concludes that in CJ Kant develops the ‘starting point 
for the true comprehension of the beauty of art, yet only by overcoming Kant’s deficiencies could this 
comprehension assert itself as the higher grasp of the true unity of necessity and freedom, particular and 
universal, sense and reason’ (60-61). This starting point, Hegel explains, begins when we recognise that Kant 
brings ‘the reconciled contradiction [of reason and sense] before our minds’, notably in the unity of ‘the intuitive 
understanding’ (57). 
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Ideas. Kant’s aesthetic sphere, in Hegel’s view, becomes the sphere of the Ideas of reason, for 
in it appearances are grasped according to the idea that is expressed through the arrangement 
of their parts. Thus Hegel argues that Kant’s ‘distinction of the purpose as final cause from 
the merely efficient cause (i.e. from what is usually called “cause”) is of the highest 
importance’ (EL 280), for it opens the possibility of ideas being seen as creatively unfolding 
in lived experience. While external purposiveness provides the concept of a complex system 
as the work of an intelligent designer (nexus effectivus), meaning that both ideas and forces 
must be imposed on matter if cognition or movement is to arise, internal purposiveness gives 
the concept of a system not in virtue of an external design but of its own inner nature (nexus 
finalis). Here the parts would be means to a system’s own inner ends or purpose, meaning that 
matter is itself alive and capable of its own development without external guidance. If humans 
are purposive in the paradigm of final causation, then they are alive in the fullest sense of the 
term. A world of final causation, for Hegel, contains the possibility of tragedy, for it has no 
external constraints. 
 While Hegel interprets Kant’s aesthetic sphere in terms of the Ideas of reason, Kant 
himself argued that the Ideas of reason are necessarily beyond experience.11 In order to show 
how this is possible, Hegel requires a new understanding of the sensuous presentation of Ideas 
in order to show how Kant’s theoretical and aesthetic spheres converge. Hegel finds this 
understanding in Aristotle’s nexus finalis and Kant’s inner purposiveness, using the term 
‘inner necessity’ to elucidate the sensuous appearance of the Idea in the parts of an object. Yet 
unlike Kant’s understanding of reflective judgment’s search for a concept, Hegel argues that 
the appearance of the Idea is nothing like cognitive awareness, that is, representation 
(Vorstellung), but is the intuitive and immediate presentation (Darstellung) of the Idea in the 
experience of beauty, the presentation of an artwork’s inner necessity (what Hegel terms an 
artwork’s Selbstzweck). It is ‘pure’ appearance because nothing is represented; Darstellung 
entails that nothing remains beyond what presents itself. Just as the living being exhibits a 
perfect confluence of matter and form, so the work of art manifests its Idea in its sensuous 
                                                             
11 Kant’s conception of the Idea builds from Plato. Plato, Kant states, used ‘the expression idea in such a way 
that we can readily see that he understood by it something that not only could never be borrowed from the senses, 
but that even goes far beyond the concepts of the understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself), since 
nothing encountered in experience could ever be congruent to it’ (CPR A313/B370, emphasis mine). Yet unlike 
Plato, Kant argues that the Ideas of reason do not pertain to objects, but are the metaphysical analogues of 
physical forces: we do not borrow them from experience, but postulate them in order to explain something about 
experience, such as our demand for unity or our feeling of moral freedom. 
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content.12 Hegel’s understanding of beauty as the sensuous appearance of the Idea assists us 
to understand his understanding of the ‘Idea’. The Idea, for Hegel, is the self-identity of the 
Concept (Begriff) in which the singular thing and the universal are united.13 This is important 
to note, for the critique made by the Kantian’s view takes off from this point, suggesting that 
Hegel does not respect singularity, but reduces it to universality. For Hegel, the indeterminacy 
of Kant’s symbol is replaced with the Idea, for there is no ‘inner’ or ‘true’ meaning, for 
nothing remains veiled. To see this Idea fully manifest in sensuous form raises our spirits; it is 
beautiful, for in it the Idea appears in sensuous form. Thus Hegel makes his famous statement 
in LA that the ‘beautiful is characterized as the pure appearance (Schein) of the Idea to sense’ 
(111).14 
By understanding beauty as the appearance of the Idea, Hegel identifies both the 
importance of art for the history of cognition but also the limitations of art as the bearer of 
truth. Hegel illustrates this point in relation to the speculative development of Greek art. 
When the Idea of Greek sculpture makes its sensuous appearance, it compels the artists to 
represent the divinely inanimate figures with dimensions of interiority and subjectivity, giving 
birth to drama. In drama, and in tragic drama in particular, the beautiful individualities 
become incarnate in living individualities. Unlike works of sculpture, tragic heroes have 
families and social roles. They possess judgment that is subject to error. They display the 
struggles and conflicts that make up the Greek world, and in the performance of the tragedies 
                                                             
12 See Aristotle, De Anima, 412a1ff. For Aristotle, there is no inner/outer contrast between form and matter. 
Rather, the form is causally responsible for the organisation of the outer parts, meaning that it is fully expressed 
in the matter: ‘matter is potentiality, form actuality’ (412a10). 
13 The verb begreifen comes from greifen, which means ‘to grasp’ or ‘to seize’, and means ‘to comprehend’. The 
noun Begriff means both ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ in the sense of ‘ability to conceive’. According to Michael 
Inwood, a Begrief for Hegel is neither exclusively universal nor a representation, and nor does it refer to the 
characteristics that objects have in common. Rather, it entails that conceptual thought can capture empirical, 
emotional and religious experience, thus transforming the regular notion of concept. See Michael Inwood, A 
Hegel Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1992, p. 58f. 
14 Because Hegel understands beauty in terms of Ideas, and Ideas as detached from nature, natural beauty does 
not play a role in Hegel’s aesthetics as it does for Kant. For Kant, in judgments of the beautiful nature leaves 
‘traces’ that speak of an undergirding unity of the theoretical and practical domains, a supersensible realm that is 
external to human cognition. For Hegel, on the other hand, nature is spiritless (geistlos) and natural beauty has 
no philosophical significance: ‘What is higher about the spirit and its artistic beauty is not something merely 
relative in comparison to nature. On the contrary, spirit is alone the true, comprehending everything in itself, so 
that everything beautiful is truly beautiful only as sharing in this higher sphere and generated by it. In this sense 
the beauty of nature appears only as a refraction of the beauty that belongs to spirit, as an imperfect incomplete 
mode, a mode which in its substance is contained in the spirit itself’ (LA 2). Thus art is not an imitation of nature, 
for the beauty of nature is a mere refraction of the beauty that belongs to Spirit. While artworks might contain an 
aspect of nature to the extent that they are composed of sensible material such as stone and sounds, what makes 
them works of art is that their materiality is spiritualised in a composition produced by human consciousness to 
express the Idea. 
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the spectators become conscious of these struggles.15 Greek tragedy provides the 
transformation whereby the inner life of the Greeks, the ‘mores’ of Greek ethical life, 
becomes a matter of thought, meaning that art as the presentation of the Idea is displaced by 
thought. When beauty and the Idea are united in the work of art, Hegel argues that ‘art now 
transcends itself, in that it forsakes the element of a reconciled embodiment of spirit in 
sensuous form and passes over from the poetry of the imagination to the prose of thought’ 
(89). 
Hegel’s thesis is often referred to as the ‘death of art’ thesis. It does not mean that 
artworks cease to be created, but that after tragedy art no longer satisfies: 
 
The philosophy of art is … a greater need in our day than it was in days when art by itself as 
art yielded full satisfaction. Art invites us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the 
purpose of creating art again, but for knowing philosophically what art is. (LA 11) 
 
When the medium of the Idea alters, Spirit takes a new shape: the form of religion, the 
immediate presence of the absolute. Hegel’s triad of Spiritual shapes – art, religion and 
philosophy – refer to those activities that in any given historical period define the norm on the 
basis of which the inhabitants of that world find their way and orientate themselves to it.16 
They are, for Hegel, immanent ‘transcendental’ categories in the sense that they provide the 
condition of the possibility of the sense and significance of a world. Like art, religion is also a 
limited shape of Spirit, for those immersed in religious consciousness without the benefit of 
philosophy cannot grasp the limit of the absolute. It is only in the medium of philosophy, 
which comes after art and religion – that is, after life – that thought can understand itself 
conceptually.17 
The upshot of Hegel’s aesthetics, his understanding of beautiful art as the 
manifestation of its idea, is that it contains no account of aesthetic judgment. As Robert 
Pippin notes, Hegel ‘largely ignores the question of the logical peculiarities of aesthetic 
judgments and their possible validity’, for he views art, as the bearer of truth, as a thing of the 
past.18 For the original spectators of art in the time of the Greeks, for example, Hegel suggests 
                                                             
15 Yet as Julian Young argues, tragic heroes are similar to sculpture in that they represent only one emotion or 
ethical power. See Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy, p. 116. 
16 Thibodeau, Hegel and Greek Tragedy, p. 147. 
17 Think of Hegel’s assertion that ‘the Owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the onset of twilight’. G. W. F. 
Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A. Wood, trans. H. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991, p. 28. 
18 Robert Pippin, ‘The Absence of Aesthetics in Hegel’s Aesthetics’, in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and 
Nineteenth Century Philosophy, ed. F. Beiser, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 394-418, p. 
396. 
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that the Idea of the artwork would have been immediately apparent. However, when art ceases 
to be tied to the ethical mores of a community and becomes autonomous, the higher forms of 
representation, that is, religion and philosophy, displace its spiritual role of reflecting a 
community’s truth to itself. Art can no longer satisfy our desire for truth, for we are capable of 
reflecting on the true character of the infinite. In Hegel’s view, modern art is no longer linked 
intuitively to the ethical life of a community. It is art ‘transcending itself as art’, a 
manifestation of the dissatisfied life of art as a continuous tradition.19 Yet tragedy still has an 
important role for the speculative audience – for us – for it is a work that expresses the inner 
rationality of thought’s own development, a development that becomes lost by the fixity that 
the understanding attempts to bring to the dynamic Ideas of reason. While tragic art, as I will 
show in the following section, disrupts an inherited framework of ethical life that was held to 
be absolute, the philosophy of tragedy disrupts the fixed Ideas of traditional philosophy, 
opening philosophy to a new task, one that is large enough to encompass the movement of 
Ideas. 
 
4.2 Hegel’s theory of tragedy 
 
Now I have outlined Hegel’s understanding of aesthetics as an attempt to reconcile the 
critical project, I am able to examine his interpretation of tragedy. As I have already noted, 
two aspects of Hegel’s theory of tragedy must be separated: the original experience of tragedy 
for the ancient Greeks, and the philosophical implications for the speculative audience for 
whom ‘art invites us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of creating art 
again, but for knowing philosophically what art is’. The significance of the speculative 
implications of tragedy, I will suggest, lies in the fact that tragedy provides an alternative to 
the moral vision of the world posed by traditional philosophy in which an abstract universal 
makes reconciliation between agent and sensuous life impossible. While Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy ‘makes the identity of the opposites into the absolute terminus … the pure 
boundary which is nothing but the negation of philosophy’ (FK 67), tragedy, for Hegel, 
manifests an alternate understanding of philosophy, one that situates the so-called 
‘theoretical’ nature of morality in the domain of society and history. 
To outline Hegel’s theory of tragedy, it is vital to note his use of Aristotle’s 
understanding of tragedy in Poetics as a way to explain the development of a community’s                                                              
19 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, trans. 
W. Wallace, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971, §561 and §562. 
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rational consciousness entirely within the bounds of experience. The significance of Poetics, 
for Hegel, lies in Aristotle’s understanding of the essence of tragedy as a process of learning 
wherein the hero gains an enlarged perspective from a process that occurs entirely within her 
experience. This process consists of three moments: reversal, recognition and catharsis. The 
importance of Aristotle’s understanding of these three moments, for Hegel, is that while the 
‘best’ tragedies present the tragic effect occurring in the hero, the true tragic effect occurs in 
the spectators.20 Aristotle explains that in a tragic drama the spectators watch an ‘imitation 
(mimèsis) of an action (praxeos) that is serious (spoudaias) and perfect (teleias)’.21 While the 
action of tragedy is ‘perfect’, or better still, ‘complete’, teleias also has the meaning of a 
‘goal’, opening us to Aristotle’s teleology. For Aristotle, telos is final causation, the goal that 
is imminent to something when it comes to completion, a goal that is necessary given its 
component parts. Aristotle’s teleology provides Hegel with a way to think of the hero’s action 
as both free and necessary. While the hero is free from external constraints, for the spectators 
there is no feeling that things could have been otherwise; they are aware that the course of 
action is necessitated by some fallibility (harmartia) that lay within the hero from the very 
beginning of the drama. While the natural order might be blind to human concerns, the 
spiritual order of human thought entails that the outcome of the play is determined by the 
hero’s way of thinking. 
The key element to Aristotle’s understanding of the experience of the spectators, an 
element that becomes vital for Hegel’s theory of tragedy, is his notion of katharsis. Through 
participating in the necessary downfall of the hero, Aristotle tells us that the spectators are led 
‘to the end of pity and fear by the katharsis of such emotions (pathèmaton)’.22 The meaning 
of katharsis, the ‘cleansing’ of these pathèmata, is uncertain in Aristotle’s usage here. It 
appears only twice in Aristotle’s writings, and it is not clear whether it has a biological 
                                                             
20 Aristotle argues that ‘the structure of the best tragedy should be not simple but complex and one that 
represents incidents arousing fear and pity—for that is peculiar to this form of art’. He states that in such 
tragedies the hero’s suffering is instrumental in the process reversal and recognition. The pity and fear, however, 
is ultimately a subjective response in the spectators through the same ‘structure and incidents of the play’. 
Aristotle, Poetics, 1452b-1453b. 
21 ibid., 1449b24-28. 
22 ibid. 
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meaning, as in a kind of relief, or a religious function, a kind of purification.23 Hegel 
interprets Aristotle as saying that tragedy satisfies us not though giving an explanation of why 
something is, but by imitating reality in such a way that reconciles us to it, calming our spirits 
and reorienting us to the demands and challenges of practical life. This is because imitation, 
mimesis, is not a speculative practice of imitating reality as it is in Plato, but a process of 
learning about the world. Imitation, Aristotle explains, ‘is natural to man from childhood … 
he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns first by imitation’.24 What is 
important about Aristotle’s mimetic account of tragedy, for Hegel, is that it portrays tragedy 
as a form of presentation whereby a poet naturally (or, in Hegel’s terms, immediately) raises 
up a community’s mode of action by presenting it in a sensuous, mediating form of 
presentation. In this sense, tragedy provides a way of externalising our own activity in a form 
in which we see ourselves reflected, giving the spectators a critical distance from what they 
see presented: their own ethical commitments. 
For both Aristotle and Hegel, the task of theorising tragedy is not one of encompassing 
all the tragedies, but of outlining the ‘proper pleasure’ of tragic drama, a kind of ‘tragic idea’ 
that does not, like the tragedies of lesser value, pander to the whims of the public but satisfies 
us due to a process of learning.25 For Hegel, Aristotle’s notion of educative mimesis, internal 
goal (telos), and reconciliation (katharsis) opens an understanding of tragedy that does not 
locate the suffering of the hero in an unfortunate sequence of events outside the hero’s control 
(an efficient cause), but as a result of the hero’s own inner state (a final cause). In this way the 
                                                             
23 Apart from Poetics, Aristotle uses katharsis only once. In this context it is employed to describe a medical 
purgation. Yet reading Poetics with this definition in mind is problematic, according to Gerald Else, for it 
‘presupposes that we come to the tragic drama (unconsciously, if you will) as patients to be cured, relieved, 
restored to psychic health. But there is not a word to support this in the Poetics, not a hint that the end of drama 
is to cure or alleviate pathological states. On the contrary it is evident in every line of the work that Aristotle is 
presupposing “normal” auditors, normal states of mind and feeling, normal emotional and aesthetic experience’. 
Else argues that Aristotle’s usage of katharsis gives us very little to go on, meaning that we must explore the use 
of the word in its context in order to derive its meaning. See Gerald Else, Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument, 
London: Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 225-6, 440. 
24 Aristotle, Poetics, 1448b5-7. 
25 Aristotle’s aim in Poetics is to identify the ‘proper pleasure’ of tragedy so that higher tragedies can be 
distinguished from those that are not written instruct but to entertain. Poets who aim to entertain, Aristotle 
explains, ‘merely follow their public, writing as its wishes dictate. But the pleasure here is not that of tragedy’. 
This critique is significant for Hegel, for it provides him with a way of identifying the ‘highest’ tragedies without 
appealing to a tragic ‘essence’. See Aristotle, Poetics, 1453a30f. 
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spectators are reconciled to the suffering of the hero because they discover that her suffering 
is not the arbitrary result of blind fate but is due to a telos that is internal to her form of life.26 
Building from Aristotle’s Poetics, Hegel begins his theory of tragedy by insisting that 
the tragedies do not present the collision of right and wrong where suffering is divinely 
justified, and neither do they present a world of irrational contingency where suffering is 
purely arbitrary. Rather, tragedy presents the unthinkable collision between right and right. 
Tragic heroes act on the conviction that the causality of their action is pure, determined by 
their unfettered will. Their thinking is technical to the extent that the outcome of their 
thinking is deemed to be consonant with reality. In presenting the activity of these heroes, 
Hegel argues that tragedy presents the inevitability of suffering when individuals understand 
the universal in a technalised way: 
 
The heroes of Greek classical tragedy are confronted by circumstances in which, after firmly 
identifying themselves with the one ethical ‘pathos’ which alone corresponds to their own 
already established nature, they necessarily come into conflict with the opposite but equally 
justified ethical power. (LA 1226) 
 
Each hero identifies him or herself with an ethical power and cannot accept the legitimacy of 
the opposed view. Thus by acting out their commitments they come into collision with what 
contradicts them. Moreover, by unreflectively acting according to an ethical power, it is not 
simply the two agents that come into collision, but the institutions that contribute to their 
immediate view, such as the family and the state. Hegel calls this order of ethical 
commitments Sittlichkeit, which is usually translated as ‘ethical life’. Sittlichkeit shares an 
etymological origin with Sitten, which refers to the ‘mores’ or ‘customs’ of a people, 
encompassing the sharable forms of life that lie in the language and mores of the individuals 
that make up a community.27 In Hegel’s terms, ethical life is the ‘immediate truth’ of spirit, 
the relationship of the citizens to their world without the mediation of subjective reflection 
(PS 271). Our ethical life paradoxically drives the agent to bring about what is, for fulfilling 
their obligations is what sustains them in being.  
                                                             
26 This definition of tragedy seems to be limited to tragedies such as Sophocles’ Antigone and Aeschylus’ 
Eumenides. Some scholars have pointed out that Hegel notes a second kind of tragedy that broadens his view to 
encompass a wider range of the tragedies such as Oedipus Rex. Such tragedies involve a conflict between (a) the 
right of the protagonist to own what it knows he has done and (b) the course of actions that have been ordained 
by the gods that have been unknowingly carried out. These tragedies dramatise the irreconcilable collision 
between the monstrous forces at play on human lives and the spontaneous freedom of the human will. This 
chapter focuses on Hegel’s first theory of tragedy, as the second theory does not emerge until his LA and is not 
integrated into his philosophy in the same way as the first theory. See Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche and the 
Criticism of Metaphysics, p. 182 ff. 
27 Charles Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 376. 
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It is worth noting the recent metaphysical realist reading of Hegel for assisting us to 
understand the importance of Sittlichkeit for Hegel’s theory of tragedy. While the Kantian’s 
view charges Hegel with transporting a pre-critical notion of reason into Kant’s critical 
philosophy, the metaphysical realist view assists us to see that Sittlichkeit provides a way for 
Hegel to locate the ontological structure of thought in substantial life, thus identifying an 
imminent conception of reason at the same time as restoring substance to Kant’s abstract 
metaphysics. For Robert Williams, Hegel’s notion of Sittlichkeit is aimed to reconcile the 
dualism Kant set between morality and aesthetics, for in ethical life there is no gap between 
what ought to be and what is.28 Moralität, on the other hand, refers to an abstract conception 
of morality that is separate from aesthetic culture, for it sets an obligation to realise what does 
not yet exist. Building from Houlgate and Dudley, Williams’ reading of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit 
suggests that Hegel’s major issue with the Kantian infinite is that it creates a dualism between 
the theoretical and practical, meaning that morality never becomes substantial but continually 
condemns the social order of its finitude. For Kant, while the aesthetic sphere might be free 
from the fixed, transcendental categories, the moral sphere is fixed and separated from 
substantial life by an abyss. Thus Kantian subjectivity finds itself ‘burdened with an absolute 
barrier that cannot be crossed’, becoming the locus of an irreconcilable antinomy.29 
The metaphysical realist view shows that Hegel’s notion of Sittlichkeit confronts 
Kant’s theoretical conception of morality. If we understand tragedy in terms of ethical life, the 
heroes do not ‘choose’ a course of action as autonomous individuals, or to put it in Kantian 
terms, practical reason does not legislate to their material impulses.30 Indeed, an antinomy 
between two Kantian moral agents is unthinkable. On the contrary, Hegel’s theory of agency 
rejects the ‘inner-outer’ distinction where an inner state causes an outer bodily reaction.31 The 
heroes act according to an immediate ethical commitment, meaning that each has justification, 
and yet each is one-sided: 
 
The original essence of tragedy consists … in the fact that within such a conflict each of the 
opposed sides, if taken by itself, has justification; while each can establish the true and                                                              
28 Williams, Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of God, p. 128. 
29 ibid., p. 11. 
30 In CPR Kant argues that it is necessary to preserve the separation of the theoretical from the practical order in 
order to maintain the purity of freedom. Freedom requires that individuals are genuinely responsible for the 
choices they make, meaning that their choices must be spontaneous: an ‘act of itself, without requiring to be 
determined to action by an antecedent cause’ (A533/B561). Freedom depends on the will, ‘a power of self-
determination, independently of any coercion through sensuous impulses’ (A534/B562). Thus, as William 
Dudley informs us, Kantian freedom is ‘metaphysical’, for it requires both a noumenal locus of causality outside 
experience and a theoretical order of moral law, both of which must be autonomous from the established code of 
ethics in a given society if it is to be truly free. Dudley, Hegel, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 5. 
31 Pippin, ‘The Absence of Aesthetics in Hegel’s Aesthetics’, p. 396. 
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positive content of its own aim and character only by denying and infringing the equally 
justified power of the other. The consequence is that in its ethical life, and because of it, each 
is nevertheless involved in guilt [Schuld]. (LA 1196) 
 
It is ‘because of’ ethical life – the fate that throws them into action – that the heroes become 
guilty. In this sense, tragic guilt does not come from doing what is wrong but from doing what 
is right. Moreover, it comes from doing what is right and therefore infringing on an opposed 
right. While Kantian Moralität stresses the inner will and intention of the agent, meaning that 
the agent is guilty to the extent that they violate a moral law, the tragic agent is deemed guilty 
regardless of his knowledge or intentions. The Kantian moral universe is devoid of struggle 
and opposition other than with one’s own inclinations. The tragic universe, on the other hand, 
is one in which the deep ethical commitments of those who make up the society can lead them 
to be both right and wrong at the same moment. Building from Aristotle’s conception of 
tragedy that we noted earlier, Hegel argues that the collision of ethical powers is fated from 
the outset; not by an external fate but through a fate that is internal to the form of life that 
draws them into conflict. What appears as ‘blind fate’ or ‘dreadful fate’ for the hero is, from 
the vantage of the spectators, a ‘rational fate’ that unfolds according to a proper principle (PS 
278). The spectators can see the impending collision from the opening of the play, meaning 
that the resulting suffering is not contingent but had to be so; it is necessary. Thus the true 
effect of tragedy, for Hegel, lies in the spectators. Rather than concluding that the moral order 
is full of irreconcilable powers, thus searching for another world in which the dualism can be 
reconciled, by grasping the necessity of the suffering the spectators are reconciled to it. 
Like Aristotle, Hegel identifies the ‘best tragedies’ as those in which the (original) 
spectators join in the reversal-recognition of the hero. In this framework, the greatest example 
of tragedy for Hegel is Sophocles’ Antigone.32 In Antigone, the tragic collision arises because                                                              
32 In Hegel’s early essay ‘Natural Law’, the primary example of tragedy is not Antigone but Eumenides, the final 
tragedy of the Oresteia Trilogy. The final scene of the Eumenides presents the litigation between the Eumenides 
(the ancient, brutish powers the law, standing for the dead Clytemnestra) and Apollo (the god of light and justice, 
standing for Orestes) before the people of Athens. The Athenians put equal votes in each side, meaning that 
Athene must step in to arbitrate. Athene restores Orestes and reconciles the people to the Eumeniedes, and she is 
enthroned above the acropolis and the people are pacified. After discussing the significance of this scene, Hegel 
concludes with the following: ‘Tragedy consists in this, that ethical nature segregates its inorganic nature (in 
order not to become embroiled in it), as a fate, and places it outside of itself; and by acknowledging this fate in 
the struggle against it, ethical nature is reconciled with the Divine being as the unity of both’. In PS, however, 
Hegel ceases to refer to the Eumenides and draws extensively from Antigone. This change is important, for while 
the Eumenides refers to the reconciliation of ethical life as ‘Divine being’ that occurs in the drama itself, 
requiring a Deus ex machine in the form of Athene’s arbitration, in Antigone the reconciliation occurs in the 
spectators as the bearers of ethical life. Moreover, the reconciliation in Antigone, for Hegel, is rational, for the 
spectators come to see the suffering of Antigone and Creon was necessary given the fracture of ethical life. See 
G. W. F. Hegel, Natural Law: The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its Place in Moral Philosophy, and 
Its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law, trans. T. Knox, USA: University of Pennsylvania State Press, 1975, 
pp. 104-5. 
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Creon and Antigone both act according to their social roles and commitments: Antigone has 
the absolute duty to perform the burial procedure for her brother, and Creon has the absolute 
duty to protect the city from traitors. While they are individual actors they also express the 
general conditions of Greek ethical life in their behaviour. In particular, both Antigone and 
Creon are bound to their ethical commitments on what the Greeks thought to be a ‘natural’ 
basis, allowing Hegel to explain the splitting of ethical substance in a way that renders Spirit’s 
development as a confluence of necessity (as a natural endowment) and contingency (as 
dependent upon a will). He states that 
 
Nature, not the accident of circumstances or choice, assigns one sex to one law, the other to 
the other law; or conversely, the two ethical powers themselves give themselves an individual 
existence and actualise themselves in the two sexes. (PS 280) 
 
The female side of the collision represents the family, life and death: the particular elements 
of life that are prior to the social participation that the polis entails. Thus construed, the ethical 
action of women represents the citizens’ existential features encompassed in their 
particularity. On the other hand, the male citizen represents the political and public sphere of 
ethical life. This involves the laws created by humans, or the universal elements of life that 
male citizens enter by participating in the life of the polis. 
Because ethical life is made actual in the action of those individuals who have 
internalised general patterns of behaviour, it is by acting that they draw the contradictions that 
lie implicit within their orientation to ethical life into appearance. They act freely, but in doing 
so they become guilty and draw the conflict between ethical powers into presence, a conflict 
that must be found to be necessary if ethical life is to achieve ‘a stable equilibrium of all the 
parts’ if Spirit is to be ‘at home in this whole’ (277). Through the development of ethical life, 
Hegel informs us that we find that Spirit does not develop arbitrarily or on the paradigm of 
‘might is right’.33 Rather, Spirit is ‘consciousness that has Reason’; it is a ‘shape’ of 
consciousness that is ‘determined by Reason’ (265). It is not simply a shape of Spirit where 
reason comes to be used instrumentally as in Kant’s moral subject, but where the ethical life, 
the immediate commitments to which each subject is bound, are shaped and determined by a 
rational process.  
Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that the significance of tragedy for Hegel’s 
reading of ethical life is that it provides a framework through which to understand the rational                                                              
33 In Hegel’s terms, ‘The court of world judgement is not to be viewed as the mere might of spirit’. G. W. F. 
Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science (1917-18), trans. J. Stewart & P. Hodgson, Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1995, §164. 
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development of consciousness. In this account, consciousness becomes aware of its inner 
tensions through the rational shape of the reversal/recognition process, thereby reconciling 
these tensions in an enlarged form of consciousness. When the ethical commitments of Greek 
life appear in tragic art, right collides with right. The spectators are thrown into a state of 
sublime discomfort, finding themselves out of their state of homeliness. The tragic resolution 
occurs in the thought of the spectators who, like Aristotle’s audience, come to grasp the 
necessity of the collision and enlarge their one-sided understanding of ethical commitment:  
 
The true development of the action [of tragedy] consists solely in the cancellation of conflicts 
as conflicts; in the reconciliation of the powers animating action which struggled to destroy 
one another in their mutual conflict. Only in that case does finality lie not in misfortune but in 
the satisfaction of spirit, because only in such a conclusion can the necessity of what happens 
to the individuals appear as absolute rationality, and only then can our hearts be morally at 
peace: shattered by the fate of the heroes but reconciled fundamentally. Only by adherence to 
this view can Greek tragedy be understood. (LA 1215) 
 
The development of tragedy does not eliminate conflict, but removes the one-sided character 
of conflicts that render them un-reconcilable. To return to the example of Antigone, neither 
Antigone nor Creon can accept the justification provided by the other, and both must reinforce 
to themselves the sanctity of their own view by expelling the other. Through the suffering that 
entails, Antigone in her death sentence and Creon in the destruction of his household, the 
spectators come to see that both ethical commitments are one-sided. Acknowledging one-
sidedness allows both commitments to come to a stable equilibrium wherein the conflict 
between them disappears as each ethical power mutually recognises the legitimacy of the 
other. For reconciliation to occur, the spectators must recognise the justification of both points 
of view and gain an enlarged perspective that maintains the demands of the family and the 
state within a greater whole. This is not a mediated task where they must ‘search for’ a new 
idea in which to capture both ethical powers. Rather, to question the validity of their own 
ethical power is to deny its unshakability. Once the heroes or the spectators recognise that 
each ethical power has justification, they are transformed; their previous understanding of 
ethical life is superseded by a new ‘shape’ of consciousness. 
Because the tragic collision like that between Antigone and Creon is not contingent or 
divinely adjudicated but is due to a rational fate, the reconciliation, for Hegel, is satisfying: 
 
In Greek tragedy [the reconciliation] is eternal justice which, as the absolute power of fate, 
saves and maintains the harmony of the substance of the ethical order against the particular 
powers which were becoming independent and therefore colliding, and because of the inner 
rationality of its sway we are satisfied when we see individuals coming to ruin. (LA 1230)  
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Reconciliation marks the end of tragic art, for the spectators no longer have an immediate 
relation to ethical life but a reflective, mediated relation. What was disharmonious is brought 
into harmony through the ‘inner rationality’ exhibited in the tragic effect. Hegel claims to lay 
bare what is satisfying about the tragic effect by understanding it in terms of the satisfaction 
of reason. 
 
4.3 Interpreting Hegel 
 
Thus far it has been established that Hegel’s theory of tragedy provides a framework 
through which to understand the speculative power of thought to reconcile reason and ethical 
life. This involves a twofold task of recognising the ability of Greek tragedy to overcome the 
shape of Spirit that is bound to an immediate attachment to ethical life, and the ability of the 
philosophy of tragedy to overcome the Kantian dualism of sense and reason in an enlarged, 
constitutive account of thought. Having established the implications of Hegel’s theory of 
tragedy, we are able to evaluate his theory in light of the Kantian and metaphysical realist 
interpretations. In this section I will argue that while the metaphysical realist view allows us 
to see Hegel’s insightful critique of Kant’s refusal to reconcile nature and freedom 
philosophically, the Kantian’s view, despite its failings, reveals Hegel’s inability to see the 
significance of Kant’s insistence of the unknowability of the aesthetic sphere. The task of 
examining the success of Hegel’s rejection of the unknowability of the aesthetic sphere, from 
this view, is to find whether his theory is capable of resisting alternative narratives of history. 
In the following section I will consider one such narrative in Walter Benjamin’s account of 
tragedy’s origin. 
Before examining the success of the Kantian and metaphysical realist views, it is 
important to first identify the their main issues of concern. The Kantian’s view argues that the 
notion of tragic reconciliation as ‘eternal justice’ renders Hegel as an anti-tragic philosopher 
who attempts to remove the contingency from ethical life. Proponents of this view take up 
Kant’s scepticism about metaphysics and oppose the metaphysical pretentions they see in 
Hegel. Bradley puts forward such a view in his essay ‘Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy’ (1909), 
attacking Hegel’s notion of reconciliation. In Bradley’s view, ‘even if we felt that the 
catastrophe was by a rational necessity involved in the divine and accomplished purpose of 
the world’, we should be morally outraged at it.34 Hegel’s notion of reconciliation displays a                                                              
34 Bradley, ‘Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy’, p. 379. 
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naive ‘enthusiasm for the affirmative’, Bradley argues, rushing over the tragic conflict in 
order to find a transcendent meaning that could render tragic suffering meaningful.35 
Bradley’s argument insists that Hegel oversteps the limits of critical philosophy by positing a 
totalising metaphysics that claims to reveal a trajectory within ethical life that moves toward 
greater unity. The agents of history, like Antigone, are unfortunate casualties in the 
development of Spirit toward greater synthesis, and while she might suffer, and multitudes 
with her, the ‘wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no scars behind’ (PS 407, emphasis mine). 
Similarly, Sebastian Gardner argues that Hegel can only maintain the connection between 
tragedy and ethical development 
 
by stepping outside the experience of tragic art so as to view the perspective of tragedy as 
merely partial, [which] is to break faith with the experience of tragedy, to fail to give it its 
due.36  
 
Gardner argues that by holding the ‘finality’ of tragedy as reconciliation, something that lies 
beyond tragic presentation, Hegel occludes the singularity of tragic suffering. For Gardner 
and Bradley, tragedy is dysteleological, a monstrous, particular moment of pain that confronts 
any attempt to find a telos or necessity that would render it meaningful. For Kant, the 
monstrous is a magnitude of experience that surpasses the sublime, for its greatness 
‘annihilates the end (Zweck) which its concept constitutes’ (5:253), thus destroying any return 
to teleological sensibility. The Kantian’s view concludes that Hegel dismisses Kant’s critical 
move and returns to a dogmatic kind of metaphysics that justifies the necessity of suffering in 
the development of a rational whole, rendering suffering as mere appearance and the 
development of Spirit as reality. 
The metaphysical realist view begins by defending Hegel against the attacks made by 
the Kantian’s view. The portrayal of Hegel theory of tragedy as a return to pre-critical 
metaphysics, for the metaphysical realist, is ultimately a caricature of his system. In 
particular, proponents of metaphysical realist view aim to show the failure of the Kantian’s 
view to recognise that Hegel does not depart from Kant’s critical project but aims to correct it. 
In Williams’ view, for example, Hegel’s notion of reconciliation is only a return to dogmatic 
metaphysics if we read him through ‘the Kantian frame’.37 By remaining committed to Kant’s 
critique of metaphysics, Williams argues that thinkers such as Bradley and Gardner fail to see                                                              
35 ibid., p. 374. More recently, Nussbaum argues that Hegel’s reading of tragedy in terms of the reconciliation of 
opposing forces within an ethical order is the ultimate progressive fantasy of modernity, turning on the belief 
that ‘the very possibility of conflict or tension between different spheres of value will be altogether eliminated’. 
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 68. 
36 Gardner, ‘Tragedy, Morality and Metaphysics’, p. 243. 
37 Williams, Tragedy, Recognition and the Death of God, p. 174. 
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that Hegel aims to move Kant’s philosophy beyond the problematic borders of theoretical 
philosophy. Bradley, for example, can only argue that Hegel oversteps critical philosophy by 
remaining committed to the Kantian dualism, leaving the ‘prejudices of ordinary modes of 
cognition totally uncontested’.38 For Williams, Bradley fails to identify exactly what kind of 
reason he uses to call Hegel to account. By interpreting tragic suffering as morally 
outrageous, Bradley relies on an unacknowledged system of Moralität that is autonomous 
from ethical life, thus, albeit unwillingly, reproducing a moral dualism. He ignores Hegel’s 
understanding of reason as an inner purpose and accuses him of transposing an infinite notion 
of rationality onto the dynamics of history, presuming a view of tragedy as the presentation of 
irresolvable contradiction. In this sense, Williams is correct, for if Hegel’s philosophy departs 
from Kant, it cannot be a return to a pre-critical understanding of reason as impassable, 
theoretical power. As we have seen, it puts forward a view of reason as something that is 
manifest within the alteration of history. 
The importance of Williams’ metaphysical realist reading is that it assists us to see 
that Hegel seeks to advance Kant’s revolution against (traditional) metaphysics. Kant denies 
that we can have the kinds of knowledge to which pre-critical metaphysics aspires, and Hegel 
agrees. Kant advances a conception of freedom in terms of self-determination, and Hegel 
agrees. Yet Williams argues that Hegel then goes beyond Kant, for he found it necessary to 
alter the frame of Kant’s critical project in order to advance to critique of metaphysics. 
Houlgate concurs with Williams, arguing that it is Hegel’s attempt to advance Kant’s critique 
of metaphysics that leads him to provide a new ontology that provides an ‘alternative to 
Kant’s “Metaphysical Deduction” in the Critique of Pure Reason’, restoring content to 
metaphysical claims in the face of Kant’s critique.39 In the metaphysical deduction, Kant 
identifies the concepts of the understanding from the logical forms of judgment, arguing that 
these concepts are ‘pure’ (i.e. without content), thereby rendering them separate from the 
content that is judged. Houlgate argues that for Hegel, Kant’s metaphysical deduction holds 
the concepts of the understanding on the opposite side of an impassable chasm from our 
experience of nature, thus preserving the metaphysical dualism between concept and object. 
Thus Hegel can only advance the critique of metaphysics, Houlgate argues, by establishing 
that ‘concept,’ ‘judgment,’ and ‘syllogism’ do not simply name logical structures, as they do 
for Kant, but ‘structures in nature, and so in being itself, not just forms of human 
                                                             
38 ibid., p. 168. 
39 Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006, p 115. 
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understanding and reason’.40 It is only by restoring content to the concepts, in this view, that 
the critical project can overcome traditional metaphysics.  
The metaphysical realist view diagnoses Kant’s separation of abstract morality and 
material life in terms of a tragic dualism, identifying the only solution to this dualism as 
Hegel’s speculative reading of history in terms of ontology. Speculative thinking considers 
world history as a tragic drama that transposes Kant’s theoretical court of reason to the 
practical court of world judgment: 
 
World history is this divine tragedy, where spirit rises up above pity, ethical life, and 
everything that in other spheres is sacred to it. … But what has been laid low, has been laid 
low and had to be laid low. World spirit is unsparing and pitiless. … Nothing profounder can 
be said than Schiller’s words, ‘World history is a court of world judgment’. No people ever 
suffered wrong; what it suffered, it had merited. The court of world judgement is not to be 
viewed as the mere might of spirit … World history, on the other hand, is always on the 
advance to something higher.41  
 
Because art is not free but expressive of the ethical mores of a community, Hegel argues that 
tragedy is an art form that is akin to life in the Aristotelian sense; to the telos expressed in 
human history. Tragedy displaces the fixity of moral absolutes that furnish the Kantian court 
of reason and frames spiritual life in such a way that enables us to reconcile what has been 
‘laid low’ into criteria that can be used for judgment. Philosophy, following the intuitive 
medium of tragic presentation, turns to historical events as aesthetic phenomena. Historical 
events are seen to manifest beautiful form; that is, give a presentation of the Idea. In the same 
way that tragedy reconciles us to the suffering of the heroes, philosophy reconciles us to 
historical suffering so that we might be ‘morally at peace’ with what unfolds. 
For Robert Bernasconi, the identity Hegel claims between philosophy and history does 
not heal the Kantian dualism, but produces a new intellectual tragedy. Bernasconi draws our 
attention to Hegel’s words that follow from the above passage, where Hegel argues that the 
peoples who do not bear the work of Spirit are rightly trampled under foot, that the atrocities 
of the Roman empire were justified because ‘it was the right of world spirit’, and that ‘the 
absolute idea of spirit has absolute right against anything else’.42 For Bernasconi, to claim that 
‘no people ever suffered wrong’ and that suffering is ‘deserved’ expresses an intellectual 
tragedy, for it reveals Hegel’s commitment to a moral view of the world where the good (in 
                                                             
40 ibid., p. 116. 
41 Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science (1917-18), pp. 306-307. 
42 ibid., pp. 307-308. 
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the form of the rational) is rewarded and the bad (in the form of the irrational) is punished.43 
Thus Hegel can say that ‘as grievous as it may be to watch [Spirit] trample [the rights of non-
Spirit bearing peoples] under foot’, we can be reconciled to this fate because it is rational.44 
Bernasconi concludes that his theory is ‘anti-tragic’, for it suggests that all suffering comes 
from a rational error. It claims that Spirit, the shape of consciousness that has reason, can heal 
the human condition from suffering.  
For Williams, Bernasconi’s critique fails to consider Hegel’s theory of tragedy on its 
own terms. Bernasconi’s charge only has force, he argues, ‘if one presupposes the moral 
vision of the world’; that is, if one is already committed to the tragic dualism between abstract 
morality and material life.45 What Bernasconi fails to note, according to Williams, is that the 
tragedies do not present suffering that is irrational. Rather, they present situations that could 
have been otherwise had the hero recognised her fallibility, yielded and recognised the 
legitimacy of the opposed ethical power. Williams corrects the tendency of the Kantian 
reading of Hegel to deny the Aristotelian element of tragedy whereby the heroes come to 
discover, through suffering, an error that lay in their understanding. In his view, Hegel’s 
theory of tragedy powerfully illuminates many of the tragedies that present suffering as the 
result of human error, as well as many events in history that can be understood though the 
reversal/recognition dynamic. Williams aims to defend Hegel by appealing to ‘Hegel’s tragic 
view of world history that is plainly evident in the text’.46 The rise of Spirit to a higher stage 
is not only an advance, he states, but is also tragic. Thus for Williams, Hegel’s reading of 
history does not endorse the cynical view that might makes right, that is, that whatever 
prevails is right. For Hegel, he argues, the ‘judgment of history is rational to the extent that it 
preserves and upholds right’.47 
However, while Williams is correct to note that many of the tragedies do present 
suffering that is rational to the extent that the hero’s fall is internal to their own being, he fails 
to note that Bernasconi’s attack is not so much against Hegel’s reading of tragedy as it is 
about the identity he posits between philosophy and history. While Bernasconi aims his 
critique at Hegel’s reading of tragedy, he ultimately questions whether we can move from 
aesthetic theory to history in order to claim that all suffering is deserved without merely                                                              
43 Robert Bernasconi, ‘“The Ruling Categories of the World”: The Trinity in Hegel’s Philosophy of History and 
the Rise and Fall of Peoples’, in Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (eds.), A Companion to Hegel, Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, pp. 315-331, p. 318. 
44 Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science (1917-18), p. 308. 
45 Williams, Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of God, p. 364. 
46 ibid. 
47 ibid., p. 366. 
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transposing a theory of tragedy onto historical events. Claiming that some events in history 
are analogous to tragedy might have some validity, for Bernasconi, but to claim that all 
suffering is deserved is to claim that the philosophy of tragedy is adequate to history. Hegel’s 
system requires that we accept his theory as adequate not only to tragedy but also to history, 
because ‘only in such a conclusion can the necessity of what happens to the individuals 
appear as absolute rationality, and only then can our hearts be morally at peace: shattered by 
the fate of the heroes but reconciled fundamentally’ (LA 1215). By grasping the absolute 
rationality of world history, Hegel argues that philosophy can turn everything from the fall of 
Greece to the failure of the French Revolution into an aesthetic phenomenon that constitutes a 
moment in the development of Spirit toward greater self-awareness. The task of philosophy is 
to survey history in such a way as to reconcile us to the suffering we find, thus allowing our 
hearts to be morally at peace.48 
 The problem for Williams’ reading of Hegel is that if some suffering proves to be 
irrational, if some historical events resist his theory and frustrate our desire for moral peace, 
then his system cannot ultimately claim to exhaust reality or be adequate to its Idea. For 
Williams, examples of dysteleological suffering are not a problem for Hegel because his 
‘metaphor of the slaughterhouse expresses the irrationality of radical evil’.49 Hegel’s 
argument is that in the irrational slaughterhouse of history, Spirit emerges as consciousness 
that has reason, that is, consciousness that can call slaughter to account. Yet Williams’ 
concession faces a difficulty he fails to recognise. If Hegel’s theory of tragedy were to admit 
the irrationality of some suffering, then our hearts would not be restored to moral peace; that 
is, not unless we were to calculate suffering to be worth the rational benefits. If some events 
cannot be contained by Hegel’s systematic attempt to describe the rationality of history, then 
we cannot say that his theory of tragedy is adequate to its object. Instead, his theory would 
describe some moments wherein historical development mirrored the logic of tragic art, just 
as his theory of tragedy might be said to describe only those tragedies that manifest the 
reversal-recognition structure. If Hegel’s theory cannot exhaust all cases it would not stand 
the resistance that alternate conceptions of historical development might pose to his own                                                              
48 In the PS (277) Hegel develops the image of being ‘at home in the world’ in the section on ‘Spirit’. Being at 
home in the world signals a position in which spirit ‘does not seek its satisfaction outside of itself but finds it 
within itself, because it is itself in this equilibrium with the whole’. It signals spirit’s both being satisfied and its 
being able to give account for why it is satisfied. 
49 One of Williams’ key motifs in his defence of Hegel’s theory of tragedy is Hegel’s reference to history as a 
‘slaughterhouse’ (G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree New York: Dover, 
1956, § 24). For Williams, Hegel is vastly aware of irrational suffering, holding that history is rational insofar is 
right is preserved. This argument, in my opinion, turns on a presumed notion of right that cannot be defended by 
Hegel’s theory of tragedy. Williams, Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of God, p. 372. 
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narrative. In the following section I consider one such narrative in the work of Walter 
Benjamin. If Hegel’s theory proves unable to resist alternative narratives of history, such as 
that put forward by Benjamin, then the identity Hegel claims between his system and history 
would fail to acquire the absolute status it demands. 
 
4.4 Walter Benjamin’s Ursprung 
 
Thus far it has been argued that the Kantian’s view fails to note that Hegel’s 
conditioned, immanent notion of reason does not return to a pre-critical metaphysics, but aims 
to extend critical philosophy into new territory. However, it has also been argued, contrary to 
the metaphysical realist view, that by conjoining philosophy and history, Hegel displaces the 
subjective task of judgment that must, according to Kant, remain primary to the speculative 
exercise of reason if we are to save thought from mistaking its private conditions with reality. 
In this final section I consider Walter Benjamin’s Origin of German Tragic Drama (GT), 
which provides an interpretation of Kant’s CJ that is not amenable to Hegel’s project but 
poses a fundamental challenge to it. The significance of Benjamin’s GT, I will suggest, is that 
it provides an alternative post-Kantian tradition to Hegel’s dialectic, showing that Hegel’s 
desire to escape the representational paradigm of aesthetics – a desire I will also identify in 
Nietzsche and Heidegger’s understanding of tragedy – renders his philosophical project 
subject to intellectual tragedy. Benjamin’s interpretation of tragedy recognises the legitimacy 
of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s false infinite and yet retains Kant’s representational 
understanding of cognition. In this regard, his understanding of Hegel’s theory of tragedy fits 
neither the Kantian nor the metaphysical realist view. His reflections on tragedy reveal that 
Hegel’s understanding of aesthetics fails to exhaust the tragedies, calling us to reconsider the 
representational paradigm of aesthetics rejected by his system.50                                                              
50 By reconsidering the notion of representation that is rejected by Hegel (and, I will suggest, by Nietzsche and 
Heidegger), this thesis embarks on a controversial project. Yet as I will claim in my discussion of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, and in Castoriadis appraisal of a representational aesthetics, to reconsider representation does not 
require that we return to a Cartesian standpoint that considers the veracity of the mind’s representations as a 
judge considers a legal argument. In the introductory essay to Beyond Representation, entitled ‘From 
Representation to Poiesis’, Richard Eldridge calls for a similar reconsideration of representation, and yet 
concludes that representation must be replaced with poiesis. When considered in light of Aristotle’s poiesis, 
Eldridge states that representations (such as artworks) ‘both represent subjects and their interests, and yet also 
fail to do so: as products of imaginative power calling to ways of cultural life not yet in being, they lead to an 
ongoing and unmasterable historicity of human life’. While Eldridge suggests that understanding cognition as 
poiesis ought to lead us beyond representation, for it destroys the Cartesian question of the correspondence of 
representation and reality, this thesis suggests that it leads us to reconsider the original intention of Kant’s 
appraisal of representation, and, in particular, how Kant’s representational aesthetics provided a way to respond 
to the tragedy of philosophy. As Eldridge himself notes, for both Aristotle and Kant, representation cannot be 
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Benjamin’s narrative of history explicitly confronts Hegel’s view, for it begins with 
the assumption that art cannot be understood as the presentation of an Idea in sensuous form. 
Hegel’s attempt to identify a pure concept of tragedy, for Benjamin, reveals an artificial, rule-
based theory of genre that misunderstands the nature of genre categories. In Benjamin’s view, 
tragedy is neither prescriptive nor empirically comprehensive. Rather, like any genre, it is 
introduced by a ‘significant work’ that violates the limits of a previous mode of presentation. 
To explain this concept of violation Benjamin introduces the notion of origin (Ursprung), 
describing the work of a transgressive piece of art that becomes a norm: 
 
Origin [Ursprung], although an entirely historical category, has, nevertheless nothing to do 
with genesis [Entstehung]. The term origin is not intended to describe the process by which 
the existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of 
becoming and disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it 
swallows the material involved in the process of genesis. That which is original is never 
revealed in the naked and manifest existence of the factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a 
dual insight. On the one hand it needs to be recognised as a process of restoration and 
reestablishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as something imperfect 
and incomplete. There takes place in every original phenomenon a determination of the form 
in which an idea will constantly confront the historical world, until it is revealed fulfilled, in 
the totality of its history. (GT 45-46) 
 
Despite Hegel’s speculative attempt to grasp the meaning of art, Benjamin argues that the 
artwork remains what it was: pure individuality. To argue that philosophy is able to uncover 
historical laws that govern genre exhibits a form of intellectual tragedy, he suggests, for it 
constructs a model of history as a dichromic continuum rather than recognising that all 
accounts of history, due to the radical singularity of all that appears, are the object of 
construction.51 
Considering the artwork as pure individuality retains a totality that resists synthesis 
into a greater movement of history, thus preserving its ability to ‘constantly confront the 
historical world’. Benjamin does not reject Hegel’s notion of the Idea of tragedy in order to 
return to Kant’s notion of the symbol, however, which might be employed as an 
underdetermined alternative to the Hegelian Idea. For Benjamin, the uptake of Kant’s notion 
of symbol by the romantic philosophers ultimately proved to overshadow his immensely 
important notion of the aesthetic idea. Kant’s notion of the symbol, Benjamin argues, proved 
unable to resist the romantic ‘notion of the symbol that has nothing more than the name in 
common with the genuine notion’ (159). The romantic notion of symbol ‘insists on an                                                                                                                                                                                               
distinguished from poiesis, meaning that it is always more than the given. See Richard Eldridge (ed.), Beyond 
Representation: Philosophy and Poetic Imagination, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 8. 
51 John Pizer, Toward a Theory of Radical Origin: Essays on Modern German Thought, USA: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1995, p. 56. 
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invisible unity of form and content’ (160), which is far from Kant’s meaning of the term. 
While understanding the symbol as the unity of form and content provides the romantic with 
an ‘immeasurably comforting effect’, it ends up serving as ‘the philosophical extenuation of 
that impotence which … fails to do justice to content in formal analysis and to form in the 
aesthetics of content’ (ibid.). Benjamin’s scepticism of the notion of symbol confronts 
Hegel’s notion of beauty as the sensuous appearance of the Idea. The concept of the symbol is 
‘abused’, he argues, ‘whenever in the work of art the “manifestation” of an “idea” is declared 
a symbol’ (ibid.). Rather than unsettling us by alerting us to the abyss between sign and 
signified, enlarging our vision to transgressive creativity, the symbol is posited as the 
anticipation of freedom, for it contains a telos of semiotic identity with its sign. Benjamin 
argues that when such a relation is declared, the unity of the material and transcendental 
object is ‘distorted into a relationship between appearance and essence’, for nothing remains 
beyond the particularity of the artwork (ibid.). 
Benjamin puts forward an alternative to the notion of symbol in his notion of ‘the 
speculative counterpart’ of symbol: allegory (161). He gives attention to modern forms of 
tragedy, arguing that the seventeenth-century form of tragedy (Trauerspiel) confronts the 
nineteenth century romantic understanding of symbol with, to use Eagleton’s words, a 
‘profound gulf between materiality and meaning’, a gulf across which a connection between 
the two persists in an underdetermined fashion.52 The seventeenth-century was preoccupied 
with allegory, a profoundly visual form, and yet what comes to appearance in the allegory is 
nothing visual but the materiality of allegory itself. In Milton’s Paradise Lost, for example, 
we find a break between nature and meaning, for the plot of history is reduced to signs and 
fragments in need of deciphering. The breach between nature and meaning, between sign and 
signifier, is due to God’s withdrawal. Milton’s attempt to justify God’s dealings with 
humankind requires an awkward and discursive style in order to bridge the abyss. From God’s 
point of view, God’s acts in creation are purely symbolic and have an immediacy of meaning, 
while from the point of view of the fallen creation those acts must be decoded and 
reassembled in a narrative form such as poetry that must lay bare its own devices. 
The significance of allegory, for Benjamin, is that it retains the representational 
character of art, thus confronting Hegel’s ‘romantic’ attempt to remove the abyss between 
sign and signifier without reproducing Kant’s practical-theoretical dualism. Allegory, he 
argues, first developed in classicism as a ‘dark background against which the symbol might 
                                                             
52 Terry Eagleton, Walter Benjamin, or, Toward a Revolutionary Criticism, London: Verso, 1981, p. 5. 
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stand out’ (165). While symbol relates to ‘being’, acting as a ‘sign for ideas, which is self-
contained, concentrated’, allegory relates to ‘sign’, acting as a ‘successively progressing, 
dramatically mobile, dynamic representation of ideas which has acquired the very fluidity of 
time’ (ibid.). In other words, when we understand the artwork in terms of Being, it is limited 
to a determinate meaning that we must recognise. The notion of allegory, on the other hand, 
opens an underdetermined meaning, thereby rendering the meaning-making process as 
historical praxis itself. This is to say that what appears in the form of pain and destruction is, 
in the symbol, idealised, meaning that ‘the transfigured face of nature is fleetingly revealed in 
the light of redemption’ (ibid.). In ‘the context of allegory’, alternatively, ‘the image is only a 
signature, only the monogram of essence, not the essence itself in a mask’ (ibid.). 
Benjamin’s insistence on the ability of allegory to retain the suffering and pain of 
history confronts the tendency of symbol to occlude the underside of history beneath the idea 
of rational progress. While symbol transfigures the ‘face of nature’ in idealised form, allegory 
confronts us with a very different face: ‘the facies hippocratica of history as a petrified, 
primordial landscape’ (166). The facies hippocratica, the ‘Hippocratic face’, is the change 
produced in the face by impending death.53 Thus allegory is facies hippocratica because it 
‘corresponds to the ancient gods in the deadness of its concrete materiality’ (224). It is the 
‘“vaporisation” … of theological essences’, ‘an appreciation of the transience of things’, a 
mode of thinking that establishes itself where ‘transitoriness and eternity confronted each 
other most closely’ (223-4). Allegory emerges in the in-between space left after the gods have 
departed but their presence remains a distinct memory corresponding ‘to the ancient gods in 
the deadness of its concrete tangibility’ (226). It is thus a sign that throws us back onto the 
materiality of signification, both ‘convention and expression’, maintaining the transgressive 
dimension of Kant’s aesthetic ideas that ruptures a previous configuration of meaning and 
confronts its audience with the task of thinking more than exists in the sign (175). Allegory 
and Trauerspiel manifest a negative kind of dialectic that confronts Hegelian rational 
development, entailing that philosophy does not lead to a higher form of presentation but 
regresses to a new form of myth. 
What is important about Benjamin’s understanding of Trauerspiel is that it refigures 
the notion of representation from symbol to allegory, thereby refiguring the notion of Greek                                                              
53 Hippocrates describes the facies hippocratica as follows ‘the nose sharp, the eyes sunken, the temples fallen in, 
the ears cold and drawn in and their lobes distorted, the skin of the face hard, stretched and dry, and the colour of 
the face pale or dusky…and if there is no improvement within [a prescribed period of time], it must be realized 
that this sign portends death’. See G. Lloyd and J. Chadwick (ed. & trans.), Hippocratic writings, 
Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1978, pp. 170–171. 
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tragedy. Tragedy does not give ‘an immeasurably comforting effect’, for Benjamin, but 
confronts us with a ‘dramatically mobile’ idea that transforms our understanding of history 
(109). Indeed, Benjamin rejects the notion that tragedy turns on a specific ‘idea’ at all. 
Tragedy confronts symbol with the allegorical in the presentation of tragic silence. The hero’s 
silence is the defining characteristic feature of tragedy, he argues, for in remaining silent the 
hero refuses to turn to metaphysical guarantees in order to defend the rightness of her action. 
We think of Antigone locked in her cave of death or Prometheus’ eternal punishment for 
attempting to claim techne from the gods. The hero ‘does not look for justification and 
therefore throws suspicion back on his persecutors’ (ibid.), and her silence transforms Creon 
into a tyrant and Zeus into a monster. If the hero were to defend herself against the logic of 
her oppressor, she would merely bluster the legitimacy of the oppressor’s claim to power, 
rendering her suffering as a necessary component in the development of some inner 
rationality. The hero knows that her suffering is unjust and is thus struck dumb. She is, like 
Prometheus, pro-manthano, ‘knowing in advance’, seeing the nullity of the established moral 
order and thus has no available language to express her knowledge.54 The lack of a language 
capable of expressing her innocence means that her defence remains unarticulated. She finds 
herself ethically in advance of the new gods who ground the political order, but also beyond 
the gods of the ancient, ethical order.  
By locating the significance of tragedy in its singular character, Benjamin suggests 
that it is not the reversal-recognition structure but ‘the paradox of the birth of genius and 
moral speechlessness’ that constitutes the ‘sublime’ element of tragedy.55 Unlike the Kantian 
sublime, however, after the suffering of the hero ‘there is no question of the reinstitution of 
the moralised universe’ (109). In other words, our hearts are not restored to moral peace, for 
we find ourselves in a moment of clarity between two kinds of myth that would occlude the 
innocence of the hero by ascribing to her some form of rational or metaphysical guilt. We are 
confronted with the facies hippocratica of the gods, and history is transformed from having an 
eschatological movement toward greater freedom into a ‘petrified, primordial landscape’, 
strewn with the bodies of untold victims. Beautiful art is not the presentation of the idea, thus 
giving expression to the movement toward freedom. Rather, allegory ‘declares itself to be 
beyond beauty. Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things’ 
(178). 
                                                             
54 See Michel Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, trans. M. Gendre, New York: SUNY, 1996, p. 156. 
55 ibid. 
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Ultimately, Benjamin’s GT confronts Hegel’s argument that all suffering is deserved 
with an alternative reading of both tragedy and history. Unlike the Kantian’s view, he does 
not reject Hegel’s reading of tragedy in terms of history, but redefines history as the ‘integral 
truth of tragedy’ (105). Yet Benjamin’s understanding of history as the truth of tragedy is 
nothing like Hegel’s narrative of historical progression. Rather, while epic poetry constitutes 
the unmediated presentation of tradition (symbol), tragedy entails ‘a tremendous re-shaping of 
tradition’ (allegory), opening tradition to the possibility of creative transformation (106). This 
transition does not anticipate a higher, conceptual grasp of traditional ideas, but a clearing 
between two forms of myth: the daimonic and the philosophical.56 Philosophy in Hegelian 
form, argues Benjamin, ‘assume[s] the form of doctrine’ (27), for it is closed to counter 
readings of history. The ideal of theoretical necessity demonstrates that ‘the total elimination 
of representation – which is boasted by every proper didactic system – is the sign of genuine 
knowledge’, thereby renouncing ‘that area of truth towards which language is directed’ 
(ibid.). Hegel’s system does not illuminate the world, for Benjamin, but rather encloses it in a 
reductive myth in which everything inarticulate can be exhausted by language. In such a 
system, representation is a digression that must be surpassed for being itself, and the method 
of philosophy must take on an ‘uninterrupted purposeful structure’ (28).  
The importance of Benjamin’s argument for this thesis is that it re-establishes the 
representational character of art. Tragedy cannot be considered as a presentation of the Idea 
that anticipates the representational activities of religion and philosophy, Benjamin argues, 
for tragedy is representational. It is an interruption to seamless reasoning, illuminating the 
world by representing a language that is unpresentable. For Benjamin, Hegel failed to see that 
Kant retained a representational conception of thought for a significant reason. Specifically, 
representation maintained a language with which to describe the human tendency to confuse 
the subjective conditions of thought with reality. Benjamin’s solution, however, is not return 
to Kant’s dualist metaphysics, for he recognises that one need not hold onto the Kantian 
dualism to maintain Kant’s emphasis on representation. As representation, art has a synthetic 
dimension, but not the kind of absolute synthesis we find in Hegel’s work. As an intermediate 
stage between the daimonic and the philosophic, art does not anticipate the systematicity of 
philosophy but maintains the open-endedness of Kant’s aesthetic ideas. The task of 
philosophy that recognises the representational character of art is to outline a procedure that                                                              
56 Benjamin responds to the overbearing comprehensiveness of Hegel’s philosophical discourse by arguing that 
tragedy is instrumental to the transition from daemonic to philosophical thinking: ‘the tragic relates to the 
daimonic as does paradox to ambiguity. In all the paradoxes of tragedy … ambiguity, the hall-mark of the 
daimons, is dying away’ (GT 109). 
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does not regress to the ‘diamonic’ or transform into ‘philosophy’, but authentically engages 
with the singularity of sensuous life. In this sense Benjamin does not provide an alternative 
‘narrative’ to Hegel at all, but an alternative ‘poetics’ of history; a problematisation of the 
attempt to narrate history, thus cleaving open the present to uncharted possibilities. 
Benjamin’s emphasis on the representational character of tragedy undermines the 
metaphysical realist view of Hegel’s theory by providing an alternative conception of history. 
For Williams and Houlgate, for example, Hegel’s critique of the Kantian dualism is the only 
direction critical philosophy can go. In their view, we have either a spurious, Kantian infinite 
that assumes a supersensible order, or a critical, Hegelian infinite that understands human 
cognition as intellectual intuition. Benjamin, however, aims to instigate ‘the rescue of 
phenomena’ and the ‘representation of Ideas’ without turning to Hegel’s notion of the infinite 
as the unity of concept and object, of thought and Being. The ‘Idea’ is the moment in the 
substance and being of a word in which the word becomes and performs as a symbol. It is this 
capacity of words to symbolise Ideas that allows a kind of philosophical discourse to uncover 
‘Ideas’. However, because the words yielded by philosophy are themselves symbolic, such a 
discourse can never become adequate to them.57 
Given that the metaphysical realist view has spent a great deal of energy defending 
Hegel against naive attacks made by proponents of the Kantian’s view, it is important to note 
that Benjamin’s critique of Hegel does not aim to be systematic, but to expose the danger of 
Hegel’s position. The metaphysical realist view has a response to the charge that Hegel 
dismisses singularity in favour of the Ideal. In Science of Logic, for example, while Hegel 
states that the singular thing and the universal are united in the Idea, he also insists that they 
maintain their independence form one another.58 In the most advanced kind of judgments, 
judgments of the concept, the singular thing is external to the universal, but not external to the 
Idea. Such judgments, according to Paul Redding, ‘can be thought of as somehow being 
directed to some object as having the degree of independence from the universal characteristic 
of the singular: qua singular, the thing is not just an exemplification of its kind’.59 Redding 
suggests that it is precisely because of Hegel’s insistence of the independence of the singular                                                              
57 Benjamin’s critique claims that Hegel’s primary motivation in arguing that beauty signals the sensuous 
presentation of the Idea is to overcome the indeterminacy of Kant’s representation of the Idea. In Benjamin’s 
account, despite the alteration Hegel makes to the task of philosophy, his system maintains the dogmatic, 
philosophical trust in the capacity of language to image, elucidate and preserve reality. Language realism in this 
form (and thus metaphysical realism) occludes the singular and indeterminate character of tragic silence, the 
inarticulate expression of the Idea that constitutes the Ursprung of language.  
58 See Hegel’s discussion of the judgment of the Concept in Science of Logic, p. 657ff. 
59 Paul Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007, p. 184. 
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that the universal can be said to be adequate to the singular thing, while the singular thing can 
be said to be external and contingent. This would mean that while one telling of history might 
be adequate to the events, it is always the case that, due to the singular nature of these events, 
another proposed history of these events is possible. Singularity, in this reading, would be 
preserved – and with the added advantage of not creating an impassable gulf between thought 
and world.60 
However, while this defence shows that Hegel gives room for the independence of the 
singular, for it makes room for alterative narratives, it does not address Benjamin’s critique of 
narrating history. Benjamin does not simply propose an alternate narrative of history to that 
put forward by Hegel, but an alternate conception of history that recognises the irreducibility 
of historical events to narratives as such. Hegel’s response to the tragedy of philosophy, 
understood as the inevitable failure of forms of judgment that neglect the singular, is to heal 
the impassable gulf between thought and world, meaning that the singular must be brought 
together with the universal under the Idea. While there might be room for the independence of 
the singular (such as a historical event), it remains inseparable from the Idea until an 
alternative Idea is found. For Benjamin, this approach is highly dangerous, for it is premised 
on a view of singularity as subject to thought. This entails a conservative understanding of 
philosophy that is concerned with the coherence of the singular in regards to its historical 
relation to other singulars, albeit in a way that respects the independence of singularity. This 
understanding of philosophy, for Benjamin, lacks a robust notion of creativity where the 
singularity of a historical event or a work of art exhausts the thinkable and remains an 
underdetermined representation. For Benjamin, responding to the tragedy of philosophy does 
not involve a way of thinking that overcomes the abyss between thought and world, but one 
that recognises the danger involved in systematic thought. Singularity is to be privileged at 
the expense of the Idea, providing an ineliminable rupture in all systematic thinking in such a 
way that cleaves open historical narratives to reveal an uncharted future. 
The advantage of Benjamin’s proposal – an advantage that renders his work important 
to this thesis – is that it frames the task of responding to the tragedy of philosophy not as a 
matter of healing the philosophical project, which would cast the solution to the problematic 
of tragedy in terms of philosophy, but of providing a way of thinking that cleaves open the 
historical realm to the creation of meaning. In Benjamin’s view, all language, and all art,                                                              
60 In this move Hegel departs sharply from Kant, for, as Redding notes, Hegel’s emphasis on singularity entering 
the judgment of the concept reveals how ‘the evaluative judgment can be thought of as establishing a genuine 
cognitive relation to an independent object’. ibid. 
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remains representation. The task of representation is not, as it is often thought, to refer to 
some primordial object that solidifies the impassable gulf between sign and symbolised, but to 
return us ‘in a roundabout way to its original object’, that is, ‘the sacred image and the truth 
itself’ (28-9): 
 
Truth, bodied forth in the dance of represented ideas, resists being projected, by whatever 
means, into the realm of knowledge [which is] possession. (29) 
 
Benjamin agrees with Hegel to the extent that art represents truth. However, he does not hold 
that truth can be projected into knowledge, that is, into a theoretical kind of knowledge where 
a theory is adequate to its object. Rather, he grounds language on allegory rather than rational 
process, posing an alternative reading of Kant’s philosophy of art history to that developed by 
Hegel. The problematic of tragedy, for Benjamin, displaces us from the possession of truth by 
revealing the allegorical nature of representation, opening philosophy to a new task. Kant’s 
aesthetic judgment provides an alternative conception of this task to Hegel’s speculative 
reason, for it treats the singular as an end in itself. The artwork is a singular locus of meaning 
that is not reducible to a concept. The task of philosophy, then, is to outline a procedure of 
thinking that is capable of attending to the singular as a unique happening, something that is 
not reducible to universals that would situate the particularity of the event within a larger 
vision of a historical process. While tragedy might sometimes alert us to a process that 
operates behind the backs of those who suffer, Hegel, by arguing that all suffering manifests 
rationality when understood as divine tragedy, renders the world fitting for the realisation of 
human ends only if we occlude the allegorical abyss between the artwork and the Idea. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the metaphysical realist view of Hegel’s theory of 
tragedy assists our understanding of his critique of Kant and the attention he gives to suffering 
and loss. It reveals that Hegel’s philosophy does not seek to explain suffering in terms a 
rationalist conception of the best of all possible worlds, but to identify the ability of art to 
raise the suffering of a community into a work that allows thought to reconcile its unresolved 
conflict. However, through examining Benjamin’s critique of Hegel, I argued that Hegel’s 
philosophy, in the end, occludes the challenge that tragic art poses to philosophy. Ultimately, 
Benjamin’s attack on Hegel’s theory of tragedy reveals that by attempting to overcome the 
representational character of art, philosophy is ultimately attempting to reclaim its hegemony 
 134 
over the aesthetic sphere. The task of such philosophy is to undermine the contingency of 
aesthetics. Benjamin’s critique of Hegel shows that, by claiming that the system is adequate to 
its object, Hegel creates a new form of immediacy that enlists the victims on which the social 
world is built in service of its historical narrative. 
The importance of Benjamin’s return to Kant’s representational account of art for this 
thesis is that it elucidates the risk inherent to the aesthetic domain wherein our thought cannot 
be understood as identical to being. In the following sections I will suggest that Benjamin’s 
critique of Hegel assists us to diagnose a similar attempt in Nietzsche and Heidegger to 
overcome the representational paradigm of aesthetics. Rather than overcoming representation, 
the task of philosophy, for Benjamin, is to recognise the risk involved in philosophical 
thinking. The task of such an understanding of philosophy is not to reconcile the philosopher 
to the suffering of history, but to learn from the tragedy of thinking by outlining a new 
procedure for thought. Such a procedure has no guarantee of success, no protection from 
future tragedy, and no capacity to redeem past moments of cultural shipwreck. Rather, it 
acknowledges the task of thinking and acting in a world that resists total understanding.
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CHAPTER 5 
Nietzsche: Tragic Philosophy 
 
 
Saying yes to life even in its strangest and harshest problems … that is … the key 
to the concept of tragic feeling (TI 228). 
 
 
In The Birth of Tragedy (BT), Nietzsche argues that Kant’s ‘monstrous courage and 
wisdom’ unveiled the subjective interest ‘concealed at the essence of logic’, opening the 
doors to a new age (112).1 While traditional philosophy privileged the transcendental over the 
aesthetic, the fixed and eternal over alteration and becoming, Nietzsche argues that Kant 
sealed the limits of thought once and for all by revealing the transcendental order to be 
beyond human reach. He defines the Kantian settlement in epochal terms, suggesting that 
after Kant, ‘a culture is inaugurated that I venture to call a tragic culture’ (ibid.). Nietzsche’s 
announcement of a tragic culture identifies something essential to tragedy that transcends the 
drama of the ancient Greeks that is reborn in Kant’s discovery of the limits of philosophy. For 
Nietzsche, however, Kant’s desire to maintain the moral intelligibility of human life led him 
to preserve the existence of a moral order of value as a postulate of reason, which means that 
he cannot provide a figure around which a tragic age can rally. Nietzsche identifies another 
figure who could lead the people beyond Kant, one who is able to see through the vacuity of 
moral value to an aesthetic kind of value: Richard Wagner. 
Nietzsche proposes the rebirth of tragic culture in response to the failure of philosophy 
to acknowledge and affirm life without retreating behind the veil of māyā; that is, without 
positing a principle of sufficient reason that deems every event meaningful as a part of a total 
system. While his proposal has resonances with the problematic of the tragedy we find in 
Kant and Hegel, in Nietzsche we see the bifurcation of this problematic in his identification of 
tragedy as an epochal moment wherein the dissonant forces of human life eclipse philosophy, 
thus challenging the conception of tragedy put forward in this thesis; the attempt to expand                                                              
1 I have altered Kaufmann’s translation of ‘Der ungeheuren Tapferkeit und Weisheit’ from ‘extraordinary 
courage and wisdom’ to ‘monstrous courage and wisdom’ in order to highlight the link between ungeheure and 
the orders of magnitude in Kant’s CJ. 
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the scope of philosophy in the paradigm of Kant’s enlarged way of thinking. Opposed to 
Kant, Nietzsche’s response to the tragedy of philosophy is not concerned with providing a 
rational way of thinking that is capable of navigating the fluidity of the aesthetic sphere, but 
with outlining a tragic philosophy, a philosophy that announces the triumph of the aesthetic 
sphere over the rational. While such a proposal resonates with Hegel’s critique of Kant’s 
moral philosophy, Nietzsche rejects Hegel’s interpretation of tragedy by arguing that art is not 
tied to the ethos of a community but is free; that it is unfettered from ethical concerns. In the 
preface to the second edition of BT entitled ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’, Nietzsche states that 
BT was the first time that he put forward a position that went ‘beyond good and evil’, a 
philosophy that ‘dares to move, to demote, morality into the realm of appearance’ (22). He 
claims that it diagnoses morality as ‘a will to negate life’, a ‘secret instinct of annihilation’ 
that must banish the ugly and painful parts of existence (23). The power of tragedy, Nietzsche 
argues, lies in its ability to issue a purely aesthetic redemption, teaching us ‘the art of this-
worldly comfort’ (26). 
In this chapter I examine the theory of tragedy Nietzsche outlines in BT in order to 
identify the challenge his understanding of the tragic poses to the interpretation of tragedy put 
forward in this thesis. While I will draw from other parts of Nietzsche’s philosophy that 
develop the themes of BT, I limit my analysis to this text for two reasons. The first is that is it 
Nietzsche’s most sustained treatment of tragedy. While tragedy remains a theme throughout 
his entire intellectual development, nowhere else does he give such a prolonged reflection on 
the implications of tragic art. The second is that Nietzsche continually returns to it throughout 
his intellectual development. Even when he reflects on BT fifteen years later in ‘Attempt at a 
Self-Criticism’, describing it as an ‘impossible’, ‘badly written’ and ‘embarrassing’ text, he 
declares it to be a ‘proven book’ that satisfied ‘the best minds of the time’.2 
Nietzsche’s reflections in ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’ raise a particular question that 
will be the focus of this chapter. While he informs us that BT rejects Schopenhauer’s 
‘resignationism’ (24) and proposes the affirmation of life as a whole we find in his later work, 
it is not clear whether his arguments in the original text live up to this later claim. Thus the 
question to be considered in this chapter is whether BT truly enables us to affirm life as a 
whole, or whether it is in fact a covert denial of life. This question is significant to the present 
thesis, for both Nietzsche’s proposal of a tragic philosophy and Kant’s enlarged way of                                                              
2 Nietzsche, ‘Attempt at Self-Criticism’, in BT, p. 19. Perhaps BT’s controversial popularity is exactly why 
Nietzsche attempts to trace the connections between his first book and his later work in the 1886 preface. He was 
to publish Beyond Good and Evil in the same year, 1886, which might explain his attempt to identify the 
argument of BT as his first attempt to move beyond the traditional morality, that is, ‘beyond good and evil’. 
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thinking claim to affirm the dimensions of life excluded from the scope of any form of 
philosophy that determines all knowledge in the paradigm of techne. If Nietzsche’s tragic 
philosophy successfully embraces life, then it would seem that Kant’s response to the 
philosophy of tragedy covertly reenergises the life-denying morality of traditional philosophy. 
If his philosophy fails, however, it may be the case that Kant’s proposal advances a superior 
response. The importance of this question extends beyond our assessment of Nietzsche’s 
work, for the success of his understanding of the tragic as the eclipse of the rational by the 
aesthetic effects not only our assessment of BT, but also the success of the contemporary 
Nietzschean view to provide an alternative to life-denying philosophy.  
The answer to the question of whether Nietzsche’s interpretation of tragedy is capable 
of affirming life turns on his relation to Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art.3 For Walter 
Kaufman, Nietzsche’s denial of pessimism is the centrepiece of BT: ‘Instead of proving 
himself in his first book as an unswerving follower of Schopenhauer … Nietzsche discovers 
in Greek art a bulwark against Schopenhauer’s pessimism. … Schopenhauer’s negativistic 
pessimism is rejected. … one can face the terrors of history and nature with unbroken courage 
and say Yes to life’.4 Kaufmann argues that it is precisely Nietzsche’s novel view of art that 
allows him to reject Schopenhauer’s conclusion and affirm life as a whole. For others such as 
Julian Young, while Nietzsche offers a ‘solution’ to Schopenhauer’s pessimism and a way of 
‘overcoming’ it, these solutions ultimately ‘represent, like Schopenhauer’s, a flight from, a 
“denial” of human life’.5 Young argues that Nietzsche’s philosophy not only reproduces 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art but that it fails to learn from Schopenhauer’s greatest 
insight: that if the tragic view is correct, then moral repulsion is the truly human response. 
In this chapter I argue that the primary aim of BT is in line with Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy: to aestheticise reality. To begin, I will briefly consider Schopenhauer’s reading of 
Kant on the beautiful and the sublime, turning to his proposal of tragic art as the form of art 
that links artistic creativity and the sublime. In light of Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art, in 
sections two and three I examine the argument of BT in order to suggest that while Nietzsche 
offers significant insights in the idea of the tragic, his interpretation of tragedy does not refute                                                              
3 While it is widely accepted that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is Nietzsche’s greatest influence in BT, there is 
much debate over the extent to which Nietzsche affirms Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art. For scholars such as 
Walter Kaufmann (1975) and Béatrice Han-Pile (2006), BT employs the basic concepts of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy of art in order to go beyond his inability to break from Kantian morality. For others such as Julian 
Young (1992) and Nuno Nabais (2006), Nietzsche fashions a veneer of criticism over an account of metaphysics 
that is essentially borrowed from Schopenhauer. 
4 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1975, p. 131. 
5 Julian Young, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 27. 
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the ethical reading of tragedy but merely ignores it, thus reproducing Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysics of art. To establish the consequences of this neglect, in section four I consider 
Franz Rosenzweig’s reception of Nietzsche.  
The significance of Rosenzweig’s critique of Nietzsche for my argument in this 
chapter is that it gives us a vantage on Nietzsche’s philosophy from a moment in history in 
which the ethical demands of modern Europe came to a particular climax. For Rosenzweig, 
who lived during the time of disintegration anticipated by Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
Nietzsche’s critique of moral value is essential for any attempt to think in the collapse of 
philosophy, and yet his aesthetic affirmation of life proved to be incapable of making sense of 
the demands of an age beyond philosophical optimism, for it does not overcome the demand 
that human suffering places on us but merely ignores it. Rosenzweig’s argument will prove to 
be significant for the following chapters, for it shows that while Nietzsche’s aesthetic 
redemption ultimately fails, the path to a new understanding of ethics cannot ignore his 
philosophy but must go beyond it. The task of going beyond Nietzsche’s critique of value, as 
we find in Heidegger and Castoriadis, will entail the development of Kant’s enlarged way of 
thinking. 
 
5.1 Schopenhauer’s metaphysics 
 
This section outlines Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of art so that we can assess the 
legitimacy of Nietzsche’s claim in ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’ that BT provides an 
alternative to Schopenhauer’s resignationism. In order to understand Nietzsche’s relation to 
Schopenhauer, we must begin with Schopenhauer’s reading of Kant’s sublime. The 
significance of Schopenhauer’s reading of Kant, I will suggest, is that he moves away from 
critical metaphysics in order to propose a positive metaphysics of art.  
In §39 of WR I, Schopenhauer explores the difference between the beautiful and the 
sublime, echoing Kant’s understanding of the beautiful as that which pleases on its own, for it 
is free from determinate judgment (201-2). In his view, the beautiful affords an experience of 
pleasure disconnected from the interests of the will, meaning that it is universal. Yet the 
objects that draw us into aesthetic contemplation ‘may have a hostile relation to the human 
will in general, as manifested in its objectivity, the human body. They may be opposed to it; 
they may threaten it by their might that eliminates all resistance, or their immeasurable 
greatness may reduce it to naught’ (201). These objects Schopenhauer deems sublime.  
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While Schopenhauer’s understanding of the beautiful and sublime builds from Kant’s 
CJ, Schopenhauer grants aesthetics an ontological meaning. Like Kant, Schopenhauer argues 
that every subject knows the world only as representation. Yet, departing from Kant, he 
suggests that there is one object of which the subject has ‘immediate’ perception: the subject’s 
own body. Thus Schopenhauer reproduces the Kantian dualism between phenomena and thing 
in itself, yet the thing in itself is not of an abstract, theoretical order, but the will. While the 
subject requires the principle of sufficient reason in order to guarantee her knowledge of 
phenomena because of the representational character of cognition, that is, the metaphysical 
principle that every appearance has a reason, he has immediate access to his own body, thus 
requiring no metaphysical principle. Any affective state the body undergoes is not devoid of 
theoretical content and limited to mere feeling, but pertains to the thing in itself. 
Kant argued that an ontological doctrine of the beautiful or the sublime is impossible, 
for neither are real determinations of the object but pertain either to relations such as harmony 
(the beautiful) or to ideas that go beyond the object such as grandiosity (the sublime). Yet if 
we consider the will as thing in itself, Schopenhauer argues that it is possible, through feeling, 
to achieve a positive aesthetics that can achieve the objective characteristics of the sublime: 
 
Nevertheless, the beholder may not direct his attention to this relation to his will which is so 
pressing and hostile, but, although he perceives and acknowledges it, he may consciously turn 
away from it, forcibly tear himself from his will and its relations, and, giving himself up 
entirely to knowledge, may quietly contemplate, as pure, will-less subject of knowing, those 
very objects so terrible to the will. He may comprehend only their Idea that is foreign to all 
relation, gladly linger over its contemplation, and consequently be elevated precisely in this 
way above himself, his person, his willing, and all willing. In that case, he is then filled with 
the feeling of the sublime [Erhaben]; he is in the state of exaltation [Erhebung], and therefore 
the object that causes such a state is called sublime. (WR I 202) 
 
Through identifying a kind of ‘knowledge’ unique to the sublime, Schopenhauer re-
establishes a metaphysics of art. The sublime arouses terror in the spectator, transporting her 
into the realm of infinitude where another existence beyond the representable makes itself 
felt. Nuno Nabais draws our attention to the paradoxical nature of this beyond, observing that 
the negation of life is actually an affirmation and a demand for another form of existence, one 
which occurs intuitively and only allows itself to be represented as a negative representation.6 
The pleasure experienced is negative, for it does not seduce us but forces us to admire and 
respect it. While the beautiful leads us to a positive intuition of the Idea in beautiful form, the 
sublime leads us to the negative intuition of the actual thing in itself. In Schopenhauer’s                                                              
6 Nuno Nabais, Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, trans. M. Earl, New York: Continuum Publishing 
Group, 2006, p. 25. 
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creative reading of Kant, this is the knowledge of the will of the world itself in its 
unrepresentability; not one’s own will, but the eternal will, the Er-Ein.7 
 The importance of a metaphysics of art, for Schopenhauer, is that it is not a return to a 
pre-critical metaphysics but enables the transcendental overcoming of metaphysical realism, 
extending the deepest insight of Kant’s philosophy. Yet Schopenhauer struggles to maintain 
this position. Kant’s aim was to give an intersubjective account of judgment based on his 
understanding of the transcendental realm that is presumed in any judgment made by any 
person. From the view of Schopenhauer’s subjective understanding of will as thing in itself, 
however, this is impossible. His great problem with CJ is that Kant 
 
does not start from the beautiful itself, from the direct, beautiful object of perception, but from 
the judgment concerning the beautiful, the so-called, and very badly so-called, judgment of 
taste. This is the problem for him. His attention is specially aroused by the circumstance that 
such a judgment is obviously the expression of something occurring in the subject, but is 
nevertheless as universally valid as if it concerned a quality of the object. It is this that struck 
him, not the beautiful itself. (WR I 530-1) 
 
Here Schopenhauer turns against Kant’s transcendental philosophy, accusing Kant of ignoring 
beauty as a property of the object. Where Kant saw the universal validity of judgments of 
taste, Schopenhauer saw a merely heteronomous account of taste (which is why Kant’s notion 
of taste is badly named – it is not taste at all). Schopenhauer dismisses Kant’s transcendental 
account of intersubjectivity and charges Kant guilty of a realist subjectivism in which 
judgments of the beautiful are not truly made by the subject but by another. Schopenhauer 
proposes an alternative in which the beautiful, as a property of an object, affects one’s faculty 
for aesthetic emotion. 
 In Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of art, the sublime plays a particularly important role. 
The transformative nature of the sublime becomes the feeling whereby the individual is raised 
out of the limitations of their individuality – retreating behind what Schopenhauer calls the 
‘veil of māyā’ (i.e. an illusion) – and into the condition of pure subject, abstracted from the 
threat faced to his own body by the object. The danger does not disappear, but the experience 
lifts one momentarily from the danger. The terrifying character of the experience does not 
lead to ‘moral reflection’ (98), but, as Nabais informs us, annuls the individual will, 
transforming him into one who contemplates nature ecstatically.8 Yet because, in the sublime, 
the aesthetic observer feels crushed by the grandeur of what is contemplated, he is reduced to 
                                                             
7 ibid., p. 21. 
8 ibid., p. 15. 
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a state of absolute fragility and insignificance. Despite the initial escape from the veil of 
māyā, the only meaning he can give to this annihilation of the self is that of illusion. 
 In order to understand Nietzsche’s relation to Schopenhauer we must piece 
Schopenhauer’s relation of the sublime together with his reading of tragedy. Schopenhauer 
himself does not make this link explicit in the original 1819 manuscript, and it is not until the 
1844 edition that he includes a section entitled ‘Aesthetics of Poetry’ where tragedy is 
recognised as belonging to the sublime. In the 1819 manuscript, the sublime is limited to 
music, which is ‘by no means like the other arts, namely a copy of the Ideas, but a copy of the 
Will itself’ (WR I 257). By elevating music above what he calls the ‘representational arts’, 
Schopenhauer displaces the subjectivist understanding of art we find in Kant where artworks 
serve as occasions for the exercise of judgment.9 In the 1844 manuscript, however, 
Schopenhauer links the sublimity of music with one kind of representational art, namely 
tragedy: 
 
Our pleasure in the tragedy belongs not to the feeling of the beautiful, but to that of the 
sublime; it is, in fact, the highest degree of this feeling. For, just as at the sight of the sublime 
in nature we turn away from the interest of the will, in order to behave in a purely perceptive 
way, so in the tragic catastrophe we turn away from the will-to-live itself. (WR II 433) 
 
Schopenhauer does not deny that tragedy is pleasurable. Rather, he argues that, as in 
judgments of sublimity, tragedy crushes the will to live, leaving us as disinterested observers 
before the monstrous suffering enclosed within the very fabric of life. In its ability to occasion 
the sublime, ‘[t]ragedy is to be regarded, and is recognized, as the summit of poetic art, both 
as regards the greatness of the effect and the difficulty of the achievement’ (WR I 252). This is 
because the Idea represented by art is not just any Idea, but the Idea of nature: 
 
[the] purpose of this highest poetical achievement is the description of the terrible side of life. 
The unspeakable pain, the wretchedness and misery of mankind, the triumph of wickedness, 
the scornful mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and the innocent are all 
here presented to us; and here is to be found a significant hint as to the nature of the world and 
existence. (WR I 252-3) 
                                                              
9 Kant had an extremely low view of music, counting it not among the beautiful arts but among the agreeable, 
arguing that it is concerned not with cognition but with the emotions: ‘If one estimates the value of the beautiful 
arts in terms of the culture that they provide for the mind and takes as one’s standard the enlargement of the 
faculties that must join together in the power of judgment for the sake of cognition, then to that extent music 
occupies the lowest place among the beautiful arts (just as it occupies perhaps the highest place among those that 
are estimated according to their agreeableness), because it merely plays with sensations’ (CJ 5:329). Kant’s 
objection seems to be that music affects before it can be judged. Elsewhere he complains about music being 
played at dinner parties because it is ‘supposed to sustain the mood of joyfulness merely as an agreeable noise, 
and to encourage the free conversation of one neighbor with another without anyone paying the least attention to 
its composition’ (305). On another occasion he compares music to jokes, suggesting that neither concerns 
cognition but are merely sentimental (332). 
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The idea of nature leaves us recoiling, thereby transforming us to view it ecstatically. It is not 
a deliverance from pain but a deliverance through pain. The spectator discovers that nature is 
nothing more than a representation, a dramatic illusion. He does not feel pity or empathy for 
the heroes – indeed, he is ‘foreign to all relation’ – but, opposed to Hegel’s spectator who is 
reconciled to their suffering, suspends his interest in their destiny, raising himself to the 
serenity of a pure aesthetic observer of the work of art, of nature itself.10 It is from the 
elevated vantage of the aesthetic observer who calmly surveys nature that the spectator 
discovers ‘that the world, that life, can never give real satisfaction and hence is not worthy of 
our affection: this constitutes the tragic spirit – it leads to resignation’ (WR II 495).  
While it is often recognised that Schopenhauer’s reading of tragedy entails a spirit of 
resignation, it is less often noted that it also involves a feeling of measured euphoria that 
allows the observer to rise above the world and survey its terrain as a disinterested spectator. 
In Béatrice Han-Pile’s analysis, for example, the pleasure released in the sublimity of tragic 
experience is what separates Nietzsche’s philosophy from Schopenhauer. While Nietzsche’s 
aesthetics entails an affirmative view of life, the ‘Schopenhauerian view would rather be that 
pain just begets more pain’.11 Yet Han-Pile’s reading of Schopenhauer is only true in terms of 
Schopenhauer’s ontology. While Schopenhauer asserts that the will is eternal lack endlessly 
striving for more, his reading of the Kantian sublime aims to provide a momentary 
overcoming of eternal pain: one that anticipates Nietzsche’s account of aesthetic justification. 
Han-Pile overlooks Schopenhauer’s reading of the sublime, finding Nietzsche’s aesthetic 
redemption as ‘radically un-Schopenhauerian’.12 In the following examination of BT, 
however, I will suggest that by understanding Schopenhauer’s view of tragedy in light of his 
reading of the sublime, Nietzsche’s understanding of aesthetic redemption is not so far from 
his view as Han-Pile suggests. By reproducing Schopenhauer’s understanding of the sublime, 
Nietzsche’s aesthetic redemption is not only unable to affirm life as a whole, but also proves 
to be an inferior response to the tragedy of philosophy – the failure of philosophy to 
encompass life – than Kant’s enlarged way of thinking. 
 
 
 
                                                             
10 Nabais, Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, p. 25. 
11 Béatrice Han-Pile, ‘Nietzsche’s Metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy’, in European Journal of Philosophy, 
14:3, 2006, pp. 373-403, p. 379. 
12 ibid. 
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5.2 The argument of The Birth of Tragedy: the Apollinian and the Dionysian 
 
 Now I have outlined Schopenhauer’s interpretation of tragedy in terms of moral 
resignation, I am able to examine whether Nietzsche’s claim in ‘Attempt at Self-Criticism’ – 
that his interpretation of tragedy in BT departs from Schopenhauer’s resignationism – is true 
to the original text. In ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’, Nietzsche suggests that the book’s main 
content was an inquiry into ‘the Greek’s relation to pain’ (BT 21). While the romantic 
conception of the Greeks we find in Hegel views ancient Greece as an innocent childhood of 
the mature spirit of western culture, Nietzsche’s reading of the Greeks builds from Jacob 
Burckhardt, a colleague of the young Nietzsche at Basel, who proposed a darker image of 
Greece.13 Burckhardt argued that the brilliance of the Greeks turned on two, interdependent 
elements; their capacity to suffer and, despite their suffering, their ability to act without the 
fetters of traditional life: 
 
What the Greeks did and endured they did and endured differently from all other peoples 
before them. Where others lived and acted from dull compulsion, they were free, spontaneous, 
original, and aware. Hence in their activities and capacities they appear to be essentially the 
gifted race of men, subject to all the mistakes and sufferings of such a people.14 
 
For Burckhardt, Greece was the locus of a play of forces, destructive and constructive, dark 
and light, providing an alternative vision of the world to the moralism of his own times. What 
interested him the most, however, is the sensitivity of the Greeks to an area of art to which 
‘the Occident, even in the southern parts, today remains dull; … the periodically recurring 
Dionysian frenzy’.15  
Nietzsche’s understanding of Greece builds from and extends Burckhardt’s view,16 
attributing to the Greeks a distinctive sensibility to pain that we find expressed by Dionysus’ 
teacher Silenus: ‘What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to 
be nothing. But the second best for you is – to die soon’ (42).17 To consider the question of 
                                                             
13 Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks, p. 192. 
14 Jacob Burckhardt, History of Greek Culture, trans. P. Hilty, London: Constable Publishers, 1963, p. vi. 
15 ibid., p. 207. 
16 Even in Nietzsche’s later writings he pays tribute to Burckhardt as ‘the most profound student of Hellenism 
alive today’ (TI 227). 
17 See also BT 60. The god Silenus is said to have taught that life is not worth living, and his teaching is often 
cited as the paradigm of pessimism. It is reiterated in several forms in the tragedies, most notably in Sophocles’ 
Oedipus at Colonus (ll. 1224-6): ‘Never to have been born is best, / But if he must see the light, the next best / Is 
quickly returning whence he came’. In WR I, Schopenhauer regularly echoes Silenus’ wisdom in statements such 
as follows: ‘as regards the life of the individual, every life-history is a history of suffering, for, as a rule, every 
life is a continual series of mishaps great and small, concealed as much as possible by everyone … But perhaps 
at the end of life, no man, if he were sincere and at the same time in possession of all his faculties, will ever wish 
to go through it again’ (324). 
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the relation of the Greeks to pain, Nietzsche begins his exploration of tragic art with the 
climactic moment in which pleasure and pain are intimately bound together: the so-called 
‘tragic effect’. By beginning with the tragic effect, Nietzsche builds from Schopenhauer’s 
reading of tragedy in terms of the sublime, meaning that he is less concerned with the content 
of the original tragedies than the subjective experience undergone by any audience when 
faced with tragic art. Starting with the tragic effect, for Nietzsche, means that the question of 
the Greeks’ relation to pain becomes one of making sense of the twin desires that coexist in 
the tragic effect, that is, our ‘wish to see tragedy and at the same time to long to get beyond all 
seeing’ (141). The first desire to ‘see tragedy’ is the pleasure we take in appearances and 
representations of life, while the second compels us to go ‘beyond all seeing’, to be 
transported to a reality that goes beyond mere appearance. In Kantian terms, we might relate 
one desire to the world of phenomena and the other to things in themselves. Both forces make 
their appearance in the very opening lines of BT: 
 
We shall have gained much for the science of aesthetics, once we perceive not merely by 
logical inference, but with immediate certainty of vision, that the continuous development of 
art is bound up with the Apollinian and Dionysian duality – just as procreation depends on the 
battle of the sexes, involving perpetual strife with only periodically intervening 
reconciliations. (33) 
 
From the outset it is clear that Nietzsche aims to subvert the logical procedure of aesthetics by 
proceeding from the immediacy of vision, to a way that is not dissimilar to Hegel’s depiction 
of the original reception of tragedy. This immediate certainty pertains to the metaphysical 
solace of the tragic effect that, counter to Aristotle’s Poetics and Hegel’s notion of 
reconciliation, cannot be understood logically. As I will demonstrate in Rosenzweig’s critique 
of Nietzsche, prioritising the metaphysical solace of tragedy places the ethical dimensions of 
tragedy – suffering, loss, the tension of law and the demands of family etc. – as a mere 
occasion for the tragic effect, meaning that there is no question of a reenergised understanding 
of ethics after the tragedy of philosophy. Yet prioritising immediacy, for Nietzsche, does not 
mean that the logical inference has no place in aesthetics, but that to perceive only by logical 
perception would give a partial picture of art. Here Nietzsche builds on Wagner’s work, 
which states that ‘the impulse of art is … stilled by philosophy,’ meaning that ‘tragedy dies 
when the community divides into egos,’ into self-sure monads that cannot experience the 
duality of tragic play.18 For both Wagner and Nietzsche, art does not anticipate higher forms 
of representation, but is a ‘continuous’ development involving ‘perpetual strife’ of the                                                              
18 Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future, and other works, p. 35. 
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Apollinian and the Dionysian duality. Like male and female the Apollinian and the Dionysian 
have an erotic relation, meaning that they desire to be fused together despite their radical 
difference. Their moments of procreation, that is, their ‘periodically intervening 
reconciliation’, bear new offspring, new forms of art that give witness to their dissonant 
interplay.  
The significance of the Apollinian and Dionysian in Nietzsche’s aesthetics is that they 
do not simply underpin the world of art, but ‘burst forth from nature herself, without 
mediation of the artist’ (38). Nietzsche’s aesthetics turn on a radical conception of nature 
wherein the material world is not governed by Spirit or divine intellect, but is infused with the 
dissonant energies of music. The dissonant energies of music can be thought of in terms of 
dream and intoxication. Apollinian art, on the one hand, is the art of the image-maker. Its hero 
is the god Apollo, the god of all representational energies, and relates to dreams to the extent 
that it pertains to the inner world of fantasy. Like the dream, Apollinian art individuates us, 
driving us toward the recesses of inner life. Yet even while the dream is most alive, even 
when the philosopher is most introspective, ‘we still have, glimmering through it, the 
sensation that it is mere appearance’ (34). It is the Apollinian that drives us to look beyond 
appearances to the heart of things in the frame of individual reflection. The Apollinian 
individuates to the extent that it calls the philosopher toward doubt about the external world, 
giving them the drive toward inner certainty. Like Schopenhauer’s image of individual man 
wrapped in the veil of māyā, Nietzsche describes the Apollinian as the drive that traps human 
beings behind a veil like a boatman on a raging sea of suffering and misery who sits calmly, 
supported by and trusting in the principle of individuation. Our retreat into our own interior 
drives us to find a principle of sufficient reason in order to render the whole cosmos rationally 
understandable. The principle of sufficient reason, as Leibniz defined it, is ‘that nothing 
happens without a reason why it should be rather than otherwise’.19 Given this principle, we 
have reason to assume that there is a sufficient reason for every event that is expressive of 
God’s underlying goodness. The purpose of this principle, for Nietzsche, is ultimately to show 
us ‘how necessary is the entire world of suffering’ (34), a fact that is clear in Leibniz’s 
Theodicy. In this ‘redeeming vision’, Apollo allows one to ‘sit quietly in his tossing bark, 
amid the waves’ (35-6), content that all the suffering in the world is justified. 
Opposed to the Apollinian drive, the Dionysian stirrings become manifest in the terror 
one experiences when one realises that the ‘principle of sufficient reason, in some other of its                                                              
19 ‘Letter from Leibniz to Arnauld, 23 March 1960’, in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Correspondence, ed. R. 
Ariew, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000, p. 7. 
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manifestations, seems to suffer an exception’ (36). When our logical systems fail, everything 
‘subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness’. The Dionysian pertains to the drive that 
longs to extend beyond the borders of the self and to fuse with the collective, a drive we feel 
in collective intoxication and to the heightened feeling of life we gain in the approach of 
spring. In such experiences the veil of māyā is torn apart to reveal the primordial will, 
Schopenhauer’s Er-Ein, and each becomes ‘one with his neighbour’, each ‘feels himself to be 
a god’ (37). In the Dionysian we find that truth is not found in the principle of sufficient 
reason, but in excess. From the intoxicated vantage of primal Oneness, contradiction is not 
something that requires healing but is ‘the bliss born of pain’, a metaphysical solace in the 
face of the terrifying realities of life (47). The Dionysian not only discloses the heart of the 
Greeks, for it draws us into the pleasure found in the painful vision of life itself, but it also 
anticipates Wagner’s manifesto that ‘in the Art-work we shall all be one’.20 
Nietzsche’s understanding of the antinomy between the Dionysian and the Apollinian 
confronts Hegel’s dialectic, for it is not a resolvable contradiction between unintegrated parts 
of ethical life, but two conflicting ways of resolving the problem of pain by transforming it 
into a kind of pleasure. As Gilles Deleuze explains, ‘Dionysus and Apollo are … not opposed 
as the terms of a contradiction but rather as two antithetical ways of resolving it; Apollo 
mediately, in the contemplation of the plastic image, Dionysus immediately in the 
reproduction, in the musical symbol of the will’.21 The Apollinian constructs a beautiful 
image that ‘overcomes the suffering of the individual by the radiant glorification of the 
eternity of the phenomenon’ (104). The Dionysian returns to primordial unity by shattering 
the individual and dragging him ‘into the great shipwreck and absorbs into original being’.22 
In other words, Apollo obliterates pain while Dionysus makes us participate in the abundance 
of being. Tragedy reconciles this antithesis, for in tragic art ‘Apollo, finally, speaks the 
language of Dionysus’. Nietzsche concludes that ‘we must understand Greek tragedy as the 
Dionysian which ever anew discharges itself in an Apollinian world of images’ (64-65). 
For Béatrice Han-Pile, Nietzsche’s understanding of Dionysian pleasure is counter to 
Schopenhauer’s notion of the will as eternal pain. Although the will’s suffering remains 
primary in that it is the motivating drive for the production of pleasure, Han-Pile argues that 
‘Nietzsche departs doubly from the Schopenhauerian model: firstly, he sees pleasure as a 
positive force, not only the cessation of pain; secondly, he also asserts the possibility of                                                              
20 Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future, p. 77. 
21 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. H. Tomlinson, London: The Athlone Press, 1983, p. 12. 
22 ibid., p. 11. 
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pleasure overcoming pain (“an excess of pleasure”)’.23 Yet is Nietzsche’s pleasure an 
overcoming of pain, or is it an aesthetic removal from the pain and its replacement by a 
momentary feeling of ecstasy, much in the same way as Schopenhauer’s sublime? It is often 
unclear in BT whether it is the Dionysian itself that finds pleasure in the terrifying realities of 
life, or whether the Dionysian, when coupled with the Apollinian, is that artistic drive that can 
look into the terrifying heart of reality and yet find solace in art. If Dionysian experience is 
the source of aesthetic pleasure, then Han-Pile’s reading gains more credence, for the 
Dionysian would allow the will itself – what Schopenhauer condemned to eternal 
disappointment – to be lifted from its sorrows in the experience of pleasure. If pleasure 
properly comes from experiencing the artwork that couples the Dionysian and the Apollinian, 
then Nabais’ connection of Schopenhauer’s sublime and Nietzsche’s aesthetic catharsis would 
prove to be correct. Aesthetic pleasure would not be the will’s ecstasy but the pleasure we 
find when we are, for the fleeting moment of aesthetic sentiment, lifted above the concerns of 
the will, enabled to survey the world from the vantage of ecstatic spectator. 
Nietzsche provides statements that could support both views, meaning that we must 
turn to his broader relation to Schopenhauer in order to find whether his aesthetic redemption 
is an illusion or whether it redeems reality itself. For Schopenhauer, the proper domain of 
music is not art but metaphysics. It is distinguished from all other arts and representational 
activities, including language, ‘by the fact that it is not a copy of the phenomenon … but an 
immediate copy of the will itself’ (WR I 309).24 To this Nietzsche agrees.25 The world itself is 
a representation of a more basic reality: it is ‘embodied music’ or ‘embodied will’ (BT 102). 
Yet given Nietzsche’s intention to build an affirmation of life from his reading of tragedy, a 
representational form of art that is metaphysically inferior to music, Schopenhauer seems a 
strange ally. If the world is ‘embodied music’, then music has an ontological significance (it 
pertains to reality), while tragedy, a form of poetry, has a merely aesthetic significance (it is 
merely a representational activity).                                                               
23 Han-Pile, ‘Nietzsche’s Metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy’, p. 379. 
24 Nietzsche cites this passage in BT 102. 
25 Despite the disagreement in scholarship over Nietzsche’s relation to Schopenhauer, most scholars agree that 
Nietzsche reproduces Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of music. An exception to this, however, is Michel Haar. 
Haar argues that ‘Contrary to what [Nietzsche] sometimes seem to say, or what he would have the reader 
believe,’ he is ‘radically opposed’ to Schopenhauer’s doctrine of music. Haar seeks to draw our attention to the 
fact that while Schopenhauer views music as a copy of a deeper reality, namely the will, for Nietzsche music ‘is 
being itself, not its first reproduction’. Haar’s argument is problematic on two fronts. Firstly, it flies against 
Nietzsche’s explicit references to music as a ‘copy of the will itself … representing what is metaphysical, the 
thing in itself’ (BT 100). Secondly, it attempts to graft Nietzsche’s argument in BT into his greater corpus, failing 
to recognise that Nietzsche’s views on the topic are not uniform throughout his intellectual development. See 
Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, p. 173-174. 
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Here we find a fundamental tension in BT. In writing this text Nietzsche aims to 
achieve two things: to write a philosophy of art, and to graft Wagner’s total theatre into a 
narrative of the rebirth of tragedy. On one side Nietzsche claims that ‘the history of the rise of 
Greek tragedy now tells us with luminous precision how the tragic art of the Greeks was 
really born out of the spirit of music’ (105). Nietzsche is writing a philosophy of art in which 
the spirit of music strives ‘toward visual and mythical objectification’ (106) in tragic poetry, 
suggesting that music demands words in order to bring to feeling what only words and actions 
can: ‘The structure of the scene and the visual images reveal a deeper wisdom than the poet 
himself can put into words and concepts’ (105). Thus tragedy brings us to a certain climax of 
the metaphysical reality of music. Yet on the other side, it is not the tragedies of Aeschylus, 
Sophocles and Euripides who take us to the summit of art, but the musician who uses tragic 
myth as a ruse to draw his audience into the metaphysical reality of music: ‘what the word-
poet did not succeed in doing, namely, attain the highest spiritualization and identity of the 
myth, he might well succeed in doing every moment as creative musician!’ (105). Music, 
Nietzsche informs us, in its ‘absolute sovereignty does not need the image and the concept, 
but merely endures them as accompaniments’ (55). It seems that it is not the tragedians as 
much as it is Wagner who truly understands the essence of the tragic.26 The essence is not 
words, poetry, or anything particular to Greek culture, but is, in fact, music. When I turn to 
Rosenzweig’s theory of tragedy I will suggest that this move is problematic, for it entails that 
the content expressed in the words of the tragedians is a mere occasion for the spirit of music 
to manifest itself. For Rosenzweig, this does not assist Nietzsche in his attempt to escape 
Platonic metaphysics, for it effectively inverts Plato’s hierarchy of reality over appearance 
rather than providing an alternative. The ethical, historical and cultural gap between antiquity 
and the modern age becomes appearance while reality – that is, the spirit of music – unites 
them in a common experience.27 
If music is sovereign, and if words and images do not truly enhance music, then it is 
necessary to clarify the relationship between music and tragedy in order to decide whether 
                                                             
26 Julian Young argues that Nietzsche’s basic motive in writing BT was to contribute to ‘Wagner’s seemingly 
quixotic but ultimately successful project of raising enough money to build his own, custom-designed opera 
house in Bayreuth’. Thus his argument is that tragedy ‘is being “reborn” in the shape of Wagner’s music-
dramas’. See Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy, p. 169. 
27 In identifying the essence of tragedy as the spirit of music, Nietzsche departs from his understanding of 
tragedy in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. In this fragmented text Nietzsche explores tragedy not in 
the art of the tragedians but in the shared experience of Athenian cultural life in the 5th century BC wherein the 
former myths that couched collective life in meaning ceased to be immediately compelling, opening the Greek 
world to the need to philosophise in order to elucidate the meaning of experience. See Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, trans. M. Cowan, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962. 
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Nietzsche’s philosophy of art truly overcomes Schopenhauer’s pessimism. Poetry, Nietzsche 
suggests, can ‘express nothing that did not already lie hidden in the vast universality and 
absoluteness in the music … Language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of 
music’ (55). This view of the deficiency of words and the absoluteness of music displaces 
tragedy as the highest art, reflecting not only a Schopenhauerian view that music can take us 
to a deeper reality than words, but also an attempt to promote Wagner’s complete music-
drama as the manifestation of Greek spirit in the present age. This tension suggests that 
Nietzsche intends to affirm Schopenhauer’s metaphysics but with an added caveat: that while 
music unveils the terrible, dissonant heart of reality, art – and tragic art in particular – can 
provide something on the level of representation, a ‘splendid illusion’, that can move even the 
darkest Hamlet to embrace life as a whole and act within it (143). Art does not reconcile us to 
reality or make us at home in the world. Rather, it occasions a fleeting moment of aesthetic 
catharsis in the face of the dissonant heart of reality. If this is the case, then Nietzsche’s 
philosophy does not depart from Schopenhauer’s on an ontological level, but merely 
emphasises Schopenhauer’s recognition of an aesthetic moment of escape. 
 If art merely occasions a fleeting moment of aesthetic catharsis, then the main thrust 
of Nietzsche’s argument supports Nabais’ view; that the Dionysian pleases through a kind of 
illusion. Art, for Nietzsche, ‘is not merely imitation of the reality of nature’ but also ‘a 
metaphysical supplement to the reality of nature, placed beside it for its overcoming’ (140). 
Even Dionysian art provides a kind of illusion, albeit one that is different to Apollinian art: 
‘every artist is an “imitator”: either an Apollinian artist in dreams, or a Dionysian artist in 
ecstasies’ (38). This resonates with a remark Nietzsche made in his early notebooks where he 
argues that the fact that we cannot handle reality, that we need illusion to bear with reality, is 
exactly ‘what is tragic’.28  
Nietzsche’s understanding of Dionysian comfort seems contradictory. At the same 
moment it is both a confrontation with reality yet also a blissful illusion. The contradiction 
dissolves, however, when we see the Dionysian in light of Schopenhauer’s sublime. As we 
have seen, the sublime, for Schopenhauer, turns on a confrontation with the terrible realities 
of life whereby we are raised out of the limitations of our individuality and into the condition 
of pure subject, the Er-Ein, where we are abstracted from the threat faced to our own bodies 
by the terrible. By annulling the will, this experience allows us to contemplate the terrible 
heart of reality ecstatically. What Nietzsche adds to Schopenhauer, suggests Nabais, is the                                                              
28 Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s, 
Humanities Press, USA, 1979, The Philosopher, § 37. 
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Apollinian desire for appearances that finds comfort in an artistic representation of reality: 
‘For Nietzsche, the mystery of Greek tragedy consisted precisely in the fact that at the heart of 
the drama there was this tension, between the One of mystical fusion with the universe in 
Dionysian delirium and the Multiple of the characters of Apollonian drama as they struggled 
to affirm the hero’s individuality’.29 
Here we find a clue to the question of the Greek’s relation to pain. Tragic art is made 
possible by a people who have borne great pain, who have ‘looked boldly right into the 
terrible destructiveness of so-called world history as well as the cruelty of nature,’ and instead 
of being overcome by it or taking on a ‘Buddhistic negation of the will,’ find ‘metaphysical 
comfort’ in the fact that ‘life is at the bottom of things, despite all the changes of appearances, 
indestructibly powerful and pleasurable’ (59). On face value, Nietzsche seems to endorse 
Han-Pile’s reading – indeed, Han-Pile cites this assertion as a key part of her defence of his 
redemptive metaphysics30 – for he suggests that the Dionysian affirms that life is ultimately 
pleasurable. However, while Nietzsche uses ontological language, that life at the bottom of 
things is pleasurable, this insight does not come from looking into the heart of nature but from 
‘the chorus of satyrs’, that is, from tragic art, the coupling of the Dionysian and Apollinian. It 
is only in aesthetic experience that life is pleasurable, and we find ourselves again close to 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of art. Nietzsche compares Dionysian man to Hamlet, for ‘both 
have once looked truly into the essence of things, they have gained knowledge, and nausea 
inhibits action; for their action could not change anything in the eternal nature of things… 
Knowledge kills action; action requires the veils of illusion’ (60). What is sublime about the 
Greeks, what takes them beyond the wisdom of Hamlet, is that they could look into the 
terrible with open eyes and yet create an illusion that enabled them to act; an illusion that 
enabled them to engage in politics and to generate a rich cultural life. For Nietzsche, to look 
into the painful depths of reality and to find art as a healing power is the very essence of 
tragedy. In this way, ‘[a]rt saves … and through art – life’ (59). Even Han-Pile recognises that 
it is art that redeems, stating that the ‘Apollonian relieves us of suffering by showing a heroic 
vision of individuation which makes human existence seem more beautiful than it really is’.31                                                              
29 Nabais, Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, p. 42. 
30 Han-Pile asserts that Nietzsche ‘teaches us that far from being “horrific”, “life is at the bottom of things, 
despite all the changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable” (BT: §7, 59)’. Han-Pile, 
‘Nietzsche’s Metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy’, p. 392. 
31 ibid., p. 382. She later describes the Dionysian as illusion and links it the sublime, unknowingly paralleling 
Nietzsche to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of art: ‘Therefore, it is essential to the definition of the Dionysian that 
it should be illusory. The illusion does not come from the sublime glorification of individuation, as in the case of 
the Apollonian, but from another form of sublime, the symbolic annihilation of the individual, which allows the 
Dionysian actor to metaphorically re-live the God’s agony and bliss’ (p. 384). 
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The Dionysian illusion is nothing like the optimistic illusion in which the essence of reality is 
logical. Rather, it turns on the ‘sublime as artistic taming of the horrible’ (60). Reality is only 
pleasurable once it has been tamed in sublime, aesthetic experience. The redemption is found 
in art, in an artistic taming of the terrors of this life. 
 
5.3 The argument of The Birth of Tragedy: the death and rebirth of tragedy  
 
Thus far I have identified a tension in Nietzsche’s argument. On the one hand, art 
confronts us with the terrors of reality and yet occasions a blissful illusion. On the other hand, 
however, the illusion turns out to be reality while the terrors of life turn out to be the means 
by which the spirit of music comes into appearance. In order to discern whether this blissful 
illusion can constitute a justification of existence, an experience that is ultimately life 
affirming, it is necessary to consider Nietzsche’s attempt to ground the birth of tragedy in a 
historical narrative that outlines the conditions for a rebirth of tragic art. When conscious life 
ceases to experience tragedy with the immediate certainty of vision and subsumes tragedy in 
its conceptual grasp, tragedy is effectively dead. In Nietzsche’s view this is no accident, for 
tragedy contains within it the logic of its own demise. While other forms of art ‘died the most 
beautiful and peaceful deaths’ as they faded away with great ages, tragedy ‘died by suicide’, 
that is to say, it died ‘tragically’ (76). Yet the Apollinan drive to encompass all of life through 
conceptual thought also contains the seeds for the rebirth of tragedy, I will suggest, for it is 
the insatiable search for order that causes the Apollinian to stumble across the groundlessness 
of logic. 
In Nietzsche’s account, death is contained in the nature of tragic art in the following 
way. The heroes of Aeschylus and Sophocles embody the confluence of the Apollinian and 
the Dionysian, for in them there is no inner/outer distinction but simply the raw presentation 
of the natural forces at work in the human being. Aeschylus is famed for placing multiple 
actors on stage, thus breaking the atomised individuality of Homeric, Apollinian art and 
allowing the Dionysian element to enter through revealing the fragility of the boundaries 
between individuals. Yet as the tragedians come to a greater awareness of their art, they begin 
to fill their characters with a rich inner life. The Dionysian and Apollinian elements become 
autonomous and the tendency of the tragic heroes to fatefully collide is removed. 
This occurs in the dramas of Euripides as the characters take on a greater interior 
reality. Euripides brings the spectator on stage, an everyday character capable of judging, 
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placing him into the midst of the tragic collision. The Euripidean hero is not fused with the 
action on stage but stands back as judge of it. Reflective pathos replaces the immediacy of 
action, meaning that Euripides cannot be understood so much as a poet but as a thinker. The 
name of Euripides’ spectator is not the god Apollo or Dionysus, but an ‘altogether newborn 
daemon, called Socrates’ (82). Socrates gives birth to an anti-mythical drive to render all 
things intelligible, to banish contingency, mystery, contradiction and intuition and to replace it 
with necessity, knowledge, reconciliation and concepts. It is in alliance with Socrates that 
‘Euripides dared to be the herald of a new art’ (86). As the Apollinian is dismembered and 
made to be the primary power without opposition, the Apollinian and the Dionysian 
dissonance is replaced with a new, unproductive opposition between the Socratic and the 
Dionysian. When the Socratic replaces the Apollinian, consciousness replaces the dream and 
the immediate certainty is replaced with the logical inference. The erotic relation between 
Apollinian and Dionysian is removed as they become ‘cool, paradoxical thoughts’ (83).  
Socrates serves as a historical marker for a fundamental shift in the figuration of 
artistic forces that echo throughout history into the present world. He is ‘the vortex and 
turning-point of so-called world history’, for his ‘influence has spread out across all posterity 
to this very day, and indeed into the whole future, like a shadow growing ever longer in the 
evening sun’ (96). Socrates is not some kind of scientist to emerge from the murky territory of 
myth. Rather, he is the ‘mystagogue of science’ (ibid.), peddling a new mythology in which 
nature itself can be understood and harnessed for the ends of humankind. With Socrates’ love 
for systematic knowledge comes a new archetype: theoretical man. It brings a new age of the 
Greeks that is no longer characterised by tragic bliss but cheerfulness:  
 
It combats Dionysian wisdom and art, it seeks to dissolve myth, it substitutes for a 
metaphysical comfort and earthly consonance, in fact, a deus ex machina of its own … it 
believes that it can correct the world by knowledge, guide life by science, and actually confine 
the individual within a limited sphere of solvable problems, from which he can cheerfully say 
to life: ‘I desire you: you are worth knowing’. (109) 
 
Greek cheerfulness is nothing like the bliss born in pain that we find in the tragic Greeks. It 
turns on a theorisation of life, to the construction of an inhabitable, logical cosmos in which 
the mind can find stability and solace, where the wounds of knowledge are healed and 
theoretical man finds himself buffered from the forces that play around him. The supreme law 
of aesthetic Socratism is thus revealed in the maxim ‘[t]o be beautiful everything must be 
intelligible’ (83-84), and beauty becomes figured as the confirmation of the morally good.  
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When Plato’s great Socratic eye turns to tragedy in The Republic it is deemed not to 
‘tell the truth’ (90), for it represents what is pleasant but not what is useful. Plato’s doctrine of 
mimesis deems that music ‘becomes a wretched copy of the phenomenon, and therefore 
infinitely poorer than the phenomenon itself’ (107). It gives birth to a new kind of music that 
either imitates the sounds of the phenomenal world like cannon-shots and marching armies, or 
attempts to ‘save the eye from gazing into the horrors of night and to deliver the subject by 
the healing balm of illusion from the spasms of the agitations of the will’ (118). Nietzsche’s 
critique, however, is less concerned with Greek comedy as it is with the opera of his own day. 
‘The features of opera,’ he argues, ‘do not by any means exhibit the elegiac sorrow of an 
eternal loss, but rather the cheerfulness of eternal rediscovery, the comfortable delight in an 
idyllic reality which one can at least always imagine as real’ (118). Like the Socratic art of 
antiquity, the optimism of modern opera ‘drives music out of tragedy under the lash of its 
syllogisms’ (ibid.). Schopenhauer makes a similar point in response to Hegel, arguing that 
optimism is a ‘really wicked way of thinking’, for it ‘makes a mockery of the unspeakable 
suffering of humankind’ (WR I 326). For Schopenhauer, it is tragedy that ‘sanctifies’ us from 
this mode of thinking and places us on ‘the road of salvation’, for the ‘peculiar effect of the 
tragedy rests ultimately on the fact that it shakes that inborn error [to think that the end of life 
is happiness], since it furnishes a vivid illustration of the frustration of the human effort and of 
the vanity of this whole existence in a great and striking example, and thereby reveals life’s 
deepest meaning; for this reason, tragedy is recognised as the sublimest form of poetry’ (WR 
II 334, 335, 336). Yet by ‘sanctifying’ us in such a way, the tragic effect does not redeem 
existence, for Schopenhauer, but purifies our way of thinking so that we can acknowledge the 
suffering of humanity. As I will suggest when I turn to Rosenzweig’s critique of Nietzsche, it 
is on this point that Nietzsche and Schopenhauer truly depart. 
Following Schopenhauer critique of ‘wicked’ thinking, the greatest charge Nietzsche 
levels against Socratic optimism is that it obscures our primordial relation to pain, a relation 
that was characteristic of the Greek imagination. While he gives several accounts of the 
transition between tragic and Socratic art, his primary argument is that Socratic art does not 
comfort us intuitively but appeals to our logical faculties: ‘the deus ex machina took the place 
of metaphysical comfort’ (BT 109). Theodicy replaces tragedy and the cheerfulness that 
would render everything explainable forces the Dionysian to mystery cults on the margins of 
society and culture. Thus the ‘un-Dionysian spirit … reveals itself most plainly in the 
dénouements of the new dramas’ (108). The dénouements of the new dramas are intellectual, 
while tragedy occasions ‘metaphysical comfort’ in the face of the pain born of life.  
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 The significance of the birth and death of tragedy for Nietzsche is that it gives a clue 
to how a rebirth of tragedy might come about, a clue that links tragedy with the scientific 
impulse. Because reason seeks for perfection, Nietzsche observes, it leads to the image of an 
infinite God in which there is no becoming, no life. Yet in its quest for perfection, the 
theoretical system constructed by reason searches for ever-greater understanding until it 
stumbles across its own limits and is reopened to the terrifying dimensions of reality it 
obscured through logical optimism. The theoretical certainty that all of nature is intelligible 
‘leads science again and again to its limits at which it must turn into art – which is really the 
aim of this mechanism’ (95-96). Art and science are not so much opposed in their goal as they 
are in their method, for both are concerned with the truth. When science fails and art takes its 
place, science does not die but is reoriented to its original goal. The logician is thus perfectly 
located to bring a rebirth in tragic art, for ‘[w]hen they see to their horror how logic coils up at 
these boundaries and finally bites its own tail – suddenly the new form of insight breaks 
through, tragic insight which, merely to be endured, needs art as a protection and a remedy’ 
(98). Thus it is Kant, and Schopenhauer who follows his lead, who reveals the darker 
elements of life through his ‘monstrous courage and wisdom’ (112).32 
 What unites the intellectual courage of Kant and Schopenhauer with the ancient 
Greeks, Nietzsche argues, is that by pushing logic to its limit they stumbled upon logic’s 
failure, the inability of the Apollinian to exhaust reality. What sets the Greeks apart from 
Kant, however, is that in the acknowledgment of the monstrous they discovered art as a 
healing power: they were able to uncover ‘the sublime as the artistic taming of the horrible’ 
(60). For Nietzsche, Greek art is different to Kant’s moralised sublime that released the 
powers of reason in the practical sphere of moral judgment. It is different to Hegel’s rational 
progress that led to the demise of tragic art; the triumph of thought over our natural conditions 
through religion and philosophy. The attention the Greeks gave to pain, for Nietzsche, gave 
                                                             
32 Nietzsche’s use of ‘monstrous’ (ungeheure) here is important. In §26 of CJ Kant distinguishes between the 
sublime (Erhaben) and the monstrous (Ungeheure) as two orders of magnitude. Left without the aid of concepts, 
aesthetic estimation of magnitude aims to comprehend that which exceeds the capacity of the imagination to 
comprehend. That which is ‘great beyond any standard of sense’ but remains subject to the estimation of the 
mind is judged to be sublime (CJ 5:256). It is the almost too great, thus expanding the imagination beyond the 
limits of the understanding and heightening its awareness of its ability to estimate or judge analogously to the 
infinitude of reason. However, that which by its magnitude ‘annihilates the end (Zweck) which its concept 
constitutes’ is judged to be monstrous (5:253). It is too great, and thus destroys any return to ethical or 
teleological sensibility. Its greatness is so vast that any ‘end’ or ‘purpose’ is utterly destroyed by the excess of 
raw nature that is encountered. While something that is almost too great gives us the illusion of danger, we judge 
it to be sublime for we find it to be an occasion for the more forceful release of reason. When something is too 
great, on the other hand, we are thrown into terror at the hands of real danger, and all hope of salvation is 
destroyed by what cannot be tamed by reason. 
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birth to tragic art, and the death of tragedy turned on a failure of courage in those philosophers 
who posited the optimism of abstract logic in the place of the alteration and cruelty of nature. 
 Thus to reopen the possibility of tragedy, an opening that has already begun in Kant’s 
recognition of the limits of thought, Nietzsche argues that we must ‘seek the pleasure that is 
peculiar to [tragic art] in the purely aesthetic sphere, without transgressing into the region of 
pity, fear, or the morally sublime’ (141). It is in this way that we can find a renewal of the 
tragic spirit: ‘only after the spirit of science has been pursued to its limits and its claim to 
universal validity destroyed by the evidence of these limits may we hope for a rebirth of 
tragedy’ (106). The overcoming of scientific optimism does not require a denial of everything 
that has occurred in modernity, but rather ‘a form of culture for which we should have to use 
the symbol of the music-practicing Socrates’ (ibid.). Exactly what a music-practicing Socrates 
would look like remains unclear (though possibly a lot like Wagner). The problem to be 
solved is that after the monstrous discovery of the limits of thought ‘no comfort avails 
anymore’. In such a context, ‘man now sees everywhere only the horror or absurdity of 
existence’ and is ‘nauseated’ (60). Modern man cannot retreat from science but requires art as 
a healing power, and the music-practicing Socrates gives a provocative image of a scientific 
culture that does not cease from exploring the depths of nature and yet, through its art, affirms 
life as a whole, life in all its contradiction, cruelty and pleasure. 
 From this analysis it is clear that at the heart of Nietzsche’s project is the attempt to 
elucidate the ‘metaphysical comfort without which the delight in tragedy cannot be explained 
at all’ (108) in such a way that reveals the necessity of a new age of tragic art in the nihilistic 
context of modernity. It is for the aim of ushering in this new world that he makes his 
repeated claim that ‘it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are 
eternally justified’ (see 22). To assess the validity of Nietzsche’s claim, we must consider his 
argument as a whole. Throughout BT, Nietzsche urges the reader that before one can feel the 
desire and joy for existence, one must free oneself from the delusion that one can heal the 
wound of existence through Socratic passion for knowledge. This freedom, however, 
uncovers the abyssal reality of things that can only be endured with art as a remedy: 
 
this dissonance, to be able to live, would need a splendid illusion that would cover dissonance 
with a veil of beauty. This is the trustiest aim of Apollo in whose name we comprehend all 
those countless illusions of the beauty of mere appearance that at every moment make life 
worth living at all and prompt the desire to live on in order to experience the next moment. 
(143) 
 
 156 
He we find again a point that many commentators overlook: that the Dionysian and the 
Apollinian are not exclusive in Nietzsche’s understanding of tragic art, but that they must be 
united if art is to reach its summit; Dionysian in that they look beyond appearances into the 
terrifying heart of reality, Apollinian in the sense that they provide a ‘splendid illusion’ that 
makes life worth living in order to experience the next moment. The moments of terror are 
thus necessary for redemption to be a possibility, for 
 
when the danger to his will is greatest, art approaches as a saving sorceress, expert at healing. 
She alone knows how to turn these nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurdity of 
existence into notions with which one can live. (60) 
 
The impulse to exist is the same impulse which calls art into being, meaning that the 
philosophy of art, aesthetics, breaks faith with life itself. In Nietzsche’s understanding, a 
culture of tragedy would entail a denunciation of the desire for intellectual satisfaction and 
substantial being, suggesting that philosophies in search of healing do not take the terror of 
existence seriously, occluding it by anthropomorphising reality as something that meets our 
desire for harmonious knowledge. Opposed to such philosophies, it is pain and sorrow that 
lead us to the creation of great art that alone can justify the alteration, process and suffering of 
life. Such art, argues Nietzsche, ‘transfigure[s] a region in whose joyous chords dissonance as 
well as the terrible image of the world fade away charmingly’. It allows the Greeks to find life 
as something beautiful without having to censor the ugly or the bad, playing ‘with the sting of 
displeasure, … and by the means of this play [it justifies] the existence of even the “worst 
world”’ (143).  
Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification of even the worst world parallels Schopenhauer’s 
sublime illusion. The world cannot be justified in moral terms, for a moral system must posit 
the existence of another world of peace and order to maintain its logical cohesion. Nietzsche 
compares us to soldiers painted on the canvas of a battle scene; our protest that the world 
should be kinder is as ridiculous as their protest would be (52). Rather, it can only be justified 
aesthetically, for in art ‘the struggle, the pain, the destruction of phenomena, now all appear 
necessary to us … in view of the exuberant fertility of the eternal will’ (104). This 
justification is ‘eternal’ because it transports us to ‘the eternal life beyond all phenomena, and 
despite all annihilation’ (ibid.); it empowers us to see the annihilation as part of life as a 
whole. In the same movement of Schopenhauer’s sublime transportation the spectator is lifted 
out of his individuation, his moral self that is repulsed by the spectacle of life, and participates 
in the life of the primordial One (das Er-Ein). In this experience the spectator feels crushed by 
the grandeur of what is contemplated and is reduced to a state of absolute insignificance, and 
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the only meaning one can give to this annihilation of the self is that of illusion. Unlike moral 
sublimity or traditional theodicies, Nietzsche claims that in a purely aesthetic justification 
nothing is negated (that is, except the self). The whole, with all its horror, is contemplated 
with serene pleasure. 
While Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification might warrant greater pleasure than 
Schopenhauer’s ecstatic perusing of nature as a whole, they both share the vantage of the 
aesthetic observer who finds, only for a moment, a solution to the so-called wisdom of 
Silenus. Redemption is brought by art, and on this point, as John Sallis argues, ‘there is 
complete solidarity between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’.33 The point at which they diverge 
is a matter of where they place value. As I will suggest in the following section, the point at 
which Nietzsche departs from Schopenhauer on the question of value has significant 
consequences for the kind of ‘life’ that his aesthetic theory is capable of justifying. For 
Nietzsche, the ecstatic illusion justifies the whole: ‘art is … a metaphysical supplement to the 
reality of nature, placed beside it for its overcoming’ (140). By identifying art as a supplement 
to the reality of nature Nietzsche locates value entirely in the realm of appearance, meaning 
that ‘life becomes the copy and art the reality’ (107). For Schopenhauer, on the other hand, 
sublime ecstasy is devoid of value: 
 
For at the moment, when, torn from the will, we have given ourselves up to pure, will-less 
knowing, we have stepped into another world, so to speak, where everything that moves our 
will, and thus violently agitates us, no longer exists. This liberation of knowledge lifts us 
wholly and completely above all this as do sleep and dreams. (WR I 197)  
 
While Schopenhauer identifies the realm of happiness in ‘another world’, it is a world devoid 
of value. The aesthetic illusion cannot provide justification for the terrors of nature, for it is 
simply a momentary transplantation from it. In the Schopenhauian paradigm we conclude that 
reality is not ‘worth our attachment’ and thus resign in aesthetic contemplation (WR II 434). 
 
5.4 Tragedy and ethics: Franz Rosenzweig  
 
Thus far I have argued that Nietzsche does not significantly depart from 
Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of art, meaning that he fails to provide a positive account of art 
capable of overcoming pessimism. As both thinkers grappled with the task of philosophy in 
environments dominated by Hegel’s work, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche sought to divorce                                                              
33 John Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, 
p. 40. 
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aesthetics and ethics, for both found the decline of world culture to announce the failure of 
Kant’s moral philosophy and the teleology of Hegelian dialectics.34 However, as Czech poet 
Czeslaw Milosz suggests, while the cultural shifts of Nietzsche’s lifetime were significant, 
Nietzsche ‘did not experience the rapid and violent changes of the next century, whose only 
possible analogy may be the time of the Peloponnesian war, as we know it from 
Thucydides’.35 In the twentieth century, especially in the tumultuous years following the First 
World War, not only was Hegelian Idealism called into question, but thinkers such as Franz 
Rosenzweig came to argue that Nietzsche’s philosophy was also unable to provide a way of 
confronting new ethical demands. In response to Nietzsche, Rosenzweig struggled to create a 
new kind of philosophy he called ‘the new thinking’ (das neue Denken), a way of thinking 
that, as Peter Gordon explains, aims to recognise ‘the philosophical merits of modernity since 
Nietzsche while continuing to draw nourishment from the resources of Judaism’.36 In this 
section I argue that Rosenzweig’s proposal for a new way of thinking in The Star of 
Redemption (1921) (SR) provides an important response to Nietzsche’s interpretation of 
tragedy for the argument of this thesis. While Rosenzweig’s central focus is to critique 
Hegelian thought from a Jewish perspective, he proposes to do this by going beyond 
Nietzsche: by reading Nietzsche as an epochal voice in world history.37 The importance of 
Rosenzweig’s argument for this thesis, I suggest, is that it calls Hegel’s understanding of 
tragedy into question by proposing a reading of Nietzsche that builds the framework in which 
Heidegger and Castoriadis operate in the search for a way to go beyond Nietzsche through 
reference to tragedy, and to do so by returning to certain elements of Kant’s enlarged way of 
thinking. 
From the famous opening lines of SR it is clear that Rosenzweig understands his new 
thinking in continuity with Nietzsche’s philosophy:                                                              
34 Walter Benjamin distinguishes Nietzsche’s reading of tragedy from the Aristotelian and Hegelian tradition 
because it asserts ‘the independence of the tragic from the ethos’ (GT 102). 
35 See Czeslaw Milosz, The Witness of Poetry, USA: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 81. The disintegration to 
which Milosz refers ‘had already taken place in the nineteenth century, though it was under the surface and only 
observed by a few’. 
36 Peter Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003, p. xix. While Rosenzweig draws from Jewish sources, and it is clear that his experience 
of being a ‘Jewish German’ shapes his argument in the text, he states that SR is ‘not a “Jewish book” … for 
while it deals with Judaism, it deals with it no more comprehensively than it deals with Christianity, and barely 
more comprehensively than it deals with Islam. Nor does it claim to be a philosophy of religion. … Rather it is 
merely a system of philosophy’. Franz Rosenzweig, ‘The New Thinking’ [1925], in Philosophical and 
Theological Writings, trans. & ed. P. Franks & M. Morgan, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 
109-139, p. 110. 
37 Along with Rosenzweig, Walter Benjamin, Herman Hesse, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger can also be 
understood in this way: finding Nietzsche to be the ineliminable starting point of grappling with the aesthetic 
origin of value, and yet insufficient to outline a new way of thinking about value. 
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From death, it is from the fear of death that all cognition of the All begins. To cast off the fear 
of the earthly, to remove from death its poisonous sting, from Hades its pestilential breath, in 
this Philosophy deceives itself [des vermißt sich die Philosophie]. (SR 9)38 
 
According to Rosenzweig, the dream of metaphysics to fly free from death through 
speculation is nothing less than a philosophical fantasy. The self-deception of philosophy 
becomes apparent when the individual is confronted with death as a real possibility. Like 
Nietzsche, Rosenzweig’s proposal will be a new concept of redemption that accords with the 
post-metaphysical desire to remain in the world. Yet unlike Nietzsche, this redemption does 
not require reality to be understood in terms of a valueless aesthetics.39 Rather, Rosenzweig 
argues that this-worldly redemption is only possible if understood in relation to an aesthetic 
kind of value that renders victimisation ethically meaningful.40 
The focus of Rosenzweig’s critique of Nietzsche is that by rendering the images, 
words and content of the tragedies as peripheral to tragedy’s true essence, Nietzsche renders 
tragic guilt and hubris as mere occasions through which the tragic essence can shine forth. 
Following Schopenhauer, Nietzsche argues that aesthetic redemption requires that we are 
removed from the pity and fear that comes from our ethical relation to the world, meaning that 
he does not develop a serious theory of the themes and content of tragic art. The content of the 
tragedies is mere appearance, for music – the animating principle of tragedy – ‘does not need 
the image and the concept, but merely endures them as accompaniments’ (BT 55). 
‘Language’, Nietzsche states, ‘can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music’ 
(ibid.), meaning that the content of tragic drama is secondary to the absolute, unrepresentable 
reality to which it takes us. For Rosenzweig, Nietzsche’s philosophy provides no language to 
make sense of the experience of Jewish people throughout the history of Europe. From this 
perspective, Nietzsche’s rejection of the ethical content of tragedy ultimately undermines his 
attempt affirm life. 
While Nietzsche’s affirmation of the creative energies of life was attractive to many 
who felt the destructive power of life and the futility of human efforts, Rosenzweig saw that 
Nietzsche’s solution could only justify life to the spectator by occluding the inarticulate 
demands of the victims who suffer at the hands of an unjust ethical order. Rather than 
elevating the spectator above the endless striving of the will, thus allowing him to survey the                                                              
38 I have modified Galli’s translation of des vermißt sich die Philosophie from ‘philosophy has the audacity…’ to 
‘philosophy deceives itself’ in order to capture the crucial sense of vermißt sich, which implies self-deception. 
39 Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger, p. 149. 
40 While Rosenzweig provides an important corrective to Nietzsche’s aesthetic redemption, in what follows we 
give focus to his proposal only to the extent that it elucidates his critique of Nietzsche. 
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world with the rapacious ecstasy of the artesian god, Rosenzweig suggests that Greek tragedy 
gives a unique opening into a community’s understanding of the relation between the self and 
the ethical order. The attention the Greeks gave to the human as the ‘measure of all things’ 
gave a particular insight into the greatness and the weakness of the self (SR 65, 82). Every 
relational category or self-distinction (such as being a friend, family, nation etc.) is revealed 
as a moral presupposition in the heroic silence of the hero who appears in the locale that strips 
the immediacy of all ethical categories: 
 
in the phenomenon of the polis, without being limited by counter-forces, precisely there, too, 
the figure of the Self, freeing itself from all the rights of the genus, takes possession of its 
throne in a defiant isolation; it was certainly present, too, in the Sophists’ claims which made 
of the Self the measure of things, but above all, with all the face of visibility, in the great 
contemporaries of those theories, the heroes of Attic tragedy. (82) 
 
In Rosenzweig’s account, Greek tragedy reveals that the distinctive sign of the self, the sign 
of its greatness, is simultaneously ‘the mark of its weakness: it is silent. The tragic hero has 
only one language that is in perfect accordance with him: precisely, silence’ (85). Far from 
appraising Schopenhauer’s moral resignation, Rosenzweig argues that the hero loves life, and 
her act of defiance, as it is for Benjamin, is a personal claim to ethical justice. Thus tragic 
silence is far more than tragic pathos. Tragic pathos, the metaphysical comfort of tragic art, is 
not the sublime taming of the terrible for Rosenzweig, for such comfort only comes at the 
exclusion of linguistic expression. Rather, tragic silence utters an unrepresentable kind of 
value that is discovered by the spectator with their ears and eyes wide open. By suffering in 
silence the hero is not reconciled to a fate scripted by the gods. Rather, their silent suffering 
unveils the injustice of the gods, thereby transforming the relation of the spectators to the 
passing daemonic order and standing as a witness to a new age. 
Rosenzweig’s understanding of tragedy comes to a particular climax in his 
understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy as an epochal voice in world history. He argues that 
in the nineteenth century, the silence of the hero and Nietzsche’s silence on ethics converge, 
rendering Nietzsche himself a kind of modern tragic hero. By negating God though the silence 
of tragic spectatorship, ‘[b]oth the tragic hero and Nietzsche figure the emergence of meaning 
from absolute immanence as a speaking silence in which sacrificial embodiment reverses into 
spiteful self-destruction’ (82). Nietzsche provides no moral justification of the terrors of life, 
revealing the life-denying force underpinning Leibnizian theodicies, and yet he does not have 
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a moral contempt for life.41 Faced with a society that held a life-denying system of morality, 
Nietzsche saw that no moral assertion could justify the injustice of the world. In baring this 
injustice in moral silence he thus becomes our ‘metaethical self’, an image of our raw 
selfhood stripped of all ethical categories, issuing in a new kind of ethics in the abyss left after 
the failure of the moral worldview (82). Thus despite the fact that Nietzsche is incapable of 
guiding us into a new age, he cannot be ignored. He is the one ‘whom none who must 
philosophize can henceforth bypass’, meaning that his philosophy forms a passage through 
which any contemporary theory of tragedy must venture (15). 
Rosenzweig confronts Nietzsche’s conception of the freedom of aesthetics by 
grounding the artwork in the ethical life of the community in a way that mirrors Kant’s notion 
of the aesthetic idea. In Kant’s understanding of the singularity the artwork, every idea 
violates a previous mode of presentation and yet establishes new norm. Nietzsche’s refusal to 
recognise the singularity of art entails that he retains the metaphysical ideal of original 
concepts by his very attempt to argue that there are no such concepts, creating an inverse 
metaphysics in which conceptual life is idolatry and aesthetic flux reality. Thus to respond to 
philosophy’s failure to encompass the fluidity of life, Nietzsche, assuming that morality can 
only take the form of traditional philosophy, rejects morality. In Rosenzweig’s view, this 
rejection of morality fails to overcome the moral system it aims to subvert. It remains unable 
to call the theoretical paradigm of morality into question, meaning that it ultimately fails to 
depart from pre-critical metaphysics. Kant’s response to the tragedy of philosophy, on the 
other hand, entails a reassessment of the kind of value available in aesthetics, situating an 
immanent kind of value in the aesthetic sphere that, while it is not rational, is reasoned. For 
Rosenzweig, by rejecting Kant’s attention to the singularity of the artwork, Nietzsche’s 
metaphysics of art opens the abyss of aestheticism, for the reality underneath art is so central 
that neither the content of the art nor the artist has any significance. By re-separating 
aesthetics and ethics, it creates a new intellectual tragedy of its own. Rosenzweig concludes 
that Nietzsche’s philosophy cannot provide a way beyond Platonic metaphysics, for it merely 
inverts Plato’s mimetic account of art, holding the spectator as a mere image and reproducing 
the hierarchical dualism between appearance and reality wherein consciousness becomes the 
fiction from which art must liberate us.                                                              
41 Benjamin agrees with Rosenzweig’s assessment of Nietzsche as a tragic hero, arguing that Nietzsche remains 
ethically silent, attempting ‘to raise himself up amid the agitation of that painful world’ (GT 110). It seems that 
Rosenzweig’s account of Nietzsche enabled Benjamin to argue in GT that Nietzsche is ‘offered up as the first 
fruits of a new humanity’ (107). This new humanity, Benjamin argues, must search for a new ethical paradigm 
out of the ashes of the tragic hero who defied the previous system of ethics and was destroyed by it. 
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Ultimately, Rosenzweig shows that it is only by presuming that we are merely artistic 
images, soldiers painted on the canvas of a battlefield, that it is possible to conclude that 
existence can only be justified aesthetically. This presumption reveals exactly to whom 
existence is justified in Nietzsche’s account. It is not justified to the soldiers on the 
battlefields, for they are mere playthings of the true subject. Rather, it is to the ‘sole author 
and spectator of this comedy of art’ to whom the world is justified, for he creates it for the 
purposes of preparing ‘a perpetual entertainment for itself’ (BT 52). As a solution to suffering, 
humans are offered a transcendence of their humanity, a flight from individuality in order to 
fuse with the Primal One and participate in its self-justification. By focusing entirely on the 
reality behind the conflict, the structural conditions of the world presented on stage are left 
unchallenged, leaving Nietzsche unable to see tragedy as an implied critique of hubris, excess 
and stubborn fixity.42 
In Rosenzweig’s reading of Nietzsche we see that the self-justification of the Primal 
One does nothing to refute the wisdom of Silenus. While Han-Pile goes to great lengths to 
argue that Nietzsche ‘departs doubly’ from Silenus’ wisdom, Rosenzweig assists us to see that 
Nietzsche does not even try.43 All aesthetic justification can do is cover the consciousness of 
what it is like to be human in an illusion, a reverse illusion that renders conscious life as the 
problem. Nietzsche’s solution ends up being a simple value judgment, inverting the truth-
appearance hierarchy and rescuing the individual from the abyss of truth by maintaining the 
sphere of illusion as the place of the aesthetic justification of existence. Rosenzweig, on the 
other hand, wants nothing of illusions. Nietzsche’s aestheticism obscures historical actuality, 
the reality of human suffering, choosing aesthetic catharsis over what is real. The task of 
interpreting tragedy, for Rosenzweig, is to remove this illusion for the sake of historical 
actuality; for the sake of truth. 
This can only be done by refuting Nietzsche’s anti-subjectivist reading of art as the 
creation of an external author and recognising the creativity of the artist. When the dissonance 
within the human artist has created both the manifestations of the human world and man 
himself, philosophy collapses into nihilism and tragedy is dissolved into mere dreams of the 
chorus and the spectators. While this raises the release one might find in aesthetic feeling of 
the tragic effect over the ethical dimension of the drama itself, the fundamental elements of 
tragedy become mere representations of a greater reality. The hero, her suffering, the reversal 
and recognition, fate, guilt and mourning are all fleeting appearances that afford a feeling of                                                              
42 See Williams, Tragedy, Recognition and the Death of God, p. 156. 
43 Han-Pile, ‘Nietzsche’s Metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy’, p. 379. 
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elevation in the spectator. All philosophical reflection is at an end, because Nietzsche’s 
metaphysics of art could not refute the argument that BT is yet another illusion.44 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Nietzsche’s provocative description of the pleasure borne in art in BT provides a 
fundamental challenge to philosophy, suggesting that philosophical language, language that is 
conceptual and propositional, cannot grasp or do justice to the excess that is revealed in tragic 
art. His turn to Greek tragedy attempts to unveil a form of philosophy that is destroyed by 
Socratic philosophy, a form of philosophy that does not shrink from the monstrous realities of 
life but finds its origins in the undergirding forces of life that are primary to conceptual 
thought. It is only this form of philosophy, he argues, that can truly embrace life as a whole. 
 Yet Nietzsche’s commitment to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of art in BT entails that 
his solution to the pain of human suffering does not succeed in overcoming pessimism. While 
he criticises Schopenhauer’s subjectivism for holding a moral position that would judge the 
dissonant energies of music with repulsion, he reproduces Schopenhauer’s notion of the tragic 
sublime: that in the experience of tragic art we are confronted with the terrible heart of reality 
itself, an experience that hurls us from our entrapment in our individual self and carries us to 
the eternal will. We are left in a serene ecstasy before what formerly terrified us, no longer 
afraid but now participating in the creative and destructive activity of the ‘reckless and amoral 
artist-god who wants to experience, whether he is building or bullying, … his own joy and 
glory’ (BT 22). The suffering of the characters on stage – and the suffering of people in our 
                                                             
44 In the 1886 preface Nietzsche recognises the difficulty he faced in his original attempt to unveil the vacuity of 
language through language. Upon reflection he states that ‘[i]t should have been sung, this “new soul” – and not 
spoken!’ (BT 20). The limitations of BT to enact its own truth became apparent, significantly undermining the 
entire project of the text. Nietzsche had argued in the original edition that ‘[l]anguage, as the organ and symbol 
of appearance, can never and in no case disclose the deepest interiority of music’ (55). This is to say that what 
needs to be known in the work of art cannot be told but must be displayed and enacted. Thus from the outset of 
the book Nietzsche alerts us to the fact that something new is needed if the book is to live up to its observations – 
a move that radically distances him from Hegelian dialectics. See Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks, pp. 
195-198. 
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own world – cease to be ethically demanding.45 The perspective on Nietzsche’s theory of 
tragedy we gain from Rosenzweig reveals that while a purely aesthetic view of reality is 
appealing to the extent that it diagnoses the life-denying tendency of traditional patterns of 
thought, by attempting to aestheticise reality Nietzsche merely denies life in an alternative 
manner; life itself becomes the manifestation of an aesthetic struggle between Apollo and 
Dionysus. Yet while Rosenzweig assists us to see that Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification 
cannot redeem life, he also shows that it cannot be ignored. As I will suggest in the following 
chapter, Rosenzweig’s argument proves significant for Heidegger, who builds from 
Rosenzweig in order to argue that taking this world seriously requires philosophy to pass 
through Nietzsche’s critique of moral philosophy in the effort to outline a new understanding 
of value. 
 
                                                             
45 Ultimately, the difference between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer’s solution to suffering, as Young points out, 
is that Schopenhauer’s spectator makes a ‘double denial’. While Nietzsche’s Dionysian spectator identifies with 
the world-will and finds aesthetic solace, the Schopenhauerian spectator finds this stance ultimately repulsive. 
His spectator denies both the Apollinian and the Dionysian reality in favour of identifying with something 
beyond the will, something that refuses to be representable. Schopenhauer condemns the creator for failing to be 
constrained by moral ideals, while Nietzsche chooses only to judge the creator by aesthetic standards, calling the 
spectator to see that humans are merely the means to the artist-god’s production of a cosmic epic. For Young, his 
philosophy rejects what humanises us in order to embrace the creative activity of an amoral artist-god. See 
Young, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art, p. 54. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Heidegger: Poetising and Thinking 
 
 
Entering into being-there, its instant and its place: how does this occur in Greek 
tragedy?1 
 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that while Nietzsche’s interpretation of tragedy 
provided a powerful critique of the inherited moral system of nineteenth century Europe, it 
ultimately inverted the system it aimed to overcome. For Rosenzweig, Nietzsche’s silence on 
ethics can be understood as a tragic silence, the stubborn refusal of a tragic hero to utter words 
of self-justification to a moral order that is unable to acknowledge its own mortality. In this 
view, Nietzsche’s silence reveals that technalised philosophy is ultimately aimed at removing 
the possibility of its own death. Because philosophy must exclude death if it is to find eternal 
truth, Rosenzweig argues that philosophy must face the reality of death that is announced ‘in 
the victim’s [silent] cry that cannot be stifled’ (SR 11) if it is to prove capable of navigating 
the new problems of its time. 
While Heidegger never admitted a conceptual debt to Rosenzweig – indeed, he was 
overtly hostile to the so-called ‘Judaization’ of the university and went to great lengths to 
separate his own thinking from Jewish influences2 – Rosenzweig claims that the ‘new 
thinking’ he advanced in SR assisted Heidegger to make vital steps toward a new way of 
                                                             
1 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 34, in Reiner Schürmann, ‘Ultimate Double Binds’, in James Risser (ed.), 
Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s, New York: SUNY Press, 1993, pp. 243-268, p. 
243. 
2 See Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger, p. xxi. Scholars have been tentative to draw connections between 
Heidegger and Rosenzweig due to Heidegger’s controversial engagement with his Jewish colleagues. For 
example, see Karl Löwith, ‘M. Heidegger and F. Rosenzweig, or, Temporality and Eternity’, in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, no. 3, vol. 1, 1942, pp. 53-77. Löwith, who was himself forced to leave Germany 
because of his Jewish heritage, denies any real engagement between the two. Gordon, on the other hand, argues 
that we must be tentative to take Löwith’s view due to a desire to criticise Heidegger’s political involvement 
with National Socialism. Gordon’s work is part of an increasing body of literature aimed at elucidating the 
influence of Rosenzweig’s new thinking on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. See also Jules Simon, Art and 
Responsibility: A Phenomenology of the Diverging Paths of Rosenzweig and Heidegger, New York: Continuum, 
2011. 
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philosophy that is able to acknowledge its own finitude.3 Both Heidegger and Rosenzweig 
diagnosed metaphysics as a world-historical error, and both envisaged a response to this 
problem in the language of tragedy. However, in the years that followed Rosenzweig’s 
reflections on the proximity of his own work to that of Heidegger, each thinker pursued a 
radically different direction in response to this error: Rosenzweig left the academy to found 
the House of Jewish Learning (Jüdisches Lehrhaus) in order to focus on dialogue as the 
means of transformation, while Heidegger came to argue that philosophy must become 
politically instrumental if it is to confront the problems of its time. During this transition, 
Heidegger saw metaphysics as a ‘planetary movement’ of technology, arguing the error of 
metaphysical thinking extends into the twentieth century through the power of technology to 
determine all human knowing in the paradigm of techne.4 In his view, Kant’s proposal for the 
organic development of an enlarged way of thinking had failed to overcome the power of 
technalised thinking. A new way of thinking is only possible if it becomes a political task, 
Heidegger argues, effacing the separation of politics from philosophy. 
Recognising that Heidegger’s interpretation of tragedy is intimately connected with 
his attempt to render philosophy politically instrumental leads our study to his involvement 
with National Socialism. While much has been written on this topic, my approach in this 
chapter will be limited to considering Heidegger’s lectures on tragedy in light of the 
comments he made on his relation to National Socialism in a letter to Karl Jaspers in 1950.5 
The importance of these comments for the present study lies in the way that they capture 
Heidegger’s attempt to justify his actions according to his philosophy. Heidegger distances 
himself from the direction that National Socialism took after his brief time as the Rector of 
Freiburg University, stating that his lectures given between 1933 and 1942 constituted a 
‘confrontation’ with the party that was evident to ‘everyone who could hear clearly’.6 While                                                              
3 In an essay written in the final months of his life, Rosenzweig identified Heidegger as an advocate of his new 
thinking. See Franz Rosenzweig, ‘Transposed Fronts’, in Philosophical and Theological Writings, trans. P. 
Franks & M. Morgan, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 146-152. 
4 In his final interview with Der Spiegel, Heidegger states that what he had learned since giving his IM lectures 
in 1935 is that ‘the planetary movement of modern technology is a power whose history-determining magnitude 
can hardly be overestimated’. Martin Heidegger, ‘Only a God Can Save Us’ [1966], in Richard Wolin (ed.), The 
Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, USA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 91-116. 
5 See Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy, California: University of California Press, 1992; 
Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. A. Blunden, New York: Basic, 1993; Rüdiger Safranski, 
Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. E. Osers, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999; James 
Philips, Heidegger’s Volk: Between National Socialism and Poetry, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 
6 The lecture courses to which he refers are those given during the decade after his resignation from the rectorate 
of Freiburg University in 1934. See Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (eds.), The Heidegger-Jaspers 
Correspondence 1920-1963, trans. G. Aylesworth, New York: Humanity Books, 2003, p. 189. Heidegger makes 
a similar claim fifteen years later in the famous Der Spiegel interview. See Heidegger, ‘Only a God Can Save 
Us’, p. 101. 
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on first glance this defence seems ungrounded, for these lectures deal primarily with Greek 
tragedy, Hölderlin’s poetry, and Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics, Heidegger explains that 
his intent was to contest the National Socialist appropriations of Hölderlin and Nietzsche, to 
criticise Nazism’s understanding of its historical destiny, and to question the technical 
thinking that became central to the National Socialist movement.7 In other words, Heidegger 
claims that his confrontation with National Socialism consisted in reconsidering its basic 
sources in order to reveal that it had fallen prey to the planetary ‘abandonment of Being’ it 
ought, in his view, to counteract.8 
In this chapter I examine Heidegger’s interpretation of tragedy in two lecture series in 
which he undertakes the alleged ‘confrontation’ with National Socialism, namely Introduction 
to Metaphysics (IM) and Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’ (HH). Between the two courses, one 
given in 1935 and the other in 1942, Heidegger’s interpretation of tragedy changes along with 
his understanding of his task as a philosopher. Throughout this development, I suggest, he 
comes to see his own philosophical work as instructing the National Socialist movement 
according to philosophically defined ends. By examining Heidegger’s interpretation of 
tragedy in these courses in light of Jaspers’ own view of tragedy, I will argue that while 
Heidegger’s interpretation of tragedy begins to unveil the problem of technalised thinking, the 
alternative it provides is incapable of providing a ‘confronting’ with National Socialism as he 
later claims in his letter. By effacing the difference between philosophy and politics, 
Heidegger not only occludes the suffering of real people in history from the scope of tragic 
concern, but also becomes complicit with totalitarianism. I conclude this chapter by arguing 
that while Heidegger re-animates the problematic of tragedy as the search for a way of 
thinking capable of navigating the fluidity of collective life, his interpretation of tragedy is 
unable to recognise the dangers of identifying philosophy and politics. The challenge left by 
Heidegger’s work, I suggest, is to outline a way of thinking that neither assumes the 
traditional hegemony of the philosophical over the political nor collapses the two entirely. 
 
 
 
                                                             
7 Véronique Fóti, ‘Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Sophoclean Tragedy’, in James Risser (ed.), Heidegger Toward the 
Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s, New York, SUNY Press, 1993, pp. 163-186, p. 163. 
8 In his letter to Jaspers, Heidegger argues that with Nazi spies in his lectures and constant monitoring of his 
work he did everything possible to confront the regime, claiming that ‘no one dared to do what I did’. Biemel & 
Saner (eds), The Heidegger-Jaspers Correspondence 1920-1963, p. 189. 
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6.1 Overcoming aesthetics 
 
Before I turn to Heidegger’s lectures on tragedy, it is necessary to clarify his 
understanding of the ‘abandonment of Being’ and how tragedy might assist in Being’s 
retrieval. In Being and Time (B&T), his first major work published in 1927, Heidegger raises 
what he calls the ‘question of the meaning of Being’. This question, he states in the opening 
line of the book, ‘has today been forgotten’ (B&T 21), meaning that we are absorbed in the 
beings that constitute our everyday lives while remaining oblivious to the conditions through 
which they arise for us. Because traditional philosophy has overlooked the question by 
dismissing it either as ‘obvious’ or as ‘undefinable’ (22-23), the task is to ‘work out’ the 
meaning of Being through discerning the structure of experience.9 To conduct this working 
out, Heidegger separates the ‘meaning of Being’ from any specific beings, a separation he 
later calls the ‘ontological difference’. 
The significance of Heidegger’s notion of the question of the meaning of Being is that 
it identifies a strata of experience that is ontologically distinct from beings, for it precedes any 
notion of how and in what manner a particular being might exist. A question of this nature is 
pre-scientific, for it ‘determines beings as beings, that on the basis of which beings are already 
understood’ (25-26).10 Failing to ask the question of the meaning of Being means that we are 
limited to the possibilities ascribed to us within an inherited way of thinking, for we confuse 
the way that beings appear with Being itself. If we presume that a human being is a rational 
animal, for example, then we consider all irrational acts as somehow ‘unnatural’, requiring 
moral or medical correction. Actions that are deemed irrational appear as problems that 
require a solution. Such thinking, for Heidegger, is ‘technical’, for it legislates nature 
according to prescribed rules. 
One aspect of Heidegger’s question of Being that will become important for his 
interpretation of tragedy is that it interprets historical and political problems in terms of 
ontology. For Heidegger, the primary problems that we face in philosophy and in society are 
not the kind of problems that require solutions. Rather, they are the result of an ontological 
condition that requires our understanding of Being to be transformed. To search for a solution 
to the social problems that we face entirely in terms of new laws, policies, strategies and                                                              
9 Heidegger’s words echo Hölderlin’s reflections on Greek tragedy in his Essays and Letters, where Hölderlin 
argues that because the Greeks ‘forgot’ the original questions raised by the tragic poets, our task is the ‘reverse’: 
the task of remembering. However, Heidegger makes no reference to Greek tragedy in B&T. Friedrich Hölderlin, 
Essays and Letters on Theory, trans. T. Pfau, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988, p. 150. 
10 I have modified Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of Seiendes as ‘entities’ to ‘beings’ in order to clarify 
the distinction Heidegger makes between Being (Sein) and beings (Seindes). 
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technologies is to assume that all the pieces of the puzzle are available for the solution; all we 
require is the application of the correct technique. For Heidegger, this technical way of 
thinking occludes a more basic problem at hand. His ontological formulation of problems is 
important to note, for it will frame his ‘confrontation’ with political problems in his lectures: 
political problems are not problems that require a solution, but are expressions of an 
ontological condition that must be transformed though a reconsideration of Being, that is, 
though philosophy. In B&T, it is this framing of the problem that begins to efface the 
difference between politics and philosophy. 
Heidegger’s ontological understanding of philosophical and social problems takes on a 
historical dimension in the years following B&T. During the early 1930s, Heidegger moved 
away from an ahistorical, transcultural analysis of experience and began to emphasise the 
social and historical dimensions of Being’s forgetting. He identifies a technalised mode of 
thinking that is a result of the history of western metaphysics, a mode of thinking that limits 
what can appear according to a prescribed understanding of Being. Technalised thinking is 
not simply a subjective error made by individuals who are absorbed in beings, but a planetary, 
global movement that is unable to see the difference between Being and beings. In 
Heidegger’s historical framework, technology is the metaphysics of our times. It is not limited 
to the development and production of machines, he argues, but a way of framing the world as 
a whole. 
The problem that technological framing poses to philosophy is that it occludes the 
question of Being by requiring objects to conform to the requirement of mathematics. In 
Jacques Taminaux’s apt description, technological framing ‘offers nothing to thought other 
than the way of calculus, for which whatever is gets exhausted in its availability for all kinds 
of manipulations, forms of planning and renewed evaluations’.11 Heidegger links Plato’s 
mathematical understanding of creation, Aquinas’ notion of efficient causation, Descartes’ 
calculative reason, Newton’s causal understanding of nature and Kant’s theoretical reason 
with modern technology, arguing that these developments constitute a history of metaphysics 
that limits knowledge to what thought can produce. If the forgetting of Being is a planetary 
movement of technalised thinking, then the retrieval of Being (a philosophical task) must 
become a historical task that encompasses every domain of collective life (a political task). In 
the hope that the German nation might be the site of an ontological retrieval, Heidegger turns 
to politics – to National Socialism – as the medium of spiritual renewal.                                                               
11 Jacques Taminaux, ‘Heidegger on Values’, in James Risser (ed.), Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the 
Work of the 1930s, New York: SUNY Press, 1993, pp. 225-242, pp. 225-6. 
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At his inaugural address as the National Socialist rector of Freiburg University in 1933 
(RA), Heidegger outlines a procedure by which to confront the problem posed by technalised 
thinking. The technological framing of the world can only be overcome, he argues, if the 
German people ‘submit to the command of the beginning’, for only in this way can they avoid 
falling into ‘the settled comfort of a safe occupation’ (RA 474). This ‘beginning’, he states, is 
ushered in with Aeschylus’ poetic voice in Prometheus Bound and is extended in the 
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. While the issue of techne remained secondary in 
Heidegger’s early project in B&T, it comes to prominence in Heidegger’s work beginning 
with RA. In this address he characterises Germany’s ‘destinal mission’ in terms of techne, 
outlining techne as a form of creativity that allows the collective knowing of a people to 
unveil the ‘very historicality of truth’.12 Listening to the command of the first beginning 
entails that science must take up the task of Greek techne, ‘becom[ing] the fundamental 
happening of our spiritual being as part of a people’ (ibid.). Science, he explains, is not the 
study of timeless forms for the unlimited instrumental application of human knowledge onto 
the world, but the task of ‘questioning’, of ‘holding one’s ground’ in the chaos of the modern 
world by participating in the first questioning inaugurated by the Greeks. Science, Heidegger 
argues, is the ‘spiritual mission’ unique to the ‘German essence’ (477), meaning that the 
university must take a political role in the National Socialist movement. 
Despite the bold conviction of RA, Heidegger suddenly resigned from the rectorate in 
February 1934, and his attempt at a political career ended not even a year after accepting the 
position. While this was by no means a break with National Socialism, it seems that 
Heidegger became discontent with the party’s philosophical direction, perhaps even 
personally affronted, as John Caputo suggests, that ‘the party was inclined to pass up the 
opportunity to have the greatest German philosopher since Nietzsche as its spiritual 
leader’.13 The double-failure of his attempt to raise the question of the meaning of Being as a 
philosopher and his attempt to sway the direction of National Socialism as a politician seems 
to have affected the way he understood his role as a thinker. Radical questioning did not fit 
with the direction of the Nazi party, the Nuremburg rallies did not gather the German people 
around the question of Being but expressed a display of omnipotent power, and Alfred 
                                                             
12 Jacques Taminaux, Poetics, Speculation and Judgment: The Shadow of the Work of Art from Kant to 
Phenomenology, trans. M. Gendre, New York: SUNY Press, 1993, p. 160. 
13 John Caputo, ‘Heidegger’s Revolution: An Introduction to the Introduction to Metaphysics’, in James Risser 
(ed.), Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s, New York: SUNY Press, 1993, pp, 53-74, p. 
53. 
 171 
Baeumler’s interpretation of Nietzsche reinforced the legitimacy of Nazi politics rather than 
exposing the groundlessness of metaphysics. 
Heidegger’s disenchantment led him to enlist the help of Nietzsche and Hölderlin in 
order to confront the global movement of technalised thinking of which National Socialism 
had become a part. By making this move, Heidegger rejects Plato and Aristotle as 
protagonists of the first beginning, arguing that they devise a conception of techne that 
identifies the eternal character of the eidos, narrowing the conception of our relationship to 
nature that makes way for the instrumental application of human knowledge on the world, 
thus beginning the historical forgetting of the difference between Being and beings. In this 
historical trajectory, aesthetics is not a modern development but belongs to the history of 
metaphysics. It concerns the political art of correctness, of controlling what can and cannot 
appear and invariably discerning what is right and wrong, what is beautiful and ugly. In 
Heidegger’s view, it can only be overcome by an alternative, ontological understanding of 
politics; that is, by a new way of thinking. 
In the years following his resignation from the rectorate, Heidegger attempted to 
identify a way of thinking that could overcome the technalised thinking of western 
metaphysics by an engagement with art, and with tragedy in particular. Tragedy, for 
Heidegger, is characterised by the ability to allow the differential character of human life to 
appear, revealing the world in such a way that resists totalisation. In the context of this thesis, 
we can see that Heidegger both develops and transforms the ongoing problematic of tragedy. 
He builds on the notion of tragedy as a poetic kind of thinking that gives an alternative to the 
determination of knowledge as techne, and yet he removes Aristotle’s formal understanding 
of the tragic genre by suggesting that tragedy does not present the content of ethical life in a 
new form, but that it brings forth the differential character of Being. For Heidegger, in the 
time when tragic theatre soared to the summit of Greek cultural life, poets, philosophers and 
statesman undertook a radical questioning of Being. In their work we are confronted with a 
political realm that is not the domain of rationality, of right and wrong, of policy and practice 
– that is, of actualities in general – but a primordial realm of possibilities around which the 
poet gathers a people through a shared attention to Being. In his lectures given in the years 
after his resignation from the rectorate, Heidegger argues that the separation of philosophy 
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and politics is an expression of the technalised thinking of the modern era.14 His solution, I 
will suggest, is to reenergise the radical questioning we find in the ancient Greeks. In the 
following sections I turn to two lecture series Heidegger gave during this period in order to 
find if his proposal can be said to constitute a ‘confrontation’ with National Socialism. 
 
6.2 Introduction to Metaphysics 
 
 Having identified the key points to Heidegger’s understanding of the abandonment of 
Being and his development toward a historical understanding of this abandonment, I now turn 
to his interpretation of tragedy in IM. In this lecture series, Heidegger turns to Greek tragedy 
in order to outline a philosophical procedure aimed at assisting the state to overcome the 
metaphysical project of aesthetics. He argues that if aesthetics is the working of metaphysics 
in regards to beauty and art, then the overcoming of metaphysics involves locating moments 
in history where thinking about art exceeds aesthetics and throws us, as spectators in the 
present, into the original experience of artistic truth. The form of art that is up to this task, he 
suggests, is tragedy. 
 From the outset of IM, Heidegger fashions his project as a search for the origin of 
thinking that predates Plato and Aristotle’s separation of techne from poiesis. Plato and 
Aristotle are deemed inadequate to the project of overcoming metaphysics, for by separating 
techne from poiesis they construct a notion of techne that removes the bringing-forth of 
poiesis, framing the natural strata as an amalgamation of raw materials waiting for technical 
transformation.15 For Heidegger, the damage of this separation comes to a climax in Kant’s 
technical understanding of judgment in CPR, wherein reason is ‘occupied with nothing but 
itself’; it ‘commands’ and ‘legislates’ nature, ‘framing for itself with perfect spontaneity an 
order of its own according to ideas, to which it adapts the empirical conditions’ (CPR                                                              
14 Heidegger’s understanding of history is essentially Hegelian. In the Epilogue to OWA he situates his work in 
relation to Hegel’s claim that ‘[a]rt no longer counts for us as the highest manner in which truth obtains existence 
for itself’ (OWA 78). For Heidegger, Hegel assists us to see that the social world is composed of a diverse range 
of interrelated activities: political, economic, moral, religious, scientific etc. At different historical moments the 
forms of activity that take the position of normative and cognitive authority push others to the periphery, which, 
in terms of their historicity, effects a change in their meaning. When a form of activity is pushed to the periphery 
it involves a change in the essence of that activity. In this sense Heidegger accepts Hegel’s ‘end of art’ thesis; the 
notion that in modernity art has been dislodged from the authoritative position it held in the Greek world to be 
replaced by other normative and cognitive meaning-giving activities. Yet rather than reading this as a historical 
progression, Heidegger suggests that the current activity that governs our thinking, namely technology, occludes 
the insights that could be found when art held a position of authority in forming the ethical life of a community.  
15 This is what Heidegger calls Ge-stell, ‘framing’, in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’. See Heidegger, 
‘The Question Concerning Technology, in Basic Writings, ed. D. Krell, London: Routledge, 1978, pp. 283-318, 
p. 285. 
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A680/B708, A548/B576). The distinction between what is given and what is constituted is 
rendered absolute, meaning that only what is constituted can be known. 
Yet building from Nietzsche’s reading of Kant as the thinker whose monstrous 
courage enabled him to unveil the subjective interest concealed within logic, Heidegger 
suggests that by making the distinction between what is constituted and what is given 
absolute, Kant drew the tragedy of philosophy into a climatic entanglement. By allowing the 
tragedy of philosophy to emerge in his own work, Kant uncovered a reflective kind of 
judgment in CJ, a way of thinking that isolates the intuitive content of perception, thus 
opening a kind of knowledge that does not involve constitution. This shift in philosophy’s 
approach is so radical, for Heidegger, that despite the fact that Kant kept this intuitive kind of 
knowledge subordinate to determinate content, his response to the tragedy of philosophy 
serves as a lasting example despite Heidegger’s aim to move beyond the determinant content 
Kant seems to maintain. We might say that while Heidegger reacts to what he sees as Kant’s 
failure to fully understand the tragedy of philosophy – as did Nietzsche – he accepts that Kant 
sets forth a particular problematic to which he directly responds. In order to build from Kant’s 
example of allowing the dissonant appearance of nature to arise as a matter of philosophical 
concern, Heidegger seeks to prioritise the intuitive dimension of Kant’s insight, turning to the 
work of thinkers who precede the initial error of separating techne and poiesis – that is, who 
precede Plato’s metaphysics – in order to find a display of the power of techne to form a 
historical people. For Heidegger, the primordial understanding of techne found in pre-Platonic 
thinkers indicates that, if the original relation to Being is to be uncovered, the direction of 
German politics lies not in its politicians but in its poets. Yet Heidegger realises that there is a 
gap between the poet and the politician, for the poet can only present a new historical 
configuration that requires a revolution to become a lived reality. The task of drawing the 
work of the poets to the attention of the politicians, he identifies, lies with the thinker. 
 Heidegger begins his self-appointed role of the thinker by placing metaphysics in 
historical context, stating that Europe ‘lies in the pincers between Russia and America, which 
are metaphysically the same in regard to their world-character and relation to the spirit’ (47-
48). They are metaphysically the same, Heidegger argues, for both show ‘the same hopeless 
frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless organization of the average man’. Rather 
than ‘listening to spirit’, they relate to spirit via a ‘technological assault’ (52). In order ‘to 
recapture, to repeat’ a time in which technology did not hinder the task of listening to spirit, 
Heidegger proposes a violent response. 
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Before we consider Heidegger’s proposal for a violent response, it is necessary to 
identify what he means by ‘listening to spirit’ and how violence might assist this task. Firstly, 
Heidegger explains what listening to spirit does not look like through criticising Nietzsche as 
the ‘last metaphysician’, departing sharply from Baeumler’s depiction of Nietzsche as a proto-
National Socialist. In similar terms to Rosenzweig, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche 
announced the death of the ‘highest concepts’, revealing them to be ‘the final wisp of 
evaporating reality’ through arguing that ‘nothing up to now has been more naively 
persuasive than the error of Being …’ (TI 80, IM 38). However, while Nietzsche criticised the 
vacuity of Being, Heidegger is attentive to his failure to search for a more primary meaning of 
Being, recognising that he simply rejects it all together. Thus, Heidegger argues, Nietzsche 
remains locked in the paradigm of traditional philosophy he aims to overcome. Echoing 
Rosenzweig, he states that Nietzsche becomes ‘the unrecognised witness to a new necessity’ 
(39). To reconsider that to which Nietzsche witnesses, that is, the history of metaphysics, 
Heidegger argues that it is necessary to reject the ‘hero worship’ of the ‘clumsy and trifling 
importunities of the horde of scribblers that is becoming ever more numerous around him 
today’. Opposed to this horde, the question we must begin with is ‘[h]ow does it stand with 
Being?’ (41), or, as he states elsewhere, ‘[w]hat is the meaning of Being?’ (44). This question 
does not involve the analytic Heidegger undertook in B&T, but a historical task whereby we 
‘repeat and retrieve the inception of our historical-spiritual’ being so that it might be 
‘transformed’ (41). This being established, Heidegger concludes that listening to spirit entails 
‘an originally attuned, knowing resolution to the essence of Being’ (52). 
 Once Heidegger has identified listening to spirit as the knowing resolution to Being, 
he outlines a procedure for how this spiritual-historical relation might be retrieved. He begins 
this task by searching for an alternate account of techne to the western tradition in 
Parmenides’ third fragment, which reads to gar auto noein estin te kai einai.16 The 
technalised thinking of western metaphysics, he notes, renders this fragment as ‘because 
thinking and being are the same’, conjoining the knowledge of the thinker with Being itself. 
This picture of thinking renders the world as ready made for thought to intuit its structure 
(154), entailing that thinking is a faculty of the human being who is already defined as a 
rational animal (189). In contrast to this assumption, Heidegger posits what he believes to be a 
more accurate translation of Parmenides: that ‘belonging-together reciprocally are 
apprehension and Being’ (155). In this rendering, Parmenides does not posit the unity of                                                              
16 Parmenides, Fragments: A text and translation, trans. D. Gallop, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, 
p. 56. 
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Being and thinking but uncovers the mutual relationship between thought and Being, where 
Being is a ‘happening’, a temporal event in which humanity itself happens (6). For Heidegger, 
Parmenides’ understanding of techne is a poetic mode of thought that ‘brings forth what is 
present out of unconcealment’. 
This rendering of Parmenides’ third fragment, Heidegger argues, transforms the way 
we think about nature. Our modern, technical framing of the world begins with the translation 
of phusis as ‘nature’, which derives from the Latin natura (‘to be born’, ‘birth’) (14). 
Heidegger argues that the Latin translation ‘thrusts aside’ the originary content of the word, 
becoming definitive for the philosophy of the Christian Middle Ages. It posits nature as the 
determining ground of beings, ascribing a sufficient reason for every appearance on the model 
of Aristotle’s efficient causation. Nature becomes the stable essence of beings, meaning that 
poiesis must be understood in terms of mimesis, imitation.17 For Heidegger, by subordinating 
poiesis to phusis, Medieval philosophy removed the concealing/disclosing event from the 
‘nature’ of beings, thus constructing a metaphysics of presence that structures the very 
process of thought according to set rules before it even begins. 
 Yet, following Hegel, Heidegger also recognises ‘an echo of knowledge about the 
originary meaning’ of nature in Aristotle’s work (17). Aristotle’s concept of final causation 
grants an artistic dimension to phusis as that which ‘emerges from itself (for example, the 
emergence, the blossoming, of a rose)’ (15). In the paradigm of final causation, phusis is ‘the 
unfolding that opens itself up, the coming-into-appearance in such unfolding’. It is 
experienced everywhere, in the rising of the sun, the surging of the sea, in the growth of 
plants and in the coming forth of human beings from the womb. Yet phusis, Heidegger 
informs us, ‘is not synonymous with these processes, which we still today count as part of 
“nature”’. In other words, phusis does not name one process among others that we observe in 
beings. Rather, ‘[p]husis is Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain 
observable’ (ibid.). 
 Heidegger’s aim is to reverse the priority in experience, suggesting that it was not by a 
natural process that the Greeks first experienced what phusis is, but it was by phusis that they 
experienced natural processes. In this framework, it was on the basis of an experience of 
                                                             
17 Heidegger attack on Aristotle’s determinative understanding of phusis is the subject of much criticism. For a 
critical analysis of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of phusis, see Alexander Di Pippo, ‘The 
Concept of Poiesis in Heidegger's An Introduction to Metaphysics’, in Thinking Fundamentals, IWM Junior 
Visiting Fellows Conferences, Vol. 9: Vienna 2000. Alternatively, in Heidegger and Aristotle, Walter Borgan 
defends Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, commending the phenomenological reading of Aristotle’s concept of 
nature. Walter Borgan, Heidegger and Aristotle, New York: SUNY Press, 2005. 
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Being in poetry and thought that ‘what they had to call phusis disclosed itself to them’ (16).18 
It is evident that Heidegger’s notion of phusis confronts Kant’s CPR conception of nature that 
is known technically and yet builds from Kant’s enlarged conception of nature in CJ. Like 
Kant, Heidegger came to recognise that to question the creativity of thought is to question the 
technical legislation of nature. If nature appears to us as art, then the desire of technical 
thinking (determinative judgment) to frame the world according to predetermined rules 
remains oblivious to the primordial self-appearance of beings. For Heidegger, as for the Kant 
of CJ, human existence is the unavoidable starting point for any attempt to think about nature, 
displacing phusis from the tradition of western thought that has understood nature as a 
determining ground and replacing it with a dynamic sense of happening and unconcealing. 
Under the temporal conditions of techne, phusis is uncovered through poetic engagement with 
the world.19 
 To allow his primordial meaning of phusis to appear, Heidegger searches for a 
connection between thinking (noein) and poetry (poiesis) that is pre-Platonic. In his view, this 
connection stands prior to Kant’s theoretical conception of nature and can be found in 
tragedy, and in Sophocles’ famous choral ode in Antigone in particular. In the choral ode, the 
chorus sing of a world dominated by technical knowledge and its terrible consequences. In a 
word that opens the ambiguity of human creativity, the chorus describe human beings 
(anthropos) as deinos  (awe-inspiring, wondrous, terrifying). Heidegger translates deinos 
according to Hölderlin’s Unheimlich: 
 
Manifold is the uncanny (deinos), yet nothing 
uncannier than man bestirs itself, rising up beyond him. (IM 156-158) 
  
What is important to note in Sophocles’ poetising of anthropos, for Heidegger, is that he does 
not describe the human being in the terms of the established references of his time: the gods, 
social status, Homer’s poetry etc. Neither are his words intelligible according to the                                                              
18 As Mark Sinclair notes, Heidegger draws our attention to the connection between phusis and phaos (light): ‘as 
light, phusis is presence, the event of presence which allows each and every being to show itself in its own 
particular shape and figure’. Mark Sinclair, Heidegger, Aristotle and the Work of Art: Poiesis in Being, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 145. 
19 Heidegger argues that Aristotle established one of the basic misunderstandings of nature in western philosophy 
by contrasting phusis with art. In the western tradition nature is not just one of two equal terms (nature and 
freedom, nature and spirit nature and law etc.) but ‘holds the position of priority’. In this view, freedom, spirit, 
law and all potentialities of human being that are held to be ‘non-natural’ are, in fact, determined by nature, 
finding their existence in relation to a ground that defines their parameters. Alternatively, Heidegger attempts to 
locate a notion of phusis that does not determine the beingness (ousia) of beings, but that provides a space for 
beings to emerge. Martin Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and Concept of Phusis in Aristotle’s Physics’, translated 
by Thomas Sheehan in Pathmarks ed. William McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 228-
229, p. 241. 
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established references of our own time: Aristotle’s rational animal, the reversal/recognition 
structure of Poetics, Descartes’ thinking thing or Kant’s unity of apperception. Rather, 
Heidegger suggests that the power of tragedy, and the choral ode in particular, lies in its 
ability to transport us to an understanding of human beings that precedes western ontology. In 
Heidegger’s view, despite recognising the philosophical importance of the problematic of 
tragedy, both Hegel and Nietzsche remained locked within the metaphysical system they 
aimed to overcome. Thus they stand as witnesses to a new necessity. For Heidegger, it is only 
by attending to pre-Socratic ontology – the pre-Socratic notion of techne as bringing-forth – 
that metaphysics can be truly overcome. 
Heidegger aims to draw out this transportation by exploring the word deinon. To do so 
he interprets the ode as an exploration of three different spheres in which the nature of the 
deinos is displayed: the conquering of inanimate nature, the domestication of animals and the 
ordering of cities. In the inanimate world, anthropos ‘wears away’ (apotruetai) three 
characteristics of the earth: the eldest (hupertatan), the immortal (aphthitos) and the 
unwearied (akamatos).20 They destroy both age and place (hupertatan) in order to create 
something new; they disrupt the resistance of the earth to decay (aphthitos), beginning the 
degeneration of the earth; they upset the rest of the earth (akamatos) by constantly working it. 
Secondly, the chorus depict anthropos as the conqueror (kratei) of animals, mastering the art 
of capturing animals and harnessing them for human service. And finally, anthropos teaches 
itself speech and has the temperament to build and rule cities. This is not some natural skill, 
but is necessitated by anthropos’ vulnerability to the frost of winter and the lashing of rain. 
Anthropos does not realise its nature through creating cities, as Aristotle states, but simply 
delays its death. 
The significance of the three ‘scenes of disclosure’ is that each presents the 
‘overpowering’, that is, something in nature that resists determination by techne. Importantly, 
Heidegger does not view the constitution of boats, spears and cities as acts of human 
creativity, but as things that were formed in order to commune with nature. This is somewhat 
strange, for Heidegger also sees these products of techne in their initial articulation as 
violence against nature.21 Violence and communing are not contradictory in Heidegger’s 
account of techne, and to this extent he no longer translates techne simply as ‘knowing’ as he 
did in RA (472), but as ‘transgressive knowledge’ (IM 170), emphasising techne’s violent                                                              
20 David Tabachnick, ‘Techne, Technology and Tragedy’, in Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, 
vol. 7, no. 3, 2004. 
21 ibid., p. 95. 
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quality. Heidegger’s poet is akin to Kant’s genius, for he not only has an intimate communion 
with nature, but is ‘the one who is violence-doing, the creative one, who sets out into the un-
said, who breaks into the unthought, who compels what has never happened, and makes 
appear what is unseen’ (172).22 While I will suggest that in Heidegger’s ‘Ister’ lectures the 
genius is Sophocles, and hence Hölderlin, here it seems to be Nietzsche who’s silence on 
morality renders him a witness to a new age. It is important to note that the genius, for 
Heidegger, does not create new form, but brings forth what is unseen, namely Being itself. 
Authentic human knowing, in his view, looks out beyond that which is directly present-at-
hand in order to set Being into work as something that is in such and such a way (174). What 
he means seems to be that the violence of techne, such as in the building of a boat, is 
countered by the return of the movement of nature, for the products of techne become swept 
away by the elements they attempted to harness. They are ‘scenes of disclosure’ because, 
through their destruction, human beings come to recognise the temporality of things and begin 
to question the truth of Being.23 
The disclosive nature of techne becomes evident when we consider Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the ode in relation to Hölderlin’s understanding of tragedy. Hölderlin 
identifies the power of tragedy in its ability to present humans as a paradox: as that through 
which nature appears and as nature’s servant. He states that 
 
[t]he significance of tragedies can be understood most easily by way of paradox. Since all 
potential is divided justly and equally, everything that is original appears not in its original 
strength, but rather, properly, in its weakness. … Properly speaking, the original can only 
appear in its weakness; but insofar as the sign in itself is posited as insignificant = 0, the 
original, the hidden ground of every nature, can also present itself. If nature properly presents 
itself in its weakest talent, then, when it shows itself in its strongest talent, the sign =0.24 
 
Only when we allow the nothingness of human beings to appear is this paradox drawn into the 
open. In the tragic hero’s demise, when the sign = 0, nature is shown to be the conqueror. 
Tragedy is a sacrifice that humans make to nature in order to allow it to come into 
appearance. In other words, human beings are essentially tragic because they can only serve 
nature in death, which brings them finally to significance. Through sacrifice humans show 
nature to = 0; that nature does not provide a principle of sufficient reason to justify the 
necessity of events, thus finally rendering themselves free from necessity.                                                              
22 In CJ, Kant describes the genius as follows: ‘Genius can only provide rich material for products of art; its 
elaboration and form require a talent that has been academically trained, in order to make a use of it that can 
stand up to the power of judgment’ (5:310). 
23 Tabachnick, ‘Techne, Technology and Tragedy’, p. 96. 
24 Hölderlin, Essays and Letters on Theory, p. 89. 
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For both Hölderlin and Heidegger, the conception of techne expressed in the choral 
ode is far from Aristotle’s understanding of techne as a uniquely human virtue whereby the 
agent produces something according to a rule.25 Rather, the choral ode depicts techne as a 
form of knowledge that is not necessarily under human control. It can produce either bad or 
good, destruction or greatness. It is associated with escape, and yet while anthropos can 
escape from most of nature – even at the expense of becoming apolis, without a city, or 
aporos, losing his way – he cannot escape his own death. In death anthropos encounters the 
limits of his skilfulness. Thus the better humanity becomes at conquering the land through 
agriculture, at domesticating animals for the production of food, and at governing cities, the 
more it will come to think that techne might be able to totally control the tumult of nature. By 
escaping the natural elements and banishing death from our midst, the more the tragic 
movement of the appearance of nature vanishes. 
The significance of Heidegger’s emphasis on this primordial disclosure of the human 
being in Sophocles’ Antigone is that his account of philosophy’s encounter with tragedy does 
not involve a procedure that attempts to navigate the tragic movement of techne. Rather, 
philosophy’s response to this disclosure of human being in the experience of tragedy is to 
accelerate its arrival. For Heidegger, the present times do not constitute what Nietzsche 
called a ‘tragic culture’, and this is precisely the problem. If the finitude of beings only comes 
to light when nature pushes back against human techne, then the solution is to engage in 
creative, violent techne in such a way as to draw the uncanny nature of human being into 
appearance. 
In this sense Oedipus is the paradigmatic tragic hero, representing the movement of 
poros that is basic to human being-there. His relentless search for truth – his ‘one eye too 
many’ (112) – means that he cannot be at home. However, his passion for truth is ‘the 
fundamental condition for all great questioning and knowing’ (ibid.). Thus Oedipus’s flaw is 
not moral in nature but comes from his insatiable desire for conceptual knowledge. He seeks 
total power through total knowing, thus anticipating the destiny of the west: the new ‘sight’ he 
gains in blindness is the sight afforded when the blindness of metaphysics is exposed.26 Like 
Oedipus, human beings use violence against the overpowering by attempting to understand 
and domesticate the world, meaning that it is precisely the search for total understanding leads                                                              
25 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1050a. 
26 Heidegger describes the movement of Oedipus as follows: ‘Step by step he must put himself into 
unconcealment, which in the end he can only endure by putting out his own eyes, i.e. by removing himself from 
all light, and letting the protective cloak of night fall around him, and, by crying out, as a blind man, for all the 
doors to be opened so that such a one could be manifest to the people as that which he is’ (IM 107). 
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to their discovery of the truth. The task is not so much to learn from Oedipus’ error as it is to 
give audition to spirit in the tragedy of contemporary knowledge. 
The significance of ‘great art’ (schönen Kunst) such as Sophocles’ Oedipus, for 
Heidegger, is that it draws the original essence of techne – the essence that has been occluded 
by technological framing – into appearance. IM is the only place in which Heidegger refers to 
‘great art’, suggesting not simply that he feels a close proximity to Kant’s CJ but that he 
thinks that CJ brings the original essence of techne into appearance. Because the poet 
articulates the unsaid, his words are unintelligible to the people. Thus the task of the 
philosopher is to make use of the material given by the genius, communicating to the people 
that which looks like ‘the charlatan’, the poet who operates outside all frames of reference, is 
really the herald of a new era (CJ 5:310). Just as Kant recognised in a different way before 
him, Heidegger argues that technical thinking occludes the truth of art, meaning that it takes 
an enlarged awareness to listen to spirit. 
Heidegger no longer considers his own task as a political confrontation, as he did in 
RA, but identifies his calling as being the central link in a threefold chain. In his lectures on 
Hölderlin’s Germanian (1934-5) given in the same year as IM, Heidegger argues that while 
‘the truth of the existence of a people, is originally founded by the poet,’ it must be ‘grasped 
and ordered, and so first opened up as being by the thinker’.27 Yet to become the ‘definite 
historical truth’ so that the hearers might become a ‘people’ we require a further link, ‘the 
creation of the state by ... the state-creator’.28 The poet ruptures the established field of 
meaning, the philosopher carefully explains the profundity of the work, and the politician 
institutes the new epoch. Heidegger’s goal is no longer to organise the self-assertion of a 
nation against a configuration of political meaning, but to transform the ‘problem of politics’ 
into a task of unveiling the origin of the political as such: a philosophical task of techne, of 
transgressive knowing.29 Setting the work of the poet as the origin of political change is, in 
one sense, a radically anti-Platonic move, not only returning the poet from exile but also 
placing him at the centre of the polis in the role of the philosopher-king.30 Yet in another 
sense it replicates Plato’s logic, for Heidegger effectively argues that in a phenomenal (tragic) 
                                                             
27 Hiedegger, ‘Lectures on Hölderlin’s Germanian’, in Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy, p. 209. 
28 ibid. 
29 Jules Simon argues that Heidegger’s introduction of the threefold means that his ‘turn’ is not simply a ‘turn to’ 
art and aesthetics, but, following his resignation from the position of Rector, a ‘turn from’ political engagement. 
The aim of Heidegger’s new task of thinking, according to Simon, is ‘the setting into motion of an aesthetic 
process of political change made possible by the gift of the poet, Hölderlin, translated by the philosopher, 
Heidegger, and which could be taught to the politician, Hitler’. Simon, Art and Responsibility, p. 14-15. 
30 Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy, p. 209. 
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world Plato’s philosopher-king must be a poet – just not an ‘unknowing’ poet who, like Ion, is 
not attuned to the essence of Being but merely replicates the great art of times past in order to 
impress an audience. By identifying the poet as the founder of the state, Heidegger displaces 
the hegemony of philosophy over politics with the hegemony of aesthetics over politics. This 
move frames the polis not in terms of praxis, that is, action aimed toward the good of the 
polis, but in terms of poetry, of poiesis. Poiesis is not a form of activity but of production; it is 
concerned with the bringing-forth of Being into appearance. Thus Heidegger aims to complete 
the aestheticisation of politics, collapsing the political order that, for Plato, must be governed 
by the philosophic, and the aesthetic sphere, which is free from the philosophic, into one and 
the same order. The only form of politics authentic to such an order lies in the transformative 
leadership of the state-creator at the instruction of the poet.31 
Heidegger’s aesthetic understanding of political change is evident in his understanding 
of the polis. In his view, it is not action as such but ‘great art’ that opens a space that is the 
condition of the possibility of objects coming into the open, a ‘site’ that is expressed in the 
Greek word polis. Thus the polis is not the site of political action, but a work that opens our 
attention to the movement of history. In relation to Kant’s notion of great art, the movement 
of history, for Heidegger, is achieved by works: 
 
Unconcealment happens only in so far as it is brought about by the work: the work of the word 
as poetry, the work of stone in temple and statue, the work of polis as the site of history that 
grounds and preserves all this. (IM 204)32 
 
The activity proper to the polis is not praxis, the mode of activity that Aristotle describes as 
that which directs itself to the life of the polis according to phronesis.33 Rather, it is poiesis, 
bringing-forth through the creation of works. The work does not orient the people to practical 
activity with the ground of mutual communicability, as it does for Kant, but to a shared 
attention to Being. Heidegger’s notion of poiesis connotes an epistemological access to a pre-
given meaning rather than something that is a communicative action. The original moment of 
language, the opening of the temple and the creation of the polis are poetic ‘works’ that 
schematise an outlook for humans to understand themselves and the world: language                                                              
31 Heidegger’s aestheticisation of the political sphere in RA and IM opens the way for Carl Schmitt’s political 
theory, which views the form of action appropriate to the political as the decision. For Heidegger, the task of the 
leader is to bring a new constellation of beings into existence though decisive action. While Schmitt views the 
decision as a political act, for Heidegger it is aesthetic, for it does not bring new form into being, as it does for 
Schmitt, but allows the violence of techne to come into appearance. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the 
Political, trans. G. Schwab, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
32 Here Heidegger seems to be attempting to complete his proposal in §74 of B&T (435-436) to realise the 
destiny of the people (Volk) though realising their ‘impotence’ and taking a stance of resolute ‘passivity’. 
33 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a. 
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schematises thought; the temple is a schema of transcendence; the polis is a schema of 
appearance. Techne, he states, is ‘the setting-into-work of Being, a setting-into-work which is 
itself knowing. This is History’ (IM 130). Heidegger’s notion of history departs from Kant’s 
art history in which aesthetic ideas appear as works of communicative action, for it is simply 
the recognition of an existing meaning. 
Thus the power of tragedy, in Heidegger’s view, lies in the fact that if we listen to the 
movement of spirit depicted therein, such as in Sophocles’ choral ode, we find ourselves cast 
out of the familiar and thrown into the radical questioning of everything that appears in the 
polis. In this understanding of the audition of spirit, the ‘authentic task’ bequeathed to us by 
tragedy does not lie in a philosophically defined procedure that might help us to navigate the 
tragic movement of Being. Rather, as Heidegger states in the concluding lines of IM, it lies in  
 
what we do not know; and insofar as we know this genuinely – namely, as a given task – we 
always know it only in questioning. Being able to question means being able to wait, even for 
a lifetime. … what is essential is … the right endurance. (IM 221) 
 
Poetic knowing involves the knowledge of the failure of technalised thinking, and is 
expressed in questioning, in waiting. This knowing is nothing like Kant’s transgressive art 
that brings a new idea of mutual communication into the heart of a community, for it simply 
anticipates the appearance of a pre-given meaning. 
Heidegger’s proposal of waiting and questioning as an authentic response to the 
counterturning essence of the deinon leads to the question of whether this can be seen as a 
confrontation with National Socialism. For Jaspers, I will suggest, Heidegger’s aesthetic 
understanding of the polis wilfully collapses the distinction between politics and philosophy, 
thus rendering the task of action and interpersonal communication as a secondary matter of 
political concern. In such a context, no confrontation is possible, for the call to audition the 
essence of being is the only ‘political’ response. For Heidegger, however, the final lines of the 
choral ode elucidate the fitting response to tragedy: the praise of the one who ‘weaves in the 
laws of the land, and the justice of the gods that binds his oaths together he and his city rise 
high — but the city casts out that man who weds himself to inhumanity thanks to reckless 
daring’. This line, in Heidegger’s view, articulates the choice that faces the destiny of a 
people: will they, like the chorus, attempt to banish the reckless, daring state-creator from 
their midst, or will they allow the daring one to be their own? The one who weaves together 
the justice of the gods and the city, the one who practices phroneo, is, for Heidegger, the one 
who is un-attuned to the hearth of being, and thus attempts to banish the state-creator from 
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their midst. A city in which such a man is valued is destined to be lost in beings and unable to 
allow the uncanny essence of human being to come into appearance. 
Before we come to our discussion of Heidegger’s lectures on Hölderlin, it is important 
to note that Heidegger’s reading of the choral ode has two characteristics that will prove 
significant to Jasper’s critique. Firstly, it does not read the drama as a whole. This is a strange 
limitation, for the chorus is clearly condemning the trajectory of technical knowledge on 
which Creon had already embarked by making the unshakable law to execute anyone who 
might attempt to honour the gods by burying Polyneices. In the attempt to read Antigone 
without the aid of Aristotle’ recognition-reversal account of tragedy, Heidegger reads the 
drama as an appraisal of the one who ‘weds himself to inhumanity thanks to reckless daring’, 
which, given the setting in which Heidegger wrote the IM, can be read as nothing less than an 
appraisal of Hitler. From an Aristotelian point of view, there is nothing ‘tragic’ about this 
view of tragedy, for tragedy is seen as something undesirable: an unfortunate play of forces 
beyond one’s control or a self-induced fate based on one’s naivety. Secondly, Heidegger’s 
reading of the choral ode does not attempt to learn from the failure of technalised knowledge. 
By identifying the ability of tragedy to bring the essence of the deinos into appearance, 
Heidegger identifies tragedy with the manifestation of Being. Thus it is the very failure of 
technalised knowledge that draws Being into appearance. Heidegger does not seek to navigate 
this failure, for it is through this failure that the tragedy of Being is overcome. In other words, 
by advocating a patient, silent questioning as the authentic response to the tragedy of Being, 
Heidegger does not so much attempt to navigate the tragedy of techne as seek a kind of 
deliverance from the tragic movement of Being. Such waiting allows us to see through the 
tragedy of techne to the unutterable depths of life, allowing the one attuned to the tragedy of 
Being to feel himself above the mere preoccupation with beings. 
Heidegger’s reading of Sophocles’ choral ode clearly contains its own interests. One 
in particular stands out: an implicit condolence of Hitler as a transgressive leader, advocating 
a silent audition as the fitting mode of being of the people. Thus it can be argued that 
Heidegger opens our attention to the political realm only to occlude its practical character, 
thus rendering critical and active engagement with the prevailing order as a mere extension of 
the abandonment of Being. The task confronting the prevailing order, for Heidegger, cannot 
be a political task requiring praxis, but only one of poiesis, of thinking, of philosophy. For 
Heidegger, the lack of praxis is precisely that which reinvigorates and recreates politics. This, 
I will suggest, leaves him with no other option than to argue that Being is tragic; that tragedy 
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is not something to be avoided or to confront heterodox forms of thinking, but to be affirmed, 
to be drawn into appearance. 
 
6.3 Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’ 
 
 While Greek tragedy featured as a Promethean challenge to the existing ontological 
order in IM, leading Heidegger to attempt to redirect the revolutionary violence of National 
Socialism toward the inner truth and greatness of the movement, Heidegger’s 1942 lecture 
series on Hölderlin’s hymn ‘The Ister’ examines tragedy as the original moment that gives 
rise to the onto-historical destiny of a people. In these lectures, Heidegger expands on the 
account of tragedy he gave in IM and provides his most sustained treatment of Greek tragedy. 
His interpretation, however, is by no means the same. What distinguishes these lectures from 
IM is, as Robert Bernasconi notes, that Heidegger speaks from a position of ‘political 
isolation’.34 For Bernasconi, in HH ‘a space open[s] up between the thinker and the people’ as 
Heidegger recognised that he was unable to determine ‘the direction of the Nazi Party’.35 
Building from Bernasconi’s observation, in what follows I will argue that while Heidegger 
perceives several problems with the National Socialist movement, by rendering these 
problems entirely in terms of the abandonment of Being he fails to provide an adequate way 
to counteract them. 
Central to HH is Heidegger’s diagnosis of the National Socialist party and its 
supporters. The crux of his diagnosis is that the National Socialist party, as it stands in 1942, 
is unable to overcome the technical thinking that it set out to combat. This failure to overcome 
technical thinking, Heidegger argues, is manifest in the ‘research’ of German academics in 
which ‘the Greeks appear as the pure National Socialists’ (80). The ‘overenthusiasm’ on the 
part of these academics does ‘National Socialism and its historical uniqueness no service at 
all’. Their technical thinking ‘is intent on being unconditionally certain of itself and thereby of 
the things that can be experienced’, refusing to submit to the uncertainty of Being by finding 
its measure in the ‘surveyability and indubitability of everything that can be calculated and 
planned’ (94). The drive for certainty leads beings to be ‘experienced in a “technical” 
manner’, failing to give audition to Being (ibid.). While it is clear in HH that Heidegger 
                                                             
34 Robert Bernasconi, ‘The Greatness of the Work of Art’, in Heidegger Toward the Turn, ed. J. Risser, Albany: 
SUNY, 1999, pp. 95-118, p. 110. 
35 ibid. 
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remains committed to National Socialism, his critique of the current trajectory of the 
movement is far more explicit than it was in IM. 
Heidegger’s criticism of the attempt made by German academics to posit the unity of 
the Greeks and National Socialism, and to use Nietzsche for this task, proceeds via an attack 
on their inability to think the unity of space and time. The intention of this attack is to show 
that they are unable to escape from the tradition of metaphysics, a tradition that thinks of ‘the 
essence of space and time in terms of their own fundamental positions’ (53). By isolating 
space and time as unique dimensions, metaphysics cannot think of space and time ‘in terms of 
their relation to history or to human beings as historical, but rather are thought with respect to 
mere process of movement in general’ (ibid.). For those intent on claiming Nietzsche as 
justification for their own agenda, the places and sequence of events in human history fall into 
‘dimensions’, into ‘those realms in which space and time can be measured numerically’. This 
understanding of history flattens out the abyssal difference between the Greek and the modern 
imagination in such a way that renders the Greeks present to the contemporary world, made 
possible through the research of Nazi academics (ibid.). 
Heidegger argues that the failure of metaphysics to be of any ‘direct assistance to us in 
illuminating locality and journeying and their unity’ (53), and thus the failure of the Nazi 
academics, is premised on the conviction that ‘thinking only needed to be liberated from the 
“poetic”’ (111-112) if it is to discern the truth. Such a conviction assumes that thinking, like 
our relation to space and time, does not have a historical origin but simply exists, establishing 
a dualism between the technique of thinking and the confusion of poetising. The inability of 
metaphysics to unify space and time can be overcome, he argues, if we recognise the 
historical basis of thinking. If thinking has a historical dimension and is not separated from 
the localised nature of poetising, then we cannot simply recreate a time that precedes 
metaphysics. Rather, we must allow our basic conception of thinking to be transformed by 
reflecting ‘on the essence of history’ (54). This task, a task that becomes the primary thrust of 
the lecture series, can be undertaken in relation to Hölderlin’s poetising of the rivers of 
Germany. 
What is important about Hölderlin’s hymnal poetising for this task, for Heidegger, is 
that it falls ‘outside of all metaphysics’ because ‘its poetising of the rivers necessarily poetises 
the historicality of human beings, and thus locale and time’ (53). ‘The Ister’, a poem that 
describes the journeying of the Danube river (Ister is the Greco-Roman name for the Danube), 
depicts a locale that it describes in terms of a ‘place’ (Ort) of dwelling, a homeland (Heimat), 
‘one’s own’ (das Eigene), or in Hölderlin’s language, a ‘Fatherland’ (Vaterland), exploring 
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the flow of the river that connects Germany to the ‘oriental vitality’ of ancient Greece (2-6).36 
It is about the building of a home within the vital land of the river, from which the ‘care’ of 
the poet is to ‘make arable / the land’ (4). Thus the significance of Hölderlin’s metaphor of 
the river, for Heidegger, is that it depicts a journeying that ‘tears humans out of the habitual 
midst of their lives, so that they may be in a centre outside of themselves’ (28). 
 While it is Hölderlin’s ‘The Ister’ that is to assist us to overcome metaphysics, for it 
expresses the poetic founding of the German people, only part way into the discussion of this 
poem the lecture course is interrupted by a sustained reflection on Sophocles’ choral ode 
which proceeds to take up a third of the entire series. Heidegger argues that Hölderlin is only 
able to ‘poetise the essence of human beings’ because he relates to the Greeks in a manner 
that does not reproduce the technical thinking of modernity, but enters a ‘poetic dialogue’ 
with the commencement of Greek poetising; that is, with Sophocles’ choral ode (55). The 
choral ode refers to a region that given ethical terms cannot grasp, meaning that to attempt to 
grasp it through academic research will merely bolster our own self-understanding. Instead, 
philosophy must allow its own vision to be transformed by this region if it is to remain 
faithful to its origin. 
In his discussion of the choral ode, Heidegger no longer turns to Hellenist sources 
because of an affinity between the Germans and the Greeks as he did in IM, but because the 
Greek world is foreign to the Germans (124). For Hölderlin, the essence of history is 
concealed in human beings ‘becoming homely’, a becoming homely that is ‘a passage through 
and encounter with the foreign’ (54). Thus Heidegger argues that it is through encountering 
the foreignness of the Greeks and journeying through it that a home can be found – not the 
‘Same’ home as the Greeks, but one that is singular in character, one that must be found 
though a people’s own journeying. In contrast to the Nietzsche’s depiction of the Greeks, 
Heidegger argues that because the ‘Greek world is what is foreign with respect to the 
historical humankind of the Germans’, it cannot provide a ‘measure or model for the 
perfection of humankind’ (ibid.). Hölderlin’s hymn provides a way of listening to the Greek 
world that is ‘more intimate’ (inniger) than Nietzsche’s philosophy, for, rather than positing 
an immediate relation though the shared unveiling of the nullity of logic, it is ‘only when the 
foreign is known and acknowledged in its essential oppositional character does there exist the 
possibility of a genuine relationship … a uniting that is not a confused mixing but a 
conjoining in distinction’ (ibid.). Thus to understand Hölderlin’s hymnal poetry we must turn 
                                                             
36 Young, 1999, p. 395. 
 187 
to his relation to the ‘choral song from the Antigone of Sophocles’ which spoke ‘ever anew’ 
to him in his hymnal poetising (55).  
The task facing the German people, then, is not to assume an immediate relation to the 
Greeks, but to journey with Hölderlin though the foreign (the Greek world) so that they might 
become homely within what is foreign. And to undertake this journey, Heidegger argues, they 
must encounter the choral ode as a kind of poetising that draws us into the experience of what 
it is like to live in a world that is bigger than we can understand, an experience that cannot 
appear if we remain in our technalised mode thinking. Yet we face a problem, Heidegger 
identifies, for ‘[o]ur modern thought is much too “intellectual,” that is, much too calculative 
and technical in its planning, to penetrate immediately into those realms of being as told here, 
let alone to be entirely “at home” there in’ (ibid.).  
To penetrate into these regions, Heidegger reflects on three different determinations of 
human being poetised by Sophocles in the choral ode. The first determination, that which 
constitutes ‘the essential ground of this tragedy’ (60), is the determination of human beings as 
deinon. Heidegger begins with a definition of denion that is similar to that in his IM: deinon 
names the uncanny: ‘that which is not at home, not homely in that which is homely’ (71). 
However, Heidegger then qualifies this definition: 
 
Uncanniness does not first arise as a consequence of humankind; rather, humankind emerges 
from uncanniness and remains within it – looms out of it and stirs within it. (72) 
 
In IM, the uncanny was a profound description of the creature who, in search of a home, uses 
transgressive creativity which renders itself unhomely. In HH, however, Heidegger identifies 
the uncanny as a ‘fundamental kind of essence’ (72) that belongs to human beings. While the 
powers of nature can be ‘sublime’ in that they ‘demand awe’ and ‘compel our astonishment’ 
(76), the uncanniness that gives sublimity its power lies solely in the human being and leads 
us back to wonderment at what kind of being the human is. The uncanny is ‘that which 
presences and at the same time absences’ (ibid.), determining human beings to have a 
counterturning essence. While Being allows beings to appear for humans, Being is not a being 
and is lost in human activity. Thus it can be said that Being determines human beings to 
forget Being, meaning that it is natural for human beings to be outside Being, lost and without 
a way. 
While technical thinking would lead us to a dictionary in order to find available 
translations for deinon, Heidegger proposes to see translation as a ‘dialogue’, meaning that the 
act of translating brings forth something ‘singular’ (66). In a dialogue we become vulnerable 
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to what will emerge, meaning that we are ready to be altered by the foreignness of the other 
with whom we encounter. This dialogue, the attempt to ‘translate’ deinon, proceeds with the 
second determination of human being Heidegger explores in the choral ode is the middle part 
of the second strophe (l. 360), pantoporos aporos, which he translates as ‘venturing forth in 
all directions – without experience’ (74). According to Heidegger, this determination captures 
the nature of human creativity whereby in trying to make our world our home we become 
unhomely. Poros, he informs us, connotes an ‘irruption of autonomous power’ (75) expressed 
in the profound ability of human beings to build shelters for themselves and to domesticate 
wild animals. Yet it is this very power that leaves them aporos, without experience, for they 
cannot transform their experience into self-understanding. All the things that human beings 
attain merely incite and drive them to go further in each pursuit, but none of these skills 
manifest the propensity for bringing human beings into what is by essence their own.  
In similar terms to IM, Heidegger argues that the supreme example of this 
determination of human beings is their inability to come to terms with their own finitude. No 
‘skilfulness’, ‘acts of violence’ or ‘artfulness’ can ‘stave off death’ (75), Heidegger states, for 
there is no techne that is adequate to domesticating our essence. Death is not some state of 
affairs that can be circumvented, nor does it ‘come to’ human beings from without. The great 
danger that faces human beings is not a problem that needs a solution, a fact that death shows 
us this in the starkest way. Rather, the danger is an ontological condition that requires our 
understanding of Being to be transformed.37 In ‘What Are Poets For?’, Heidegger explains 
this danger as follows: 
 
What threatens man in his very nature is the willed view that man, by the peaceful release, 
transformation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature, could render the 
human condition, man’s being, tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects.38 
 
The fundamental threat to humanity is not the fact that we will die. Rather, it is our tendency 
to fool ourselves into thinking that some kind of skill can stave off death. If the problem is 
technically framed, then all is hopeless, for death cannot be conquered. Yet if our 
understanding of Being is transformed by the tragic work of art – by the choral ode in 
particular – we discover that death is not something to be escaped for pure Being, but that the 
‘being of humans in itself proceeds towards its death’ (HH 76). To find a home in our                                                              
37 See Hubert Dreyfus, ‘Heidegger on the Connection Between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics’, in 
Charles Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
pp. 345-372, p. 360. 
38 Martin Heidegger, ‘What Are Poets For?’, in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. A. Hofstadter, New York: 
Harper Perennial, 2001, pp. 87-140, p. 114. 
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essence, death must be embraced as our ownmost possibility. Echoing Hölderlin’s famous 
words, Heidegger states that ‘The selfsame danger is, when it is as the danger, the saving 
power’ (QCT 39). 
Thus Heidegger claims that what is ‘tragic’ about the ancient Greek world is that the 
Greeks attained ‘the pinnacle of its essence at that very point where it preserves and brings to 
appear the counterturning in being itself’ (HH 77). In other words, it was the propensity of the 
Greeks to allow the deinon in its counterturning essence to come into appearance that 
constitutes the greatness of the Greek world. To depict human beings in this movement is the 
‘poetic determination’ of human being, requiring a mode of expression large enough to allow 
death, the counterturning essence and the uncanny nature of all human endeavours to take a 
central role in collective life (77). The essence of the deinon is ‘enunciated in its completeness 
by Sophocles for the first time – but also for the last time – thus extends back into the realms 
that, in a concealed manner, sustain our own history’ (ibid.). Heidegger seems to restrict the 
manifold dialogue partners we might find in history – let alone our contemporary society – to 
Sophocles, for he assets that in no other place can we find the essence of human being 
‘completely’ poetised. The metaphysics that begins with Plato is ‘not up to the essence of the 
“negative”’, for it seeks to make the essence of humankind as rational beings fully present to 
philosophical analysis. In the following section we find that this move, for Jaspers, is highly 
problematic, for by arguing that we inherit this inability to grasp the negative dimensions of 
our being, Heidegger denies any saving potential in politics, or even in a conversation with a 
fellow human being, for we are all tied to the same fate. It is in becoming attuned to the 
counterturning essence of Being that salvation lies. 
The third determination of human being Heidegger notes is the middle part of the 
second antistrophe (ll. 370-371), hupsipolis apolis, which he translates as ‘towering high 
above the site – forfeiting the site’ (79). Heidegger frames the technical understanding of the 
polis as the error of National Socialism, suggesting that National Socialism had become 
victim to the same technical thinking as modernity. This third determination poetises the 
movement that humans undergo whereby their aspirations to political greatness – the creation 
of laws and cities that Sophocles’ praises in the ode – inevitably throws us out of the city, 
making us apolis, without a site. This determination cannot be articulated in terms of good 
and evil or even in some kind of error of judgment, for it precedes any ethical determination. 
Rather, it shows that evil does not mean that something is ‘merely bad’ but that something is 
‘essential to being itself’ (78). Heidegger no longer considers the polis as a work of human 
transgressive creation, but argues that it is ‘the essence of the polis to thrust one into excess 
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and to tear one into downfall’ (86). Evil is essential to being, seen in the fact that the essence 
of the polis is to make us apolis. The Nazi politicians fail the essence of National Socialism 
by attempting to render ‘the political realm calculable and indubitable so that it can “plan and 
act”’ (94). Under their rule, the political becomes that which is without question, thus 
occluding the possibility of the evil appearing in their own action. In contrast, the Greeks 
considered the polis as that which is worthy of question, meaning that the beings that appear 
within were of secondary concern. 
These three determinations of human being, Heidegger argues, are poetised in the 
character of Antigone. Heidegger no longer understands the one whom ‘weds himself to 
inhumanity thanks to reckless daring’ as Creon, and hence as Hitler, the violent state-creator, 
but as Antigone, as Being itself.39 Antigone takes the path that appears before her as destiny, 
something that no one knows has arisen except herself (103). She accommodates herself to 
this destiny and finds herself in direct conflict over the site of all beings. By being removed 
from all human possibilities, she is within the unhomely. She looms over the site of all beings, 
and steps out of this site becoming the supreme example of the uncanny, for ‘the most 
uncanny being is intrinsically unhomely’ (104). Yet at the same time Antigone preserves the 
most intimate belonging to the homely. Antigone’s death, Heidegger informs us, marks her 
becoming homely, a homecoming out of being unhomely. Thus it is she who is referred to in 
the closing words of the chorus, the one who is excluded from the hearth: 
 
In the Greek sense, Antigone names being itself. This is the ground of being homely, the 
hearth. It is the counterplay (not between state and religion but) between being unhomely in 
the sense of being driven about amid beings without any way out, and being unhomely as 
becoming homely from out of a belonging to being. What is poetised is a becoming homely in 
being unhomely. (118) 
 
Antigone’s heroic dwelling within the uncanny, finding the hearth in her cave of death, 
provides the basis for a new conception of the poet in Heidegger’s reading of tragedy. The 
poet is the one who turns the counterturning experience of Being into a work, thus allowing 
Being to emerge meaningfully in her community. Like Hölderlin and Sophocles, the poet 
dwells within the river, the flowing, unfolding of Being, and gives voice to the historical 
turning, calling the people to a new orientation toward beings so that they might enter into the                                                              
39 Julian Young suggests that Heidegger not only sees Antigone as the reckless daring one, but himself as the 
daring one, projecting his own resistance to the National Socialist movement onto Antigone: ‘In contrast to the 
discussion in the Introduction to Metaphysics, the Ister discussion would seem to bear this out, for Creaon is, 
surely, Hitler, and Antigone is, inter alios, Heidegger himself’. While Young is probably, to some degree, 
correct, his reading detracts some of the potency of Heidegger’s reading of Antigone as the portrayal of Being. If 
Young is right – and there is certainly evidence in the text to support his claim – HH would be a self-justifying 
text bordering on narcissism; a supreme act of hubris. Young, The Philosophy of Tragedy, p. 228. 
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opening made by Being. Our metaphysical, inherited assumptions ‘have such difficulty in 
bringing the right kind of hearing to encounter the word of this poetry’ (165).  
The significance of Antigone, then, is that she provides a representative of the true 
path of humanity that does not remain entangled in subjectivity but understands her own 
being as uncanny, taking it upon herself to become homely within her essence (117). In this 
sense she ‘is the poem of becoming homely in being unhomely’ (121), and our task is to listen 
to her speak. Heidegger’s translation of her final words before her death attempts to draw out 
this connection: ‘To take up into my own essence the uncanny that here and now appears’ 
(99). While Heidegger’s translation of Antigone’s realisation that she must pathein to deinon 
is dubious at best, he is correct in linking her words to the choral ode that uncovered the 
essential nature of human beings as the beings who, in searching for a home, are thrown into 
the unhomely.40 However, the unhomely is not the world of apparent meanings created by 
human beings as it was in IM. Rather, Heidegger states that the unhomely is ‘nothing that 
human beings themselves make but rather the converse: something that makes them into what 
they are and who they can be’ (103). There is something within the homely that speaks to 
humans, calling them forth toward the opening of Being. This is where humans must make 
their home: within their counterturning essence, within the arable land of the river. 
What is important about Heidegger’s interpretation of Antigone in HH for our 
assessment of his work in light of Jaspers’ critique is that the creative struggle that he found in 
the choral ode of Antigone in IM between transgressive knowledge and nature is replaced by 
the ontological struggle between being and appearance. In IM, the artist was seen as the 
creative agent exemplified by Parmenides and Sophocles who took a transgressive stance 
toward the metaphysics that held inherited meaning in place in order to give a new rule to art. 
The task of the philosopher (Heidegger) was to direct the political leader in the same creative 
exercise of techne in order to allow the true nature of techne to rupture the falsehood of 
technology. In HH, it is not the poet who confronts a historical epoch, but the artwork that 
presents the confrontation, orientating the spectators toward the polis as the site of 
                                                             
40 Heidegger’s translation is dubious because pathein to deinon simply means ‘to suffer the uncanny’. By 
rendering pathein to deinon as ‘to take up into my own essence the uncanny that here and now appears’, 
Heidegger quite deliberately reads his own understanding of Antigone as the hero of tragedy, the one who finds a 
home in being unhomely, into the text. 
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appearance.41 Sophocles’ Antigone is not an example of thought confronting the flux of 
history, but depicts what it looks like to act in a manner that fits with our historical 
endowment. The task of the German people, Heidegger argues, is not to confront political 
problems through conventional forms of politics, but to journey through the foreign in order 
to allow the counterturning nature of the political to appear. 
The implication of Heidegger’s lectures on Hölderlin’s poetry is that the tragedies 
bring-forth the truth of our nature as tragic. Tragedy has nothing to do with an error or a grand 
mistake, for such a definition, in Heidegger’s view, implies that correcting this mistake could 
solve the problems of humanity. Rather, Heidegger views tragedy as the essence of human 
life. Finding a home within our own nature involves a kind of knowledge that we can suffer 
but cannot cognise, meaning that the task of finding a home within the uncanny belongs to the 
poetic, while poetising, as we see paradigmatically in the choral ode, is ‘a telling finding of 
being’ (119). The key modification to Heidegger’s view on tragedy in HH is that being 
uncanny is our nature: we can never achieve homeliness in this life, meaning that to live is to 
question. What is poetised in the choral ode is the becoming homely in being unhomely, and 
it is Hölderlin’s task – the becoming homely by passing though the foreign – that is poetised 
in the choral ode. Modern technology cannot be overcome by finding an identity with the 
Greeks, for the technical nature of such an attempt entails that it cannot hold the unity of 
space and time together. Rather, it must be transformed by journeying thought the foreign, 
through the uncanny essence of human being we find poetised by Sophocles. 
 
6.4 Tragedy is not enough 
 
Thus far I have outlined Heidegger’s interpretation of tragedy in two of his lectures in 
which he undertakes his so-called ‘confrontation’ with National Socialism. In order to assess 
the validity of this claim, in this section I turn to Jaspers’ response to Heidegger’s                                                              
41 This anticipates the understanding of art Heidegger develops in the late 1940s. In OWA, for example, 
Heidegger argues that the significance of Greek tragedy lies in its ability to unveil an alternative medium of 
presentation to technalised representation. Tragedy, Heidegger informs us, puts the old gods of inherited values 
and the new gods of emerging linguistic practices into battle in order to transform a peoples’ thinking. The 
people are unhabituated from a homely fitting-together of beings in such a way that what is ‘holy and what 
unholy’ is put up for decision (OWA 42). In this way the work of art shows its ‘workly character, for it sets ‘up a 
world’ (43). A world is not a mechanical or scientific ‘collection of the countable or uncountable, familiar and 
unfamiliar things that are just there’ (ibid.), for a world cannot be an object before us. Rather, Heidegger 
cryptically explains that the ‘world worlds’, meaning that the world is that which provides the conditions of 
possibility for objects to appear in a particular way (ibid.). The workly character of the artwork means that this 
disclosure becomes historical, meaning that the artwork gives ‘things their look’ and ‘to men their outlook on 
themselves’ (42). 
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interpretation of tragedy in Tragedy Is Not Enough (TNE), a book published shortly after his 
correspondence with Heidegger that constitutes part of his Von der Warheit. Before doing so, 
however, it is important to highlight two dimensions of Heidegger’s lectures that will be 
relevant to our analysis. The first is that the political realm of human praxis is secondary to 
the realm of appearances that are constituted of works of human poiesis. To focus on the 
political in terms of praxis occludes the ontological dimension of poiesis. The second is that 
Heidegger’s understanding of tragedy does not consider the content of tragedy to be human 
actions, judgment or the outworking of human thought in the public sphere, but a poetic 
depiction of the movement of Being. In this sense, Being is tragic. While the identity of Being 
and tragedy is can also be found in IM, it is particularly evident in HH. By turning to Jaspers’ 
argument in TNE, this section aims to highlights the danger of Heidegger’s attempt to equate 
politics with poiesis, with philosophy. The importance of Jaspers’ argument for this chapter is 
that it shows that the knowledge gained from tragedy provides no content that might provide 
political direction or give access to pure being. Rather, it concerns the way of thinking, one 
that recognises the limits of individual speculation and clears the way for politics. 
In TNE, Jaspers affirms several dimensions of Heidegger’s pre-Platonic reading of 
techne through of Sophocles’ choral ode, which entails that there are no guarantees for the 
outcome of human creative action. ‘Tragedy depicts a man in his greatness beyond good and 
evil’ (56), he states, and is made possible by a kind of knowledge that does not come from 
‘achieving a harmonious interpretation of the universe and actually living in accord with it’, 
that is, from finding a ‘home’ in this world (32). Rather, it comes from discovering the limits 
of our power in the attempt to build this home. Thus when the tragic sense appears, 
‘something extraordinary is lost: the feeling of security without the shadow of tragedy’ (33). 
Tragic knowledge, for Jaspers, arises whenever this feeling vanishes; that is, whenever 
awareness exceeds our power to act.  
While Jaspers identifies tragedy with the differential nature of techne, and hence the 
differential nature of truth, he criticises Heidegger’s attempt to overcome the differential 
character of truth by unveiling a primordial sense of truth as appearance. Tragedy, for Jaspers, 
does not occur with the differential character of truth that comes into appearance without 
technical legislation. Rather, it occurs in a partly Hegelian fashion: ‘wherever the powers that 
collide are true independently of each other’ (57). This collision does not occur when the 
powers doing battle on their own, but exists between the bearers of truth: human beings. Of 
‘genuine tragedy’, Jaspers states, ‘one can speak only with reference to man’ (94). Human 
tragedy can be identified on two levels. The first is that human life itself – all activity and 
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success – is ‘doomed finally to suffer shipwreck’, for while death and suffering might be 
veiled from sight, ‘in the end they engulf all’ (ibid.). The second level is that ‘reality is 
divided against itself, and so is truth’ (95). Tragedy is real because irreconcilable opposition is 
real. Truth must defend its rightful claim not only against injustice, but also against the 
rightful claims of other truths. Thus every ‘mortal imperative’ is ‘tainted by guilt, for it must 
destroy others equally moral and equally imperative’ (95). 
Jaspers’ interpretation of tragedy rejects the ontological distinction, suggesting that 
Heidegger’s ontological project is ultimately an attempt to overcome tragedy. Tragedy, for 
Jaspers, does not concern Being itself, for it ‘belongs in the foreground’ (104). For example, 
Jaspers argues that tragic knowledge can arise in the midst of a conversation, not because the 
conversation is ‘tragic’, but because it can become an occasion in which we encounter the 
split, perspectival nature of truth.42 If tragedy expresses a kind of knowledge that does not 
arise from an encounter with Being, with a layer of reality occluded by representation, but 
from the experience of the split nature of truth, then it belongs ‘neither in the realm of 
transcendence nor in the Basis of all Being, but in the world of sense and time’ (ibid.). In 
other words, tragedy belongs in the world of representation. If we mistake tragedy with Being, 
Jaspers states, we are faced with a choice between inauthenticity or lurid grandeur: to ‘live 
and err, or to grasp truth and die of it’ (ibid.). This is seen in Heidegger’s recommendation for 
the people to support the transgressive violence of the state-maker in IM or to remain faithful 
to their calling to death in HH. If we place tragedy in the foreground, however, recognising it 
as a representation that elucidates the limits of human power and our inability to live up to our 
promise, then we are released from this ‘rigid either-or’ and are able to acknowledge that 
‘truth, whole and complete … is not available for us in life and time’. In this framework, it is 
through encountering the problematic of tragedy that philosophy is displaced from the project 
of accessing pure being and becomes the task of outlining a way of thinking and doing that 
acknowledges the fact that ‘within time, truth is forever underway, always in motion and not 
final even in its most marvellous crystallisations’ (ibid.).  
While the failure of IM to become instrumental in the political project of National 
Socialism might have opened Heidegger to the awareness of the limits of philosophy, the 
opposite is the case. Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference allows him to ascribe the 
human dimension of tragedy to the realm of beings, leading him to search for the movement 
of tragedy that is primary to the collision of human truths. In this formulation, the task is not                                                              
42 In this sense Jaspers affirms Benjamin’s critique of the attempt to overcome the representational paradigm of 
aesthetics though tragic art. 
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to acknowledge the tragic nature of truth and to find ways of navigating the divided nature of 
the world. Rather, it is to transform the ontological conditions that allow the divided nature of 
human truth to come into appearance. This entails a transformation of our understanding of 
history from a realm that reveals absolute spirit to one that sets humans on their way. 
However, while Heidegger breaks with the tradition to the extent that his understanding of 
history entails that, unlike Hegel’s account, history cannot have a meaning, he reproduces the 
notion of history assumed by pre-critical philosophy that is unable to grasp that the centre of 
history is ultimately the being who creates form through its activity: the human being.43 While 
Heidegger radically questions the nature of temporality, the ‘eternal questions of politics are 
forgotten’.44 For Jaspers, the denigration of action to a mode of production is nothing other 
than a denial of tragic knowledge. Rather than moving us to sympathy for those subject to the 
misery of human tragedy, Heidegger’s identification of Being and tragedy ‘lifts us above 
reality’ (or to a layer beneath it) and allows the tragic philosopher to live ‘in an aura of 
grandeur’ (99). 
Jaspers’ critique of Heidegger does not portray his interpretation of tragedy as a 
simple misreading, but as a dangerous position of philosophical isolation. By refusing to 
engage in the world of beings – the divided political realm where all truth is underway – 
Heidegger soars in reflective grandeur while ‘man presses for redemption from his terrible 
realities, which lack the glamour of tragedy’ (100).45 Tragic knowledge does not allow for 
such soaring, argues Jaspers, for ‘it achieves no comprehensive interpretation of the world’. 
Rather, tragic knowledge grounds us, transforming the practice of philosophy from individual 
speculation to outlining a way of thinking adequate to the political arena in which truth is 
underway.                                                               
43 C.f. Hannah Arendt, ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought’ [1954], in Essays in 
Understanding 1930-1954, ed. J. Kohn, New York: Schocken Books, 1994, pp. 428-447, p. 433. 
44 ibid. 
45 Jaspers’ critique of disengaged speculation echoes the broader critique of philosophy he develops in Basic 
Philosophical Writings: ‘High in the mountains on a vast rocky tableland the philosophers of each generation 
have been meeting since time immemorial. From there one can gaze down onto the snow-capped mountains and, 
still deeper, into the valleys inhabited by man, and into all directions under the heavenly canopy toward the far 
horizon. Sun and stars are brighter there than elsewhere. The air is so pure that it consumes all gloominess, so 
cool that it keeps the smoke from rising, so bright that it causes thought to soar into unfathomable spaces’. It is 
not difficult to gain access to this plain, yet it requires that one leave their familiar surroundings – their home – 
in order to learn from these heights ‘what authentically is’. While recognising that ‘no one can be encountered 
there’, because it requires an isolated journey, he reflects that he still attempted to seek ‘among the eternal 
speculations for men who find them important’. He found only one man, but not one with whom he could 
converse: ‘This one however was my polite enemy. For the forces we served were irreconcilable. Soon it seemed 
that we could not speak to each other at all. Joy turned into pain, a strangely inconsolable pain, as if we were 
missing an opportunity that was palpably close’. Jaspers need hardly add in the following line that ‘[t]his was the 
way it was with Heidegger’. Karl Jaspers, Basic Philosophical Writings, trans. E. Ehrlich, L. Ehrlich & G. 
Pepper, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1986, pp. 511-2. 
 196 
In contrast to Heidegger’s attempt to identify a way of thinking that is aware of the 
tragedy of technalised thinking, Jaspers argues that tragic knowledge, as opposed to tragic 
philosophy, ‘accepts danger and that inescapable nexus of guilt and doom implicit in all true 
action and accomplishment in the real world’ (96). This understanding of tragic knowledge 
develops Kant’s response to the tragedy of philosophy – not by deeming it necessary to 
assume a theoretical order of moral value as a postulate of reason, but by attributing to all of 
humanity the capabilities of judging that, according to the philosophical tradition, had been 
the prerogative of the statesman. For Jaspers, to know the tragic is not simply to recognise the 
counterturning essence of human beings, but to choose to act in light of this recognition. The 
significance of Jaspers’ argument for this thesis is that it shows that tragedy not only displaces 
us from both the task of instructing politics according to philosophically defined ends, but 
also from instructing politics from poetically defined ends – from keeping pure from political 
engagement – and opens us to the task of politics, to legislating and judging in a realm that is 
held in common. In this light, Jaspers argues that Heidegger’s lectures on tragedy cannot be 
said to express a ‘confrontation’ with National Socialism, for no philosophical project can 
rightly claim to ground a political project. Confrontation, as Jaspers states in Philosophy, is 
offered by ‘any felicitous meeting of individuals who band together in fact without oath or 
pathos. “Truth begins with two,” said Nietzsche’.46 In other words, confrontation cannot be 
achieved by philosophy, though philosophy might clarify how we might go about confronting 
a political regime. Rather, confrontation can only be achieved by political action, by praxis. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
In an interview with Ansgar Kemman concerning his relationship with Heidegger, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer noted that great thinkers such as Heidegger find it difficult to submit to 
the preconditions of a conversation, for their ability to place their conversation partner within 
their own thinking is so great. Gadamer explains this point with reference to his own 
experience of inviting Heidegger to speak with his students, noting their ‘disappointment’ 
with Heidegger that interprets as a result of Heidegger’s inability to converse. For Gadamer, 
‘Heidegger never got beyond that stage, but it is also difficult when one has such a superior 
                                                             
46 Karl Jaspers, Philosophy, Vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 36. 
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intellect. … For people like us, it is easier to notice that the other could also be correct’.47 He 
identifies the power of Heidegger’s capacity to think as a kind of tragic fate, a dimension of 
his thinking that separated his ideas from conversation, rendering him vulnerable to 
intellectual tragedy. Gadamer’s reflections assist us to see why Heidegger’s interpretation of 
tragedy is deeply paradoxical: it provides, on the surface, an important diagnosis of the 
technical thinking that buffers us from being affected by the world, and yet this very diagnosis 
fails to identify a response, for it serves to elevate his thinking over the activities of political 
life. Rainer Schürmann captures this paradox well, arguing that while Heidegger critiques the 
tendency of western metaphysics to confuse the world for Being itself, he does not escape ‘the 
ultimacy that philosophers have pursued since Parmenides’.48 For Schürmann, Heidegger’s 
intellectual power is tantamount to his political failure. 
For Jaspers, ad hominem arguments are entirely appropriate when it comes to 
Heidegger’s philosophy, for his philosophical response to the project of building the 
collective world so that Being might come into appearance elevates the thinker above what is 
tragic in a state of philosophical grandeur. To separate the divided nature of beings from a 
more primordial concept of Being is to remove what is properly tragic from the 
anthropological level and to render it as an ontological problem, casting our ethical 
responsibilities as a shadow of a deeper problem at hand. In a letter dated December 22, 1945, 
Jaspers offered his advice to the denazification committee overseeing Heidegger’s intellectual 
career. On the one hand, he writes, Heidegger failed to grasp the dangerous intentions of the 
party’s leadership. Yet on the other hand, like Alfred Baeumler and Carl Schmitt, Heidegger 
remained culpable for self-consciously assisting the National Socialist movement with his 
philosophy. Baeumler, Schmitt and Heidegger, Jaspers writes, all ‘brought their very real 
intellectual abilities to the task, only to end up blackening the reputation of German 
philosophy. So I agree with you,’ Jaspers concludes, ‘that there is a touch of the tragedy of 
evil about it all’.49 
 
                                                             
47 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Heidegger as Rhetor: Hans-Georg Gadamer interviewed by Ansgar Kemman’, in 
Daniel Gross and Ansgar Kemman (eds.), Heidegger and Rhetoric, Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2005, 47-64, p. 51. 
48 Reiner Schürmann, ‘Ultimate Double Binds’, p. 243. 
49 Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life, trans. A. Blunden, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993, p. 
244. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Castoriadis: Tragedy and Self-creation 
 
 
There is no way of eliminating the risks of collective hubris. Nobody can protect 
humanity from folly or suicide.1 
 
 
This chapter identifies the significance of Castoriadis’ contribution to the problematic 
of tragedy. Specifically, it explores his attempt to identify a way of doing philosophy that 
recognises the importance of Heidegger’s ontological formulation of political problems and 
yet maintains the priority of human agency. In the previous chapter I argued that Heidegger’s 
interpretation of tragedy sought to identify an account of techne that was attuned to the 
movement of the polis. This account of techne calls for an aesthetic process of political 
change that begins with the poet, is communicated by the thinker, and is instituted by the 
politician. Rather than challenging the Platonic attempt to institute the political order 
according to philosophically defined ends, Heidegger renders the poet in the place of the 
philosopher-king, retaining Plato’s neglect of the potential of communicative action to bring 
new form into being. While Heidegger calls into question the conception of temporality 
assumed by traditional philosophy, in relation to Jaspers’ work I argued that his understanding 
of techne reproduces the traditional denigration of praxis as a mode of action subordinate to 
Being. 
In similar terms to Jaspers, Castoriadis argues that Heidegger’s ontological difference 
removes any meaningful understanding of politics from the political realm. This not only 
renders his philosophy inept to confront totalitarian power, but, more specifically, inept to 
confront heteronomy. In this chapter I claim that for Castoriadis, this failure can be 
understood as a result of Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of the tragedies. In 
Castoriadis’ view, the tragedies do not unveil a realm in which appearances are brought forth 
in a manner that is primary to technical legislation. Instead, they confront our attempt to 
stabilise the fluidity of the political sphere with philosophical discourse that is governed by                                                              
1 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’, in The Castoriadis Reader, trans. & 
ed. D. Curtis, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997, pp. 267-290, p. 282. 
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the univocal language of ideals, security, and self-preservation. The significance of 
Castoriadis’ interpretation of tragedy for this thesis, I will argue, is that it extends Kant’s 
formulation of the problematic of tragedy into a new constellation of thought that had 
occluded a rich understanding of life, identifying Kant’s enlarged way of thinking as an 
exemplary response to the tragedy of philosophy. 
Before examining Castoriadis’ interpretation of tragedy, the first section of this 
chapter identifies the problem that his consideration of tragedy aims to confront: the thinking 
of being as ‘being something determined’. To think of being as being something determined, 
for Castoriadis, is the effort to identify being with human signification, an effort that aims to 
connect intellectual questions with reality.2 In the intellectual environment of France during 
the 1960s to 1980s, Castoriadis’ critique of determinist thinking aimed at several intellectual 
movements that fashioned themselves as alternatives to traditional philosophy, such as 
Marxism and structuralism. Far from escaping the determinist thinking of the philosophical 
tradition, Castoriadis argues that both Marxism and structuralism express a kind of ‘logicism’, 
a mode of thinking that attempts to explain society and history by reference to an underlying 
logic that determines the arrangement of the elements (IIS 171). While Castoriadis was deeply 
committed to Marxism until the late 1950s, he came to see Marxism as an obstacle rather than 
a resource in his effort to renew radical politics. In particular, he is critical of the Marxist view 
of history as the result of a lawful process. Rather than calling the present moment of history 
into question, he argues that Marxism entails a kind of thinking where all events are seen as 
expressions of fixed laws that lie beneath. Social and historical realities ‘bring-forth’ these 
laws, and the task of history is to grasp them in a determinant paradigm. Such thinking, for 
Castoriadis, is ‘identitary’, for it occludes the singularity of particular appearances, fashioning 
itself in terms of ontological reality. It obscures the fact that, like all theories, it too is a 
product of socially and historically mediated forces, becoming an avatar of deeper tendencies 
in western thought toward determinism and the covering over of all creative being.3 
Having identified Castoriadis’ critique of identitary thinking, the second section 
examines his understanding of tragedy as a disruption of determinist thinking, providing a 
new task for philosophy that seeks to problematise ideas and recast them in terms of                                                              
2 The effort to connect intellectual questions with reality is similar to what Cavell describes in terms of 
‘intellectual tragedy’. As we noted in the Introduction, Cavell argues that intellectual tragedy ‘is not a matter of 
saying something false,’ but the ‘inability to acknowledge, I mean accept, the human conditions of knowing’. 
For Castoriadis, I will suggest, tragedy is a presentation of limits, ‘showing’ us rather than ‘telling’ us of the 
danger of stepping beyond the limits of thinking. See Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 19, 454. 
3 Warren Breckman, Adventures of the Symbolic: Postmarxism and Democratic Theory, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013, p. 97. 
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unrealised projects. The third section considers Castoriadis’ reading of tragedy as an 
interpretation of Kant’s CJ, one that portrays Kant, at his most radical moments, as a 
philosopher who provides a powerful response to the tragedy of philosophy. This 
interpretation of Kant proposes an alternative to the Idealist and Nietzschean views, which 
both limit the philosophical importance of tragedy to a specific crisis. Instead, it allows us to 
see the problematic of tragedy as an ongoing dialogue with the goal of expanding the scope of 
philosophy in the paradigm of Kant’s enlarged way of thinking. 
 
7.1 Identitary logic: Being as being something determined 
 
 Like Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger before him, Castoriadis considers tragedy as a 
means to confront the determination of all knowledge as techne. While Castoriadis explores 
determinative thinking in terms of Aristotle’s techne and Kant’s determinative judgment, he 
argues that by giving definition to the technical procedure of thinking, both Aristotle and Kant 
stumble across an insight that is analogous to the tragedies. Yet departing from Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, Castoriadis argues that what renders this insight in close proximity to the tragedies 
is not that it unveils a primordial conception of Being. Rather, it draws our attention to the 
priority of the imagination, especially the productive ability of the imagination to create a 
second nature: an order of ‘non-being’ beyond reference to the existing. As I will claim, 
recognising the productive capacity of imagination, for Castoriadis, involves an insight 
similar to that we encounter in the tragedies. Both experiences confront our attempt to gain 
access to a univocal notion of Being, requiring an alternative procedure of thinking that 
renounces this desire. Thus, Castoriadis’ interpretation of tragedy makes explicit a basic 
assumption of the problematic of tragedy: the primacy of the imagination in human thinking, 
or, in other words, the primacy of aesthetics. This returns us to Kant’s enlarged way of 
thinking, for it is the very attempt to uncover the logic of cognition that ‘forces’ us, to use 
Kant’s words, to acknowledge the primary place of aesthetics in human experience. 
To understand the connection Castoriadis makes between the productivity of the 
imagination and tragedy, it is necessary to identify his understanding of the historical 
trajectory of philosophy that the problematic of tragedy confronts. For Castoriadis, ‘Greco-
Western thought’, that is, thinking understood as an explicit institution in western history, has 
systematically attempted to seal the priority of the determinant use of judgment over the 
 201 
capacity of imagination to create new, and hence contingent, form. Such philosophy, he 
argues in The Imaginary Institution of Society (IIS),  
 
has constituted, developed, amplified and refined itself on the basis of this thesis: being is 
being something determined (einai ti), speaking is saying something determined (ti legein). 
And, of course, speaking the truth is determining speaking and what is said by the 
determinations of being or else determining being by the determinations of speaking, and, 
finally, observing that both are but one and the same. (221) 
 
Castoriadis terms this model of thinking ‘identitary logic’, for it expresses a system of logical 
relations that ascribe identity to both individual objects and to collections of objects in 
ensembled sets. Identitary logic takes the form of explaining the world according to causation, 
finality, motivation, function and structure, all of which search for necessary and sufficient 
conditions that could guarantee the truthfulness of experience (ibid.). It is displayed in the fact 
that mathematics has offered the only available model of a true demonstration, namely a 
‘sufficient determination of what is said in its necessity’ (222). By fashioning the ideal of 
determinant thinking in terms of mathematics, identitary logic constitutes a technical model of 
thinking that legislates nature according to its demand for completeness, denigrating the non-
mathematical, contingent strata of living things to a realm of less-than-being. 
 Building from Nietzsche, Castoriadis suggests that while identitary logic is a form of 
intellectual tragedy – for it separates mathematical thought from sensuous life – its desire for 
systematic understanding entails that it is also suited to stumble across its own limits. To 
elucidate this dynamic in a modern context, Castoriadis turns to the development of set-theory 
at the end of the nineteenth century in the work of Georg Cantor. While Cantor’s original 
proposal is now called ‘naive’ set-theory, for it is seemingly unaware of the internal 
paradoxes demonstrated by Bertrand Russell, Castoriadis argues that its importance cannot be 
overestimated, ‘for it exhibits the indefinable within the definition of the definite, the 
inelimenable circularity within every attempt at a foundation’.4  
Cantor responded to the question of the foundation of mathematics with the initial 
theory of sets that provided the groundwork for the development of what is now known as 
category theory. His theory begins with a definition of a set as ‘a collection into a whole of 
definite and distinct objects for our intuition or of our thought. These objects are called the 
elements of the set’.5 What is significant about this definition for Castoriadis – what makes it 
more philosophically important than Bertrand Russell’s critique or later developments in                                                              
4 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Logic of Magmas and the Question of Autonomy’, in The Castoriadis Reader, 
trans. & ed. D. Curtis, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997, pp. 290-318, p. 292. 
5 Cited in IIS 223. 
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category theory6 – is that it rejects previous attempts to derive the theory axiomatically and, 
instead, accepts its circular and undefinable terms, thus drawing our attention to several 
elements it presupposes.7 Firstly, it presupposes that we must be able to distinguish between 
objects. These objects belong to the sphere of perception, or to representation, and must be 
posited as definable. Secondly, it draws our attention to the presupposition of a schema for 
both separation and union. Only with such schemata can objects to be posited as both distinct 
and as being assembled into a whole. However, if the application of these schemas is 
premised on our presupposing their existence, then they have no logical support. Rather, we 
merely presume that they have already been applied before we apply them; that ‘each of the 
terms collected together in this way to form a whole has already been implicitly posited as 
collected together into this whole which it itself is, that the diversity of features defining it and 
distinguishing it …. has been united in order to posit/form/be this very object’ (224). Cantor’s 
definition of the operation of numerical sets opens the question of ‘the justification’ of their 
‘starting point’, ‘implying, therefore, that this [starting point] is external to the discourse at 
hand and that it is posited from somewhere else’ (ibid.). In Castoriadis terms, Cantor 
                                                             
6 While Cantor’s naive set-theory was ultimately superseded by the set-theories of Bertrand Russel and Gottlob 
Frege and the category theory of Samuel Eilenberg and Saunders Maclane, Castoriadis is concerned with the 
epistemological implications of the initial impulse of set-theory. In this sense axiomatic set-theory and category 
theory build from the initial impulse of Cantor’s approach. Russell’s paradox, in Castoriadis’ view, turns set-
theory in a direction that is more concerned with the coherence of logical systems than the epistemological 
movement begun by set-theory. In the attempt to avoid the paradoxes of set-theory, Castoriadis argues, 
mathematicians such as Russell were led to ‘various systems of axioms, which, at the price of an ever more 
unwieldy formalism, have suppressed the clear intuitive content of Cantor’s definition, and this, in my opinion, 
without any genuine gain on the formal level’ (see ‘The Logic of Magmas and the Question of Autonomy’, p. 
292). In other words, while Russel argues that naive set-theory is paradoxical, and thus incomplete, for 
Castoriadis this incompleteness alerts us to the incompleteness of any attempt to classify sets. The significance 
of set-theory for our analysis (and, to some extent, category theory) is that it returns mathematics to 
transcendental (i.e. Kantian) questions, for they explore the condition of the possibility of schematic and 
topological experience rather than the objects of experience themselves. Russell’s response to Cantor’s 
paradoxes ultimately occludes this trajectory. See Robert Goldblatt, Topoi: The Categorical Analysis of Sets, 
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1984, Chapter 1. Goldblatt’s use of Kantian language to explain the 
development of category theory from Cantor’s initial naive set-theory highlights the epistemological dimensions 
of this turn. 
7 Jeff Klooger, Castoriadis: Psyche, Society, Autonomy, Boston: Brill, 2009, p. 206. 
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‘explodes’ the search of justification by unveiling the groundlessness (the circular reasoning) 
implicit in all logical systems (222).8 
 The importance of Cantor’s set-theory, for Castoriadis, lies in the way that it returns us 
to Kant’s original elucidation of representational, schematic thought. Building from Ernst 
Cassirer’s neo-Kantian interpretation of critical philosophy, Castoriadis does not understand 
Kant’s framework of representation in terms of a theoretical abyss between the finite realm of 
phenomena and the infinite realm noumena. For Cassirer, Kant’s philosophy should not be 
read as a ‘complete historical whole’, but as ‘the expression of the enduring and continuing 
tasks of philosophy’.9 The relevance of Kant’s philosophy, in this view, lies not in a tradition 
of Kantianism but in a set of enduring problematics opened by Kant’s work; problematics that 
do not aim to explain the world but to elucidate it, meaning that they are constantly open and 
forever incomplete. In the same way that Kant’s critical thought presumed the existence of 
mental schemata without providing justification for their existence, set-theory reopens the 
Kantian problematic of representation, entailing that identitary logic, the system of thinking in 
which mathematics provides the only available model of true determination, can only be 
formulated if and only if there exist sets in the sense that Cantor defined. Yet if sets exist in 
this sense, then their origin and the schemata that allow them to be applied are not guaranteed 
by logic but are simply presumed by our using them. Their application presupposes that they 
have been applied before we come to use them, meaning that we experience sets as 
determined to the extent that they precede our thinking them. Or to put it differently, each set 
only comes into being by virtue of being utilised. Thus the ground of mathematical 
presuppositions is not found in logic but in the fact that they have already been applied; that 
they are a practice of convention.10                                                              
8 Castoriadis’ argument also resonates with Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem which problematises the 
justification of axiomatic statements in a logical system, meaning that no system can be complete. According to 
Du Sautoy, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem ‘was not the death knell of mathematics. Gödel had not 
undermined the truth of anything that had been proved. What his theorem showed was that there’s more to 
mathematical reality than the deduction of theorems from axioms’. We might say that Gödel cleaves open the 
possibility of that which exceeds the given, showing that mathematics is by necessity incomplete. His emphasis 
on mathematical ‘demonstration’ resonates with Castoriadis’ understanding of tragedy, for it implies that one 
cannot grasp the Incompleteness Theorem by being ‘told’ but by being ‘shown’. We must encounter the limits of 
systems in a process of self-discovery. See Marcus Du Sautoy, The Music of the Primes: Why an Unsolved 
Problem in Mathematics Matters, London: Harper Perennial, 2004, p. 182. 
9 Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, p. 3. 
10 While the contrasting positions of constructionism and logicism lie outside the scope of our concerns here, it is 
important to note that Castoriadis asserts the groundlessness of sets against the logicism of Russell and 
Whitehead. Russell’s Paradox entails that Cantor’s naive set-theory is logically paradoxical. Following Russell’s 
discovery, set-theory was faced with the problem of revising the intuitive (or naive) ideas about sets and 
reformulating them as such a way as to avoid inconsistencies. For Castoriadis, the drive of logicism is to heal the 
abyss between thought and reality, thus occluding the challenge that Cantor’s set-theory poses to our 
understanding of logic.  
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The discovery of the groundlessness of our cognitive schemata has significant 
ramifications for our understanding of the imagination. Firstly, it implies that identitary logic 
is the expression of a creation – of an ontological genesis – ‘concerning what is and the 
manner in which it exists’ (227). Yet such creativity requires the human ability to create a 
second order of non-being beyond our attachment to the existing. For Castoriadis, it is not 
until Aristotle’s discovery of the imagination (phantasia) that the ensemblising power of 
thought came to philosophy’s attention. For Aristotle, phantasia is an imitative, reproductive 
or combinatory power. Opposed to knowledge or intelligence ‘which are never in error’, 
Aristotle explains that phantasia is ‘that in virtue of which an image arises for us’, and thus 
‘can be false’.11 This kind of imagination is not always present like sensation or thought, but 
occurs when we recollect things that are not present. Yet he suddenly introduces a second, 
different phantasia: ‘As sight is the most highly developed sense, the name phantasia 
(imagination) has been formed from phaos (light) because it is not possible to see without 
light’.12 Without this imagination, Aristotle observes that there can be no representative or 
conceptual thought, for this imagination seems to precede any thought. Yet Aristotle’s 
reference to this second kind of imagination is only in passing, and he seems not to have 
linked phantasia with poiesis; with the practical ability of humans to shape their environment. 
For Aristotle, imagination was merely reproduction, a mode of techne that ‘brings-forth’ what                                                              
11 Aristotle, On The Soul, 428a1-2, 16-17. Aristotle’s account of phantasia in On The Soul can be understood as 
an explicit response to Plato’s understanding of the term. In the infamous Book X of Republic (602c-d), Plato 
discusses the techne of the poet, who is said not to be an imitator of things as they are but of appearances (thrice 
removed from the truth). Socrates asks what kind of faculty (dunamin) imitation makes a special appeal. He then 
identifies the faculty of appearances (phantasia) as that which makes it possible for a man to appear to be small 
when he is distant, and larger when he is close; for a stick to appear straight when out of water, and bent when it 
is plunged half into a stream. The techne of measuring, numbering and weighing, on the other hand, help with 
theses illusions by allowing phantasia to give way to the measuring part of the soul (logisamenon). When this 
faculty has done its measuring, it will often produce results that contradict phantasia. Because it is impossible 
for the same thing (the soul) to hold two contradictory judgments about the same thing, Socrates deems that the 
part with judges according to the appearance must be different from that which judges with the measurement. He 
concludes that the latter is better than the former, for it is not subject to representing non-being. In On The Soul, 
Aristotle argues that phantasia and logisamenon are not two types of judgment where one is inferior to the other, 
and neither is judgment a posteriori to sense impression. Rather, he suggests that one is judging and the other 
sensory, meaning that both operate harmoniously and immediately: ‘It is clear then that imagination (phantasia) 
cannot, again, be opinion (doxa) plus sensation, or opinion mediated by sensation, or a blend of opinion and 
sensation; this is impossible both for these reasons and because the content of the supposed opinion cannot be 
different from that of the sensation (I mean that imagination must be the blending of the perception of white with 
the opinion that it is white: it could scarcely be a blend of the opinion that it is good with the perception that it is 
white): to imagine is therefore (on this view) identical with the thinking of exactly the same as what one 
perceives non-incidentally’ (428a24-428b1). Against Plato’s account of phantasia as an inferior kind of judging, 
Aristotle seems to argue that appearance cannot be equated with judging sensibly, because something appearing 
in a certain way (a man appearing to be small when he is far away) is compatible with a contemporaneously held 
true belief that he is in fact 6ft tall. By arguing that phantasia is not opinion plus sensation, Aristotle is able to 
say that a man’s being 6ft can still be true given one’s perception of him being smaill. See Kimon Lycos, 
‘Aristotle and Plato on “Appearing”,’ in Mind, 73, 1964, pp. 496–514. 
12 Aristotle, On The Soul, 429a3-4. 
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was already there rather than creatively bringing it into being. Aristotle’s failure to connect 
phantasia with poiesis, for Castoriadis, establishes the subsequent neglect of imagination in 
philosophical inquiry, seen in the fact that philosophy from the start has been a search for the 
truth as opposed to opinion, for aletheia as opposed to doxa. 
Castoriadis argues that Aristotle’s conception of imagination, elaborated by Kant 
centuries later, expresses the ongoing need for a philosophical conception of mental images 
that transcend reality and are posited as projects.13 In order to elucidate this capacity, he 
builds from Cassirer and Arendt, who both focused on Kant’s distinction between 
reproductive and productive imagination.14 While the reproductive imagination represents 
what has been seen, the productive imagination produces something it has not seen, meaning 
that it is expressed symbolically. Kant’s response to the tragedy of philosophy leads to his 
identification of a realm of non-being that is always beyond the given, seen in the productive, 
symbolic nature of his construction of the aesthetic sphere. Yet Kant’s productive 
imagination, for Castoriadis, is seriously limited by his refusal to cleave from the traditional 
ontology he calls into question. ‘When Kant sees in the work of art “produced” by genius the 
undetermined and indeterminable positing of new determinations’, Castoriadis notes, ‘there 
will still be an “instrumentality” of a higher order, a subordination of the imagination to 
something else that allows one to gauge its works’.15 This poses a challenge to Kant’s overall 
coherence in CJ, for the ontological status of the work of art remains ‘a reflection or a 
derivative of its value status, which consist in the presentation within intuition of the Ideas for 
which Reason cannot, in principle, furnish a discursive representation’.16 For Castoriadis, 
Kant’s grappling with the creative energy of genius pushes his work to breaking point. 
Despite the fact that he maintains that the infinite is always noumena, beyond our cognition, 
Kant’s productive imagination ‘interrupts’ the ontology of his critical system, of ontology as                                                              
13 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Discovery of the Imagination’, in World in Fragments, trans. D. Curtis, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1997b, pp. 213-245. 
14 See Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, p. 314, 323, Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992, p. 79. C.f. Castoriadis, ‘The Discovery of the Imagination’, pp. 213-
235. What is important about Cassirer’s reading of Kant’s productive imagination, for Castoriadis, is that it 
emphasises the representational character of thinking without requiring access to a theoretical sphere of 
ontological fixity. For Cassirer, Kant is not concerned with determining the being of the theoretical sphere but 
with elucidating that which ‘reason brings forth entirely out of itself’, as he states in the Preface of the first 
edition of CPR (Axx). For Castoriadis, Cassirer’s reading of Kant does not return us to the Fichtean absolute ego 
that contains all of reality. For Cassirer, Kant was an idealist about form, not matter, for he argued that the 
existence of an empirical world, a ‘natural strata’, is logically necessary given the synthetic orientation of the 
transcendental categories. While there is noting outside of Fichte’s absolute I, Kant never ceased from arguing 
that without an ‘object’ (Gegenstand, that which ‘stands against’ us) there is nothing to protect imagination from 
fantasy. 
15 Castoriadis, ‘The Discovery of the Imagination’, p. 214. 
16 ibid. 
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such.17 This is particularly apparent in Kant’s three aporias of the imagination: that the 
imagination ‘images’ and yet cannot be seen, let alone said; that imagination is related to 
sensibility and thought, but it cannot be sensed or thought; that it is neither ‘clear’ nor 
‘distinct’ but it illuminates or images the world. The aporetic nature of imagination means that 
it cannot ground itself with any determination, for it is that which grounds; it escapes 
signification for it is that which signifies.18 
Castoriadis develops what he understands as the disruptive nature of Kant’s notion of 
imagination by recasting it as the ‘radical imagination’.19 The term ‘radical’ is used, he 
explains, ‘to emphasise the idea that this imagination is before the distinction between “real” 
and “fictitious”. To put it bluntly: it is because radical imagination exists that “reality” exists 
for us … it is radical because it creates’.20 For Castoriadis, the imagination elucidates the 
transition from the theoretical to the human domain through a process whereby humanity 
creates itself as a living being in terms of society and history. In this framework, imagination 
is the faculty that produces a symbolic realm that goes beyond the natural order and must be 
understood in its social and historical dimensions, producing the ‘significations and 
institutions’ that take the role of Kant’s ideas of the understanding: the schemata for the ideas 
of reason.21 Such an account of the imagination requires a basic a-causal energy that is subject 
to no end other than its own devising. Castoriadis describes this energy as vis formundi, a 
creative power that follows no logic. The imagination’s a-causality does not mean that it is 
‘unconditioned’, ‘absolute’, or without relations, but that it is not subject to a causal 
metaphysics that exhausts appearances in an identitary, mathematical logic. The seat of this 
vis formundi, Castoriadis argues, is ‘the singular human being’, a living being who cannot be 
understood in terms of a purely causal metaphysics.22 
                                                             
17 Similarly, Arendt argues that Kant’s refusal to accept the ontological status of productive imagination means 
that it is never fully productive, for it does not create ex nihilo but creates with what is given to it. Arendt, 
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p. 79. 
18 Building from Castoriadis’ interpretation of Kant, we might argue that if the imagination has the primacy that 
Kant, at times, ascribes to it, then the ontological realm of noumena cannot be other than a representation of 
imagination. 
19 Castoriadis’ notion of the radical imagination confronts the Freudian and Heideggerian imagination. For both 
Freud and Heidegger, the imagination ‘brings-forth’ (poiesis) representations, ‘producing’ or drawing into 
presence what was already there. For Castoriadis, the imagination creates ex nihilo, linking it closely with poiesis 
but with an essential distinction. He models the imagination’s creativity not on the Greek artificer who gives 
determinate form to the pre-existing materials of the world – who ‘brings-forth’ – but on the creativity of the 
Hebrew God who creates the world from nothing. Thus the very structures, meanings and ideas in the 
imagination are created by each imagination in every case. See CL 83. 
20 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary’ [1994], in Castoriadis, The 
Castoriadis Reader, trans. D. Curtis, Blackwell Publishers, 1997, pp. 319-337, p. 321. 
21 ibid., pp. 321-322. 
22 ibid., p. 322. 
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In the intellectual context of Paris during the 1960s to 1980s, Castoriadis’ 
identification of a creative basis to all human being and doing confronted the identitary 
thinking he saw in both Marxism and structuralism. Rather than retreating from Marxism to 
structuralism as did many of his contemporaries, Castoriadis viewed structuralism as an heir 
of Marxism, and thus the latest manifestation of the west’s penchant for deterministic 
systems. From the view of structuralism, the symbolic use of language is understood to reveal 
internal structures, entailing that meaning is ultimately an ‘epiphenomenon, a redundant 
accompaniment to what is supposed really to be happening’ (172). In Claude Lévi-Strauss’s 
work, for example, cultural and linguistic structures are determined by a combination of the 
structures of the mind and transregional shifts that can only be understood in terms of the 
social whole. ‘Symbolic function’, in his view, is a combination of diacritical elements within 
a structure. For Castoriadis, on the other hand, ‘symbolic function’ is ‘imaginative function’, 
because the basic capacity of symbolism is the creativity of imagination. Structuralism 
remains unable to articulate this creative, imaginative dimension to symbolism, for it has 
‘nothing to say about the sets of elements it manipulates, about the reasons for their being-
thus, or about their modifications in time’ (170). Masculine and feminine, north and south, 
high and low ‘all seem self-evident to structuralism, simply found there by humans … as if 
social organisation could be reduced to a finite sequence of yes/no, and as if … the terms it 
implies were themselves given from somewhere else’ (ibid.). It reduces the ‘instituted society 
to a collection of dead rules … in the face of which the subject (in order to be ‘structured’ 
must be immersed in passivity’.23 Thus structuralism, for Castoriadis, is ultimately a pseudo-
scientific ideology that merely legitimises established thinking. It fails to confront 
heteronomous modes of being with the task of breaking with inherited structures.24 For the 
structuralist, there is no otherness, and hence no history, for ‘the new is, in every instance, 
constructed through identitary operations … by means of what was already there; the totality 
of the process is only the exposing of the necessarily realised virtualities inherent in a 
primordial principle, present from all time and for all time’ (173). While structuralism aimed 
to question the technical, rationalist thought of modernity, its fundamental incapacity to 
articulate human creativity entails that, as a theory, it is incapable of overcoming the technical 
thinking it aims to critique. 
                                                             
23 Castoriadis, Crossroads in the Labyrinth, p. 88. 
24 François Dosse, History of Structuralism, vol. 2, trans. D. Glassman, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997, p. 115. 
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While his critique of structuralism as a mode of identitary logic has clear resonances 
with Heidegger’s critique of technology, Castoriadis argues that Heidegger’s ontology also 
fails to escape the technical thinking it aims to question. For Castoriadis, Heidegger’s 
commitment to the ontology of ‘disclosure’, that is, ‘the placing-before of what remained 
hidden but, of course, was already there’, remains incapable of articulating human creativity 
(198). As we noted in the previous chapter, the ontology of disclosure privileges the 
production of poiesis over the creativity of praxis, meaning that anything that ‘emerges’ 
within history is framed as a possibility of Being. This entails that when humans ‘create 
institutions, poems, music, tools, languages – or monstrosities, concentration camps, etc. – 
[they] create Nothing’ (199), for these forms are mere productions, fabrications with a given 
form.  
It is important to note that Castoriadis’ critique of phenomenology is not so much 
aimed at Heidegger as it is at his contemporary, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Rather than 
recognise the disruption that a creative understanding of ontology might bring to the 
philosophical tradition, Merleau-Ponty continues Heidegger’s attempt to escape from the 
representational paradigm of thinking. In The Visible and the Invisible, for example, Merleau-
Ponty argues that ‘if our relation with the world is Vorstellung, the world “represented” has 
the In Itself as the meaning of its being’. 25 In his view, representation is dualistic, because all 
that is ‘real’ lies outside it. The alternative that Merleau-Ponty proposes is to ‘reach’ Being 
itself: ‘What I want to do is restore the world as a meaning of Being absolutely different from 
the “represented,” that is, as the vertical Being which none of the “representations” exhaust 
and which all “reach,” the wild Being’.26 For Castoriadis, however, posing the question of the 
meaning of Being does not draw us underneath the ‘layer’ of representation, but isolates the 
intuitive element of imagination without recognising the necessity of the conceptual 
understanding for the possibility of having experience at all.  
Thus phenomenology remains unable to escape identitary logic, for it continues the 
Greco-Western tendency to think of representation in terms of a projection screen which 
separates ‘subject’ and ‘thing’, or, in Heidegger’s critique of modern technology, in terms of a 
fraudulent mask created by modern technology that causes us to forget Being (330). This 
formulation of the problem entails that philosophy – in both traditional and phenomenological 
forms – is premised on the drive to overcome this separation, either by identifying a technical                                                              
25 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingis, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1968, pp. 252-253. 
26 ibid., p. 253. 
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mode of thinking that could guarantee our access to the thing or by removing the 
representational character of thought altogether. If philosophy is premised on the task of 
providing a passage between subject and object, the notion of representation provides a 
fundamental limit. Representation, for Castoriadis, not only ‘questions’ but also ‘destroys’ the 
identitary logic in which being is considered ‘as one, … as sameness, as the sameness for all, 
hence being as common – koinon – and the type of logical organisation consubstantial, 
homologous to this thesis’ (330). Thus for philosophers in search of a common, unitary 
conception of being, the failure of what is given in representation ‘to conform to the most 
basic logical schemata’ entails that representation must be denounced (ibid.). 
The alternative Castoriadis provides to Marxism, structuralism, and phenomenology is 
based on the conviction that, to overcome identitary logic, a way of thinking is required that is 
able to acknowledge the creativity of imagination (i.e. representation) and accept the 
representational dimensions of thought. Again, Castoriadis argues that Kant provides an 
exemplary way of proceeding in the notion of imagination’s reflective capacity he outlines in 
CJ. For Kant, to reflect is ‘to compare and combine a given representation either with other 
representations or with one’s cognitive faculties, with respect to a concept thereby made 
possible’ (CJ 5:179). Reflection allows us to turn our own thinking into an object of 
representation, and to find the concept expressed therein. If we understand the concepts that 
govern the practice of thinking to be social institutions in the most basic sense, however, then 
reflection is not simply a process of identifying concepts that are transcendentally necessary. 
Rather, it is a process by which our thinking ‘turns back on itself and interrogates itself not 
only about its particular contents but also about its presuppositions and its foundations’.27 
Since the social institution has furnished these foundations, genuine reflection necessarily 
involves ‘a challenging of the given institutions of society, the putting into question of 
socially instituted representations’.28 This task does not attempt to uncover a layer underneath 
representation. Rather, like Castoriadis’ interpretation of Cantor’s naive set-theory, it calls the 
very self-positing nature of institutions into question, undermining the constant effort of 
society – and our own cognitive effort – to connect signification and being. When imaginary 
significations are recognised as contingent, they become subject to question and alteration, 
opening us to the prospect of new possibilities. 
                                                             
27 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Logic, Imagination, Reflection’, in World in Fragments, trans. D. Curtis, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997, pp. 246-272, p. 267. 
28 ibid. 
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What is important for our argument in this chapter is that the very fact that we can 
think of this kind of reflection, that we have some, albeit limited, language to elucidate the 
ability of the imagination to call itself into question, is only made possible by explicit 
attempts made in history to break from the closure of identitary logic. Two significant 
attempts, for Castoriadis, are found in Aristotle and Kant, for both recognised the power of 
the imagination to create images that transcend reality; images that are unrealised but not 
unrealisable.29 Another attempt to call the imaginary significations of society into question, 
Castoriadis argues, one that precedes Aristotle and Kant, occurred in the Athenian cultural 
revolution of the fifth century BCE. This attempt was not simply made by philosophers such 
as Protagoras and Democritus, but by tragic poets, historians, and politicians. What is 
important about the Athenian cultural revolution, for Castoriadis, is that it turned not only on 
the recognition of the self-created nature of social, legal, and religious meaning, but on the 
acceptance of human limits. 
 
7.2 Tragedy and self-creation 
 
To understand the reflective character of the Athenian cultural revolution, Castoriadis 
begins by outlining an appropriate historical method that does not simply reproduce the 
identitary logic of our own time. For a logicist historical method, ‘the new is, in every 
instance, constructed through identitary operations … by means of what was already there’ 
(IIS 173). In such a method, the time of radically otherness, an otherness that can neither be 
deduced nor produced, has to be abolished’ (ibid). Castoriadis identifies two historical 
methodologies that reproduce the logicist thinking that correspond roughly with the Idealist 
and Nietzschean views identified in this thesis.  
The first is that which explores history in terms of the logical order of ideas in search 
for the emergence of meaning within history. The problem with this method, for Castoriadis, 
is that history ‘cannot itself “have a meaning” (or, moreover, “not have meaning”) – any more 
than a gravitational field can have (or not have) a weight, or an economic space can have (or 
not have) a price’.30 This view of history, for Castoriadis, seeks to explain the emergence of 
meaning within history as if events, thoughts, and actions were the results of causes that can 
be known. A better view of history, Castoriadis suggests, recognises that ‘history is creation’,                                                              
29 See Castoriadis, ‘The Discovery of the Imagination’, pp. 231-245; Vrasidas Karalis, ‘Aristotle and Us: Some 
Observations on His Philosophical Language’, in Thesis Eleven, No. 93, 2008, pp. 36-51, p. 47. 
30 Castoriadis, ‘Institution of Society and Religion’, p. 5. 
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meaning that it ‘is that in and through which meaning … is conferred upon things, acts, etc’.31 
In this framework, if we turn to history in order locate a concept such as freedom, it is only 
found because human ‘doing posits and provides for itself something other than what simply 
is, and because in it dwell significations that are neither the reflection of what is perceived … 
nor the strictly rational development of what is given’ (IIS 146). A proper historical method 
must be attuned to the creativity of human doing if it is to identify the radical nature of the 
Athenian cultural revolution. Thus, when we consider tragedy, a proper historical method 
begins by recognising that there ‘is no definitive concept of tragedy, only the history of 
tragedy’.32 
The second logicist method Castoriadis identifies is put forward by a group of scholars 
he terms the ‘structuralist Hellenists’ (which he identifies as Vernant, Vidal-Naquet and 
Detienne). These scholars, he suggests, view the task of history as an anthropological task in a 
way that becomes paradigmatic for what we termed the Nietzschean view. Castoriadis draws 
from Daniel Coppieters de Gibson, who characterises these thinkers in terms of a common 
understanding that ‘the figure of Greek man … determines the status of anthropos, placing 
him in a relation with the gods and, correspondingly, with animals’.33 For the structuralist 
Hellenists, the western determinations of human being as a rational animal, as created in the 
image of God, or as the necessary and sufficient condition of knowledge, obscure a reality 
that is disclosed in the tragic presentation of Greek anthropos. This means that philosophy 
must be bypassed in favour of retrieving Greek anthropos.  
While the attention this view gives to the social and political setting of antiquity 
clearly influences Castoriadis’ own view, he argues that the structuralist method contains a 
‘danger of repeating the critical misapprehension that has plagued the approach to the ancient 
Greek world for centuries’.34 This danger, he suggests, is that we speak of ‘the Greek 
anthropos’, ‘the Greek polis’, ‘the Greek conception of nature’, etc’.35 What is dangerous 
about the attempt to identify a definitive understanding of the Greek world is that it occludes 
the fact that ‘the “spirit” of ancient Greeks is realised precisely as alteration, self-alteration, 
self-institution – all three notions interwoven with striving toward self-knowledge, which is                                                              
31 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’, in The Castoriadis Reader, trans. & 
ed. D. Curtis, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997, pp. 267-290, p. 269, Castoriadis, ‘Institution of Society and 
Religion’, p. 5. 
32 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Rising Tide of Insignificancy, trans. anon, unpublished, p. 318. 
33 Coppieters de Gibson, ‘Les Grecs et la question de l’homme’, p. 65, in Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Aeschylean 
Anthropogony and Sophoclean Self-Creation’, in Figures of the Thinkable, trans. H. Arnold, Stanford University 
Press, California, 2007, pp. 1-20, p. 3. 
34 Castoriadis, ‘Aeschylean Anthropology and Sophoclean Self-Creation’, p. 4. 
35 ibid. 
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continuous effort, work, and process, not a static result’.36 By searching for an authentically 
Greek anthropos in order to confront the Greco-Western picture of humanity, the structuralist 
view locates in history precisely the logic that it uses in its search, remaining unable to see the 
otherness of the Greek world. In short, the structuralist view, like the Idealist view, occludes 
the fact that the ‘basic characteristic of ancient Greek history is precisely that it is history in 
the most emphatic sense of the term’.37 
 Thus for Castoriadis, a method that is appropriate to the otherness of historical being is 
one that recognises the radical nature of human creativity. Such a method, as Suzi Adam’s 
states, is able to attend to that which cannot ‘be predicated, predicted or deduced from its 
precedents’, thus enabling us to see the enormous social-historical creation that takes place in 
ancient Greece.38 According to Adams, Castoriadis’ understanding of ancient Greece 
‘completely alters the signification of those terms or elements [such as anthropos, polis and 
nature] making up this structure’.39 In particular, it confronts the view put forward by 
historical methods that remain subject to identitary logic, for it identifies the distinctive 
character of the Greeks precisely in their awareness of historical creation and its limits. 
From this historical method, Castoriadis identifies tragedy as a transgressive form of 
art that orientates its audience to a new way of seeing. When understood according to this 
method, the significance of the tragedies for a contemporary method lies not in any specific 
content but in their ability to disrupt the hegemony of our own patterns of thinking, and 
thereby providing a window into a society that undertook the collective interrogation of its 
shared meanings. Tragedy, in this view, is not an idea that transcends the particular historical 
moment of ancient Athens or a mode of thinking that unveils a layer underneath 
representational thinking. Rather, it is a public institution that, for the original spectators, 
questions traditional notions of responsibility and agency (Agamemnon), explores the 
indeterminacy of nomos (Antigone), unveils the danger of hubris (Ajax), and even calls public 
decisions into question (Trojan Women). In short, it ‘exhibits the uncertainty pervading the 
[political] field, it sketches the impurity of motives, it exposes the inconclusive character of 
the reasoning upon which we base our decisions’.40 Tragedy does not simply problematise the 
central assumptions of collective life, for Castoriadis, but exemplifies a way of thinking that 
authentically engages with the depth of these problematics.                                                              
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 Suzi Adams, Castoriadis’s Ontology, New York: Fordham University Press, 2011, p. 50. 
39 ibid. 
40 Castoriadis, ‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’, p. 286. 
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Before considering the alternative way for thinking exemplified by the tragedians, it is 
important to establish Castoriadis’ understanding of the ability of tragedy to disrupt identitary 
logic. The tragedies, in Castoriadis’ view, disrupt the idea of Cosmos as the fundamental 
nature of the world that is able to provide the ground for determinant knowledge. Rather than 
presenting Cosmos as Being, Castoriadis argues that they unveil ‘Being as Chaos’, which is to 
say that the ‘order of the world has no “meaning” for man’.41 On the surface, Castoriadis’ 
understanding of tragedy in terms of the presentation of ‘Being is Chaos’ seems similar to 
Nietzsche’s idea of tragedy as the presentation of true being underneath the layer of 
representation. In one sense Castoriadis does draw from Nietzsche, for like Nietzsche he 
suggests that if we find a disruptive, a-causal and creative energy at the heart of psychic life, 
then thought cannot be said to access timeless truth. Yet in opposition to Nietzsche, 
Castoriadis does not conclude that representation occludes original chaos, meaning that it 
must be overcome by participating in the Primordial One. Rather, he argues that there is no 
possibility of a primordial participation in the chaos of being, for human thought is 
representation. The question is not whether representation can be overcome, but whether 
representational thinking can open itself from the closure of the effort to unite signification 
and being and accept its fundamental creativity. 
What distinguishes the luminosity of the tragedies from other forms of art, for 
Castoriadis, is that they present the chaos of being without reproducing identitary thinking: 
they are ‘transparent’.42 The tragedies are not phenomenal, giving us an intuition of our 
participation with chaos that takes us under the layer of representation. Rather, they are 
representations, but representations of a transparent kind, for they allow us to see through the 
fixity of the continental plates of social institutions to the magmatic flux underneath.43 The 
notion of ‘transparency’ contains within it Kant’s notion of elucidation. Elucidation, for Kant, 
is the activity of reflective judgment that does not attempt to explain or stand in front of a 
singular appearance, but to ‘make lucid’, to unveil. To elucidate is not to submit the object 
under a concept but is, through a poetic kind of thinking, to allow a symbolic presentation to 
go beyond nature to the cognitive apparatus though which it appears. Unlike Merleau-Ponty’s                                                              
41 ibid., p. 273, 284. Elsewhere Castoriadis describes tragedy as a ‘window into the abyss, into chaos, and the 
shaping of this abyss – it is the moment of sense, the creation of a cosmos by art itself’. Cornelius Castoriadis, 
‘Fenêtre Sur Le Chaos’, in Fenêtre Sur Le Chaos, Éditions Du Seuil, Paris, 2007, p. 153 (translation mine). 
42 ibid. 
43 In IIS (343), Castoriadis resists the structuralist understanding of the functional categories of human thought 
with the notion of ‘magma’, a concept he uses to describe ‘that from which one can extract (or in which one can 
construct) an indefinite number of ensemblist organisations but which can never be reconstituted (ideally) by a 
(finite or infinite) ensemblist composition of these organisations’. The fluidity of magma supports all ensemblist 
organisations but cannot be understood structurally, for it is always in motion and radically indeterminate. 
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phenomenology, elucidation requires the self-limitation of the desire for unmediated contact 
with the object as thing in itself, recognising that one’s representational perspective is 
‘shaped’ by a social-historical logic. Thus the tragedies do not invite us in to participate with 
being, but, paradoxically, give the abyssal ground of reality a kind of form. 
In contrast to Heidegger’s interpretation of tragedy in terms of transcultural, 
ontological texts, Castoriadis’ method shifts attention to the cultural specificity of tragic 
presentation. In other words, because the tragedies are not merely phenomenal but 
transparent, they cannot be understood to give an abstract presentation of ‘chaos’ as a layer 
underneath the flux of representations. Rather, they reveal the chaotic basis of a particular 
constellation of identitary thinking by presenting the inherited content of social life in a new 
form. In the context of ancient Greece, the shift from representing ancient myths from epic to 
dramatic form oriented the spectators to their tradition in a new way. It is not the content that 
changes but the form in which it is presented: the univocal authority of the Chorus is 
displaced by the polyvocality of opposing characters. Amongst the multitude of perspectives, 
the Chorus becomes one voice among many, the voice of tradition, rather than providing a 
final interpretation of the events. Thus the tragic form refrains from giving an interpretation of 
the action and, instead, represents the judgments made by each character and the reasoning 
upon which those judgments are made. The spectators gain a new orientation to the content of 
epic, for they are confronted with the inconclusive character of the reasoning upon which the 
heroes base their decisions and make claims to legitimacy. They become the jury faced with 
the most monstrous of crimes performed by their heroes, thereby gaining a new orientation 
toward tradition. In this framework, tragedy is not transgressive because it presents new 
content, but, as Herbert Marcuse states, because it ‘re-presents reality while accusing it’, 
alienating individuals from their functional existence in the effort to emancipate the 
imagination.44 
By placing the heroes before the watching audience, the entire cultural history of 
ancient Athens is cleaved open and revealed to be the outworking of individual and fallible 
choices, many of which were seen to be highly dubious. For example, Homer’s presentation 
of the battle of Troy in the Odyssey is reconsidered by Aeschylus’ three hundred years later in 
a manner that calls the entire myth into question. In the Odyssey, Agamemnon is forced to 
sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia so that the winds would give a favourable passage for his 
army on their journey to the battle of Troy. He returns from Troy as the triumphant conqueror                                                              
44 Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics, Boston: Beacon Press, 
1977, p. 8. 
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only to be killed by Aegisthus, who has taken Agamemnon’s wife Clytemnestra as his lover.45 
While the death of the heroic king after a long and victorious voyage is unfortunate, 
Agamemnon’s death is not tragic. In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, however, Agamemnon meets a 
different fate. He returns from Troy claiming that his heroic victory was not simply his own 
but the act of divine vengeance.46 While he is busy heralding his shared triumph with the gods 
whose supposed ‘protecting power / Sent forth, and brought me home again’ (ll. 852-3), 
Clytemnestra awaits him. She plays the role of the affectionate wife, laying out a purple 
carpet to honour his victory, yet the carpet is not the victor’s path but signals her intent to turn 
a victory march into funeral procession. Clytemnestra holds Agamemnon responsible for 
murdering their daughter and brutally kills him when he reaches their home. The Chorus hold 
Clytemnestra guilty of a grievous crime and swiftly call for retribution, causing Clytemnestra 
to respond by claiming that her action was justified by Apollo who helped her to see that ‘The 
guile I used to kill him / He used himself at first’ (ll. 1524-5). However, the Chorus also hold 
Agamemnon guilty, for he sacrificed Iphigenia because he valued his glory and his war over 
the demands of his family. They recognise that sacrificing his daughter did not mark his 
‘sending off’ by the gods but an action that aimed to ‘keep morale from sagging / in 
superstitious soldiers’ (ll. 806-7). It was a sin (harmartia) that violated the ‘awe that 
parenthood must claim’ (ll. 226, 133), resulting in his own death. The spectators are 
positioned to see the battle of Troy not as the vengeance of the gods but as the outworking of 
Agamemnon’s ego.  
While the Chorus shows that error lies with both Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, they 
prove unable to decide on a right course of action in response. The situation is too complex, 
too fraught with contradictions for the old voice of tradition to prove capable of providing a 
response. The spectators are left to critically assess the reasoning that each character gives for 
their actions, and yet they cannot make sense of the situation with their predetermined ideas 
of justice. They must balance the competing elements and search for a new procedure of 
thought that authentically engages with the tragic character of the ethical demands presented. 
By refusing to present the conflict as between good and evil and by focusing on the 
activity of human judgment, the tragedies are grounded on the realisation of responsibility, 
orientating the spectators to the political order under a new way of thinking that is other than 
that which preceded it. The tragedies do not appeal to any universal reference points outside a                                                              
45 See Homer, The Odyssey, trans. E. Rieu, revised trans. D. Rieu, London : Penguin Books, 2003, 11.409-11. 
46 When Agamemnon returns he addresses his countrymen as follows: ‘First, Argos, and her native gods, revive 
from me / The conqueror’s greeting on my safe return; for which, / As for the just revenge I wrought on Priam’s 
Troy, / Heaven shares my glory’. Aeschylus, Agamemnon, ll. 810-813. 
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form of life, but present practice of judgment as a tenuous, dangerous, human activity. The 
tragic poets lived in a time of transition, where new institutions were emerging within 
traditional religious practices. They experienced a time of rupture, and saw the need for new 
ways of making sense of human action. They created artworks that are exemplary, prying 
open an old foundation of validity and revealing it to be inadequate to deal with experience, 
throwing the spectators back onto their own devices. They are alerted to the inescapable 
reality of judgment: that ‘nothing can guarantee the a priori correctness of action’, neither 
divine law nor human reason.47 Moreover, they managed to turn that awareness into works of 
art. 
In the Greek tragedies we find that the experience of recognising the failure of an 
inherited mode of thinking to navigate new problems is basic to a way of thinking that is 
based on experience and reflection. Tradition is displaced from a position of transcendental 
authority, and the task of judging the singularity of emerging problems is established in its 
place. Thus tragic self-reflection cannot be understood as the rejection of tradition for a new 
form of inquiry, but as the transformation of tradition; the establishment of a new, critical 
relation toward tradition where new tools are drawn from a traditional gamut of references. It 
is not through the rejection of tradition but through the critical confrontation with tradition 
that the imagination is freed to think beyond the concepts it inherits. 
The emphasis Castoriadis places on the critical relation to tradition and the way of 
thinking that it entails is best seen in his reading of Sophocles’ Antigone. Contrary to Hegel’s 
interpretation of Antigone as the antithesis between the family and the law and Heidegger’s 
understanding of the character of Antigone as the daring hero who gives voice to Being, 
Castoriadis argues that ‘the subject of the tragedy is hubris itself: the act committed “because 
of reckless daring” (tolmas charin)’.48 Like Hegel, Castoriadis recognises that Antigone and 
Creon represent two conflicting authorities: Antigone claims to uphold the ‘divine law’ that 
calls one, when an orphan, to forsake all for one’s brother, while Creon appeals to the self-
grounding system of ‘human law’ where no city can exist without restrictions just as no city 
can tolerate treason. Yet against Hegel, Castoriadis argues that neither Sophocles nor the 
Athenian people would have seen these contrasting authorities as incompatible. Indeed, 
Sophocles does not present them as contradictory, for we find in the final lines of the famous 
choral ode that anthropos can become hupsipolis (standing high in one’s city) by ‘weaving 
                                                             
47 Castoriadis, ‘The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’, p. 286. 
48 Castoriadis, ‘Aeschylean Anthropogony and Sophoclean Self-Creation’, p. 13. 
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them together (pareiron)’.49 The scenes that follow the choral ode present the incapacity of 
either Antigone or Creon to think in a way that is capable of this weaving. Thus the drama of 
Antigone, for Castoriadis, is not so much about the content of the ethical commitments held 
by Antigone and Creon as it is about their way of thinking. Both characters blindly defend one 
of the two principles, becoming hubristes and apolis. The act that renders them hubristes, we 
find in Haemon’s warning to Creon, is the going beyond the limits of phronein by attempting 
to be monos phronein, the one who ‘thinks right’.50 
For Castoriadis, hubris provides a new schema for identifying action and speech that 
transgresses the limits of the polis. By presenting claims of legitimacy in terms of human 
judgment, the tragedies present the notion of hubris not as the transgression of some natural 
or divine limit, but as a transgression of the limits of judgment. The import of Sophocles’ 
depiction of Creon and Antigone, in this view, lies in the presentation of two kinds of thinking 
that transgress the limits of judgment, a transgression that occurs by holding one’s private 
conviction to encompass the whole. The characters act in the belief that the correctness of 
their action is guaranteed either by the new forms of law emerging in democratic Athens or in 
the old gods of the city. Thus for Castoriadis, Sophocles’ tragedy presents the fact that ‘even 
when we are right, it is possible that we may be wrong – there is never a final logical 
reason’.51 This is to say that nothing can provide a guarantee for our actions, not even the 
gods or the law. 
Castoriadis’ interpretation of Antigone identifies a procedure for navigating this tragic 
situation in which nothing can be guaranteed, a procedure that is expressed in Haemon’s 
climactic confrontation with Creon. The choral ode anticipates this confrontation by 
celebrating the terrifying ability of human beings to build cities and create institutions while 
recognising their profound failure to control themselves, orientating us to a proper awe of the 
most unsettling and enigmatic being: the human being. Given the chorus’ injunction to weave 
together the conflicting demands of community life, Castoriadis argues that the collision of 
Antigone and Creon draws our attention to the fact that neither listen to the reasons of the 
other. Instead, they insist on their own notion of right, mistaking, to use Kant’s words, their                                                              
49 ibid. This is Castoriadis’ own, literal translation of Sophocles’ words. More poetically it is rendered ‘Great 
honour is given / And power is given to him who upholdeth his country’s laws / And the justice of heaven’. 
Sophocles, Antigone, in The Theban Plays, trans. E. Walting, London: Penguin Books, 1947, ll. 354-6. 
50 Haemon opens his confrontation with Creon with the following monologue: ‘Father, man’s wisdom is the gift 
of heaven, / The greatest gift of all. I neither am / nor wish to prove you wrong, / Though all man might not think 
the same as you do. … Surely, to think you own the only wisdom, / And yours the only word, the only will, / 
Betrays a shallow spirit, an empty heart. / It is not weakness for the wisest man / To learn when he is wrong, 
know when to yield’. ibid., ll. 689-693, 710-713. 
51 Castoriadis, ‘Aeschylean Anthropogony and Sophoclean Self-Creation’, p. 13. 
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‘subjective private conditions … to be objective’ (CJ 5:293-4). Both approach the situation 
with a predetermined universal and base their judgment on a closed order of meaning that is 
irrefutable from the outside, meaning that neither can make a demand on the other. 
Recognising the fragility of the situation, the significance of Haemon’s confrontation with his 
father in the climax of the drama lies in his refusal to directly engage in his father’s 
arguments, for Creon’s reasoning is sound within the closure of his notion of right. Haemon 
states that ‘Neither do I want nor am I able to say that you are wrong’ (l. 686). In his view, the 
reason that Creon is wrong is not because the determinate content of his conviction is false, 
but because he follows a procedure of thinking that occludes the divided nature of the 
situation at hand: ‘For whoever believes he alone is capable of judgment / or whoever 
believes he has a soul or an eloquence that no one else has, / when such people are opened up, 
they are seen to be empty’ (ll. 707-9). Haemon argues that Creon is wrong even though he is 
right, for he insists on being monos phronein (thinking alone). Haemon concludes in words 
that Castoriadis claims to be the play’s central idea, begging Creon ‘not to be wise alone’ (l. 
709). 
Castoriadis identifies in Haemon’s words an epistemological procedure that refrains 
from individual speculation and aims toward publicity, drawing the tragedies into proximity 
with Kant’s enlarged way of thinking. In Kant’s work after CJ, he constantly stressed that the 
faculty of thinking depends on its public use: without ‘the test of free and open examination’, 
he states, no thinking and opinion-formation is possible.52 Opinions are not private 
convictions that we bring, pre-determined, to political decision-making, for reason is not 
made ‘to isolate itself but to get into community with others’.53 This view is not limited to his 
later writings, however, for Kant’s goal throughout his work is impartial thought, meaning 
that opinions must stand the test of publicity if they are to respect the limits of judgment. This 
kind of thinking crystallises in CJ as ‘enlarged’ thought, the process of taking into account the 
thoughts of others.54 In Castoriadis’ view, Kant’s proposal of an enlarged mode of thinking 
that acknowledges the challenges of representational thinking and yet aspires toward 
universality outlines a way of thinking that is attuned to the fluidity of human life.                                                              
52 Kant, ‘Reflexionen zur Anthropologie’, no. 897, Gesammelte Schriften, 15:392, in Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s 
Political Philosophy, p. 40. 
53 ibid. 
54 It is important to note that Kant’s notion of enlarged thought builds from Rousseau’s distinction between the 
private and the general will. For Rousseau, it is impossible for the private will to be concordant with the general 
will in an enduring way, for ‘by its nature the private will tends toward having preferences, and the general will 
tends toward equality’. For Kant, Rousseau failed to articulate how a community would be orientated toward the 
general will or how the citizens would be transformed from being concerned with their private will to willing the 
common good. His solution, in the CJ, lies in enlarged thought. Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 29-30. 
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7.3 Kant: a philosopher of tragedy 
 
 Thus far I have suggested that Castoriadis’ interpretation of tragedy can be read as a 
response to identitary logic, disrupting the link between signification and Being. In this 
section I argue that the significance of Castoriadis’ interpretation of tragedy is further seen in 
the way it transforms his understanding of philosophy. This understanding of philosophy, I 
suggest, portrays Kant’s CJ as a text that is analogous to the tragedies to the extent that it 
presents the antinomy between the concept of nature as a determinant substance and the 
concept of nature as an aesthetic, self-created idea, placing the being of signification into 
radical question and enlarging the imagination of his reader to encompass the tragic character 
of representational thinking. 
 In a framework similar to his interpretation of tragedy, Castoriadis’ understanding of 
philosophy begins by identifying its institutional character. While philosophy can become the 
effort to identify the being of signification with being itself as we see in identitary thinking, 
the initial creation of philosophy – and even the initial desire to (re)connect being and 
signification – signals a different task: 
 
The historical creation of philosophy is rupture of this closure [of instituted society]: explicit 
putting into question of these [so-called imaginary significations], of the representations and 
words of the tribe. … [It is] possible only in and through an onset of rupture in social 
heteronomy and the creation of a new type of being: reflexive and deliberative subjectivity.55 
 
The ‘otherness’ of philosophy, for Castoriadis, lies in its break with the heteronomous 
instituting of society by transforming inherited institutions. Philosophy is thus an institution 
that begins when the being of nature, of phusis, appears not as a given, fixed part of 
experience, but as a question that demands our attention.56 The development of the Greek 
word phusis indicates that the elaboration of the phusis did not signal a revolutionary term, 
but the transformation of particular ensembles of meaning. While Homer seems to be the first                                                              
55 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Done and to be Done’, in The Castoriadis Reader, trans. & ed. D. Curtis, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1997, pp. 361-417, p. 370. 
56 In his essay ‘Fenêtre Sur Le Chaos’, Castoriadis argues that this origin of philosophy is not unique to pre-
Socratic thought, but that we find it equally in Plato and Aristotle. Plato identifies the proper foundation of 
philosophy is thaumazein, a sense of wonder, and in Aristotle’s argument that it is due to thaumazein humans 
‘both now begin and at first began to philosophize’. Thaumazein discloses a mode of thought that begins from 
our activity of seeing (theorein), where a particular ‘this’ (a form of idein) throws us into an amazed stupor, into 
wonder. However, it is before Plato and Aristotle that the idea of phusis arose as a matter of question. Plato, 
Theaetetus, trans. R. Waterfield, London: Penguin Books, 1987, 155d; Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982b12-13; 
Raymond Prier, Thauma Idesthai: The phenomenology of sight and appearance in archaic Greek, USA: 
University Press of Florida, 1989, p. 85. 
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to use an early form of phusis (phua) in order to indicate generation and growth, its scope was 
limited to the vegetative domain.57 Heraclitus introduced an anthropological dimension to 
phusis, understanding it in relation to the human condition. For the Sophists, phusis (that 
which is subject to its own proper principle) was understood in relation to nomos (that which 
is subject to a created principle) in a creative battle in the debate over which parts of the 
human condition are natural, and which are convention.58 It is only after Heraclitus and the 
work of the Sophists that the being of nature becomes a problem. It is not until phusis arises 
as a question and is placed in opposition to what belongs to human convention, to nomos, that 
human thought recognises its creative work in generating form in order to navigate the natural 
strata. 
The origin of philosophy, then, does not lie in ‘the ancient Greek understanding of 
phusis’, in ‘Plato or Aristotle’s concept of phusis’, or even in ‘the ancient Greek 
understanding of philosophy’. Rather, it lies in the transformation of the relation of nomos to 
phusis in such a way that cleaved the being of nomos from the determining ground of phusis, 
bringing the historical character of human institutions to the attention of the ancient Greeks. 
This distinction between phusis and nomos is, for Castoriadis, ‘one of the great creative 
moments of Greek thought, and its most characteristic’.59 On one side, phusis signifies ‘the 
push, the endogenous and spontaneous growth of things that nevertheless is also generative of 
an order’, while on the other, nomos, ‘usually translated as “law,” originally signified the law 
of sharing, therefore institution, therefore usage (ways and customs), therefore a convention, 
and, at the limit, convention pure and simple’.60 Nomos establishes a lasting ‘imaginary 
institution by means of which we make ourselves qua human beings’.61 In the rupture 
occurring in the Greek social world whereby institutions where seen to be subject to human 
creation, if something pertains to nomos and not to phusis then that something depends on 
human conventions and not on the nature of beings.  
Castoriadis recognises three significant implications stemming from the separation of 
nomos from phusis that provide the shared grounds for philosophy and democracy.62 The first 
                                                             
57 Homer mentions phua only once. See Homer, The Odyssey, 10.302-3. 
58 See Michel Foucault’s exploration of the sophists in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History,’ in The Foucault 
Reader, New York: Random House, 1984, pp. 76-100. 
59 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Phusis and Autonomy’, in World in Fragments, trans. D. Curtis, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997, pp. 331-341. 
60 ibid., p. 331. 
61 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Value, Equality, Justice, Politics: From Marx to Aristotle, From Aristotle to Us’, in 
Crossroads in the Labyrinth, trans. K. Soper & M. Ryle, Great Britain: Harvester Press, 1978, pp. 260-339, p. 
326. 
62 Castoriadis, ‘Done and to be Done’, p. 373. 
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is that to separate nomos from phusis is to say that there can be no phusis of nomos; there can 
be no determinate principle of human institutions. If human institutions are separate from the 
natural order and are not determined by it, it follows that they are contingent and thus subject 
to question and alteration. The second is that nomos is created by human activity, an insight 
reflected in the self-adjudicating institutions that arose in Athens where the laws governing 
human affairs were subject to deliberation and alteration. The recognition of self-creativity 
entails a notion of imagination, phantasia, which does not imitate phusis but creates a 
symbolic world that goes beyond it (i.e. representation). Thirdly, Castoriadis identifies that 
the opposition of nomos and phusis entails that ‘there is at least one type of being, human 
being, that creates, gives rise to, its own eidos in a “non-natural” fashion, without this eidos 
being found already, dunamei, in its determinate potentialities’.63 
While Plato denies the shared ground of philosophy and democracy, for he contrasts 
the contingent character of democracy with the necessary truth of philosophy, Aristotle’s 
stance is not so clear. While Aristotle sought to bring nomos and phusis back into the realm of 
human affairs, he also aims to heal the tension between them by identifying a distinct realm 
appropriate to each, the realm in which things ‘cannot be otherwise’ and the realm of 
‘coming-to-be’, thus occluding the tragedy of the tension.64 However, Castoriadis argues that 
a glimmer of tragedy arises in Aristotle’s work in the tension between Aristotle’s definitions 
of nature. In response to the Sophists who separated nomos and phusis, Aristotle argued that 
anthropos is by nature (phusis) a political animal (one who creates nomos), meaning that the 
creative element of human beings is a product of nature. While this definition places nomos in 
the human domain, it removes phusis to the determinative realm of being. Yet when Aristotle 
defines phusis in Physics, he gives two definitions that, Castoriadis argues, stand radically 
opposed. The first interpretation Aristotle gives is tied to the idea of telos, of ends: 
 
nature [is] end and that in view of which [something occurs] 
(he de phusis telos kai hou heneka)65 
 
For Aristotle, every ‘thing’ is a part of a chain of means and ends, wherein each is always end 
of an interior thing and means of a thing superior in value. That which has an end is a kind of 
artefact, what modern philosophers refer to as a ‘machine’ that has a final goal. A watch, for 
example, has an end, a nature, which is to tell the time. This end is not determined by an inner 
                                                             
63 ibid. 
64 See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 70b9-72b4, and Nicomachean Ethics, 1142a25f. 
65 Aristotle, Physics, 194a28-29. 
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principle (a principia domestica) but is endowed as an efficient cause (nexus effectivus) by an 
external force – in this case a watchmaker. 
 Aristotle poses a second definition of phusis that stands in tension with the first. The 
first definition of nature in terms of efficient causation is unable to accommodate the finalities 
of the living being, a self-organising being that cannot be understood in terms of efficient 
causation but in terms of final causation (nexus finalis). Aristotle permits this dimension in the 
second interpretation of phusis, identifying phusis as 
 
the essence of the things that have in themselves, as such, principle of movement 
(arkhen kineseos)66 
 
This entails that phusis contains in itself the origin and the principle of its movement, 
meaning that living beings posit themselves, partially as their own ends. In this definition, 
movement (kinesis) is not only local movement but also change, generation, and alteration 
(alloiosis).  
For Castoriadis, Aristotle’s second definition of phusis stands in a radical tension with 
the first, echoing something of the confrontation between nomos and phusis that is basic to 
tragedy. It shifts the notion of phusis from ‘that which has in itself the principle or the origin 
of its moment’ into ‘that which has in itself the principle or the origin of its change – of its 
alteration’.67 It is to say that nature forms itself; it creates itself, expanding our concept of 
nature as the determinative ground for eternal being. If nature is truly self-forming, then there 
is no fixed order by which we can legislate natural appearances. Rather, our concepts of 
natural things would be contingent significations that do not determine the thing’s being but 
elucidate its inner principle. The tension between Aristotle’s two definitions of phusis echoes 
the tragic collision of nomos and phusis, because it contrasts the determination of nature 
according to a proper principle with the concept of nature as indeterminate. This tension is 
‘tragic’, for it problematises the necessary, stable determination of appearances implicit in 
identitary logic, introducing a zone of indeterminacy between nature and the institutions 
though which we understand nature. In short, it confronts us with the reality that phusis can 
give no necessary grounding for nomos, enlarging our way of thinking in order to recognise 
the contingency of imaginary institutions. 
                                                             
66 ibid., 192b21. In the Metaphysics Aristotle also refers to this interpretation, describing techne as the ‘principle 
of movement in something other than the thing moved’, and phusis as the ‘principle of movement in the thing 
itself’. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1070a6-7. 
67 Castoriadis, ‘“Phusis” and Autonomy’, p. 335. 
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Heidegger also saw the contradiction between Aristotle’s two definitions of nature, yet 
he ultimately removed this contradiction by prioritising the radical indeterminacy of phusis 
over nomos. He argues that, in Physics, ‘Aristotle conceives of phusis as the beingness (ousia) 
of a particular (and in itself delimited) region of beings ... But this same treatise of the 
Metaphysics [I, 1003a27] says exactly the opposite: ousia (of the Being of beings as such in 
totality) is something like phusis’.68 In Aristotle’s first definition, Heidegger notes, nature is 
not just one of two equal terms (nature and freedom, nature and spirit, nature and law etc.) but 
it ‘holds the position of priority’.69 Freedom, spirit, law and all ‘non-natural’ potentialities of 
human being are determined by nature, finding their existence in relation to a ground that 
defines their parameters. In the second definition, however, Heidegger argues that we hear an 
‘echo of the great beginning of Greek philosophy, the first beginning of Greek philosophy. In 
this beginning Being was phusis, such that the phusis that Aristotle conceptualized can only 
be a latter derivative of originary phusis’.70 Heidegger argues that the task of philosophy, as 
was the achievement of tragedy, is to allow this notion of phusis to come into appearance. It 
refuses to determine the beingness (ousia) of beings, like the first definition, but provides a 
space for beings to emerge.  
 For Castoriadis, however, Heidegger fails to outline a way of thinking that is adequate 
to the tension between nature and our way of conceptualising nature, for he fails to understand 
phusis in tension with nomos. By outlining the task of philosophy as one of retrieving the 
‘echo of the first beginning’, Heidegger does not bring the two understandings of nature as 
nomos and phusis into confrontation but merely inverts the Platonic dualism of form over 
simulacrum, positing form as the mere occlusion of appearance.71 When phusis is understood 
as primary to nomos, the task of philosophy is one of overcoming representation; of unveiling 
the primary movement of being that is obfuscated by the representational paradigm of 
thought. In this sense, Heidegger’s philosophy casts the self-created nature of nomos aside as 
a part of the anti-tragic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, rendering creativity as a mode of 
production in order to maintain the agency of Being. For Castoriadis, Heidegger’s 
                                                             
68 Martin Heidegger, ‘On the Essence and Concept of Phusis in Aristotle's Physics’, trans. T. Sheehan in 
Pathmarks ed. William McNeill, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 228-229. 
69 ibid., p. 241 
70 ibid., p. 229 
71 One of Castoriadis’ many criticisms of Heidegger can be traced, as Suzi Adams states, to ‘Heidegger’s interest 
in and reliance on a physis that was pre-nomos, and hence an acceptance of a certain kind of a top-down 
unveiling (or “disclosure”) rather than a bottom-up institution (or “creation”)’. Adams, Castoriadis’s Ontology, p. 
20. 
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commitment to pure Being renders him blind to the idea of tragedy as the collision of nomos 
and phusis. Thus his philosophy is unable to confront heteronomy. 
To uncover the tragic dimension of philosophy, Castoriadis returns to Kant’s CJ. In 
Castoriadis’ reading of Kant, the rediscovery of the self-organising concept of nature in the 
eighteenth century provided the catalyst to the rediscovery of the tragedy of philosophy. 
When philosophy is confronted with its failure to provide a manner of thinking that is 
adequate to the self-forming, living being, it is again confronted with the nomos/phusis 
problematic, an encounter that reopens philosophy’s perception of tragedy. In Castoriadis’ 
interpretation, it was not Schelling, Hölderlin, or Hegel who provided a solution to the tragedy 
of philosophy, but Kant. In CJ, the conception of nature as determinate ground and as 
contingent appearance comes to a particular climax in the antinomy of teleological judgment. 
Kant’s engagement with the radical biological movements of the late eighteenth century led 
him to reconsider the identitary logic of traditional ontology. The discovery of the living 
being requires a new conception of being in terms of a fluid, dynamic and groundless 
condition of possibility. 
Kant’s recognition of the antinomy of teleological judgment results in several 
important conclusions. First, it results in the recognition that our representation of nature is 
limited to our concept of nature, that is, to the institution of nature that is historically 
contingent. Second, recognising the representational character of thought thereby separates 
human cognition from the being of nature. Third, recognising the abyss between nature and 
human thought requires the acknowledgment of the contingency of human signification. 
Kant’s understanding of contingency, however, does not entail absolute lawlessness. Rather, it 
allows us to conceptualise appearances in terms of an internal purpose that dynamically 
responds to its environment. This understanding of contingency aims to solve the problem 
that was raised by Kant’s examination of judgment in CPR, which entails that (1) nature 
conforms to judgment, and (2) judgment cannot access the being of nature. The antinomy of 
teleological judgment between the concept of nature as lawfully determined and the concept 
of nature as self-forming (as beyond the limits of human thought) enables Kant to recognise 
that if our concept of nature is unable recognise contingency, the universe is limited to a 
theoretical order of cause and effect (for us). When we ‘confuse’ the heautonomy of reflecting 
judgment for the heteronomy of determining judgment, the otherness of historical creation is 
not only unthinkable but a threat to the perfection of nature. The procedure of thinking that is 
aware of this dilemma, on the other hand, is one that gives law to itself; it self-limits by 
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refraining from its determinative operation in contexts that involve living, self-organising 
beings. 
 Thus, it is not the determination of nature according to the ideas of reason that 
constitutes the task of autonomy, for Castoriadis, but the self-determination of judgment: 
heautonomy. In his essay ‘“Phusis” and Autonomy’, Castoriadis states that in the discovery of 
the living being we arrive 
 
at an idea of autonomy that differs radically from simple self-constitution. We conceive 
autonomy as the capacity of a society or of an individual, to act deliberately and explicitly in 
order to modify its law – that is to say, its form. Nomos becomes the explicit self-creation of 
form, which thus makes it appear both as, still, the opposite of phusis – and as one of the 
latter’s points of culmination.72 
 
Autonomy understood in terms of Kantian heautonomy does not reproduce the theological 
voluntarism of seventeenth century philosophers such as Descartes and Hobbes, but puts 
forward a version of voluntarism that is attuned to the lawful lawlessness of the living being. 
Descartes’ voluntaristism, for example, can be seen in his claim that there are no truths 
antecedent to God’s will.73 Hobbes outlined a naturalistic account of voluntarism by 
identifying that political legitimacy is underpinned by the ‘irresistible power’ of God that was 
the underlying source of his absolute right of dominion.74 Castoriadis’ voluntarism, on the 
other hand, entails that because the being of nature cannot provide a definitive ground to 
social significations, significations must be understood as framing our most basic orientation 
to the world, and yet are subject to critique. Thus the voluntaristic ground of the project of 
autonomy conditions the possibility of calling these significations into question.  
 In the context of the present thesis, the importance of Castoriadis’ reading of Kant as a 
tragic philosopher is that it identifies in Kant’s philosophy a procedure that authentically 
engages with the tragedy of philosophy. If human creativity is ontological to the extent that, 
through creative praxis, it brings genuinely new form into being, then the task of philosophy 
is not to build a vision of society in terms of philosophically defined ends, but to outline a 
procedure that acknowledges human creativity, that is capable of authentically engaging with 
the contingency of living beings. Thus the significance of Kant’s attention to judgment lies in 
the way that his response to the tragedy of philosophy turns his project from the task of 
outlining the conditions of the possibility of objectivity to the task of outlining the conditions 
for mutual communicability; from building a system of knowledge to outlining a political                                                              
72 Castoriadis, ‘“Phusis” and Autonomy’, p. 340. 
73 Redding, Continental Idealism, p. 27. 
74 ibid. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, Ch. 31, §5, p. 237. 
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procedure. This is to say that responding to the tragedy of philosophy and turning to politics 
constitute one and the same task. 
While Plato’s response to tragedy was to outline a system of philosophy that would 
remove the political nature of politics, Kant’s proposal privileges the unique qualities of the 
particular and the normative guidance given by aesthetic ideas that are part of the shared 
imagination of a community. Herein lies the importance of Kant’s CJ for Castoriadis: it 
vindicates the notion of a public realm of appearances as a political arena. Thus Kant’s 
intersubjective account of judgment provides the beginnings of a mode of judgment that is 
freed from the identitary logic that views being as being something determined. Kant’s 
enlarged view of judgment is regulated by social norms and ideas, yet is first and foremost an 
individual responsibility. In this framework, Castoriadis argues, the task of judgment must be 
understood not in moral but in political terms. 
Castoriadis’ reading of Kant as a tragic philosopher identifies the radical nature of 
Kant’s critique of the faculty of judgment in its destruction of the distinction between the 
‘enlightened few’, the philosophers, and the naive hoi polloi. When this distinction 
evaporates, philosophy ceases to be the quest for transcendent knowledge and, instead, 
embraces humankind in the manner that Kant outlined in his famous self-reflection: 
 
There was a time when I believed all this knowledge could be the honour of mankind and I 
despised all those who were bereft of such knowledge. Rousseau has corrected me. I learned 
to honour man, and I would consider myself less worthy than the average worker if I did not 
believe that all this [meaning ‘philosophy’] could contribute to what really matters – the 
restoration of the rights of humankind.75 
 
When philosophy embraces humankind, its preoccupation with ‘politics’ in the Platonic sense 
disappears.76 In other words, when self-interest is sublimated into a public affair and 
philosophy recognises that it cannot make claim to power by virtue of its superior knowledge, 
the old tension between philosophy and politics disappears. The need to lay down the rules for 
an ideal, philosophical society ceases to be the task of philosophy, and we find that 
philosophy becomes a task of outlining a procedure that acknowledges the contingency of 
signification and a critique of thought that goes beyond its limits. Philosophy, in this 
                                                             
75 Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, 20:44, in Dieter Heinrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German 
Idealism, ed. D. Pacini, USA: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 55. Following his encounter with Rousseau, 
Kant never ceases to argue this point, stating in CPR (B859) that ‘in regard to the essential ends of human nature 
the highest philosophy cannot advance further than is possible under the guidance which nature has bestowed 
even upon the most ordinary understanding’. 
76 For Kant, this loss is not really a problem, for it merely ‘touches only the monopoly of the schools and in no 
way the interest of human beings’ (CPR Bxxxii). 
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framework, involves a way of thinking that is analogous to tragedy in that it opens up society 
for creative transformation through the recognition of limits. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that Castoriadis’ interpretation of Kant’s work – particularly 
his attempt to read Kant’s enlarged way of thinking as a response to the tragedy of philosophy 
– provides an alternative to the Nietzschean and Idealist views of the philosophy of tragedy. 
While the Nietzschean view suggests that the philosophy of tragedy is properly understood as 
the attempt to transform the task of philosophy by locating the message encapsulated in tragic 
drama, and the Idealist view suggests that the philosophy of tragedy is the attempt to reconcile 
the antinomy between nature and freedom arising in Kant’s critical work, Castoriadis casts the 
philosophy of tragedy as the exploration of a problematic that disrupts philosophical thinking 
and attempts to transform the scope of philosophy in the paradigm of Kant’s enlarged way of 
thinking. Kant’s enlarged way of thinking, for Castoriadis, acknowledges the failure of the 
understanding to legislate the appearance of nature according to logic. When the philosophic 
is displaced from its hegemonic position over the political, its task becomes one of outlining a 
way of thinking that authentically engages with the contingency of nature by setting oneself 
‘apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment’, and reflecting on one’s own 
‘judgment from a universal standpoint’ (CJ 5:295). 
The import of Castoriadis’ reading of Kant lies in his identification of the new task of 
philosophy given the failure of technalised thinking: the task of negotiating limits. In this 
sense the task of philosophy is political, though it is not reducible to politics. Philosophy is 
not reducible to politics, for its task is to make the political political; to transform our way of 
seeing, enlarging our vision to see the priority of praxis over the technical application of 
concepts to phenomena. If this reflective principle of philosophy were to become a working 
principle in a society, then philosophy could not be limited to the academy, but would become 
essential to the formation of citizens capable of weaving together the competing demands of 
the polis. Sophocles’ image of weaving is a powerful metaphor of political engagement, for it 
elucidates the creative task of navigating private interest and universal concern; of learning an 
enlarged way of thinking where each judgment made is an invitation to other citizens to judge 
in terms of publicity.
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this thesis I have tried to demonstrate that the ‘enlarged way of thinking’ Kant 
develops in CJ assists us to see the philosophical problematic of tragedy as a major 
contribution to the goal of expanding the scope of philosophy. Enlarged thinking, for Kant, 
requires that we acknowledge the limits of our intellectual capacities, thereby sublimating the 
subjective interest that would lead our thought beyond the conditions of its possibility into a 
concern for the whole. This occurs via a reflective process that displaces the immediacy of 
our own view, thereby ‘enlarging’ the imagination to the possibility of new form. Enlarged 
thinking outlines a way of thinking akin to Aristotle’s phronesis, a mode of praxis that is 
distinct from the rule-bound operation of techne due to its ability to deliberate over contingent 
situations for which no rule can be found. Kant’s enlarged way of thinking highlights the 
importance of his representational understanding of thought for navigating the challenge that 
tragedy poses to philosophy. Representation is the shaping of the world beyond what is 
simply ‘given’ according to form that is held in common and has no foundation apart from its 
prior application. By alerting us to the representational character of thought, tragedy disrupts 
our attempts to find timeless truth and opens us to the task of making sense in common. In 
this way tragedy denies the hegemony of the philosophic over the aesthetic, occasioning a 
transformation in the form of Aristotle’s katharsis through which we come to see that, as 
Bakhtin states, ‘the world is open and free, everything is still in the future and will always be 
in the future’.1 
 This interpretation of the philosophical problematic of tragedy aimed to provide an 
alternative to the two main conceptions of the philosophy of tragedy in recent thought: the 
Nietzschean and Idealist views. The Nietzschean view, I suggested, rejects the philosophical 
tradition as a systematic denial of tragedy that attempts to render suffering explainable. 
Tragedy serves as a bulwark against two millennia of error, presenting the collision of the old 
gods and the new in a world characterised by dissident forces. The Idealist view, on the other 
hand, is concerned with identifying tragedy as a response to the Kantian dualism, the crisis                                                              
1 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, p. 166. 
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occurring between theoretical philosophy and nature at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
Tragedy is seen as a corrective to philosophy, meaning that the task of philosophy is to grasp 
the tragic so that it can encompass finitude, contingency and death. While we have recognised 
elements in both views that enrich our understanding of the problematic of tragedy, by 
focusing on the content of tragedy they distract us from a deeper problem: that philosophy, 
the task we are now undertaking, is prone to intellectual tragedy. Recognising the proximity 
of intellectual tragedy entails that tragedy is not limited to epochal moments in cultural 
history wherein the old gods clash with the new – though experiences of this nature might 
shed light on a particular cultural blindness – but that all human thinking is prone to stray 
beyond its limits. 
What differentiates this interpretation of philosophy’s engagement with tragedy from 
the Nietzschean and Idealist views is that it does not reject the philosophical project or 
provide a definitive account of tragedy. Both of theses views essentially render tragedy as a 
thing of the past, meaning that the philosophical possibilities of tragedy lie in the task of 
remembering. In contrast, this thesis has employed a method that, drawing from Bakhtin, is 
attentive to the many voices that (over-)populate tragedy, leading us to discover the cogency 
of the philosophical problematic of tragedy not in past experiences, but in the common desire 
to expand the horizon of philosophy from a technalised paradigm to a new way of thinking 
that acknowledges the tragedy of philosophy; not an abstract tragedy, but a present tragedy 
that is expressed through the activity of one’s own inherited way of thinking. To have a 
purchase on tragedy means to be aware of tragedy in one’s own experience, for an enlarged 
awareness cannot be inherited or learned but is gained through a process of transformation 
whereby the given is opened to the possibility of the ungiven.  
This interpretation, I have argued, portrays the problematic of tragedy as a matter of 
raising questions about the way of philosophy, and to this extent Kant’s enlarged way of 
thinking is a case in point. This is not to say that Kant’s philosophy must be accepted in toto if 
one is to benefit from this new procedure, but that Kant’s response to the failure of philosophy 
– his acknowledgement of the limits of philosophy and his search for a new way of thinking 
adequate to living form – provides an exemplary response. Even Nietzsche, who is no ally to 
Kant, can be understood in terms of this view. Nietzsche’s attack on the life-denying nature of 
rationalist philosophy calls for an enlarged vision of philosophy that is capable of reconciling 
the way of doing philosophy with life itself. If life does not adhere to a rational standard 
where all appearances can be explained in terms of efficient causation, then the procedure for 
thinking must encompass the singular character of appearances. Nietzsche’s attempt to usher 
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in the tragic age inaugurated by Kant, to reveal the life-denying character of morality and 
identify a way of feeling the whole of life, shows a desire to enlarge philosophy beyond what 
can be encompassed by a philosophical system. 
My final task is to turn explicitly to the question of how this interpretation of tragedy 
alters the way we understand the renewed interest in tragedy in contemporary philosophy. The 
aim of this conclusion is to draw the argument of this thesis to a close by using the 
understanding of tragedy in terms of a philosophical problematic to clarify the significance of 
the renewed interest in tragedy. This will allow me to establish that the renewed interest in 
tragedy is in continuity with the ongoing dialogue we have examined in this thesis. This 
continuity suggests that the renewed interest in tragedy is not simply a new development in 
the history of ideas but a development in philosophy no less significant than other times when 
tragedy arose as a pressing matter of philosophical concern. To establish such a connection, 
this chapter identifies three themes in the contemporary philosophy of tragedy that extend the 
broader dialogue on the problematic of tragedy into the present context: the enlargement of 
the imagination, the recognition of ethical complexity, and the search for a new understanding 
of universality. The significance of these themes, I will suggest, is that they express the 
ongoing need for philosophy to expand its limits, to search for new ways of thinking that open 
the possibility of new form. 
 
8.1 Enlarging the imagination 
 
One feature of the problematic of tragedy that is extended into the landscape of 
contemporary philosophy is the understanding of tragedy as a disruption to established ways 
of thinking, enlarging our awareness to possibilities beyond the given. While for Hegel 
tragedy is no longer the bearer of historical truth, it still contains the ability to confront us 
with the limits of (Kantian) morality and expand our understanding of ethical life. For 
Nietzsche, tragedy entices us to riot against the moral constraints that seek to bind us to a life-
denying view of reality, shattering – albeit for a moment – all limits and boundaries that are 
placed upon us. In Heidegger’s understanding, tragedy confronts us with the limits of creative 
techne that are obscured by modern technology. In Castoriadis’ view, tragic presentation tears 
us out of our investment in the instituted world and confronts us with the task of autonomy. 
While the philosophical content disrupted by tragedy is different in each case, there is a 
consensus that tragedy confronts a constellation of thinking that has solidified in the words 
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and practices of a society, opening us to the need of a mode of perception that is larger than 
an inherited pattern of thought.  
Developing the historical emphasis on the transformative nature of the problematic of 
tragedy, contemporary philosophers who turn to tragedy aim to confront the inability of 
mainstream philosophy to provide a language capable of navigating matters that lie outside 
the limits of general logic or empirical science. For Terry Eagleton, the reception of tragedy is 
a kind of litmus test for philosophy’s ability to understand itself as a rigorous science while 
still asking the basic questions of human life and freedom. In this view, the fact that 
contemporary philosophy finds tragedy to be ‘too solemn and portentous’ is tantamount to its 
inability to think beyond the limits of empirical science.2 Because the tragedies ‘retain a trace 
of the archaic as a kind of drag or ballast within the historical’, they provide ‘a reminder that 
whatever our civilized achievements we remain an arbitrary outcropping of Nature, monstrous 
or amphibious animals who straddle two domains and will never be quite at home in either’.3 
Martha Nussbaum agrees, arguing that contemporary philosophy is suspicious of tragedy 
because it has confined itself to a view of philosophical thinking that is restricted to the 
knowable, excluding contingency, suffering and anguish; that is, the very fabric of human life 
as presented in the tragedies.4 For Dennis Schmidt, contemporary philosophy has limited 
itself to such a narrow set of problems that it is unable to respond to the manifold questions 
that humans have asked throughout history.5 Tragedy contains a reflective capacity, for 
Schmidt, providing a new conceptual discourse ‘in which the horror that human beings can 
create for themselves [can be] displayed and so reflected upon’.6 For Eagleton, Nussbaum and 
Schmidt, the cogency of tragedy lies in its ability to reveal the inability of philosophy that 
mimics the rigour of empirical science to navigate contingent matters that cannot be 
quantified or predicted. Thus it enlarges the scope of philosophy to include topics to which it 
has traditionally remained silent, such as grief, emotion, gender, motherhood, guilt, laughter, 
the gods, and the contingency of ethical life. 
While the critique of contemporary philosophy made by Nussbaum, Eagleton and 
Schmidt comes from the vantage of the history of philosophy, the need for philosophy to 
enlarge its view is also felt in other domains. For Stanley Cavell, analytic philosophy’s                                                              
2 Eagleton, Sweet Violence, p. ix. 
3 ibid., p. 287. 
4 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, xvf. 
5 Tragedy, for Schmidt, provides a language through which to question the fundamental assumptions of 
‘metaphysics, Christianity, sciences, technology, as well as the influence of these upon the real formations of 
cultural and political life’. Schmidt, On Germans and Other Greeks, p. 4. 
6 ibid., p. 274 
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inability to tackle ‘the wider, traditional problems of human culture’ warrants a return to art, 
and to tragic art in particular.7 In Cavell’s vision, the dominance of naturalism in analytic 
philosophy results in the attempt to equate philosophical knowledge with the empirical 
sciences, casting any attempt to reject this assumption as super-scientific pretension. When 
philosophy is equated with the empirical sciences, anything that cannot be determined by 
naturalism is deemed insufficient to count as philosophical knowledge.  
Cavell’s critique is not limited to analytic philosophy, for many philosophers also feel 
that the continental philosophical tradition is equally impaired. Echoing Cavell, Kalliopi 
Nikolopoulou argues that continental philosophy often contains an ‘explicit – and more often, 
implicit – denial of tragedy as a viable mode of being in and understanding our world’.8 The 
conventional assumption in continental philosophy, for Nikolopoulou, in the belief that 
culture goes all the way down, which represses the antinomy of nature and culture that is 
basic to tragedy. By stripping humans of any remnants of a human nature that might provide a 
form of subjectivity with freedom as a definitive faculty, the continental tradition, 
Nikolopoulou argues, occludes the tragic experience wherein their feeling of moral freedom 
collides with the arbitrary formations of culture, thus tipping the scale to the opposite extreme 
of the modern philosophers they aim to correct. While the methods of analytic and continental 
philosophy are divergent, Cavell and Nikolopoulou suggest that neither philosophical 
tradition is large enough to encompass the wider questions that philosophy has traditionally 
posed concerning life, death, the good, friendship, creativity and wonder. Tragedy, in their 
view, cleaves open the limited view of established patterns of thinking to these deeper 
questions that underpin human life. 
However, while the contemporary interest in tragedy finds the motif of tragedy as a 
source by which to identify the limitations of recent trends in philosophy, it refrains from 
conceptualising certain parts of contemporary thinking as a present intellectual tragedy. Given 
our study of key voices in the problematic of tragedy, this is surprising to note. For Kant, 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Castoriadis, it was by framing the content of their own 
times in terms of intellectual tragedy that tragedy as a philosophical problematic has any 
power. The ongoing dialogue in philosophy regarding the significance of tragedy does not 
simply suggest that the Greek tragedies provides some kind of essential content that can 
enlarge our own view, but that philosophy, the task we are now undertaking, is prone to                                                              
7 Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, p. 74 
8 Kalliopi Nikolopoulou, Tragically Speaking: On the use and abuse of theory, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2013, p. xxiii. 
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intellectual tragedy, meaning that we must maintain constant awareness of the limits of 
thought. For Kant, the failure of traditional philosophy to encompass empirical science was 
nothing other than an intellectual tragedy; for Hegel, Kant’s attempt to unite the traditional 
and emerging views of nature rendered his work an intellectual tragedy; for Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, the technalised thinking of their own times prevented tragedy from coming into 
view; and for Castoriadis, Marxism, structuralism and phenomenology all express an 
intellectual tragedy, for they render historical creativity as a form of production that expresses 
determinant form. Understanding the problematic of tragedy in terms of an enlarged way of 
thinking expresses a search for a language with which to speak of contemporary forms of 
tragedy, opening inherited patterns of thought to new ways of thinking by which to navigate 
this tragedy. 
This search for a new language is implicit in Nikolopoulou’s diagnosis of the inability 
of continental philosophy to see the tragic collision of freedom and culture. However, while 
Nikolopoulou argues that continental philosophy is unable to see the tragic collision, she 
refrains from presenting this overemphasis on the cultural dimensions of human being as a 
contemporary form of intellectual tragedy. Instead, she attempts to apply lessons found in 
ancient tragedies to contemporary problems. This approach not only undermines the 
specificity of each historical epoch, but also collapses what could be seen as a contemporary 
form of tragedy into the ancient. Nussbaum comes closer to diagnosing contemporary forms 
of tragedy than Nikolopoulou, yet she refrains from making this framing explicit. She argues 
that contemporary philosophy is unable to grapple with the themes presented in the tragedies, 
meaning that we must return to the tragedies in order to reinvigorate philosophy’s attention to 
such themes. This observation is made possible by her engagement with ancient tragedy, and 
yet it holds back from reframing the contemporary failure of philosophy as a productive 
locale of transformation, and, instead, it simply points to a solution. Nussbaum does show us 
how tragedy opens us to new possibilities by referring to a mode of thinking that is foreign to 
our current world. However, she does not consider tragedy as a way of forming a present 
crisis so as to open it new and hitherto unimagined possibilities. 
If we think of tragedy as a thing of the past, then we limit ourselves to past forms of 
tragedy. Alternatively, if we think of tragedy as an ongoing problematic capable of 
confronting the failure of contemporary content, then the task of uncovering this tragedy 
becomes one of an enlarged way of thinking: a way of thinking that is able to present the 
blindness of the established way of thinking in a work that expresses this tragedy to a 
contemporary audience for whom the established way of thinking has immediate significance. 
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The intention of such a task would be to transform an established way of thinking by giving 
those who hold it a reflective self-understanding, thereby gaining an enlarged view that is 
capable of seeing the elements of life to which they were blinded. The work of such 
philosophy is not to answer the problems of a given time, but to transform the way of thinking 
of those who populate it. 
Cavell stands as an exception to this hesitation to identify a contemporary form of 
tragedy. As we noted in the Introduction, Cavell argues that ‘[t]here is such thing as 
intellectual tragedy. It is not a matter of saying something false’, he states, but the ‘inability to 
acknowledge, I mean accept, the human conditions of knowing’.9 Cavell does not hesitate 
from speaking of contemporary tragedy, for in his view the renewed interest in tragedy is 
nothing other than the acknowledgment of the inability of our inherited way of thinking to 
accept the human conditions of knowing, meaning that focusing on ancient Greece is merely a 
foil for acknowledging the tragedy of our own thinking. This does not mean that we are 
experiencing the same tragedy as the Greeks. Indeed, no one has, and no one will. Rather, 
Cavell suggests that ‘[t]ragedy, could it now be written, would not show us that we are 
helpless – it never did, and we are not’.10 What tragedy would show us – what tragedies 
always did show us – is ‘why we (as audience) are helpless’.11 The reason why we are 
helpless, as the tragedians saw it, is that ‘pain and death were in our presence when we were 
not in theirs’. The problem for us, however, is that tragedy can no longer have such an effect 
on us due to the fact that ‘we absent ourselves from’ pain and death.12 While the purpose of 
tragedy thus remains unchanged: ‘to make us practical, capable of acting’, Cavell argues that 
this does not mean that we require a rebirth of tragedy, but a new grasp of tragedy in our own 
times.13 While tragedy used to make us capable of acting ‘by showing us the natural 
limitations of action’, now its task must be different. Instead of purging us of pity and fear, 
the work of tragedy is ‘to make us capable of feeling them again’.14  
Cavell’s understanding of contemporary tragedy can be understood in terms of the 
following paradox: that we can only move beyond helplessness when we recognise that we 
are, in contemporary society, helpless. The task of philosophy that takes tragedy seriously, 
then, is to confront contemporary thinking with our helplessness, thereby opening new 
possibilities of helping ourselves that were hitherto unimagined. The content of such a task                                                              
9 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 19, 454. 
10 Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say, p. 346. 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid., p. 347. 
14 ibid. 
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could be multiple: from international relations, foreign aid, human rights, the arts, local 
governance and economics. Yet the form would remain the same: to present the inability of 
any domain to alleviate the problems of the human condition; to awaken us to our limits. By 
enlarging our awareness in such a way that reveals the complexity of reality, tragedy does not 
disempower the agent, but moves her towards accepting her limitations. It is only then, argues 
Cavell, that we can become truly capable of acting.15  
 
8.2 Recognising ethical complexity 
 
Building from philosophy’s ongoing concern with the problematic of tragedy, one of 
the driving motivations behind the contemporary turn to tragedy is the search for a conception 
of ethics that is large enough to acknowledge the complexity of a world in which our 
awareness of conflicting ethical claims exceeds our ability to act. In the contemporary turn, 
however, our awareness of ethical demands and our ability to act are even greater than they 
were for Kant, Hegel, or Nietzsche. Unlike these thinkers, the need to develop an enlarged 
awareness of ethical complexity does not have the urgency it had in times past, for ethical 
complexity is part of the social fabric of contemporary life. The contemporary turn to tragedy, 
in this context, is not simply in search for a way of alerting us to pressing ethical demands – 
indeed, we are more aware of them than ever – but for a way of showing that our so-called 
solutions are often part of the mechanisms that exacerbate the problem. As we found in 
Heidegger’s work, the problematic of tragedy confronts us with the fact that ethical problems 
are not the kind of problems that require technologised solutions. To approach ethical 
problems in search for solutions exhibits a technalised mode of thinking, for it presumes that 
all the pieces necessary to solve the problem are ready to hand. Technalised thinking fails to 
                                                             
15 Kierkegaard made a similar argument in response to Hegel’s death of art thesis, attempting to reenergise the 
presence of tragedy in modern philosophy. For Kierkegaard, tragedy is just as pertinent in modernity as ancient 
times, ‘just as weeping is still natural to all men alike’. While the content of tragedy shifts to meet the demands 
of new generations, the form of tragedy retains the ability to confront our self-understandings with the truth that 
our choices are both active and passive: ‘If the individual is entirely without guilt, then is the tragic interest 
nullified, for the tragic collision is thereby enervated; if, on the other hand, he is absolutely guilty, then he can no 
longer interest us tragically’. The greatest inhibition a society can make to its capacity for autonomy, 
Kierkegaard argues, is to obscure either side of this paradox and thus heal the tension. What other language than 
this could prove capable of navigating the problem of human agency in the contemporary world, where our 
choices for consumption and lifestyle are embroiled in economic systems to which we are oblivious, but which 
we know participate in the most grievous harm to other humans and their environment? Our ability to perceive 
tragedy, for Kierkegaard, is the ‘aesthetic sense with regard to human life’; it is what ‘the divine love and mercy 
are’, it is ‘like a mother’s love’. In other words, tragedy is like an immunisation that contains a disturbing shot of 
life. One cannot be truly be happy, Kierkegaard concludes, until one can see tragedy. Søren Kierkegaard, 
Ether/Or, trans. F. Swenson & L. Swenson, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946, p. 113-118. 
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recognise that the way of thinking it employs and the systems in which it is embedded are an 
expression of the problem it aims to ameliorate. The renewed interest in tragedy builds from 
Heidegger’s analysis, searching for a language that is capable of acknowledging the 
complexity of these problems. 
One such attempt is put forward by Bernard Williams in Shame and Necessity, yet, as 
we find on close analysis, his commitment to the Nietzschean view ultimately obscures the 
force of his critique of moral philosophy. For Williams, philosophy is typically oriented 
toward the project of rendering life morally intelligible by giving us good news about our 
moral condition. This project, Williams argues, begins with Plato and Aristotle’s attempts to 
confront the tragedians in order to make ‘our ethical relations to the world fully intelligible’.16 
However, our contemporary ethical condition, Williams argues, ‘lies not only beyond 
Christianity, but beyond its Kantian and its Hegelian legacies’. Thus we have ‘an ambivalent 
sense of what human beings have achieved, and have hopes for how they might live’.17 In 
order to find a grammar by which to express this condition, Williams turns to Greek tragedy, 
informing us that the ‘stark fiction’ of the tragedies confronts us with ‘the horrors’ of life in 
such a way that refutes the good news offered by the philosophers. 
However, while Williams highlights the ability of the Greeks to explore matters of 
ethical complexity in a way that is beyond the language of good and evil, his Nietzschean 
account of the failure of philosophy does not ultimately serve his task of providing an 
alternative. By turning directly to the ancient tragedies for resources with which to confront 
the mythologies of Kant and Hegel, Williams caricatures the philosophical tradition as the 
Platonic, anti-tragic legacy of philosophy that aims to banish contingency for a moral theory 
that would render life intelligible and history as an ever developing trajectory toward the 
good. By doing so, Williams not only overlooks Kant and Hegel’s reflections on moral 
philosophy in light of natural contingency (to which he is most certainly indebted), he also 
fails to see that tragedy features as a search for integration, rendering life as something that 
can be fought for and valued. Williams’ real opponent seems to be a neo-Platonic version of 
Christianity in which suffering, contingency and decay are swept up into a narrative that 
would see all things moving toward a happy end. The alternative to this view, for Williams, is 
the presentation of a different ‘news’ to the philosophical tradition: that the suffering we 
witness as the result of unintelligent necessity outside our control.18 While he frames this as a                                                              
16 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 166. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid., p. 152. 
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kind of ‘bad news’ that confronts the ‘good news’ of the philosophical tradition, it is, if 
anything, the announcement of good news. As Nussbaum argues, our contemporary world in 
which there is ‘a good assumption that most of the starvation and much of the other misery we 
witness is the result of culpable negligence by the powerful, metaphysical resignation would 
again be relatively good news, letting the powerful off the hook’.19 For Nussbaum, the 
tragedies call us to ‘throw off our laziness and selfish ambition and obtuseness and ask 
ourselves how the harms we witness might have been prevented’.20 Contrary to Williams, it is 
not philosophy as such that is the problem, but a mode of philosophy incapable of recognising 
the tragedy of which it is a part. 
In The Tragic Vision of Politics, Richard Lebow provides an alternative to Williams’ 
good-bad dualism by searching for a new, political language modelled on the tragedies that is 
not only capable of acknowledging ethical complexity, but of recognising responsibility.21 In 
similar terms to Heidegger, Lebow identifies the capacity of tragedy to reframe our use of 
language. Contemporary discourse in politics and international policy, he argues, employs 
language as a tool for instrumental ends, giving no concern to the original and contingent 
meanings to which those words first brought complex realities and questions into being. Such 
a language occludes the possibility of accepting responsibility for any negative consequences 
that come from its application of technique, becoming ‘so impoverished that it almost 
precludes asking, let alone answering, some of the most important questions about our own 
interests, the nature of influence and the dangers and opportunities that hegemonic power 
confronts’.22 Underlying the poverty of contemporary political discourse, for Lebow, is its 
inability to recognise the differential nature of action; the fact that even the best intentions can 
yield terrible and unforseen results. Responding to this poverty, Peter Euben argues that 
                                                             
19 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. xxxvii. 
20 ibid. 
21 Lebow’s work in political theory has sparked a new trend of exploring international relations with the aid of 
tragedy. This is evident in the recent collection of essays entitled Tragedy and International Relations (2012). 
Editors Toni Erskine and Lebow focus on two insights of tragedy for contemporary international relations: ‘its 
enduring capacity to warn us of the dangers of power and success and its problematization of all conceptions of 
justice’. The first has to do with the concept of hubris and its consequences: ‘The more powerful and successful 
an actor becomes, the greater the temptation to overreach in the unreasonable expectation that it is possible to 
predict, influence, or control the actions of others and by doing so gain more honour, wealth, or power’. Thus 
hubris is a kind of ‘category error’ occurring when ‘powerful people make the mistake of comparing themselves 
to the gods, who have the ability to foresee and control the future’. The second is concerned with our 
understanding of justice. Tragedies ‘present the audience with contrasting and equally valid conceptions of 
justice’, demonstrating that ‘our conceptions of justice are parochial, not universal, and are readily undercut by 
too unwavering a commitment to them’. Toni Erskine & Richard Lebow (eds), Tragedy and International 
Relations, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 9. 
22 Richard Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, p. xiii. 
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‘Greek tragedy might … help us determine who we are and what we are doing to ourselves 
and others, while making it clear that such questions are never fully answered or finally 
resolved’.23 For Euben, modernity must find discursive practices like that we find expressed 
in tragedy if it is to acknowledge its regressive moment, a language capable of opening 
complex questions as much as proposing answers. Such a discourse would be premised on the 
‘belief that order was fragile, that human efforts to control, or even, reshape, their physical 
and social environments were far more uncertain in their consequences than most leaders and 
intellectuals recognised, and that hubris – in the form of an exaggerated sense of authority and 
competence – only made matters worse’.24  
By arguing that philosophy must learn to speak the language of tragedy, Lebow and 
Euben problematise the attempts made by states and global institutions to determine social 
unity under universal banners such as democracy and human rights. The problem with 
contemporary political discourse, in this view, is that its desire to maintain authority and 
correctness entails that it views the tension between the demands of ethics and the practical 
task of politics as a threatening contradiction. Thus political leaders find it necessary to couch 
their language in self-justifying narratives that are incapable of recognising errors, 
misjudgments and the complexity of the decisions at hand. Such language turns on a 
technalised discourse that actively aims to occlude ambiguity and contingency, precluding the 
capacity of language to explore the dimensions of human error that cannot be understood in a 
technalised paradigm. It has no way of articulating the fact that good intentions do not 
necessarily lead to good outcomes, for it retains a technalised mode of conceptualising 
problems. 
Yet as we found in the case of Nussbaum, Eagleton and Schmidt, Lebow and Euben 
also hold back from naming the contemporary ethical discourse as, following Cavell, an 
intellectual tragedy. For Lebow, it is not the failure of contemporary discourse – a tragedy of 
our own time – but tragedy in the form of Greek drama that ‘confronts us with our failures 
and limits, and the disastrous consequence of trying to exceed them’.25 Building from Euben, 
Adrian Poole argues that it is not the critique of contemporary political discourse, but ancient                                                              
23 Peter Euben (ed.), Greek Tragedy and Political Theory, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, p. vii. 
In Euben’s view, the tragedies express a language capable of responding to Horkheimer and Adorno’s warning 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment that if ‘enlightenment does not assimilate reflection on this regressive moment, it 
seals its own fate. By leaving consideration of the destructive side of progress to its enemies, thought in its 
headlong rush into pragmatism is forfeiting its sublating character, and therefore its relation to truth’. Max 
Horkheimer & Theodore Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, trans. E. Jephcott, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, p. xvi. 
24 Euben, Greek Tragedy and Political Theory, p. x. 
25 ibid. 
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Greek tragedy that ‘diversifies man’s universe, severing the certainties that seem to bind 
human beings together, to make men and women at one with each other, with themselves, 
with their world’.26 For Jonathan Badger, it is not the contemporary turn to the problematic of 
tragedy, but Greek tragedy that ‘offers a vision of how communities might cope with the 
conflicting elements of human nature and avoid the calamity that comes from thoroughly 
indulging one side or the other’.27 These observations may well be true, identifying many key 
lessons that can be learned from the tragedies. However, focusing exclusively on what can be 
leaned from ancient Greek tragedy undermines the more basic intuition that they are aimed to 
establish; that mainstream philosophy and political discourse is subject to intellectual 
tragedy.28 By appealing to the ancient sources rather than naming contemporary tragedy, the 
lessons learned from tragedy become simply more arrows in one’s critical quiver, while the 
transformation that comes from recognising the intellectual tragedy of one’s own form of life 
remains unrealised. Recognising the intellectual tragedy of contemporary political discourse – 
its refusal to allow the antinomy between the demands of ethics and the practical concerns of 
politics to appear as a basic tension of all institutions – requires new forms of tragedy capable 
of presenting the content of the prevailing paradigm of thinking in such a way that reveals its 
blindness, allowing its spectators to gain an enlarged awareness of ethical complexity. 
Euben comes closer to this task than Lebow and Badger, arguing that any philosophy 
of tragedy must recognise the ‘tragedy of tragedy’.29 In contemporary policy, Euben argues, a 
dynamic is occurring that could blow out into a contemporary tragedy: ‘single-minded 
devotion to security and order is likely to increase the intensity of the disorder it will 
eventually bring about, whether it is the return of the repressed’.30 To elucidate this point, 
Euben turns to the scene in Euripides’ Bacchae wherein the King’s attempts to reign in the 
god and his intoxicated worshippers not only fails but exacerbates the situation, escalating the 
original problem to its extreme. Bacchae calls for a complex self-awareness, for it recognises                                                              
26 Adrian Poole, Tragedy: Shakespeare and the Greek Example, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p. 2. 
27 Jonathan Badger, Sophocles and the Politics of Tragedy: Cities and Transcendence, Routledge: New York, 
2012, p. 1. 
28 Similarly, Nikolopoulou argues that the German idealist tradition occludes the ‘core principles of the tragic 
world’ by understanding tragedy in terms of the philosophy of tragedy. Thus they miss ‘the political force with 
which tragedy once addressed the actual nature of conflict and the importance of human responsibility’. While 
Nikolopoulou makes a legitimate attack on some of the central themes advanced by the German idealists, she 
strips them from their historical experience of rupture and dislodges their thought from the political order to a 
theoretical realm of philosophical speculation. Thus she fails to see that the turn to tragedy in German 
philosophy, while certainly problematic, contains resources with which to transform the way of doing 
philosophy. Nikolopoulou, Tragically Speaking, p. xxiv. 
29 Peter Euben, ‘The Tragedy of Tragedy’, in Toni Erskine & Richard Lebow (eds.), Tragedy and International 
Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, pp. 86-96, p. 86. 
30 ibid., p. 87. 
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the dangers of hubris and yet suggests that enforcement of limits cannot stem the tide of 
human excess. Euben does not simply appeal to Bacchae as a means to provide an alternative 
to contemporary thought, but allows Euripides’ narrative to inform his critique of the present, 
enlarging his own work in order to see a similar dynamic in the patterns of thought operative 
in contemporary life. Yet what Euben does not note is that the task of presenting new forms of 
tragedy is not simply to anticipate the ‘return of the repressed’ in the forms of ethical life, but 
to present this tragedy before it leads to self-destruction. Tragedy is not the collision of ethical 
powers in lived experience, independent of human presentation, but a way of framing 
contradictory ethical powers in such a way that alters our orientation to them. 
If philosophy is to present the tragedy of contemporary forms of technalised thinking, 
it must be characterised by a language that is able to name the darkness created by our own 
hands and not be claimed by it. It must provide a discourse in which we are able to take 
responsibility for the consequences that come from a fate unfolding in our own action, 
recognising that the choices that produced disastrous results were entirely our own. It must 
experiment with new ways of articulating the complexity of contemporary ethics, enabling us 
to acknowledge that the problems we face are both unsolvable and yet require our efforts to 
ameliorate them. It must search for ways to express the possibility of freedom from within the 
natural and cultural orders that bind us. Tensions such as these, as Richard Eldridge aptly 
states, provide the ‘enduring material for human tragedy’, meaning that tragedy only becomes 
a possibility when we can grasp the full dimensions of experience.31 Without such a language, 
the most inspiring visions of the future and the most illustrious promises of technology 
become escapist mythologies, ultimately drawing our attention away from the systems in 
which we are embedded. An enlarged way of thinking, on the other hand, begins when we 
acknowledge intellectual tragedy and embarks on a way of proceeding that is not in search of 
a solution, but opens new projects in the effort to engage with the extremities of collective 
life. 
 
8.3 A new understanding of universality 
 
While the renewed interest in the problematic of tragedy in contemporary philosophy 
finds in tragedy a powerful tool with which to question current forms of philosophy and 
political discourse, it also aims to go beyond the recognition of limits in search for a                                                              
31 Richard Eldridge, ‘How Can Tragedy Matter For Us?’, in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 52, 
no. 3, 1994, pp. 287-298, p. 296. 
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productive insight: a new understanding of universality. In this search, tragedy is seen to 
express a way of thinking about universality that is neither metaphysically grounded nor 
contingent to a specific cultural community, but a principle akin to Kant’s aesthetic a priori 
that is found in the experience of tragedy. 
This is best seen in Bonnie Honig’s Antigone, Interrupted, which searches for a new 
kind of humanism in the collapse of the humanisms of the twentieth century. Honig explores 
Sophocles’ Antigone as a lamentation of ‘sovereignty’s excesses and the disappointments of 
rationalism’, one that resonates with us today.32 The power of her reading of Antigone is that 
it does not turn to the original text in order to locate the form of tragedy, but identifies a 
shared cry that is uttered in both Antigone’s voice and in the contemporary world. This cry, 
for Honig, expresses ‘a new universalism that might take the place of these discredited 
contenders: whatever our differences, we are all mortal and we all lament our finitude, since 
the time of Antigone’.33 Honig explores modern thought in terms of intellectual tragedy, 
arguing that in the failure of modern projects of universalism we experience a deeper feeling 
of the whole that heralds a new form of universalism based on our capacity to suffer, to 
experience loss and to grieve. Echoing Rita Felski’s statement that the ‘growing self-doubt of 
philosophy and the questioning of reason, analytical method, and conceptual knowledge’ are 
solicitations to tragedy, Honig argues that contemporary philosophy is the task of thinking 
from within this failure.34 Philosophy’s growing self-doubt, for Honig, contains the possibility 
for a new humanity united around our shared failure and finitude, a unity that cannot be 
grounded on the capacities of the subject but must be felt in the process of lamentation and 
grief. Our recognition of the tragedy of philosophy is itself a cry for a new universal. 
Honig’s attempt to locate the resources to build a new kind of universalism in the 
failure of modern projects of self-fashioning returns us to Kant’s original task in CJ to unite 
reason and feeling. Kant’s enlarged procedure for philosophical thinking identified a rational 
principle in the feeling experienced in the failure of philosophy; not a principle of theoretical 
reason, but a principle that is found in the search for a procedure of philosophy capable of 
engaging with the contingency of the aesthetic sphere. The acknowledgment of the failure of 
philosophy, Kant suggests, does not provide a new universal, but leads us to search for a 
principle that might regulate the exercise of judgment, allowing it to authentically engage in 
the aesthetic sphere according to the ground of mutual communicability. A community that                                                              
32 Bonnie Honig, Antigone, Interrupted, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 1. 
33 ibid. 
34 Rita Felski (ed.), Rethinking Tragedy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, p. 1. 
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aspires to judge in such a way not only recognises that there is no knowledge of political and 
aesthetic matters. It also expects the same practice of universal thinking in each judger. 
Judgments of beauty, of morality and of political matters become invitations to the universal 
exercise of judgment whereby we attempt to set ourselves ‘apart from the subjective private 
conditions of the judgment, within which so many others are as if bracketed, and reflect [on 
our own judgment] from a universal standpoint’ (CJ 5:295). The task of philosophy that 
acknowledges the failure of technalised thinking, for Kant, is precisely to outline such a 
procedure. 
The contemporary search for a new understanding of moral universality is premised 
on the intuition that tragedy restores a feeling of the whole, a feeling that does not give any 
positive content or ‘good news’, but one that can empower moral activity in a political sphere 
where there is no guarantee that the outcome of reasoned judgments will yield good results. If 
it is true that contemporary philosophy is becoming aware of the tragedy of our own times, 
then this search is urgent. Enlarging our view to become aware of tragedy throws us onto our 
creative resources, opening the future as an indeterminate reality. Moreover, it reveals that 
such a future cannot be determined by philosophically defined ends, but that philosophy can 
assist by outlining a procedure though which the aesthetic sphere might become the site of the 
reconciliation of our rational and natural selves in creative works and actions that anticipate a 
future of enlarged thinking, thus empowering each citizen to see more than there is to be seen 
in a given social order, to see more than there is in their fellow citizen, and to see more than 
there is in themselves. The task of philosophy that takes the problematic of tragedy seriously 
is to find a way of thinking that neither aspires toward exhaustive understanding nor collapses 
into chaos, but authentically engages with the singularity of what appears in order to envisage 
the given in terms of an unrealised project of which we are a part. 
 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The call for an enlarged imagination, for a way of thinking capable or recognising 
ethical complexity, and for a new understanding of universality in contemporary philosophy’s 
turn to tragedy extends the ongoing problematic of tragedy into uncharted territory. This 
continuity suggests that the renewed interest in tragedy is not simply a new instalment in the 
history of ideas but a creative engagement with a present crisis. The examination of 
philosophy’s ongoing dialogue in this thesis has tried to show that the philosophical 
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problematic of tragedy is best understood as a way of framing the failure of philosophy to 
stabilise the aesthetic sphere in determinant form in such a way that transforms our relation to 
the aesthetic sphere, cleaving open the possibility of new form. It is in this regard that tragedy 
has much to contribute toward the demands of philosophical thinking today; not because it 
contains a set of lessons for us to learn, but because the form of tragedy is transformative, 
interrupting philosophy’s search for timeless knowledge and opening it the task of outlining a 
way of thinking that authentically engages with the fluidity of life. 
Establishing the capacity of tragedy to transform our way of thinking reveals that 
neither the Greek tragedians nor the post-Kantian Idealists have a monopoly on the 
problematic of tragedy. To suggest that the tragedians had a unified view of tragedy fails to 
note the rapid historical creativity that underpinned the institution of tragic art. To suggest that 
in Kant’s time the antinomy between nature and human action was felt for the first time fails 
to recognise that it was precisely this problematic that troubled both Newton and Leibniz one 
hundred years earlier. What is unique to both the tragedians and to Kant’s philosophy is that 
they refrained from sealing individual agency and the law of the gods in two separate 
domains, and attempted to express the viability of agency in the natural sphere that is 
permeated by forces outside the agent’s control. Throughout this thesis we have noted the 
cogency of CJ in Kant’s presentation of the antinomy between nature and freedom as arising 
from overstepping our limitations: from technalising the maxims of nature and morality as 
machine and unconstrained activity. If we recognise that the antinomy is between our concept 
of nature and our experience of moral freedom – not nature itself and freedom as an abstract 
ideal – then the possibility of reconciling the antinomy does not belong to the philosophic but 
to the aesthetic; to the creation of new form in all domains of society through practical 
experimentation, dialogue, philosophy, the arts and the sciences. It is only when the task of 
philosophy is diverted from establishing timeless truth to making sense in common that the 
antinomy can be resolved in a community’s praxis. 
Intellectual tragedy akin to Kant’s own time is not alien to recent intellectual trends 
that posit nature as subject to basic laws that unfold irrespective of our feeling of moral 
freedom. Indeed, the constant resurgence of technalised forms of thinking return us to the 
expediency of Kant’s philosophy. One example that expresses a constellation of technalised 
thinking in the twentieth century is the development of gene theory. In the discovery of DNA, 
scientists come to understand the direct transcription from a strand of RNA to a corresponding 
DNA in a process that seemed to operate oblivious to environmental factors, revealing a law-
governed structure at the basis of all human development. From the view of gene theory, our 
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DNA is a kind of fate that determines human behaviour all the way down. In the early 1980s, 
however, a radical biological movement called epigenetics challenged this view, and in recent 
years this contemporary form of epigenesis has become the primary view in genetic theory.35 
The theory of epigenetics entails that genes are merely one aspect of a cast of biochemical 
factors in a cell, meaning that they are susceptible to all that goes on in the cell’s formation. 
The decisions as to which proteins will engage in synthesis are not predetermined by a 
prewritten ‘script’ encoded in a single strand of DNA, but are a function of the cell as a 
whole.36 This entails that cells are self-organising, living beings that dynamically respond to 
their environment. Being able to turn on and off gene synthesis in given contexts, cells are 
self-regulating and create their own form: they are both organised by their environment, by 
nature, and by their own inner principle, having the ability to communicate this development 
to the following generations. 
The cogency of epigenetics for contemporary thought is that it effaces the line 
between biological and social inheritance, entailing two significant implications. The first is 
that our inheritance extends beyond merely physical traits to social, cultural and psychological 
dimensions. The second is that we are far more malleable than we might have thought. The 
acknowledgement of the failure of gene theory and the search for a new procedure for 
scientific thinking might, if we recognise its significance, plunge us again into the space of 
tragedy, where we are both inescapably oriented to the world through what we have inherited 
and yet, due to the contingency of the natural strata and our own creativity as living beings, 
our inheritance is not determined but is subject to alteration. Such a universe is, to use Kant’s 
terms, lawlessly lawful. To frame the eclipse of gene theory by epigenesis in terms of 
intellectual tragedy could resurface a critical reconsideration of the limits of human reason 
and a new way of thinking in which natural determination and disruptive creativity might 
coalesce. 
However, failing to understand gene theory in terms of intellectual tragedy has left 
space for new forms of biologism to arise, one of which we find in neuroscience.37 In the past 
decade, new mapping technologies have become able to observe our mental lives in the 
activity of our neurons, re-birthing the question of rational deliberation given the mechanicity 
of nature. Because our thoughts and actions are the products of our brains, and because our                                                              
35 See Castoriadis’ discussion with biologist Francisco Varela in Castoriadis, ‘Life and Creation’, in Postscript 
on Insignificance: Dialogues with Cornelius Castoriadis, London, Continuum, 2011, pp. 58-73 
36 Richard Francis, Epigenetics: The Ultimate Mystery of Inheritance, New York: Norton & Company, 2011. 
37 For example, David Eagleman, Incognito: The Secret Life of the Brain, New York: Pantheon Books, 2011; 
Sam Harris, Free Will, New York: Free Press, 2012; Michael Gazzaniga, Who’s in Charge?: Free Will and the 
Science of the Brain, New York: Harper Collins, 2012. 
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brains are determined by the physical state of the world, there appears to be no room for 
choice, meaning that our moral feeling is epiphenomenal. What we find in this trend of 
thought, as was the case in the discovery of DNA, is the attempt to render a determinate basis 
of life that might prove capable of delivering the good news that we are not ultimately 
responsible for the work of our own hands. Presenting the antinomy between nature and 
freedom in neuroscience, however, might yield new forms of tragedy that open a much 
needed conversation about moral culpability, problematising the way we administer praise 
and blame according to assumptions of equal opportunity and even conditions. From the view 
of neuroscience, much of our conscious experience is subject to neural pathways that are 
predetermined by our inherited constitution, our nutritional history, the way we have 
experienced nurture and countless other factors. Yet to say that these determining factors 
destroy the possibility of freedom establishes a new dualism between physical causation and 
ideal freedom. What neuroscience ultimately reveals is the same recognition of Kant’s CJ: 
that human dependency is prior to human freedom, and must provide the ground for it.38 
Instead of considering the implications of this fact, contemporary neuroscience reinforces 
established systems of power that are reproduced in the neural framework of the brain. What 
might have opened the possibility of productive ethical conversations at the nexus of the 
physical and the psychological instead becomes a new form of heteronomy. 
The penchant of contemporary society to absorb the biologism of popular science is 
just one aspect of recent thought that calls for new forms of tragedy capable of turning these 
sites of technalised thinking into spaces in which new, creative endeavours become possible. 
The conversation begun by Euben and Lebow in the political sciences is another. When 
understood in light of Kant’s enlarged thinking, the problematic of tragedy allows us to frame 
linguistic patterns in new ways, cleaving open determinate closures in order to map new 
conceptual spaces that reorient our thinking. The question that the problematic of tragedy 
poses to us is how the recognition of human fragility might open a space that is based on the 
mutual recognition of fallibility rather than on fantasies of self-fashioning and endless 
pliability. The space of tragedy invites us to problematise the fate that unfolds in our own 
lives, accepting our limits in such a way that opens the future to new possibilities. Moreover,                                                              
38 While Kant’s emphasis on the dependency of freedom comes increasingly apparent in CJ and his post-critical 
work, he holds onto the ineliminable conviction that every ‘now’ is the locus of freedom: ‘Every evil action must 
be considered, whenever we seek its rational origin, as if the human being had fallen into it directly from the 
state of innocence. For whatever his previous behaviour may have been, whatever the natural causes influencing 
him, whether they are inside or outside them, his action is yet free and not determined through any of these 
causes; hence the action can and must always be judged as an original exercise of his power of choice’. Kant, 
Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, pp. 62-3. 
 246 
it empowers us to invite others to take responsibility for the fate that is shared amongst a 
community, not administering praise and blame according to technalised criteria, but 
accepting the singular character of every human life and the part of the shared social fabric 
that he or she inhabits. 
After two and a half thousand years since the original staging of the tragedies, we are 
still confronted with our fundamental inability to attune ourselves to our condition. By 
recognising the failure of philosophy to legislate the fluidity of natural and collective life, 
Kant’s CJ stands as an exemplary attempt to transform the failure of philosophy into a way of 
thinking that is attuned to the fallibility of human knowledge. In Kant’s time, the nature and 
limits of human knowledge were pushed to their limit, turning him to search for a principled 
way of thinking about the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere: our aspiration for mutual 
communicability. His proposal of an enlarged way of thinking reveals the paradox of the 
problematic of tragedy: that the acknowledgment of the tragedy of philosophy is the very 
means by which one finds a new way of philosophy. 
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